Discussion Paper No. 07-030

Lost in Transmission?
Stock Market Impacts of the 2006 European Gas Crisis

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Non-technical Summary

Recently, energy security in Western Europe seems to be at risk. Around the turn of the year 2005/2006, the Russian freezing of natural gas exports to and via the Ukraine led to a European gas crisis, triggering off intensive debates about energy security all over Europe. Using an event study approach, we assess whether or not the Russian announcement of suspension of gas deliveries, this suspension itself as well as its withdrawal had an impact on West European utilities’ as well as oil and gas companies’ stocks. Besides the intention of putting the phenomenon of energy security on the agenda of economists dealing with financial markets, this paper should contribute to the methodological enhancements of event studies in the field of resource and environmental economics. In this respect, besides looking at stock returns, we consider autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in our methodological framework and assess event impacts on return volatility.

We find that the announcement of the crisis accompanied by resource and electricity price increases and therefore a rise of Western Europe’s energy risk and costs tended to increase market expectations with respect to energy-related firms. The renewal of gas deliveries increased market uncertainty. One factor behind these findings could be windfall profits of energy-related companies due to increasing resource and electricity prices. All in all, our results suggest that energy policy does not have to bear in mind negative effects for energy-related firms in situations when security of energy supply is in danger. In contrast, our findings indicate that the energy sector may even profit from energy crises that induce resource price hikes. Given this, it is far from surprising that policy generally considers energy supply as a matter of public concern that should not fully be left to the strategic calculus of private companies.
Lost in Transmission?

Stock Market Impacts of the 2006 European Gas Crisis

Ulrich Oberndorfer*, Dirk Ulbrich†

May 2007

Abstract: Around the turn of the year 2005/2006, the Russian freezing of natural gas exports to the Ukraine led to a European gas crisis. Using event study technique, we first investigate whether the Russian announcement of suspension of gas deliveries, this suspension itself as well as its withdrawal, had an effect on unsystematic volatility of European energy stocks. Secondly, we measure event effects on stock returns, taking volatility into account. Our results suggest that the announcement of the crisis and therefore a rise of Western Europe’s energy cost and risk tended to increase market expectations with respect to energy-related firms. In contrast, market uncertainty increased when Russia reopened its valves. One reason for these findings could be windfall profits of energy-related companies due to increasing resource and electricity prices. The existence of event-induced volatility confirms our methodological approach in order to test for abnormal returns.

Keywords: energy security, event study, gas crisis

JEL classification: Q41, Q43, G 14

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1. Introduction

Recently, energy security in Western Europe seems to be at risk. Around the turn of the year 2005/2006, the Russian freezing of natural gas exports to the Ukraine led to a European gas crisis. This triggered off intensive debates about energy security all over Europe (cp. e.g. Economist, 2006). Apart from this singular gas transmission crisis, ongoing political interventions in the Russian energy sector and general political instability in the Ukraine constantly give reason for serious concerns about energy security in Western Europe (Helm, 2005). Subsequently to the gas crisis in 2006, concerns about a stable oil supply were especially put forward by the (quite similar) Russian suspension of oil deliveries to Western Europe via Belarus in early 2007.

The relevance of this issue for Europe is even more apparent in the light of the striking energy dependence on Russian resources. In 2005, 20 per cent of the gas consumed in Western Europe stemmed from Russia and was transmitted via Ukrainian soil. Additionally, the global rise in energy demand due to the fast economic growth in Asia makes energy security an essential challenge for Western Europe (Correljé and van der Linde, 2006). What is more, the current period is shaped by the rise in importance of gas as the main source of new electricity-generation capacity (cp. Foss, 2005).

In the past decades, the scientific debate about energy security focused on possible implications for competitiveness at an economy-wide level as well as for politics (cp. e.g. Toman, 1993, LaCasse and Plourde, 1995, Zweifel and Bonomo, 1995, and Helm, 2005). Less discussed in academic contributions, however, is the question whether energy security has an impact on single sectors or companies that depend on a stable and secure resource supply. In this respect, it is straightforward to ask how utilities and companies operating or trading with natural gas are affected by changes in the environment of energy security. For this group, effects are not yet empirically analyzed. As the natural resource is the foundation
of energy-related companies’ business, supply crises could, on the one hand, induce insecurity and have a negative effect on their business prospects. On the other hand, however, it seems to be possible that those companies would profit from such supply crises if they could realize windfall profits, e.g. due to rising resource prices.

Using an event study approach, we assess whether or not the Russian announcement of suspension of gas deliveries, this suspension itself as well as its withdrawal affected (a) the volatility and (b) the level of West European utilities’ as well as oil and gas companies’ stock returns. Therefore, the contribution of this paper is twofold: Besides putting the phenomenon of energy security on the agenda of economists dealing with financial markets, it should contribute to the methodological enhancements of event studies in the field of resource, energy and environmental economics. To our knowledge, this is the first paper in the field that assesses event impacts on return volatility. However, it is obvious that volatility is an important issue in financial markets and, to be precise, in stock attractiveness for potential investors (cp. e.g. Engle, 2004). Given a certain return level, risk-averse investors will prefer the equity with the lowest volatility. Furthermore, we are not familiar with any event study in this field that generally considers autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity – although the GARCH-class has become standard in financial econometrics subsequent to Bollerslev’s (1986) seminal paper. Consequently, event-induced volatility and security-specific volatility effects have been ignored here for the calculation and significance testing of abnormal returns. This analysis aims at starting to fill this gap.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the 2006 European gas crisis, the event to be analysed in this study. In Section 3 we review the related literature while Section 4 introduces the methodological approach chosen. Our data basis and important features of our analysis are presented in Section 5. Section 6 reports the results, section 7 concludes.
2. The 2006 European Gas Crisis – An Overview

The Russian gas monopoly Gazprom\(^1\) is an all-important supplier, owning 17 per cent of the world-wide gas resources. In 2005, it provided for about 50 per cent of Ukrainian gas consumption. Moreover, 25 per cent of the West European gas demand is supported by the supplier. 80 per cent of these imports (have to) be transmitted via the Ukraine.\(^2\) As other former member states of the USSR, until 2005 the Ukraine received Russian gas deliveries for a price that was well below the price level of the world market. While the world market level was about 230 dollars per 1000 cubic meters of gas in December 2005, the price the Ukraine had to pay was even below 50 dollars.

In a situation of deteriorated Russo-Ukrainian relations and rising oil and gas (world market) prices in late 2005, Gazprom – together with the Russian government – announced to withdraw this discount on gas deliveries. Gazprom consequently indicated a price increase of more than 350 per cent starting January 1, 2006, simultaneously threatening to cut gas supply while the Ukraine claimed that such steps would violate past contracts.\(^3\) As the Ukraine rejected the claim for price increases, a gas supply crisis was initiated on December 27, 2005, when Gazprom decisively announced a suspension of gas transmissions in case the Ukraine would not accept the Russian price increase. This suspension was scheduled for January 1, 2006. In the following days, no agreement between the Russian and the Ukrainian side was reached, even though international and especially European politicians had appealed for a negotiated resolution of the problem. The announcement on December 27 came too late in order to react on financial markets. We therefore consider the trading days starting from December 28, until January 1, as the period of announcement of the crisis. December 27 is analyzed as well, but separately.

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\(^1\) The official company name of the corporation is OAO Gasprom.

\(^2\) Von Hirschhausen et al. (2005) develop an interesting model (subsequently, they calibrate numerical results and run simulations) that takes into account different options of transporting Russian gas to Western Europe.

\(^3\) Alternatively to this price increase, Gazprom demanded the licence for an equity stake in the Ukrainian transit pipeline network (Stern, 2006b).
Gazprom followed through with its threat and suspended gas deliveries on New Year’s Day, 2006. The same day, the Ukrainian utility MOT declared that Russian deliveries had decreased by 25 per cent. In Central and West European countries, gas deliveries declined consequently, emphasizing the overall European dimension of the gas crisis. On January 2, 11 European countries reported a cutback of gas deliveries due to reduced feeding-in from Russia. The drop was not negligible, e.g. reaching losses of about one third of usual deliveries in Austria, 25 per cent in France and Italy, as well as of unknown size in Germany, the largest European economy (Stern, 2006b). At the APX, London, gas prices rose by more than 10 per cent. Even in the daytime of January 3, a normalization of Russian gas deliveries was not reached. While the gas price at the APX did not stop rising, the cutback of gas supply had consequences for the trading of resources other than gas, for example oil, and electricity at West European exchanges as well: The price of WTI rose by about 3 per cent; Brent prices reached their 3-month peak. Furthermore, German electricity prices at the EEX, Leipzig, were about 50 per cent higher than at the turn of the year. Moreover, the Gazprom share reached a record high when the Russian stock market reopened, indicating that Gazprom-investors appreciated the crisis (Stern, 2006a). Consequently, we label the trading days between January 1, and January 3, i.e. January 2, as the crisis period (day).

However, in the course of January 3, Russia turned the supply to the Ukraine back on. Consequently, the gas shortages in Western Europe were removed. A legal (preliminary) compromise in the conflict was reached on January 4. The agreement set the price for Russian gas deliveries that the Ukraine had to face from 2006 on at 95 dollars, the transit price for Russian gas through the Ukraine rose from 1.09 to 1.65 dollars. Resource prices at the international exchanges, as well as European electricity prices remained at a high level, although, following Stern (2006b), there were no indications of continuous gas delivery shortages after January 4. In the empirical analysis of this paper, trading days from January 3, to January 5 are taken as the period when the crisis was resolved and withdrawn.
3. Literature Review

Event studies are particularly applied in finance and accounting, for example, to examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, or issues of new debt or equity (MacKinley, 1997, Kothari and Warner, 2006). However, they are increasingly used to analyze news related to resource, energy, and environmental economics. Those studies can roughly be subdivided into three different groups: Event studies considering (1) disclosures of information regarding positive or negative corporate environmental performance (Dasgupta et al., 2001, Gupta and Goldar, 2005, Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2007), (2) environmental news related to regulations concerning energy and the environment (Lanoie et al., 1998, Karpoff et al., 2005, Dasgupta et al., 2006), and (3) direct effects of regulation.

There are relatively few event studies which form this third group. This is due to the fact that regulation generally rather refers to a process than to a surprising event that may be analysed using the event study technique. If information has been available before the event, which is often the case, abnormal returns should not occur as the news is already priced in by the financial markets. Many of those studies have important features in common with our own analysis: Often, electric utility stocks are analysed (Butler and McNertney, 1991, Diltz, 2002, Kahn and Knittel, 2003, Oberndorfer and Ziegler, 2006). Besides that, those papers have in common with the assessment conducted here that they assess the influence of a general shock related to resource, energy, or environmental economics on stock returns. Results from those papers remain inconclusive, indicating that regulation does not affect financial markets as a rule. To our knowledge, there is no event study available that assesses the impact of energy supply shortages on stock returns.

However, some, although only few empirical work on the interrelationship between resource prices – price shocks that may due to energy supply crises – and financial markets exists. Using quarterly data, Jones and Kaul (1996) find that the impact of oil shocks on US and
Canadian stock returns do not exceed an equivalent impact of real cash flow changes, while for Japanese and UK stocks, oil shock impacts are larger than the respective real cash flow impacts would justify. Sadorsky (1999) shows within a VAR framework that oil prices as well as oil price volatility play an important role for stock returns. Hayo and Kutan (2005) find that the oil price has a positive impact on Russian stock returns. Energy news seems to effect on the Russian bond market, while no impact on financial market volatility can be measured. Similarly, Huang et al. (1996) report a significant and positive correlation between the returns of US oil stocks and (current and lagged) oil futures returns. The authors attribute this sign of the correlation to the fact that oil companies could benefit from increases in oil prices. This result is consistent with the findings of Boyer and Filion (2007) who show that the stock returns of Canadian oil and gas companies is positively associated with oil and gas prices.

Methodologically, to our knowledge, all event studies in the field of resource, energy, or environmental economics focus on the impacts of the respective event on stock returns. Against this background, this is the first paper in this field that, besides looking at stock returns, assesses event impacts on unsystematic return volatility. It is obvious that volatility is an important issue in financial markets and, to be precise, in stock attractiveness for potential investors. Given a certain return level, risk-averse investors will prefer the equity with lowest volatility (cp. e.g. Engle, 2004). Furthermore, we are not familiar with any event study in our field that generally considers autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity – although the GARCH-class has become standard in financial econometrics – or even event-induced volatility (and, what is more, security-specific volatility effects) for the calculation and significance testing of abnormal returns. Using simulation technique, Savickas (2003) shows that traditional tests are misspecified in the presence of event-induced volatility.
4. Methodology

In this article, we want to analyze the impact of the 2006 European gas crisis on West European utilities from a stock market perspective using event study techniques. This is a very reliable approach for measuring impacts on their business prospects since, given the existence of efficient financial markets, stock prices constitute the best possible estimate of the net present value of discounted cash flows (Fama, 1970). Furthermore, measuring the economic impact of such a short-dated crisis is very difficult if the analysis is not based on daily data. For indicators of business prospects other than stock prices or returns, such as exports, sales, Tobin’s Q, or return on assets, daily data are not available. The methodological approach of this event study analysis is twofold: First, we want to analyse if the Russian suspension of gas deliveries, the announcement of this suspension as well as its withdrawal had an effect on unsystematic volatility of European energy stocks. Secondly, we want to measure event effects on stock returns, taking volatility and especially possible event-induced volatility into account.

First, we employ the approach formulated by Hilliard and Savickas (2003) in order to test for event-induced abnormal unsystematic volatility in the stock returns. The authors use a standard GARCH(1,1) (one-factor) model as a baseline. Models of the GARCH-class (Bollerslev, 1986) are very appealing approaches for the analysis of high-frequent time series in financial markets. Reason for this is the fact that they, in contrast to linear estimation techniques, address the so-called volatility clustering, the tendency that current volatility of asset prices tends to be positively correlated with its past values. Amongst those approaches, the use of the GARCH(1,1) model is widespread as it generally sufficiently explains systematic variation of asset price volatility (Akgiray, 1989, Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, Engle, 2001), although meanwhile numerous modifications have been proposed. The one-
factor model (inspired by the so-called market model) in the GARCH(1,1) form can be formulated as

\[ r_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i r_{mt} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad \text{with} \quad \epsilon_{it} \sim N(0, h_{it}), \quad (1) \]

\[ h_{it} = a_i + b_i h_{i,t-1} + c_i \epsilon_{i,t-1}^2, \quad (2) \]

where \( r_{it} \) is the stock return for firm \( i \) in the period \( t \), and \( r_{mt} \) is the return of the market portfolio, respectively. The error term \( \epsilon_{it} \) is assumed to be conditionally normally distributed with zero mean and variance \( h_{it} \). \( \alpha_i \) and \( \beta_i \) are the parameters of the mean equation, \( a_i, b_i, \) and \( c_i \) are the parameters of the variance equation.

At an event day \( t \), two different types of factors may determine the level of unsystematic volatility: Security-specific factors are captured by the model formulated above (e.g. correlation with the market, volatility dynamics). Event-specific factors, however, form part of \( \epsilon_{it} \), but are ignored in the conditional variance \( h_{it} \). The impact of event-specific factors can not adequately be captured by simply looking at the respective error terms as in such a setting; they can not be separated from security-specific factors.

Those event-specific factors, however, can be measured by the ratio \( \lambda_t \) of the cross-sectional variance of the estimated residuals from the one-factor model (1) and its conditional variance implied by the GARCH process. The parameter \( \lambda_t \) that is positive as a rule measures the event effect at time \( t \) on volatility in a manner that it indicates the multiple by which the unsystematic volatility increases from its no-event level, i.e. \( \lambda_t = 1 \) indicates that the event has no effect while for \( \lambda_t = 2 \), unsystematic volatility has doubled. If the volatility of the event day significantly exceeds the one implied by the model dynamics, an event impact on unsystematic volatility is observed. The parameter is estimated as follows,

\[
\hat{\lambda}_t = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( \frac{\hat{\epsilon}_{i,t} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{\epsilon}_{j,t}}{\sqrt{\frac{N-2}{N} \hat{h}_{i,t} + \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{h}_{j,t}}} \right)^2, \quad (3)
\]
with $N$ denoting the number of assets analysed. The $\hat{\epsilon}_{i,t}$'s and the $\hat{h}_{i,t}$'s are taken from the estimation of equation (1) and (2) for the respective firm $i$. The estimator of the cumulative abnormal return volatility for an event window between the days $k$ and $m$ is the sum of the individual estimators:

$$C\hat{\lambda}_{k,m} = \sum_{t=k}^{m} \hat{\lambda}_{t}. \quad (4)$$

The null hypothesis of $\lambda_i = 1$ or of $C\hat{\lambda}_{k,m} = m - k + 1$, respectively, can then be tested using

$$s_t = (N - 1)\hat{\lambda}_t, \quad (5)$$

$$Cs_{k,m} = (N - 1)C\hat{\lambda}_{k,m}, \quad (6)$$

where under $H_0$, the test statistic is $\chi^2$-distributed with $N - 1$ or $(N - 1)(m - k + 1)$ degrees of freedom, respectively.

In order to assess whether the gas crisis had an impact on stock returns, i.e. if abnormal returns occurred due to this event, we use the approach suggested by Savickas (2003). Given the fact that it addresses both conditionally heteroskedastic behaviour of volatility as well as possible event-induced variance increases it is a very robust method. Furthermore, it does not require the conditional volatility to be the same across firms analysed. These are very appealing features making Savickas’ approach superior to well-established methods (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1980 and 1985, and Boehmer et al., 1991). The advantages of Savickas’ approach are emphasized by the results obtained by Babalan and Constantinou (2005). In the existing event studies in energy and environmental economics, however, this approach has not been employed, yet. Moreover, to our knowledge, there is no event study available in this discipline that takes conditional heteroskedasticity into account although approaches of the GARCH-class have become standard in financial economics.

Savickas’ (2003) test is based on an estimation framework with

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i r_{m,t} + \gamma_i D_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad \text{with} \quad \epsilon_{i,t} \sim N(0, h_{i,t}), \quad (7)$$
\[ h_{i,t} = a_i + b_i h_{i,t-1} + c_i \varepsilon_{i,t-1}^2 + d_i D_i, \]  
where \( D_i \) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if for an event day or period \( t \), and 0 otherwise.

The model can accommodate more than one dummy variable that may equal 1 for one or several days, each. In the case of multiple dummy variables, multiple dummy variable coefficients have to be estimated in each equation. In equations (7) and (8), the example of only one event day or period \( t \) is shown. Here, the coefficient \( \gamma_i \) gives the event (return) effect for firm \( i \). In order to assess an event effect for a sample of firms, the mean of the \( \gamma_i \) coefficients over the corporations has to be calculated. \( d_i \) is the coefficient of the dummy variable \( D_i \) in the variance equation. Besides the inclusion of the dummy variable(s), the GARCH(1,1) framework is identical to that one used for assessing effects on unsystematic volatility (see equations (1) and (2)).

The cross sectional test statistic \( \theta_i \) is a refinement of the usual t-statistic which takes intertemporal firm-specific heteroskedasticity into account, and can be calculated according to

\[
\theta_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{N} S_{i,j}}{N}, \text{ with } \sqrt{\frac{1}{N(N-1)} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \left( S_{i,j} - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{N} S_{i,j}}{N} \right)^2}
\]

\[
S_{i,t} = \frac{\hat{\gamma}_i}{\sqrt{\hat{h}_{i,t}}},
\]

Being the ratio of the estimated mean of abnormal return for each security and of its estimated standard deviation, \( S_{i,t} \) is a measure of abnormal (event-induced) returns that accounts for security-specific event-induced volatility. If \( D_i \) and, consequently, \( \gamma_i \) (and \( d_i \)) refer to a period rather than only one day, \( S_{i,t} \) is calculated using the square-root of the mean conditional variance of the respective period. \( \gamma_i \) and \( \theta_i \) refer to average cumulative abnormal returns in
this case. Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal return the test statistic $\theta_i$ is Student-t distributed with $N-1$ degrees of freedom.

5. Data and Details of the Event Study

As outlined in the introduction, we test whether or not the 2006 European gas crisis implied higher unsystematic volatility for and abnormal returns of West European utilities as well as oil and gas companies. Therefore, we analyze stocks of two different groups of companies: First, we use the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Utilities companies, secondly, the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Oil & Gas firms (all as on September 30, 2006). Finally, our analysis includes the full sample, i.e. both groups of companies.

From the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Utilities, sufficient data was available to include 32 (out of 35) firms in our study.\(^4\) For Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Oil & Gas, 26 firms (out of 27) were analyzed.\(^5\) All in all, our (full) sample comprises 58 firms. Log returns have been calculated for all time series used. The market return has been calculated from the Dow Jones Stoxx 50. All series have been carefully checked for splits and outliers.

For both event study approaches used in this paper, we use 280 observations, i.e. daily returns, for each firm. This should yield reliable parameter estimates. Our estimations start on January 12, 2005, and end on February 10, 2006. Therefore, to our understanding, we do not only consider a sufficient number of observations before our event window, but also the event days as well as 25 observations after the event are included in the estimation. In contrast to most conventional event study techniques, the approaches used here allow for doing this. For the end of our estimation window, early February 2006 is chosen as subsequently during this

\(^4\) These are AEM, British Energy Group, Centrica, Edison, EDP, Enagas, Endesa, ENEL, EON, Fortum, Iberdrola, International Power, Kelda, Northumbrian, Public Power Corporation, RED, RWE, Scottish & Southern Energy, Severn Trent, SNAM, Solarworld, Terna, Union Fenosa, United Utilities, Veolia, Verbund, and Viridian.

\(^5\) The firms analyzed are Acergy, Aker, BG Group, Bourbon, BP, Burren, CIA, ENA, ENI, Fugro, Maurel, Norsk, OMV, Petroleum, Repsol, Saipem, Shell, Statoil, Technip, Total, Tullow, Lundin, and SBM.
month, the Iranian resumption of uranium enrichment convulsed the international stock markets and especially energy prices and stocks. Given this, the estimation of event effects of the 2006 European gas crisis is more reliable using stock return data until February 2006.

As outlined in the methodological part of this paper, we estimate abnormal volatility and returns as well as (average) cumulative abnormal volatility and returns. The choice of event periods for the estimation of cumulative abnormal returns refers to part 2 of this paper. Therefore, we treat trading days from December 28, 2005 to December 30, 2005 as announcement period and from January 3, 2006 to January 5, 2006 as withdrawal period. In order to estimate average cumulative abnormal returns, for each period, one separate dummy variable equaling “1” for a day being part of the respective period is introduced in the estimation for equations (7) and (8) (as far as the estimation of cumulative abnormal returns is concerned). December 27, 2005 and January 2, 2006 (crisis day) are treated individually here (with one individual dummy variable, each). In order to estimate (daily, not cumulative) abnormal returns, equations (7) and (8) contain one dummy variable for each trading day between December 27, 2005, and January 5, 2006. In order to assess abnormal volatility, the estimation of one model for both cumulative and daily abnormal volatility is sufficient as equations (1) and (2) do not require the inclusion of dummy variables. Cumulative abnormal volatility is simply estimated in adding up daily abnormal volatilities from the respective event (announcement / withdrawal) period.

6. Results

Before proceeding to the event study methods, we briefly check the adequacy of our approaches in testing if autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and, therefore, so-called volatility clustering is present in our data set. In order to do this, we employ the common ARCH-LM test (Engle, 1982). Given that autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity can be found, our assumption is that a GARCH (1,1) framework should sufficiently capture this
phenomenon (cp. chapter 4). Our results are quite clear and suggest that in the great majority of the return series analyzed, volatility clustering occurs. In about 70 per cent of our series, ARCH effects are even highly significant at the 1%-level. For nearly all of the stock returns of our sample, ignoring ARCH effects would imply at least inefficient parameter estimation.\(^6\)

Table 1 Abnormal unsystematic volatility for December 27, 2005 in the full sample, for utilities and for oil & gas companies analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>#</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Sample</strong></td>
<td>(\hat{\lambda}_t)</td>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>(\hat{\lambda}_t)</td>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>(\hat{\lambda}_t)</td>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.12.2005</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 (Cumulative) abnormal unsystematic volatility for the crisis announcement in the full sample, for utilities and for oil & gas companies analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>#</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Sample</strong></td>
<td>(\hat{\lambda}_t / C\hat{\lambda}_t)</td>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>(\hat{\lambda}_t / C\hat{\lambda}_t)</td>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>(\hat{\lambda}_t / C\hat{\lambda}_t)</td>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.12.05</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.12.05</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.12.05</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.-30.12.05</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the full sample, the approach formulated by Hilliard and Savickas (2003) that tests for event-induced abnormal unsystematic volatility in the stock returns shows a highly significant event impact on one day analyzed (see Table 4). On January 3, 2006, when the withdrawal of the crisis was announced, unsystematic volatility differs highly significantly from its “normal” level. Compared with this baseline, unsystematic volatility rises by 73 per cent. This volatility increase remains significant (at the 5%-level) for the whole event window (crisis withdrawal). For the three days analyzed here, volatility rose by 22 per cent on average. In contrast, unsystematic volatility is very low when the crisis was announced. In the announcement phase between December 28, 2005, and December 30, \(C\hat{\lambda}_t\), the estimator of cumulative abnormal volatility suggests that unsystematic volatility falls more than 50 per

\(^6\) The results of the ARCH-LM tests are available on request.
cent below its “normal” level (see Table 2). What is more, also on December 27 as well as on the crisis day (January 2, 2006), the respective $\lambda_t$ is smaller than one, so that the null hypothesis of no event effect can not be rejected in favour of positive abnormal volatility at any common level (see Tables 1 and 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Abnormal unsystematic volatility for the crisis day in the full sample, for utilities and for oil &amp; gas companies analyzed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\lambda_t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.01.06</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4 (Cumulative)</th>
<th>abnormal unsystematic volatility for the crisis withdrawal in the full sample, for utilities and for oil &amp; gas companies analyzed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_t / C\lambda_t$</td>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.01.06</td>
<td>1.73***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.01.06</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.01.06</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.-05.01.06</td>
<td>3.65**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** and ** indicate significance at the 1%- and 5%-level, respectively.

If we distinguish utilities from oil and gas stocks, these results largely hold. Furthermore, we can show that unsystematic volatility on January 3 is quite homogenous over the two groups of stocks. For utilities as well as oil and gas stocks, significant (1%- and 5%-level, respectively) abnormal unsystematic volatility occurs. The respective rise in unsystematic volatility adds up to 69 and 58 per cent, respectively. There are sector-specific effects on January 5, however. Only for the utilities stocks, a significant impact can be observed here.

Compared with the baseline of no event effect, unsystematic volatility rises by 61 per cent. If sector specific abnormal volatility is cumulated over the withdrawal event window, a highly significant impact therefore remains very strong for utilities (45 per cent on average; daily), while we do not get a significant result for oil and gas corporations.
All in all, for each group of firms we observe significant abnormal unsystematic volatility for January 3, 2006. For the full sample as well as for the utilities analyzed, we furthermore get significant cumulative abnormal volatility for the period of crisis resolution. Outside of this period, unsystematic volatility often falls noticeably below its non-event level.

From a methodological point of view, the existence of event-induced volatility at a between-firm level confirms our choice of the methodology of Savickas (2003) in order to test for abnormal returns. Traditional tests would be misspecified under such conditions. As outlined in chapter 4 of this paper, the methodology applied here takes into account event-induced variance increases and especially volatility effects that differ across the firms analyzed.

Table 5 Abnormal returns of December 27, 2005 in the full sample, for utilities and for oil & gas companies analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Oil &amp; Gas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abnormal return (mean, in %)</td>
<td>θ (p-value)</td>
<td>Abnormal return (mean, in %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.12.2005</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-1.39 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Abnormal returns are based on the sample mean over the respective γis. ** indicates significance at 5%-level.

Table 6 (Average cumulative) abnormal returns of the crisis announcement in the full sample, for utilities and for oil & gas companies analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Oil &amp; Gas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Average cumulative) abnormal return (mean, in %)</td>
<td>θ (p-value)</td>
<td>(Average cumulative) abnormal return (mean, in %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.12.2005</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>3.82*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.12.2005</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-1.10 (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.12.2005</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.43 (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.-30.12.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>2.42*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (Cumulative) abnormal returns are based on the sample mean over the respective γis. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1%- and 5%-level, respectively.
When abnormal returns of the full sample are analyzed, significant event impacts can be observed for December 28, 2005, as well as for January 4, 2006 (see Tables 6 and 8). These effects are both positive and significant at the 1%- and 10%-level, respectively. On December 28, we observe (daily) abnormal returns of 0.35 per cent for the full sample, while for January 4, these abnormal returns are smaller (0.31 per cent). When abnormal returns are analyzed cumulatively, a significant impact (at the 5%-level) can only be observed for the crisis announcement period. The abnormal average cumulative daily effect on stock returns is 0.14 per cent.

Table 7 Abnormal returns of the crisis day in the full sample, for utilities and for oil & gas companies analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># 58</th>
<th># 32</th>
<th># 26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Sample</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abnormal return (mean, in %)</td>
<td>θ (p-value)</td>
<td>Abnormal return (mean, in %)</td>
<td>θ (p-value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.01.2006</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-1.12 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Abnormal returns are based on the sample mean over the respective γs.

Table 8 (Average cumulative) abnormal returns of the crisis withdrawal in the full sample, for utilities and for oil & gas companies analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># 58</th>
<th># 32</th>
<th># 26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Sample</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Average cumulative) abnormal return (mean, in %)</td>
<td>θ (p-value)</td>
<td>(Average cumulative) abnormal return (mean, in %)</td>
<td>θ (p-value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.01.2006</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.84)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.01.2006</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.83* (0.07)</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.01.2006</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.50 (0.62)</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.-05.01.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10 (0.92)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (Average cumulative) abnormal returns are based on the sample mean over the respective γs. * indicates significance at the 10%-level.

If we analyze utilities separately, we do only get evidence for a significant effect for December 28. The abnormal return calculated is positive as well, but less important than for
the full sample (0.19 per cent), and significant at the 5%-level. Significant average cumulative effects do not occur. For the oil and gas sector, significant positive effects that are stronger than in the full sample are calculated for December 28 and December 30 (0.56 and 0.74 per cent) and significant at the 1%- and 5%-level, respectively. As a consequence, average cumulative abnormal returns in the announcement period sum up to 0.34 per cent per day and are significant at the 5%-level. Furthermore, for this sector we find a significant (5%-level) negative event effect of -0.45 per cent for December 27. On January 3, a positive effect of 0.43 per cent occurs that is significant at the 10%-level. This manifests in an average cumulative abnormal return for the oil and gas sector in the withdrawal phase of 0.31 per cent that is significant at the 10%-level, as well.

All in all, the only event effect on stock returns that is robust when the two sectors are analyzed separately occurs on December 28, 2005 and is positive. Besides that, we find a negative effect for oil and gas corporations on December 27 as well as positive effects on December 30, 2005 and January 3, 2006 for this sector.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, the impact of the 2006 European gas crisis on West European utilities is measured from a stock market perspective. Using event study methodology, we assess whether or not the Russian announcement of suspension of gas deliveries, this suspension itself as well as its withdrawal, implied higher volatility and abnormal returns for West European energy stocks. In the field of resource, energy and environmental economics this is, to our knowledge, the first paper measuring event impacts on unsystematic return volatility as well as generally considering autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and event-induced volatility for the calculation and significance testing of abnormal returns.

From a methodological point of view, the existence of event-induced volatility at a between-firm level confirms our choice of the flexible methodology of Savickas (2003) in order to test
for abnormal returns. The important issue of risk and volatility was neglected in resource and environmental economics so far, and tests for abnormal returns based on the traditional event study literature are misspecified under such circumstances. We therefore suggest that event-induced volatility should more often be taken into account in event studies in environmental and resource economics.

We find positive significant abnormal returns for the phase when the 2006 European gas crisis came within reach and became more concrete. This effect is especially pronounced and robust for December 28, 2005, the day when Russia definitely announced the gas transmission suspension. The very consistent – and positive – assessment of the crisis announcement is underpinned by the fact that cross-sectional volatility is very low during that phase, suggesting that there was a large consensus and few uncertainty among financial market agents that the European energy-related industry could profit from such a crisis. The fact that the positive return impact is relatively modest may be due to a possible partly anticipation of the crisis given Gasprom’s longer-lasting threat of gas price increases.

It seems that these positive financial markets reactions on the crisis announcement fully anticipated the supply suspension as no abnormal returns can be measured when the withdrawal was implemented – from January 1 to January 2. We observe (highly) significant abnormal unsystematic volatility on January 3, 2006, when Russia reopened its valves which means that the crisis resolution induced insecurity in the financial market assessment of energy firms. On January 4, a positive effect is visible for the whole sample, which can be explained with the legally binding ending of the conflict. However, these effects are small, only significant at the 10%-level, and do not manifest in significant cumulative abnormal returns for the whole “withdrawal phase”.

Summarizing, the definite announcement of the crisis as well as of price increases and therefore a rise of Western Europe’s energy risk and costs tended to increase market expectations with respect to energy-related firms and especially oil and gas corporations while
the renewal of gas deliveries increased market uncertainty. The – often large – oil and gas
stocks of the European suppliers are upvalued due to the fundamental resource price increases
at the international exchanges. This is quite in line with the existing empirical evidence on the
relationship between resource prices and energy stocks (Huang et al., 1996, Boyer and Filion,
2007). The effect does not only hold for oil and gas companies that directly gain from price
increases due to a revaluation of resource deposits and stocks. Utilities may profit as well. The
most important factor behind this finding could be windfall profits of utilities due to
increasing electricity prices. Sources of energy production other than oil and gas are available
and utilities can at least partly switch between those sources.
Generally, it could well be that energy companies tend to raise their markup in the wake of
bad news. This point is emphasized by the fact that demand elasticities for energy are
extremely low as a rule, so that price increases can often easily be passed on to the consumers.
Finally, the stock market effect observed may reflect the expectation of energy-related
industries that future energy policy, e.g. via competition policy, could increasingly take into
account their interests as a reaction to their ostensible dependence or even instability. In
contrast, our analysis on unsystematic volatility suggests that during our event windows,
insecurity is only induced in the financial market assessment of the energy sector the days the
gas crisis was withdrawn. We attribute this finding to the fact that this crisis resolution did not
severely lower resource and electricity prices immediately. However, it created the potential
for an energy price drop in the near future. This is especially underpinned by the fact that
unsystematic volatility is highest on December 3, 2006, the day the crisis withdrawal was
announced.
All in all, our results suggest that energy policy does not have to bear in mind negative effects
for energy-related firms in situations when security of energy supply is in danger. In contrast,
our findings indicate that the energy sector may even profit from energy crises that induce
resource price hikes. Given this, it is far from surprising that policy generally considers
energy supply as a matter of public concern that should not fully be left to the strategic calculus of private companies.
References


