This paper studies the relation between multi-period discrete-time and continuous-time principal-agent models. We explicitly derive the continuous-time model as a limit of discrete-time models with ever shorter periods and show that the optimal incentive scheme in the continuous model, which is linear in accounts, can be approximated by a sequence of optimal incentive schemes in the discrete models. For a variant of the discrete-time model in which the principal observes only total profits at the end of the last period and where the agent can destroy profits unnoticed we show, that if the length of each period is sufficiently small, then an incentive scheme that is linear in total profits is approximately optimal.
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