Complementarity, relation-specific investment, and opportunism : explaining asymmetric governance modes in hub-and-spoke networks within the enterprise application software industry


Kude, Thomas ; Dibbern, Jens ; Heinzl, Armin


[img]
Vorschau
PDF
Working_Paper_3_2008.pdf - Veröffentlichte Version

Download (93kB)

URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2276
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-22769
Dokumenttyp: Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr: 2008
Sprache der Veröffentlichung: Englisch
Einrichtung: Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > Sonstige - Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre
MADOC-Schriftenreihe: Area Information Systems and Institute for Enterprise Systems > Working Papers Lehrstuhl für ABWL und Wirtschaftsinformatik (Heinzl) (bis 2011)
Fachgebiet: 004 Informatik
Normierte Schlagwörter (SWD): Softwareindustrie , Investitionspolitik , Hub-and-Spoke-System , Ressourcenabhängigkeitstheorie , Serviceorientierte Architektur
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch): Relational View , Resource Dependence Theory , Power Imbalance , Modularity , Service-Oriented Architecture , Software Stack
Abstract: In the enterprise application software industry, dominant system vendors (hubs) have formed strategic partnerships with small software companies (spokes), resulting in the emergence of hub-and-spoke networks. Based upon the concept of software stacks, we argue that the governance mechanisms applied by hub and spokes depend on the complementarity between hub’s and spoke’s resources. Specifically, we draw on the relational view and combine it with the resource dependence theory to develop a theoretical framework that explains the link between the type of complementarity and differential governance mechanisms. We are able to show that while hubs seek to take advantage of complementarities with the entire network of partners, spokes are primarily interested in gaining access to complementary resources and capabilities of the hub organization. In order to leverage the benefits of resource complementarity, hubs mainly invest in networkspecific resources to generate value. On the contrary, the spokes’ investments are hub-specific. Accordingly, hubs only face minor threats of opportunistic behavior on the part of a specific spoke, whereas the spokes’ existence is endangered by the threat of opportunistic behavior by the hub. Due to these three asymmetries, hubs apply formal governance mechanisms in order to efficiently coordinate the network of spokes, whereas spokes rely on informal governance mechanisms.
Zusätzliche Informationen:

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




+ Zitationsbeispiel und Export

Kude, Thomas und Dibbern, Jens und Heinzl, Armin (2008) Complementarity, relation-specific investment, and opportunism : explaining asymmetric governance modes in hub-and-spoke networks within the enterprise application software industry. [Arbeitspapier]
[img]
Vorschau



+ Suche Autoren in

+ Download-Statistik

Downloads im letzten Jahr

Detailierte Angaben



Sie haben einen Fehler gefunden? Teilen Sie uns Ihren Korrekturwunsch bitte hier mit: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Eintrag anzeigen Eintrag anzeigen