Foreign Policy towards Latin America in Europe: A Comparative Study

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Date of Defence

26 April 2012
“En las buenas conciencias de Europa, y a veces también en las malas, han irrumpido desde entonces con más ímpetus que nunca las noticias fantasmales de la América Latina, esa patria inmensa de hombres alucinados y mujeres históricas, cuya terquedad sin fin se confunde con la leyenda. [...] Pues si estas dificultades nos entorpecen a nosotros, que somos de su esencia, no es difícil entender que los talentos racionales de este lado del mundo, extasiados en la contemplación de sus propias culturas, se hayan quedado sin un método válido para interpretarnos.”

“[T]he Europeans of good will – and sometimes those of bad, as well – have been struck, with ever greater force, by the unearthly tidings of Latin America, that boundless realm of haunted men and historic women, whose unending obstinacy blurs into legend. [...] And if these difficulties, whose essence we share, hinder us, it is understandable that the rational talents on this side of the world, exalted in the contemplation of their own cultures, should have found themselves without valid means to interpret us.”

Gabriel García Márquez (1982): La soledad de América Latina

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Thank you, Sergio, for accompanying me from when I first considered going down this path until the final stretches with unrelenting support, patience, encouragement, and inspiration. Thanks for being there whenever I needed it.

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, who have made all of it possible by helping me find my way and supporting my choices. You have given me everything, and without you I would not be here today. Thank you.
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt; German Federal Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific former colonies of EU Member States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo; Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHK</td>
<td>Auslandshandelskammer; German Chamber of Foreign Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMLAT</td>
<td>EU Council Working Group on Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBVA</td>
<td>Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria; Spanish bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>UK Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMWi</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie; German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung; German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>European Union Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAQDAS</td>
<td>Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Configurational Comparative Methods</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>European Union Common Commercial Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich-Demokratische Union; Christian Democratic Union, German conservative party</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLAT</td>
<td>EU Council Working Party on Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREU</td>
<td>Correspondence Européenne; a network for EU Member States and the Commission to communicate on external affairs, confidential and encrypted</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union; Christian Social Union, Bavarian conservative party, works with the CDU at national level</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWG</td>
<td>Council Working Group (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Donor Assistance Committee; Committee of the OECD members who are development aid donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEG</td>
<td>Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH; German Investment and Development Corporation, a subsidiary of KfW promoting private-sector initiatives in transition countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIHK</td>
<td>Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag; German Association of Industry and Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement; agreements between EU and ACP states</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation, precursor of CFSP</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>FAD</td>
<td>Fondo de Ayuda al Desarrollo; Spanish Development Aid Fund</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei; Free Democratic Party, German liberal party</td>
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FIEM  Fondo para la Internacionalización de la Empresa; Spanish Fund for the Internationalisation of Enterprises (replacing FAD)

FONPRODE  Fondo para la Promoción del Desarrollo; Spanish Fund for the Promotion of Development (replacing FAD)

FSQCA  FSQCA software package, to carry out fsQCA (capitalised to distinguish software and method)

fsQCA  fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (method)

GDP  Gross National Product

GNI  Gross National Income

GTAI  Germany Trade and Invest; German government trade and investment support agency

ICEX  Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior; Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade

iXPOS  German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology’s export on-line portal

JETCO  Joint Economic and Trade Commission; between the UK and another country, such as Brazil

KfW  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau; Loan Corporation for Reconstruction - German state loan corporation

LAC  Latin America and the Caribbean

MAEC  Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación; Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

MAXQDA  Software package for Qualitative Data Analysis

MDGs  Millennium Development Goals

MDSD  Most Different Systems Design

Mercosur  Mercado Común del Sur; Common Market of the South, including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay

MITYC  Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio; Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce

MSSD  Most Similar Systems Design
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement; includes the United States, Canada, and Mexico</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ofecome</td>
<td>Oficina Económica y Comercial; Spanish government Commercial Offices abroad</td>
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<td>OTC</td>
<td>Oficina Técnica de Cooperacion; Technical Cooperation Office, Spanish development cooperation office abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIDM</td>
<td>Plan Integral de Desarrollo de Mercado; Comprehensive Market Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Programme Partnership Agreement; between the British government and British NGOs to deliver the UK’s bilateral aid budget in Latin America</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCA</td>
<td>Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKTI</td>
<td>UK Trade and Invest; British governmental trade and investment support agency</td>
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<td>WDI</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Indicators</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Part I

Making Policy towards Latin America in Europe
Chapter 1

Introduction
Why do different European countries have different foreign policies towards Latin America? What factors determine these different policies? While the EU is attempting to craft a common Latin America strategy, Member States’ approaches to the region vary. Such disparate national approaches can potentially hamper a coherent European policy, making it slow to react to political and economic change – all this in the relationship with a region that has supposedly been a “Strategic Partner” for the EU since 1999 (European External Action Service (EEAS) 2011a).

In order to understand such inconsistencies arising at national or even at the European level, we have to understand the driving factors behind national foreign policies as well as the interaction between the national and the EU level. This study purports to reach such an understanding by first systematically mapping the variation in policy activity towards Latin America of several European countries in economic, governance, and EU-related affairs. I focus on the foreign policies of three countries: Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. On the basis of theoretical relevance and the variation uncovered in the first step, I then select two policy areas for in-depth study: development policy and the interaction between national policy towards Latin America and the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis the region. Through the in-depth study of these areas I then seek to determine factors that play a role in causing various levels of foreign policy activity towards Latin America. Situated within a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach and based on an extended liberal theoretical account, the present investigation develops a framework that can shed light on policymaking towards Latin America in EU Member States. Empirically, the study is based on a series of semi-structured interviews carried out with officials at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs as well as Development Ministries and Agencies of the countries under study. This evidence is complemented and contrasted with further interviews of European Union officials and Latin American diplomats based in Brussels, as well as government documents and, in the case of development policy, data available from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The study finds that, in accordance with utilitarian-liberal theorising, foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe is determined mainly by domestic political and economic interests. However, both in development policy towards the region and in the interaction between national and EU policy, other factors also play a role. These include domestic norms, but also the impact of international and European socialisation, rational adaptation to international and European rules, as well as, in the case of national-EU level interaction, the effect of the distribution of competences within the EU. These independent variables interact with one another in unique ways, thus produ-
1.1 Foreign Policy-Making towards Latin America in Europe

In this investigation, I seek to uncover factors that influence foreign policymaking towards Latin America on behalf of three EU Member States: Germany, Britain, and Spain. The following section briefly motivates the choice for policy towards Latin America as the subject of analysis, as well as the choice for the three countries whose policies towards the region this investigation sets out to assess.

1.1.1 Why Latin America?

In 1999, the first bi-regional Summit of Heads of State and Government from the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Rio de Janeiro, inaugurated the European Union’s bi-regional “Strategic Partnership” with the region (EEAS 2011a). Latin America has, over the past decade, exhibited relatively solid economic growth. It is rather stable politically, and some of its countries have gained considerable political clout on the world stage, with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico being members of the G20. While these factors may lead one to expect a greater focus and more homogeneous policies and levels of policy activity towards Latin America across the EU, this has not been the case. Activity on behalf of different EU Member States towards the region varies widely. Overall, the EU and its Member States have been sluggish to respond to economic and political change in the region as a result of this variation. Only very recently have EU members other than Spain and Portugal slowly appeared to begin taking an increased interest in the region, as its countries seem – thus far – largely unfazed by the global economic and financial crisis. Why do EU Member States carry out policy towards one and the same region in such different ways and at very different levels of activity? It is the task of this study to seek an explanation for this variation, and I will tackle the question using the toolbox of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), with a focus on an extended liberal theoretical account.

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1Nowadays, the word ‘strategic’ is often omitted, and two countries of the region, Brazil and Mexico, now have their own “Strategic Partnerships” with the EU. A recent study mapping the EU’s strategic partnerships around the globe does not include the bi-regional partnership with Latin America, but focuses on bilateral EU relations with Mexico and Brazil (Grevi and Khandekar 2011). The term “Strategic Partnership”, however, continues to appear on the European External Action Service (EEAS)’s web site to describe the EU’s relationship with the region (EEAS 2011a).
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From an FPA perspective, Latin America may at first sight seem an odd choice for the purpose of studying foreign policy-making, since it is not a region that is particularly ‘exciting’ in terms of events that might provoke a foreign policy response by EU Member States or the EU as a whole. Indeed, many studies located within an FPA framework focus on special events or particular crises – think, for instance, of Graham T. Allison’s seminal work on “The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Allison 1971). Latin America, on the other hand, does not exhibit these characteristics. It is neither outstandingly poor (such as Sub-Saharan Africa) or unstable (such as the Middle East), nor does it match the vertiginous economic rise of parts of Asia. Instead, as outlined above, the region is relatively democratic, with steady but not extravagant economic growth across most of the region during recent years. It is not subject to the same periodic attention as a crisis region or to the same consistent awareness as the EU’s neighbourhood, for example. The relatively low-key approach to the relationship with Latin America on behalf of the EU and most of its Member States is why foreign relations with the region have overall not received a great deal of scholarly attention, especially in a comparative framework. Even with respect to country-specific studies, the literature is highly disparate, with a plethora of studies covering Spain, a medium amount on Germany’s policy towards the region, and a very scarce coverage for the UK (examples include del Arenal (2009a) on Spain, Maihold (2008) on Germany, and Grugel and Kippin (2006) on the UK). Other studies analyse the performance of various countries within the EU’s policy towards the region (Freres and Sanahuja 2006; Ruano forthcoming 2012), but these tend to be edited volumes with a chapter focusing on each country rather than explicitly comparative projects contrasting countries directly.

This is an unfortunate state of affairs for several reasons. Firstly, as I have discussed above, the different levels of policy activity towards Latin America are surprising given the characteristics of the target region, as one might expect more homogeneous policies towards a strategic partner region of the EU with rather stable economic growth and political – even democratic – stability. Secondly, relations with Latin America cover the entire foreign policy spectrum from economic to cultural relations, making them a fascinating subject of study for their breadth. This investigation therefore sets out to comparatively analyse policy towards a region that is largely based on tranquil, day-to-day foreign relations, an aspect of policy that has hitherto received little attention despite

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2Democratic stability varies across Latin America. The vast majority of countries falling under this study’s definition of ‘Latin America’ (see App. A) are classified as electoral democracies by the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” reports since 2004. Countries not classified as electoral democracies in the region include Cuba at all times and, at different times, Haiti (2004-6; 2011), Venezuela (since 2009), and Honduras (since 2010; Freedom House 2011).
1.1. FOREIGN POLICY, LATIN AMERICA, AND EUROPE

such ‘normal relations’ constituting an important share of Western democracies’ foreign affairs.

1.1.2 Defining Latin America

Latin America, for the purposes of this study, includes the countries of Central and South America as well as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti (the three non-Anglophone independent Caribbean island nations). In particular, the decision to include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti was also cross-checked with interviewees and found to be appropriate. The issue of the Caribbean is somewhat problematic in any study of policy towards Latin America in the European context, because it is included in the EU-LAC Strategic Partnership, yet the Caribbean countries are also included in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group under the Cotonou Agreement and therefore receive different treatment regarding trade agreements (indeed, the first regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) under the Cotonou framework was concluded with the Caribbean countries assembled in CARIFORUM; see EEAS 2011; European Commission 2011). Additionally, Germany includes the Caribbean within its Latin America policy (Auszwärtiges Amt (AA) 2010), while the UK excludes the Anglophone Caribbean (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 2007; interviews), and Spain is just beginning to step up involvement with the Caribbean, as interviewees stated. Given these unclear differentiations, the decision was taken to largely leave the Caribbean outside this study’s focus. Even so, it is important to bear in mind that boundaries are fluid in this respect.

At this point it is also worth mentioning Cuba, which remains a special case in policy towards the region. I do not dedicate special attention to the Cuban case in this study. The reason is that Cuba would make a perfectly fine case study of its own, and it is outside the scope of this investigation to analyse it in the depth this would require. Nevertheless, in particular during the case study on national-EU level interaction, it is practically impossible to avoid the subject, because the country plays such an important part in the EU’s policy towards the region that it “comes up practically every month as an issue”, as one interviewee put it. Cuba is certainly one of the most politicised aspects of Latin America policy in Europe. Therefore, it will be mentioned when required, but not covered in specific detail. The focus of this study, instead, is on Latin America policy more broadly defined. Policy towards different Latin American countries will serve as examples in some cases. In others, where

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3 The countries included are listed in Appendix A, based on the UN Statistics Division’s data (2009).
particular countries stand out, this is also highlighted.

1.1.3 Foreign Policy towards Latin America

I conceptualise foreign policy in line with Christopher Hill’s definition as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (Hill 2003: 3), a decision discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Additionally, I divide it into different policy areas adapting the framework of Otto Czempiel (1981), who conceptualised the foreign policy areas of security, well-being (in the economic sense) and governance. The resulting framework for policy towards Latin America includes three dimensions: economic policy (including trade and investment as well as development), governance (including political dialogue, cultural relations, and Civil Society involvement in official policy towards the region), and finally, the European dimension that characterises EU Member States’ foreign policies nowadays.

As indicated above, the foreign policies towards Latin America on behalf of different EU Member States have not previously been placed in a comprehensive framework enabling their direct comparison. In fact, the comparison of foreign policy-making in different countries presents methodological challenges independently of the target region. In order to facilitate comparison, in Chapter 3 I measure policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of the three countries under study: how much activity do they direct towards the region on each of the three dimensions specified above? Foreign policy is often carried out in country-specific ways that are not directly comparable, and data do not always come in a handy numerical format that lends itself to systematic comparison across different indicators. The present investigation thus faces the challenge of integrating context-specific indicators, a frequent issue in comparative political research (see e.g. Przeworski and Teune 1970; van Deth 1998). What is more, it also faces the problem of making qualitative and numerical data comparable. I thus develop an index based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA; see e.g. Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Ragin 2008), which offers the enormous advantage of being able to place these different types of data on an equal footing and making them directly comparable across countries and policy dimensions. This represents a methodologically innovative approach inspired by the works of Gran (2003) and Kvist (2007) on fuzzy-set ideal type analysis, and contributes to the further expansion of the fields to which fsQCA can be fruitfully applied. On the basis of the variation systematically exposed by this index and their theoretical relevance, I then go on to select two cases for in-depth study in order to ascertain the motivations underlying policy-making towards Latin America: development policy, a subcomponent of the economic
foreign policy dimension, and the interaction between national foreign policy and the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the region.

In this study, I focus on current policy towards Latin America rather than on historical processes. This means that the time frame covered by the findings ranges from the mid-2000s roughly until the first half of 2011, when the final interviews were carried out. This ensures keeping the context within which policy is made relatively constant, as well as exogenising the thorny issue of foreign policy change as much as possible (see e.g. Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson 1999), which would give this investigation an entirely new dimension. At the same time, keeping the time frame relatively short allows for in-depth cross-country analysis. Finally, because the analysis is based mainly on interviews with policy-makers, there is a practical factor that has to be considered. The institutional memory of diplomatic services with a turnover time of three to four years tends to be relatively short. Although some of the officials interviewed for this study do have long-standing, in some cases decades, of experience with the Latin America policy of their country, it is wise to err on the side of caution by focusing on more recent issues.\(^4\)

Even so, a few time-related issues deserve mentioning. Firstly, in two of the countries – Germany and the UK – there was a government change during the time period covered. The 2009 German and the 2010 British general elections each brought in Conservative-Liberal governing coalitions.\(^5\) This is a factor of which the researcher needs to be aware, as some parameters of foreign policy may change with the government and have indeed done so, as this study will show. Nonetheless, I assume that foreign policy tends to be constant enough for the analysis to remain largely valid. As Manners and Whitman (2000: 260f) state, foreign policy is slow to adapt to changes, in part because the bureaucrats carrying out the policy do not normally change with the government, so that changes take time to trickle down. Nonetheless, government changes must be borne in mind. Secondly, the EU context within which states operate is currently changing substantially as a result of the Lisbon Treaty.\(^6\) This is discussed in more depth in Chapter 6, but again, the changing European institutional context is something that is worth taking into consideration. Finally, there is the question of economic crisis, an issue particularly relevant for Spain, which

\(^4\)This is not to deny the value of an historical analysis. Yet aside from wanting to keep as many context parameters as possible constant, it must also be noted that space, time, and resources of any research project are necessarily limited. It was therefore felt that a more historical perspective would have compromised the depth of the cross-country analysis. The development of each country’s Latin America policy over time, however, remains an issue worthy of further research.

\(^5\)While the 2011 Spanish general election lies outside the time frame under analysis here, it is important to be aware that it is also likely to develop some effects on policy towards Latin America.

\(^6\)For an in-depth analysis of the possible changes resulting from this institutional reconfiguration, see Trueb (2012a).
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is seeing its foreign policy circumscribed by the effects of the crisis, which set in about half-way through the period studied by this investigation, in 2008. The full effects have been felt since 2010, and analysts consider that this may be the closing of a cycle of the internationalisation of Spanish foreign policy that began with democratisation and its entry into the EU in the 1980s (Molina and Tovar 2011: 378). Spanish foreign policy is therefore now operating under new constraints that led, for example, to a merger between the Secretariats of State for Iberoamerica and for External Affairs into the Secretariat of State for External Affairs and Iberoamerica.\(^7\) For the purposes of this study, a long-term effect of the crisis cannot yet be determined, but it appears that it has led to a certain stagnation of foreign policy.

1.1.4 Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom

This investigation focuses on the policies towards Latin America of Germany, Spain, and the UK, a selection that must be carefully considered. In the first place, while this may sound trivial, in order to study foreign policy-making towards Latin America it is indispensable that the countries under consideration actually have national policies towards the region.\(^8\) The new EU Member States, for instance, which might be fruitfully studied in the EU context, simply do not have national relations with Latin America that are intense enough for in-depth study.\(^9\)

In addition, comparing Spain, Germany, and Britain allows the researcher to keep several factors constant, allowing me to base this investigation on a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD; della Porta 2008: 214ff) and honing in on country-based factors that might explain the variation in their policies towards Latin America. MSSDs are based on reducing “the number of ‘disturbing’ variables to be kept under control” (ibid.: 214) by exogenising them, thus facilitating the attribution of variation in the dependent variable to those independent variables that can still take different values. Nonetheless, MSSDs risk the over-

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\(^7\)‘Iberoamerica’ is often used to designate Latin America in the Spanish context; in fact, the term often includes the Iberian peninsula as part of ‘Iberoamerica’ (del Arenal 2004: 3). This is the case, for instance, with the Iberoamerican Community, which includes the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America and Brazil, but also Spain, Portugal, and Andorra (Secretaría General Iberoamericana (SEGIB) 2011).

Most recently, the new Conservative government redistributed the state secretaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create the post of Secretary of State for International Cooperation and Iberoamerica.

\(^8\)Germany and Britain have even formulated their policies towards the region in policy strategy papers or speeches (AA 2010; FCO 2007; 2010). While Spain does not do so – indeed, Gratius (2010) poses the provocative question of why Spain does not have a “policy towards Latin America” – this is because its policy vis-à-vis the region is extremely broad rather than limited.

\(^9\)To a large extent, they are slowly coming by policies towards Latin America through the EU context. For an insight into this process, Kaczyński (forthcoming 2012) provides an analysis of Polish policy towards Latin America in the context of the Europeanisation.
determination of the outcome variable because the contexts of the compared situations are not normally similar enough to permit considering the influence of the environment as entirely non-existent (Przeworski and Teune 1970; see also della Porta 2008: 215). This problem is considered by the investigation’s theoretical framework, which I outline below, as well as in Chapters 2 and 4. Nevertheless, the MSSD framework allows the researcher to keep the number of independent variables under control, whereas in a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) the number of independent variables would become rather unwieldy (della Porta 2008: 215) and, as some would argue, involve far more independent variables than a small-N study is able to handle (the so-called ‘degrees of freedom problem’ or underdetermination, see e.g. George and Bennett 2005: 28f). But, as George and Bennett (ibid.) point out, in small-N case studies based on process-tracing, the logic behind determining the impact of independent variables is quite different from that operating in large-N studies based on regression analysis, so that the ‘degrees of freedom problem is largely irrelevant.\footnote{The ‘degrees of freedom problem’ refers to the idea that there may not be more independent variables than there are cases studied. This is, however, very often the case in small-N research, including this study. George and Bennett (2005: 28f) elucidate why this is not a problem: there are many observations along the way of a process-tracing case study to make inference valid (such as, in the case of this investigation, the observations from a total of 37 interviews), and the in-depth study of few cases allows for finding inconsistencies in the theories.}

In Chapters 2 and 4, I assess the advantages and limitations of this approach in depth. In the following, I focus on the factors that make Germany, Spain, and Britain suitable for comparison under an MSSD approach.

Firstly, all three countries under study can – within reason – be considered middle powers in the international system, thus keeping the influence of such systemic factors relatively small. Nevertheless, this is where the problem of environmental impact is probably the strongest.\footnote{The UK holds, for instance, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which the other two countries do not.} The study’s explanatory framework therefore has to remain context-aware. Secondly, the three are influential EU Member States. The EU is now an important factor in the foreign policies of its Member States, so that it makes sense to hold EU membership constant in order to keep the differential impact of this potentially influential “‘disturbing’ variable” (della Porta 2008: 214) minimal. In this case, all three countries under study have the potential to leave their mark on EU policy towards the region, and vice versa. Germany and the UK are traditionally pivotal members of the Union, while Spain’s special relationship with Latin America catapults it to such a position in this case – although even without this special relationship it is one of the larger and more vocal states. In addition, all three have been EU members for quite a long time by now and are therefore
not subject to the same pressures as new Member States might be.\textsuperscript{12} Taken together, these factors keep the intensity with which the EU level exercises any sort of force on their national foreign policies relatively constant – its differential impact leading to variation in the EU dimension therefore ought to stem from other factors.

When discussing the selection of cases for study under a small-N research design, one question invariably arises: “Why not others?” In the case of this study, one might ask why Italy, France, or Portugal are not taken into account. They mostly fulfil similar criteria as Germany, Spain, and Britain: an autonomous national foreign policy towards Latin America, long-standing EU membership, and – perhaps with the exception of Portugal – global middle power status. The question of why Germany, Spain, and Britain were chosen over these countries – or why they were not included – is thus a valid one. Yet, as with any research project, the time and resources of this investigation were limited, so that a choice had to be made. In a study like the present one, any expansion of the number of countries studied necessarily comes at the expense of the depth with which they can be analysed. Spain, Germany, and the UK were thus chosen as representatives of the population discussed above (influential EU Members with an autonomous national policy towards Latin America). Portugal, for instance, shares several of Spain’s characteristics. Most importantly, it is a former colonial power in Latin America and acceded the EU at the same time as Spain. France and Italy, on the other hand, are similar to Germany in that they are founding members of the EU. Regarding their global positions, Italy may be considered similar to Spain, and France similar to both the UK and Germany. The one factor that sets the UK apart is its sceptical attitude towards the EU, which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 6. Thus, while there are almost certainly some country-specific factors that would differentiate the policies towards Latin America of Portugal, France, or Italy from those of Spain, Germany, and the UK, they are sufficiently similar to be able to choose a sample that allows the researcher to carry out an in-depth cross-country study. This discussion leads directly to the question of the extent to which the results of the investigation can be generalised, which is addressed in the next paragraph.

\textsuperscript{12}Nevertheless, I will take into account that Spain is, relative to the other two, a ‘late joiner’ not just to the EU but also to the international community more generally. Although the UK joined the European Communities a mere 13 years earlier than Spain, it was arguably already a part of the Western international community beforehand. Spain, on the other hand, became incorporated into both very rapidly after democratisation in the late 1970s (Aixalà i Blanch 2005), joining NATO in 1892 and the EC in 1986. Although by now, Spanish policy-makers have had ample time to soak up the potential effects of joining and membership is no longer a process in development (Barbé 2011: 152f), it is wise to take this particular aspect into consideration.
1.1.5 Generalisability of the Results

It is important in the context of country selection to consider the generalisability of this investigation’s results, though this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. The choice of Germany, Spain, and the UK as policy-making countries and the choice of Latin America as a target region limits the generalisability of the results to the extent that factors held constant by this investigation would vary if policy-making in countries or ‘recipient’ regions of foreign policy were concerned. As Donatella della Porta puts it, “in comparing similar systems, we cannot go beyond [...] theories that apply only in a certain area” (della Porta 2008: 214). In the cases at hand, this applies to factors such as EU membership and length thereof, as well as country ‘size’, that is, geopolitical and economic standing within the wider international community and the EU. Likewise, factors influencing policy towards Latin America may be different from those impacting foreign policy towards other regions or countries. Lastly, the generalisability of the study’s findings is circumscribed by the two cases that are studied in greater detail: development policy and interaction between the national and the EU level. It is therefore important not to overgeneralise from the present investigation’s findings (Bennett and Elman 2006a; George and Bennett 2005).

Nevertheless, the factors that are shown to matter in this study may well apply beyond the countries and cases subject to research here. The results can therefore provide important pointers regarding the sources of foreign policy-making in Europe and even in the wider world. However, it must be considered that if the study’s theoretical model is extended to other countries, policy areas, and ‘target regions’, other influencing factors and interaction mechanisms are likely to be at play and must be incorporated into the theoretical framework. It is to the discussion of the theoretical model applied in this investigation that I now turn.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

The present study’s theoretical approach is based on an extended liberal framework. As outlined in the previous section, its research design holds systemic factors such as the three countries’ position on the international stage as well as EU membership constant to a large degree. Following from this, I focus on explanatory factors emanating from the domestic level, making a liberal approach the ideal setting as it is centred “on subsystemic determinants of behaviour” (Rittberger 2001a: 4). Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework in greater detail and discusses three types of liberal foreign policy theorising.
that have been conceptualised by researchers and emphasise different independent variables (Moravcsik 1997; Freund and Rittberger 2001): structural or republican liberalism, which focuses on the type of domestic government, agency-based or commercial liberalism, which highlights the strength of domestic interests, and ideational or constructivist liberalism, which emphasises the role of domestic norms in influencing foreign policy. However, since all three countries under study are parliamentary democracies, however, structural or republican liberalism’s independent variable, the type of domestic regime, can be exogenised by this study. The independent variables considered in this investigation therefore stem from both agency-based utilitarian liberal (e.g. Moravcsik 1997) and constructivist liberal (e.g. Wagner 2002, Koenig-Archipugi 2004) theory, and include political and economic interests as well as domestic norms about foreign policy-making, based on the premise that ideational and cultural factors matter in how foreign policy-makers approach their task (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Katzenstein 1996).

Yet despite holding systemic factors constant, it is unwise to ignore them entirely. The liberal framework has to be extended for two reasons: on the one hand, there may still be residual variation in the factors held constant. On the other hand, they may have a differential impact upon policy-making although they are virtually the same in the three countries under study, because they may be mediated by domestic factors that account for such different influences (Beyers 2005; Risse et al. 1999; Moravcsik 1997: 522; 542ff). Consequently, I take into account independent variables stemming from international interaction based both on a rationalist and constructivist logic of action: policy-makers may adhere to international rules because they are interested in preserving their country’s international reputation, for instance (e.g. Checkel 2005; Slaughter 2004), or because they have been ‘socialised’ into considering a certain type of foreign policy behaviour appropriate (see e.g. Checkel 2005; Lewis 2003).

However, I conceptualise these variables as mediated by domestic material and ideational factors theorised under the liberal framework to account for their differential impact on systemically similar countries. The study conceptualises the two logics of action – the logic of expected consequences emphasised by rationalist scholars and the logic of appropriateness highlighted by constructivists (March and Olsen 1989; 2004) – as compatible and potentially complementary within the same framework (e.g. Jupille et al. 2003; Fearon and Wendt 2003; Risse 2003). At the limit, in accordance with utilitarian-liberal theorising, I expect domestic economic and political preferences to matter the most (Fearon and Wendt 2003: 58) in determining foreign policy activity towards Latin America. Additionally, congruent with Jupille et al. (2003: 21),
I assume that high substantive stakes invite rational calculation, although relatively low stakes allow for non-calculative decision making. On the whole, I expect domestic interests to trump the effects of both domestic and international socialisation, as well as the rational adaptation to international norms.

Since this study considers two in-depth case studies, one on development and the other on interaction between national foreign policy towards Latin America and the EU’s relations with the region, the precise independent variables are embedded within this general theoretical framework, but are fine-tuned by recurring to relevant theories on development policy-making (e.g. Lumsdaine 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007) and on (foreign) policy-making in the European Union (e.g. Larsen 2009; Moumoutzis 2011). These middle-range theories will be embedded within the general framework in order to derive more specific theoretical expectations about foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe.

1.3 Methodological Framework

This investigation is based on a small-N case study design. Having outlined the country-selection process above, this section briefly discusses the selection of the two cases that will be analysed in depth in the second part of the study, as well as the methodological considerations underlying the research design of the case studies. In the first place, I establish cross-country and cross-dimensional variation in the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005: 84f) by measuring policy activity towards Latin America on the three dimensions of foreign policy. This is done, as described above, on the basis of an index constructed using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA; Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Ragin 2008; 2000). The step-by-step index aggregation procedure required by the fsQCA method allows me to systematically expose variation on the economic, governance, and the European dimension of policy towards Latin America, as well as on their subcomponents. The emerging variation as well as theoretical considerations are then used to select the two cases for further study: development policy – a subcomponent of the economic dimension – and national-EU-level interaction.

Both cases display high levels of cross-country variation in the dependent variable (Van Evera 1997) that point to underlying domestic differences. In addition, however, the two cases are worth investigating from a theoretical perspective. Regarding development policy, there is a long-standing debate among researchers regarding the motivating factors of development aid and whether they respond to a norm of alleviating poverty (e.g. Lumsdaine 1993),
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a utilitarian logic, where aid is used to achieve political or economic goals (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007), or both (e.g. Berthelémy 2006), and if so, how the two logics of action are configured. As regards the interaction between national foreign policy towards Latin America and the EU level, there is plenty of theorising on how the two levels interact, and how (foreign) policy is Europeanised (e.g. Börzel 2002; Larsen 2009; Moumoutzis 2011), and this study hopes to shed further light on these mechanisms of interaction and what motivates policy-makers to take national policy stances to the EU level in some cases, but accept issues emanating from it in others.

In order to address these questions, I draw on process tracing methodology as “a research procedure intended to explore the processes by which initial conditions are translated into outcomes” (Vennesson 2008: 224). Process tracing can help disentangle different explanatory factors, even if different theories lead to the same expectations, a phenomenon called equifinality (George and Bennett 2005: 207). Additionally, it is particularly suitable to uncover the interaction of various explanatory factors (Checkel 2006: 366) and thus extremely useful for the purposes of this investigation.

The main data source employed to distinguish factors explaining the making of Latin America policy in Europe is a set of 27 semi-structured elite interviews with national policy-makers from Spain, Germany, and Britain. These interviews were conducted at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Development Ministries and Agencies of all three countries. Additionally, they were triangulated with other sources in order to compensate for potential strategicness (e.g. Berry 2002): an additional 10 interviews were carried out with EU officials dealing with Latin America, as well as with Latin American diplomats based in Brussels and responsible for handling European-Latin American relations. In the case of development policy, aid data are available from the OECD statistics database and were used to generate descriptive statistics such as aid concentration curves (Baulch 2003) and Suits Index values (Suits 1977) to obtain initial insights into the making of development policy towards Latin America. The elite interviews were then used to further trace the factors impacting upon policy, and complemented with triangulation interviews. In the EU case study, a qualitative content analysis of government documents is carried out to gather first indications of interaction between national and EU foreign policy towards Latin America, based on a framework by Larsen (2009), which I further adapt and fine-tune to suit the purposes of this investigation. Again, the elite interviews are then used to investigate policy-makers’ motivations for such interaction, and are complemented and cross-checked with triangulation interviews as well as further evidence from government documents.

For each case study, a separate coding scheme was developed to analyse
the interviews using Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), for which the MAXQDA programme was used (VERBI Software 1989-2010). Based on saliency theory (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987) and interview-specific methodological considerations (e.g. Gläser and Laudel 2010), the coding procedure is able to identify the impact of the various independent variables conceptualised by this study. The procedure and its limitations are discussed in depth in Chapter 4.

1.4 Roadmap: Outline

This investigation proceeds as follows. In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I situate the investigation within the fields of research it speaks to and outline its contribution in these areas. In particular, I focus on extant literature on policymaking in Europe and foreign policy-making more specifically, and locate the project within current efforts to analyse European-Latin American relations. The second half of Chapter 2 establishes this study’s overarching theoretical framework.

In Chapter 3, I operationalise the dependent variable as foreign policy activity towards Latin America on three dimensions – economic, governance, and European – and their subcomponents by developing relevant indicators. I then outline how to measure policy activity towards Latin America with the use of an index based on fsQCA methods, with reference to issues of measurement and index methodology, also showing how fsQCA lends itself to accomplishing the fundamental challenges of comparing context-specific indicators and combining numerical and qualitative evidence. Finally, Chapter 3 puts these considerations into practice by constructing the index to expose cross-national and cross-dimensional variation in foreign policy activity towards Latin America.

The second part of the study begins with an introductory chapter (Chapter 4) explicating the choice of two cases for further study: development policy and national-EU level interaction. It bases this choice on the variation found in the previous chapter, as well as the cases’ theoretical relevance. Moreover, the chapter outlines those methodological considerations relevant to both case studies, thus dealing with the choice for and evaluation of elite interviews and data triangulation.

The next two chapters constitute the two in-depth case studies. In Chapter 5, I seek to elucidate the factors impacting upon development policy towards Latin America to explain various levels of policy activity. I begin with a brief consideration of the scholarly debate about the motivating factors of develop-
ment assistance, before moving on to deriving the case study’s specific theoretical expectations embedded within the overarching framework established in Chapter 2. I then illustrate the concentration of German, British, and Spanish development assistance in Latin America both within the region and in comparison to their aid to other developing regions with the help of so-called aid concentration curves (Baulch 2003). I innovate upon the methodology of plotting these curves in order to control for population size, and employ the Suits Index, which indicates whether aid is predominantly poverty-oriented or not (Suits 1977), to support the evidence from the curves. These measures give a first indication of whether aid is oriented more towards the poor countries of Latin America, or towards the richer ones, thus giving a first indication of whether development policy is driven by normative considerations of helping the poor, or rather by economic or political considerations of boosting new markets or improving political relations with emerging powers such as Brazil.

Next, I move on to the analysis of the interviews conducted at the national level, before briefly triangulating them with those interviews carried out with EU officials and Latin American diplomats, and discussing the results.

Chapter 6 then assesses the interaction of national foreign policies towards Latin America with the EU level. It begins by conceptualising this interaction as mechanisms of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ of policy elements and asks what motivates policy-makers to pursue one or the other, and under what circumstances they do so. I then conduct a content analysis of government documents from the three countries under study to ascertain how these mechanisms play out in practice. Following this analysis, the study goes on to draw up the specific explanatory framework, again situated within the general theoretical model, before proceeding once more to the analysis of national elite interviews. I then triangulate them with interviews of EU officials and Latin American diplomats, as well as with a more in-depth analysis of the relevant policy documents, before discussing the results.

The final chapter (Chapter 7) contextualises the two case studies, binding them together and situating them within the overall framework, as well as outlining areas of further research arising from this investigation. It summarises the results, assesses their theoretical and empirical implications, and concludes.
Chapter 2

Conceptualising Policy towards Latin America in Europe
In order to analyse the making of policy towards Latin America in Europe, previous research helps conceptualise the issue. In this chapter, I first introduce and discuss the relevant literature before building up the study’s overarching theoretical framework. I thus begin with a discussion of the literature on foreign policy-making towards Latin America, which is developed to very different degrees for the three cases under study and to date has not been situated in a unifying comparative framework. I then move on to discussing previous theoretical work that may help create an explanatory context for different levels of policy towards the region on behalf of different EU Member States. In doing so, the chapter provides a theory-based overview of the general variables that may influence the different levels of intensity with which policy towards the region is carried out by the three countries under study. Distinct hypotheses are then specified in Chapters 5 and 6 for the specific policy areas under study.

2.1 Relevant Research and State of the Art

Given this study’s subject, it is useful to begin with a discussion of the extant literature on foreign policy-making towards Latin America on behalf of the three EU Member States under study. The field is hugely disparate, in agreement with the levels of intensity with which policy towards Latin America is conducted in each country. While this is intuitive, I will show that what is missing is a coherent comparative framework within which several national policies towards Latin America are analysed. This investigation purports to provide such a framework. It thus contributes to a better understanding of how policy towards one single region is made on behalf of three countries that are broadly similar but exhibit variation on a range of variables impacting upon foreign policy.

2.1.1 European-Latin American Relations

Member State Relations with Latin America

Policy-making towards Latin America has received very disparate levels of attention in the three countries under study. In the British case, it appears to be studiously ignored most of the time. While the UK has a vibrant Latin American studies community – it has produced, for instance, Leslie Bethell’s carefully edited seminal *Cambridge History of Latin America* in 11 volumes (Bethell 1984-2008) –, it does not frequently deal with British-Latin American relations. There are some exceptions that allow one to trace developments over time, at least to some extent (Bulmer-Thomas 1989b; Grugel and Kippin 2006; White-
2.1. STATE OF THE ART

However, these contributions tend to be limited to short papers (Bulmer-Thomas 1989b) or chapters in edited volumes (Miller 2005; Grugel and Kippin 2006; Whitehead forthcoming 2012). Miller (2005: 34) notes the long decline of British foreign policy towards Latin America since the beginning of World War I and points out that nowadays, “[f]or most people in Britain [...] Latin America is a marginal region of unknowns and curiosities with its stereotypical generals and corrupt politicians, its niggling but skilful footballers, and increasingly, its salsa music.” (ibid.: 33). In other words, Latin America is studied by British academics and the British population is interested in Latin American culture, but few deal with how their own country relates to the region in current affairs. As a consequence, only a few book-length analyses of British relations with the region exist, the most recent such contribution being Victor Bulmer-Thomas’s edited volume on Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship (Bulmer-Thomas 1989a). The sparsely populated ranks of British-Latin American relations, however, give this investigation the potential to provide unique and fresh insights.

In the case of Germany, the body of literature is more substantial, and provides helpful analyses in tracing the development of German policy towards Latin America over time up until the present day (e.g. von Gleich 1968; Mols 1984; Grabendorff 1993; Mols and Wagner 1994; Maihold 2008, 2010). There is thus a relatively solid stock of secondary literature to draw on in analysing German foreign policy towards Latin America. The older studies can provide a historical background, while the more recent ones will be used to help assess the results of this investigation. However, similar to the British literature, the German body of research lacks a unified effort to systematically analyse the factors that drive policy-making towards Latin America. Often, the contributions take stock of the state of the relationship very thoroughly. They usually conclude that Latin America does not receive as much German attention as it should, or the wrong kind, and make recommendations as to how things might be improved (e.g. Benecke et al. 1993; Maihold 2008). This is due to the fact that many of the studies are published as papers at think tanks or political foundations and are therefore set to have a normative component centred on how policy towards the region could be improved.

Both the British and the German bodies of literature on relations with Latin America suffer from the problem that Latin America is not a foreign policy priority for the respective countries. In the case of Britain, for instance, Graham (1989: 52) comments that “few reasons have been found in Whitehall to pay anything other than sporadic attention to Latin America” since 1945. Like politicians, political scientists tend to be drawn to those policy areas that are ‘interesting’ and fast-moving. Special relationships and crisis regions are ana-
lysed in depth, while the more day-to-day aspects of foreign relations do not receive such coverage. This is unfortunate. After all, routine relations constitute a large share of most European countries’ interaction with the rest of the world. By looking at policy towards Latin America, this study therefore contributes to the analysis of an important aspect of foreign policy that is all too often ignored. For both Britain and Germany, literature dealing with these countries’ foreign policy in general will have to be taken into account in order to provide starting points and possibilities for cross-validation. That way, I will be able to provide additional insights into the extent to which policy towards Latin America might be typical or unique.

For Spanish relations with Latin America, of course, the exact reverse is true. For Spain, policy towards Latin America is special and generates the corresponding amount of researchers’ attention, more than this literature review could ever hope to analyse. Alongside overarching studies on policy towards Latin America (e.g. Malamud 2004; del Arenal 2009a; Moltó 2010), there are also numerous studies on Spanish policy towards Latin America within the EU framework (e.g. Grugel 2002; del Arenal 2006). Latin America also plays an important role in the literature analysing Spanish development policy, as it is a major recipient of Spanish development assistance (e.g. Martínez and Sanahuja 2010; de la Iglesia-Caruncho 2011). However, with some exceptions such as Baklanoff (1996) or Youngs (2000), output is often limited to Spanish-language publications. While more recently, some papers are also published in English, even if they are published by think tanks based in Spain (e.g. Grugel 2002; Gratius 2010), there is still a language barrier that prevents research on Spanish foreign policy towards Latin America, but also Spanish foreign policy more generally, from being received outside Spain.\footnote{A similar problem applies to Germany, although in recent years German research has become much more internationally focused and centred on publishing with English-language journals and publishing houses, so that its international profile has been raised. Spanish research is moving in a similar direction but has been slower to adapt.} Nevertheless, in the case of Spanish policy towards Latin America, there is ample possibility for this study to draw on existing literature and compare results with it.

All three bodies of literature have one commonality: they do not speak to each other. Studies focused strictly on the national background do not attempt to set the national policy towards Latin America in relation with other countries’ policies towards the region (in part, this is also due to the aforementioned language barrier). The existing literature can inform this study with regard to policy output. To a more limited degree, since literature is scarce especially for the British case, it can shed light on individual states’ preferences regarding Latin America policy. In general, however, the field suffers from a lack of systematic comparative analysis of Latin America policy-making in Europe.
most cases, it focuses either only on a particular aspect of Latin America policy, on one country’s policy, or descriptively on current issues and policy recommendations. In order to understand what drives policy-making towards Latin America in Europe, a uniform comparative framework is required to facilitate theory-guided empirical analysis. By presenting such a framework, this study will add not only to the existing academic debate on European-Latin American relations, but also to the unification of individual national bodies of literature that are currently disconnected from one another. This is not just relevant from an academic vantage point, but also from a more practical perspective: as the EU seeks to strengthen its biregional partnership with the region, it is important to obtain a better grasp of what the different EU Member States’ policy backgrounds are in order to discover potential common areas of interest and thus move towards a more concerted EU policy towards the region.

**EU-Latin American Relations and the Member States**

In addition to the country-specific studies there are some volumes looking at the EU-Latin American relationship which deserve being mentioned at this point, not only because they can provide insights for the case study on national-EU-level interaction, but also because they introduce an element of comparison that the above nuclei of literature on national policy towards Latin America are lacking. In fact, two of the few texts on UK-Latin American relations come from just such edited volumes: Kippin and Grugel’s 2006 study forms part of a book edited by Christian Freres and José A. Sanahuja (2006) on relations between the EU and Latin America. A more recent study of the Europeanisation of British national policy towards Latin America by Laurence Whitehead is forthcoming in a volume edited by Lorena Ruano (forthcoming 2012). Both these volumes also include chapters dealing with Spain (del Arenal 2006; Sanahuja forthcoming 2012) and Germany (Bodemer 2006; Trueb forthcoming 2012b). Technically, both are limited to analysing EU Member States’ foreign policies towards Latin America within the EU context. Nonetheless, they also provide insights into the bilateral policies that, especially for the case of Britain, cannot be found elsewhere. Despite this achievement, neither study provides a truly comparative framework of European countries’ policies towards Latin America. This is, in part, due to their limitation to the EU context as these studies focus on one specific aspect of foreign policy. It is, however, also due to the nature of edited volumes, which by virtue of being composed of individual researchers’ contributions tend to struggle with providing what George and Bennett call “structured, focused comparison” (2005: 67ff, 71). Therefore, although these studies are broader in scope because they include more country case studies,
the present investigation is better able to directly relate results from the different countries under study with one another.

In addition, there is a body of literature concerned with the biregional relationship between Europe and Latin America more generally, without focusing on specific Member States. This is the case of studies by Grabendorff and Seidelmann (2005), Sanahuja (2006), Gratius (2007; 2008; 2009), Maihold (2006; 2007) and Freres et al. (2007). Others are concerned with particular policy areas, such as development (e.g. Freres 2000; 2010). While the biregional relationship is not the focus of this investigation, these contributions are helpful insofar as they reflect on the importance of the Member States within the relationship, as for instance Westphal’s contribution to Grabendorff and Seidelmann’s volume does (Westphal 2005a: 354). With respect to this field, the present study therefore constitutes a more in-depth analysis of the factors emanating from the Member States that substantially shape the biregional relationship. By complementing the literature on European-Latin American relations from the perspective of systematically comparing national foreign policies towards Latin America, this contribution goes to form part of this research tradition in a meaningful way.

In the following, I introduce and discuss this study’s dependent variable, foreign policy towards Latin America conceptualised as policy activity towards the region. This variable will be subject to further scrutiny in Chapter 3, where it will be measured for all three countries under study, and contrasted in detail. I then go on to analyse how various theories of foreign policy can be helpful in devising an overarching explanatory framework, and provide general hypothetical statements that may be pertinent to an explanation of cross-national variation.

2.1.2 Foreign Policy towards Latin America in Europe

In order to assess different EU Member States’ policies towards Latin America, a comparative map of policy towards Latin America in the three countries under study is required as a starting point. That is, the variation in the dependent variable has to be mapped systematically: before analysing it comparatively, one must know what foreign policy towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK looks like and where the differences lie. This begins with a specification of what is understood by ‘foreign policy’. In this study, I substitute this relatively vague term with ‘foreign policy activity’ in order to reach a more easily measurable concept. ‘Foreign policy activity’ allows for establishing variation across the three countries and across policy areas or ‘dimensions’, as I will proceed to call them. Therefore, the study assesses how active the three countries
are regarding policy towards Latin America, as well as whether they display the same level of activity in all areas of their relationship with the region. The operationalisation of policy activity and its measurement will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In this section, an outline of how the dependent variable is structured and its theoretical motivation will suffice. To later enable a precise and comprehensive operationalisation and measurement of policy activity towards Latin America, a fine-grained structure is provided.

A useful definition of foreign policy is provided by Christopher Hill (2003: 3), who considers it “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations”. This definition’s strength lies in its idea that foreign policy as a whole consists of the sum of policy in various areas vis-à-vis external actors such as states or regions. Therefore, it is useful to consider a spectrum of different areas of relations with Latin America when analysing foreign policy towards the region. In his 2003 volume, Hill is concerned with foreign policy in a globalised world, leading him to emphasise the importance of considering ‘traditional’ foreign policy side-by-side with foreign economic policy (Hill 2003: 13f). Given the importance of economic relations in European states’ policy towards Latin America, the idea that foreign economic policy is one component of overall foreign policy is an important notion. A similar point was, indeed, made earlier by Czempiel (1981: 16) in dividing the content of policy into security, welfare (in the sense of economic well-being) and governance – meaning that the three had to be considered in parallel.\(^2\)

Czempiel conceptualises ‘welfare’ in the sense of economic well-being (ibid.) pursued by a state, or rather its representatives, when making policy – including foreign policy. In foreign affairs, according to Czempiel, welfare refers to external economic relations, trade, and official development assistance (ibid.: 129ff). Governance, on the other hand, refers to a distributive system of power, freedom, and participation (ibid.: 135). In terms of external relations, the governance dimension thus includes issues such as the promotion of democracy and human rights. The security dimension, finally, understood in its traditional sense of military security, is less relevant in European-Latin American relations, as neither region feels militarily threatened by the other.\(^3\) However,

\(^2\)The German original distinguishes between “Sicherheit”, “Wohlfahrt (im Sinne wirtschaftlichen Wohlstands)”, and “Herrschaft” (Czempiel 1981: 16). Czempiel makes it clear that in foreign policy, this refers to issues such as external economic relations, trade, and official development assistance (ibid.: 129ff). “Herrschaft” could be translated as ‘authority’, but the meaning Czempiel attributes to it (a distributive system of power, freedom, and participation, ibid.: 135) makes ‘government’ the better choice.

\(^3\)An exception, of course, is the Falklands/Malvinas situation between the UK and Argentina. However, this can be considered a minor enough issue to make it theoretically safe to subsume security aspects under the governance dimension.
‘new security issues’ such as drug trafficking, terrorism and migration (Brown and Ainley 2005: 177) do matter in the relationship. But because of the structure of the relationship between EU Member States and Latin America, they are included in the governance dimension, because they are fundamentally dealt with through mechanisms of political dialogue.

Furthermore, since all three countries under study are Member States of the European Union, it is reasonable to include a European dimension of foreign policy. Indeed, accepting the notion that the EU may have a distinctive impact on how Member States make policy calls for a specific research agenda on European foreign policies. This point is made by White (1999: 56), who analyses the case for a European branch of FPA and has been seconded more recently by Larsen (2009) in his paper on “A Distinct FPA for Europe”. Member States’ interaction with the European level is ubiquitous nowadays, even in external relations. The extent to which EU membership significantly changes Member States’ policy by adding an additional level to the relationship that interacts with national policies has been analysed in depth by students of Europeanisation more generally (e.g. Börzel 2005; 2002) as well as by studies focussing specifically on foreign policy (e.g. Wong and Hill 2011; Larsen 2009; Manners and Whitman 2000). If we accept these studies’ premise that there is reason to believe that EU membership substantially changes the aspect of foreign policy in EU Member States, there is good reason to also introduce a European dimension to the dependent variable measuring how active the countries under study are at the EU level regarding policy towards Latin America.

Using these considerations as a point of departure, I thus conceptualise foreign policy as consisting of three dimensions: economic policy, governance, and an EU dimension. The economic and governance dimensions, in turn, include several subcomponents making up each dimension. Together, the three dimensions constitute the total of foreign policy, that is, Hill’s “sum of official external relations”. Table 2.1 summarises the three dimensions of foreign policy towards Latin America and their respective subcomponents. I now briefly discuss each dimension in turn.

2.1.2.1 The Economic Dimension

As Table 2.1 shows, the economic dimension includes both trade and investment relations and development cooperation. In making policy towards Latin
2.1. STATE OF THE ART

Table 2.1: Dimensions of foreign policy towards Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Europe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade and investment</td>
<td>Political dialogue</td>
<td>EU involvement in policy towards Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development cooperation</td>
<td>Cultural policy</td>
<td>Civil society involvement</td>
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American, European countries attempt to secure trade and investment possibilities for their domestic industries and firms. Although the negotiation of trade agreements and, since the Treaty of Lisbon, investment protection treaties with third countries falls under EU competency, the promotion of economic exchange and investment between Member States and Latin American countries remains very much in the hands of each individual country, and the Member States have been careful not to give the Commission too much competence in this respect (Woolcock 2005: 379f, 389). It is important to note here that what I am concerned with here are not the trade and investment figures that might be driving economic policy towards Latin America. In the context of economic policy as a dependent variable, it is the activity on the part of policy-makers to promote economic exchange and investment between their countries and Latin America that is of interest.

While the case for including trade and investment promotion on behalf of policy-makers in the economic dimension is an obvious choice, the case for including development cooperation here must be made more carefully. Hill (2003: 134ff) includes both trade and aid as means of “economic statecraft” in foreign policy, which justifies the inclusion of development cooperation under this dimension. As pointed out above, Czempiel (1981: 129ff) makes a similar argument and includes both trade and aid under his “welfare” dimension. In both cases, this is of course predicated on the idea that states use development cooperation as a tool to reach their goals. Yet the discussion in the development literature on why states give aid and whether altruistic, appropriateness-based or utilitarian, consequences-based factors carry the day has not been satisfactorily solved (see Lumsdaine 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007 for two sides of the debate). At this point, however, we are not yet concerned with the driving factors of development policy towards Latin America, which will be the subject of Chapter 5, but with a helpful categorisation of the different policy areas to facilitate a “structured, focused comparison” (George and Ben-
between the three countries under study. Additionally, even with a logic of appropriateness in mind when considering development policy, one could argue that since its aim is to enhance economic development in the recipient countries, it continues to be well-placed in the economic dimension even if it is more than just part of the arsenal of tools at foreign policy-makers’ disposal when attempting to advance their country’s economic interests.

2.1.2.2 The Governance Dimension

The governance dimension includes three subcomponents, which are intimately intertwined. The first is political dialogue, a term wide enough to accommodate cooperation between politicians and diplomats on almost any issue. In the case of European countries’ relations with Latin America, political dialogue as a diplomatic instrument includes exchanges for instance on the promotion of good governance, migration issues, social cohesion, human rights and the fight against drugs as well as, increasingly, talks on political cooperation on the global stage, as Latin America’s weight in the world grows – just to give an idea of the range of issues covered. It is fairly easy to see why political dialogue has been included in the governance dimension, as these issues are well within the concept of Czempiel’s “Herrschaft” (governance) dimension. After all, a discussion of questions of human rights, democracy, and global governance in the dialogue between two countries is precisely the foreign policy or international dimension of Czempiel’s distributive system of power, freedom, and participation (Czempiel 1981: 135ff).\footnote{Although Czempiel’s work is very much rooted in the Cold War context, his discussion continues to ring true in its fundamentals.} Additionally, as indicated above, ‘new security issues’ are also included in political dialogue.

The second subcomponent of governance is cultural policy. All three countries under study operate cultural foreign policies designed to extend their culture and language beyond their own borders, and all three of them have cultural policy links with Latin America, as I will show in Chapter 3. Cultural policy speaks to the governance dimension by attempting to bring the European countries’ history, culture, language, and thereby their own governance systems and values, closer to Latin America (and occasionally vice versa). Hill (2003: 134ff) includes cultural diplomacy among the means of carrying out foreign policy, thus bringing out the close connection between the first two subcomponents of ‘governance’.

The third and final subcomponent is civil society involvement. This is related to the governance dimension in that ‘governance’ may include the involvement of non-state actors in the official policy process. Kohler-Koch and
Rittberger (2006: 28) note that “Governance [...] denotes the participation of public and private actors”. Although they deal with governance as applied to the EU context, this conceptualisation can be extended to the foreign policy-making process. In all three countries under study, civil society organisations (CSOs) are actively involved in the relationship with Latin America. They receive contributions from the governments to work with and in the region. Their work clearly stretches into the field of ‘governance’: firstly, they work on issues of good governance, education, human rights, democracy, and so on. Biekart (2006: 12) lists eight main areas of action in European CSOs’ work with Latin America, of which the following are relevant for governance as conceptualised here: political participation, socio-economic rights, civil society development, conflict, peace construction and reconciliation, and gender. Overall, “political participation” was the most populated category with 89% of the CSOs covered by Biekart’s study stating that they worked in this area. What is more, CSOs themselves are a hallmark of the kind of pluralistic governance system Europe seeks to promote in Latin America (Westphal 2007: 100ff), thereby establishing a link with those issues discussed under political dialogue. Therefore, like cultural policy, CSO engagement serves to bring the European ‘distributive system’ closer to Latin America. In some cases, the CSOs reinforce what is emphasised by government actors in political dialogue, in others they challenge it. Precisely by sometimes challenging their home governments, for example for being soft on human rights abroad, they show European governance systems at work in foreign policy. Their involvement in policy towards Latin America is thus well-placed under the governance dimension.

2.1.2.3 The European Dimension

The final dimension of foreign policy towards Latin America is the European dimension. Based on the literature discussed above (e.g. White 1999; Larsen 2009; see also White 2001), the European dimension is a particular aspect of the foreign policies of EU Member States, as European action becomes a channel for them to carry out policy vis-à-vis third countries and regions. In particular, Wong and Hill’s statement that “[a]ny definition of European foreign policy [...] has a particular dimension” (2011: 3) demonstrates the importance of this point: it is now impossible to think about EU Member States’ foreign policies without considering their EU membership and the relationship between na-
tional policies and the EU level. Assessing the involvement of the three countries under study with the EU’s policy towards Latin America, therefore, is promising not only because it says something about the countries’ relationship with Latin America, but also about the way national foreign policy-makers interact with the EU level in foreign policy issues. The European dimension is conceptualised here as the importance of the EU level in Member States’ policy towards Latin America.

The European dimension, however, presents a problem of product-process ambiguity: while here it is conceptualised as part of the dependent variable, there is considerable theoretical reason to expect and evidence suggesting that EU membership impacts upon foreign policy-makers in the first place (see e.g. Manners and Whitman 2000; M.E. Smith 2000). However, as all three countries under study are by now long-standing members of the EU, the impact of EU membership is, to a very large extent, held constant. If anything, it would be domestic or other mediating factors that account for differences in the EU’s impact on Member States’ foreign policy-making towards Latin America.

Furthermore, the EU is of course relevant in the two other dimensions as well. In fact, the economic and governance dimensions with their sub-parts seep into the EU dimension in that these policy areas are also relevant at the EU level, albeit to varying degrees: development policy is an area of shared competence, external commercial relations are communitarised, and the EU carries out political dialogue processes with the countries of Latin America through fora with varying Member State involvement (for a discussion of these mechanisms and their content, see Alemany 2007). It is therefore important to make clear that in the context of the European dimension of the dependent variable, what is being looked at is the level of policy activity the three EU Member States under study direct towards Latin America via the EU framework. However, the EU’s special status as both an influencing factor and a dimension of the dependent variable must be taken into account by the theoretical framework and is further discussed in Section 2.2.1.1.

Having outlined the theoretical motivations for the conceptualisation and structure of the dependent variable, it is the task of Chapter 3 to consider the empirical implications of this conceptualisation. In Chapter 3, I will therefore outline the operationalisation and measurement of foreign policy activity towards Latin America and then proceed to put them into practise by indexing foreign policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Germany, Spain, and the UK using an innovative indexing procedure based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). In the next section, I move on to theorising the factors that might be able to explain variation in the dependent variable.
2.2 Explaining Foreign Policy towards Latin America: Theoretical Framework

In the search for explanations of foreign policy activity towards Latin America, theories of foreign policy offer a wide range of independent variables that may play a role (Hudson 2007). To narrow down the field of potential explanatory factors for the case at hand, I now make the case for a liberalism-based framework with the appropriate extensions that can incorporate factors emanating from the domestic level, as well as from the international and European level – with the latter factors in turn being mediated by the domestic level. Based on the selection of the three cases under study, this section begins by making the case for a liberal focus and then proceeds to outlining the study’s explanatory factors. Because of the study’s structure, consisting of the above-mentioned index of policy activity and two in-depth case studies of different policy areas, I will not formulate in-depth hypotheses in this part of the investigation. Specific independent variables and hypotheses will instead be specified for each of the two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, based on the relevant middle-range theories pertinent to each case. Nevertheless, in this section, I clarify those overarching independent variables that may influence policy towards Latin America in Europe and formulate expectations about what such influence might look like and how it might affect the level of policy activity.

2.2.1 A Liberal Theoretical Approach

2.2.1.1 The Case for a Liberal Focus

What kind of theoretical approach is required to explain the foreign policy activity of Germany, Spain, and the UK towards Latin America? As discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 1.1.4), this study is based on a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), trying to hold constant as many factors of the cases under study as possible (della Porta 2008: 214ff). The factors that are held constant here are mostly systemic: all three countries can, within reason, be considered middle powers, all three are influential EU Member States, in particular regarding policy towards Latin America, and finally, they have been EU members for a relatively long time by now, which should have given them enough time to adjust to EU membership. Those explanatory factors that may explain variation in the dependent variable are therefore most likely found in the domestic realm of each country. Therefore, an explanation of variation should be

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9 However, see fn 12, p. 30 for the particularities of the Spanish case and why this factor should be taken into account.
based on a theory that focuses on domestic explanations rather than on the geo-political position of each country under study within the international system or the EU, as for instance Realist theory might. The theoretical framework that best matches this investigation’s requirements is hence a liberal framework, since it “focuses on subsystemic determinants of behaviour” (Rittberger 2001a: 4).

### 2.2.1.2 Characteristics of a Liberal Focus

Liberal theories of foreign policy concentrate on the importance of domestic preferences in explaining foreign policy activity or behaviour. In Hill’s definition of foreign policy as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (2003: 3), liberal foreign policy theory dives into the factors that motivate the state to carry out its “sum of official external relations” in a certain way as based on the outcome of a domestic process of preference aggregation (Moravcsik 1998: 20f). The fundamental idea is that the factors conditioning a state’s preferences are to be found within the state. This idea appeals to this study’s framework because if systemic factors are by and large constant, the explanation for differences in foreign policy activity towards Latin America must be found at the level of each individual state under study.

The process of preference aggregation itself – that is, the question of how policy-makers arrive at determining what foreign policy they should pursue and how actively – is exogenous to my framework, since I am concerned with which factors impact upon foreign policy towards Latin America rather than with how these factors are formed. While I am aware that how they are formed – such as through the interaction of interest groups (see especially Moravcsik 1993, 1998) – is intimately linked to the explanation of which factors matter under which circumstances, the actual preference aggregation process is mostly outside the scope of this investigation and would require a different methodological approach that cannot be covered within the limits of this study, although I do hope to be able to give some indications.10 There are a number of different types of preference that may determine foreign policy.11 The task

10It might, however, be the subject of future research.
11Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 146f) conceptualises two causal mechanisms for the choice of preference: public pressure (emanating, for instance, from interest groups) or elite choice (that is, policymakers’ decisions). Which one is at work at a given time may depend for example on the intensity of the general public’s or interest groups’ preferences on a certain foreign policy issue, but this question is not particularly relevant for the purposes of this investigation. In fact, it is likely that, especially in Germany and Britain, elite choice is mostly at work since the general public is not particularly interested in Latin America, while in Spain, where there is a large Latin American population and the region is more in the focus of the general public, public pressure may be more relevant. However, what this study is interested in is which preferences are relevant – that is, what factors motivate policy towards the region –, not how they are chosen.
2.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

of this study is to uncover which ones are important in foreign policy towards Latin America on behalf of each country, under which circumstances, and how they may interact.

Different varieties of liberalism see the origin of preferences in different areas. Andrew Moravcsik (1997) differentiates three, which he terms commercial, republican, and ideational liberalism. Freund and Rittberger (2001: 71), on the other hand, differentiate between two variants of what they call ‘utilitarian liberalism’: structural and agency-based liberalism. Systematising these differentiations, they can be said to vary along two dimensions: firstly, the logic of action, and secondly, the type of ‘preference motivator’, i.e. what determines policy-makers’ choice of preference. The logic of action corresponds either to a logic of expected consequences or a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 2004; 1989) – that is, whether action is based on rationally trying to realise those preferences determined during preference aggregation, or whether it is based on what is considered by policy-makers the ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’ course of action. Both variants of Freund and Rittberger’s utilitarian liberalism and Moravcsik’s commercial and republican liberalism correspond to a rationalist, consequentialist logic, while ideational liberalism corresponds to a logic of appropriateness and has therefore also been termed “liberal constructivism” (Wagner 2002; Koenig-Archibugi 2004) or “societal constructivism” (Boekle et al. 2001: 105f). Indeed, Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 145, fn 18) explicitly points out that “ideational liberalism” and “liberal constructivism” amount to the same approach.

The ‘preference motivators’ that condition the independent variables are threefold. Freund and Rittberger provide the more general approach in classifying structural and agency-based motivating factors, with which Moravcsik’s republican and commercial liberalism are commensurate. Under structural – or republican – liberalism, preferences depend on the domestic structure, that is, a country’s form of government or the strength of a state vis-à-vis domestic society (Freund and Rittberger 2001: 71f) – as Moravcsik (1997: 530) calls it, the “mode of domestic representation”. Structural, or republican, liberalism is not relevant to the study at hand, as the form of government does not vary substantially across the three countries in question. All are liberal, and indeed parliamentary, democracies. The fact that Germany is a federal republic while Spain and Britain are parliamentary monarchies should not have any significant impact on their foreign policies towards Latin America.

The second type of preference motivator is agency-based (Freund and Rittberger 2001: 72), and Moravcsik’s commercial liberalism can be subsumed under this: preferences here depend on domestic interests, whereby domestic groups compete for the realisation of their respective interests (ibid.), and the
most important, or strongest, interest is incorporated as a policy goal. Moravcsik sees commercial liberalism’s preference motivator in “patterns of market incentives” or “distributional conflicts” (1997: 528f) and considers mostly the (economic) well-being of the most powerful interest group as the determinant of preferences and thus of foreign policy. ‘Commercial’ liberalism is, in this sense, a misnomer: well-being may also allude to political or social well-being rather than strictly to economic interests – depending on the policy area under study. Freund and Rittberger’s ‘agency-based liberalism’ terminology is thus more comprehensive. Therefore, foreign policy towards Latin America based on preferences according to agency-based liberalism would be motivated by, for example, economic interests in economic policy, or political interests in political dialogue.

The third preference motivator is not covered by Freund and Rittberger, who only deal with utilitarian liberalism, but is comprised by Moravcsik’s ideational liberalism or constructivist liberalism. While both structural (republican) and agency-based (commercial) liberalism correspond to a consequentialist logic of action, ideational liberalism populates the above-mentioned category based on a logic of appropriateness. Preferences are, here, motivated by “domestic social identities or values” (Moravcsik 1997: 525) or, as Boekle et al. (2001: 105f.) put it, “norms shared within the society” – or, indeed, norms shared among policy-makers, if Koenig Archibugi’s causal mechanism of elite choice for state preferences holds (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 146f). Therefore, what would matter here are considerations over what constitutes the ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’ foreign policy action in general, and in particular towards Latin America. In Table 2.2, I summarise the typology of liberalisms based on the above discussion.

Table 2.2: Typology of Liberal Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference Motivator</th>
<th>Logic of Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consequences</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strongest interest</strong></td>
<td>Structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(republican)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency-based</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(commercial)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic norms</strong></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constructivism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liberality</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
As I have outlined above, structural liberalism will not be considered in this investigation, leaving utilitarian agency-based liberalism – which I will proceed to call utilitarian liberalism for the sake of simplicity – and liberal constructivism as potential explanatory theories for the framework of this study.

2.2.2 A Note on Logics of Action

At this point it is worth briefly considering the compatibility of the two logics of action. Establishing this relationship is important in order to be able to make meaningful predictions about the impact of this study’s independent variables. Additionally, the issue has been the subject of heated debate in the literature. This debate over the merits of rationalism and constructivism in Political Science and in the wider Social Sciences is highly complex and involves deep ontological as well as epistemological discussions and divisions that concern the very basics of human behaviour. An in-depth discussion of the debate’s intricacies is therefore beyond the scope of this study and has been well carried out elsewhere (e.g. Fearon and Wendt 2003). Due to the work of many researchers (e.g. Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003, Risse 2003, among many others) trying to bridge the rationalist-constructivist divide through a pragmatic approach, it has become relatively widely accepted that the differences are indeed surmountable and both logics of action can be combined within the same explanatory framework. Researchers advocating the integration of both logics of action tend to settle on a ‘thin’ or ‘moderate’ (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003; Risse 2003) variant of constructivism that feeds into a positivist epistemology and allows the researcher to look for the influence of independent variables on a given outcome or dependent variable. Within such a framework, the two logics can then enter into a fruitful conversation based for instance on a division of labour, a sequential approach, or the subsumption of one under the other (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003). This investigation accepts the idea that material factors matter at the limit (Fearon and Wendt 2003: 58), and that high substantive stakes invite rational calculation, although relatively low stakes allow for non-calculative decision making (Jupille et al. 2003: 21). Similarly, Wagner (2002: 102, 107, 166) prioritises material factors and complements them with liberal constructivist ones in explaining the preferences of different EU Member States over EU foreign policy.

What does this mean for explaining policy activity towards Latin America? I am going to assume that the intensity of material – economic or political – interests determines, to some degree, the receptiveness of the three countries under study to the impact of the constructivism-based variables conceived in this study. Simply put, the idea is that ‘interests trump norms’. Overall, there-
fore, I expect Spanish policy towards the region to be more interest-driven than that of Germany and Britain, whose interests in Latin America are lower. This translates both into higher overall policy activity towards the region on behalf of Spain, and on the influence of the different independent variables, which will be hypothesised in detail in the two case study chapters.

Departing from these considerations, therefore, this study will develop a theoretical framework that incorporates independent variables from both a logic of appropriateness and one of expected consequences within a positivist framework. The challenge, as Zürn and Checkel (2005) point out, will be to show for cases of equifinality whether behaviour is caused by constructivist or by rationalist explanatory factors. Researchers have noted that operationalising constructivist explanatory variables without leaving room for rationalist interpretations is difficult (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Zürn and Checkel 2005), and one of this study’s tasks is to overcome this problem as far as possible.

2.2.3 Liberal Explanatory Factors

From the above discussion, the question arises of which explanatory factors, or independent variables, the two varieties of liberalism considered by this study posit. Therefore, in the following I outline which factors might be relevant and how I expect them to play out in the cases and countries under study. It is important to bear in mind, however, that I reserve the creation of detailed hypotheses for each individual case study in order to make more fine-grained and case-appropriate predictions. Here, instead, I focus on deriving general theoretical expectations.

**Utilitarian Liberalism**  Within the utilitarian-liberal approach, as discussed above, material factors are frequently seen as a strong influence (Freund and Rittberger 2001: 68). In his seminal book *The Choice for Europe*, Moravcsik finds overwhelmingly in favour of economic considerations as driving international cooperation (Moravcsik 1998: 3). Especially in a relationship where issues of geopolitical “high politics” (Moravcsik 1998: 4) are of little importance, such as the European-Latin American one, a utilitarian-liberal view expects economic factors to have great explanatory leverage, as preferences are motivated by the ‘strongest interest’ (see Table 2.2). Therefore, in order to construct hypotheses relating to utilitarian-liberal explanatory factors, it is important to bear in mind that according to this framework, “what states want is the primary determinant of what they do” (Moravcsik 1997: 521). The researcher then has to ascertain policy-makers’ preferences over policy towards Latin America to explain
Economic Interests Liberal accounts of foreign policy often emphasise material factors, since their economic well-being is what domestic interest groups and, eventually, voters care the most about (Wagner 2002; Freund and Rittberger 2001; Moravcsik 1998). Therefore, it is possible to imagine that policy towards Latin America is conceived primarily with the goal of increasing the economic benefits of those domestic firms who are already active in Latin America through trade or investment, or those who want to enter the up-and-coming Latin American markets. In this case, I would expect to see the country with the largest economic interests in the region (Spain) to operate the most active policy towards Latin America, followed by Germany and the UK, whose economic sectors’ involvement with the region is lower (Eurostat 2009). This would affect foreign economic policy towards the region – including development policy – in particular, but the governance dimension and the European dimension might likewise be affected as efforts are concentrated in those countries where close relations seem to promise the largest economic returns.

How these factors play out in the respective policy areas will be discussed in more detail within the individual case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, where case-specific hypotheses are derived. Nevertheless, some general expectations can be stated here for each of the independent variables, in particular regarding the levels of policy activity to be measured in Chapter 3. As stated above, it is likely that domestic economic interests go rather a long way in explaining policy activity on the economic dimension, in particular the trade and investment component thereof. Things look different on the development sub-component of economic foreign policy towards Latin America, where conflicting motivations on behalf of policy-makers are more likely, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5. As for Spain, it is the country with the highest economic stakes in Latin America (Eurostat 2009; see also Arahuetes and García 2007; Heredero and Hernández 2006) and may therefore be expected to be particularly active on this dimension as it seeks to secure these accomplishments, particularly in the current crisis where its Latin American investments have helped keep Spanish enterprises afloat (The Economist 2009). However, if economic interests are the main driver behind policy towards Latin America, I would also expect this to be the dimension where Germany and Britain are the most active, given the region’s economic growth during the period under study and the fact that their political interest in Latin America is even lower.
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION AND FRAMEWORK

Political Interests  However, whether it is economic or other preferences determining policy activity may also depend on the policy area. Latin America’s growing importance on the world stage as its economies continue to grow while those of Europe are struggling warrant additional attention to the “strategic setting” (Frieden 1999: 48) in considerations of rationalism-based preference formation. The strategic setting, according to Frieden, is important in determining actors’ foreign policy preferences in that it constitutes the framework within which they move. Applying this to the context of this study, one would have to consider the shape of the relationship between the countries in question and Latin America to determine what each of them ‘wants from’ the region: is the relationship primarily based on economic factors, or is there for example a geopolitical component? If so, we would expect foreign policy towards Latin America to be more active on the governance dimension, and policy-makers would motivate their policy choices with the importance of Latin American countries as political partners. Similarly, Wagner (2002: 110) considers “power” and “plenty” to be the main utilitarianism-based determinants of state preferences. In the Latin American case, in line with a utilitarian-liberal approach one would expect “plenty” to carry the day as an explanation for policy towards the region on behalf of EU Member States, but there may also be an increasingly important “power” component.

Regarding their implications for policy activity, political interests are likely to matter more on the governance dimension, and again I would expect Spain, which has been traditionally close to Latin America, to be the most active here. Spain has been said to use Latin America as a way of projecting itself internationally (e.g. Grugel and Alegre 1991; Moltó 2010), so that it can be expected to display high levels of activity. As regards Germany and Britain, it is difficult to anticipate theoretically where political interests matter more and which country might display higher levels of policy activity as a result. Both can be expected to be relatively low, as Latin America is not an important political partner for both countries: Germany is traditionally more oriented towards its European partners and the US, as well as more recently towards Eastern Europe (Anderson 2005; Grabendorff 1993), and the UK – vice versa – often focuses on the transatlantic relationship first and Europe second, also orienting itself towards multilateral fora (Williams 2004; Forster 2000). However, political interests may also influence the economic dimension and the European dimension, thus potentially increasing activity in these areas.

However, it is important to test the liberal-utilitarian framework against competitive explanations, and to check whether other factors that can enhance the liberal explanations might matter in European countries’ foreign policymaking towards Latin America. The variation in the dependent variable re-
2.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

revealed in the next chapter may not be entirely explained by liberal utilitarianism, or may even present puzzles for it. For example, in explaining development policy towards Latin America, one may want to consider norms over aid allocation as a potential explanation. In the case of national foreign policies’ interaction with the EU level, it may be worth considering the impact of socialisation at the European level. In placing the competing or complementary independent variables on the same footing as the liberal utilitarian ‘baseline model’, I begin by contemplating factors from the realm of liberal constructivism.

Liberal Constructivism – National Socialisation into Domestic Norms

Ideational factors, however, represent a methodologically challenging concept and researchers have struggled to operationalise them. Thus, they have frequently “tended to be pushed aside” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889). As previously discussed, this investigation seeks to integrate rationalist and constructivist explanatory factors within a positivist framework. The enormous advantage of such an approach is that it allows the researcher to treat ideational factors, such as domestic norms giving rise to a national identity, as a variable (Abdelal et al. 2006) alongside and complementing rationalism-inspired factors. In their edited volume, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) assemble a range of articles that show what such an approach is capable of. In particular, taking ideational factors into account, contributions to their work show how “nations react quite differently to similar material circumstances because of fundamental differences in normative beliefs about politics” (ibid.: 16). Wagner similarly theorises “reality constructs”, defined as identities, norms and values (Wagner 2002: 166), as a possibility to move beyond rationalism-based explanations. These and other works discussed above operate under the basic assumption that the world is “ideational as well as material” (Ruggie 1998: 879)

From these considerations derives the liberal constructivist idea that policymakers may have been socialised into a domestic norm upon which they base their decisions about policy-making towards Latin America. Normative prescriptions about the ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’ way to carry out foreign policy may exist and may vary across different countries. Different ideas about the ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’ content and conduct of foreign policy towards Latin America may therefore result in different foreign policy behaviour on behalf of differ-

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12Motivations for using the rationalist framework as a baseline model are discussed in Section 2.2.2; for an in-depth assessment see also Wagner (2002: 102ff).
13Although Finnemore and Sikkink’s piece considers the relevance of international norms, which are not strictly the focus of this study (unless mediated by domestic factors), this difficulty applies to ideational factors in all settings.
ent countries. Ideas can serve as policy makers’ road maps, defining potential ways of procedure, they can serve as focal points defining solutions to a problem or ‘glue’ holding a coalition of policy-makers together, and they can become institutionalised, specifying policy in the absence of innovation (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 13ff). It might even be the case that policy-makers as such are especially susceptible to such a norm, as they might choose their career path based on wanting to implement a certain kind of policy. Thus, Germany, the UK and Spain may, for instance, have different foreign policy cultures (Boekle et al. 2001: 105f) within which their approaches towards Latin America are embedded. Policy-makers may be motivated by what they see as ‘appropriate’ given their policy culture, national identity, or domestic norms. However, in this study, I am not interested in how policy-makers have been socialised, but whether they have been socialised, so that the socialisation process as such remains exogenous to this framework. In considering national socialisation, I borrow from the literature on the subject that has evolved in EU studies, where national-level socialisation has been shown to be important in policy-making (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005).

Observing the effects of socialisation as such is difficult, and many studies of socialisation have struggled to operationalise it in such a way that it does not leave room for rationalist interpretations (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1062). Of course, this study cannot solve all the methodological problems associated with the concept of socialisation, but by providing a clear conceptualisation of socialisation’s status as an exogenous independent variable for the purposes of this study, as well as by triangulating different sources, I can provide a plausible account of the factors at work.

As for their impact on policy activity, domestic norms about what kind of foreign policy is legitimate or ‘the right thing to do’ may exist in all three countries and impact upon all the dimensions of policy towards Latin America conceptualised in Section 2.1.2. How they will affect policy activity depends very much on the national norms themselves and is difficult to state in a general manner – they may increase, or indeed diminish it. For example, if there is a domestic norm at play in Britain that development assistance should go to the poorest countries (Watkins 2010), this may well draw activity away from Latin America, which is comparatively ‘rich’. On the other hand, if in Germany there is a domestic norm about directing foreign policy at least partially through the EU framework, this would likely increase German policy activity on this dimension while it might lower it for the UK, where domestic norms regarding the EU tend to be rather sceptical (Wagner 2002). Therefore, in the case of domestic norms it is instrumental to ascertain not just whether they matter, but

14These issues are discussed in depth by Beyers (2010).
which ones are at play in a particular policy field, as this impacts upon the level of activity with which a country is likely to act towards Latin America. For each case study, therefore, secondary literature will be employed to be able to incorporate directional statements into the theoretical expectations. In particular, country-specific studies of foreign policy-making in Britain, Germany, and Spain will be helpful here. They include, among others, Rittberger (2001a) and Malici (2006) for the German case, Youngs (2010) and Aixalà i Blanch (2005) for the Spanish case, and Williams (2004) and Wallace (2005) for the British case – to mention only a few recent studies.

Overall, previous research suggests that German foreign policy has been influenced by a national perception that the right way to carry out foreign policy is that of a civilian power embedded both in Europe and the international community (e.g. Katzenstein 1996; Aggestam 2000; Anderson 2005, among others), even after reunification: Rittberger (2001b: 7) terms it a “norm-consistent foreign policy”, and Malici (2006: 37) argues that many of Germany’s choices in foreign policy are based on a “foreign policy culture of reticence”.15 Nevertheless, more recently there has been a renewed debate about the extent to which Germany’s foreign policy is based on domestic norms or whether it is becoming more interest-driven. (Karp 2009; Bulmer and Paterson 2010, see also Daehnhardt 2011). I therefore expect German policy activity towards Latin America to be influenced by domestic norms, although this impact should be secondary to the realisation of its domestic interests. The specific norms expected to be at play will be defined in the individual case studies, although they should be broadly in line with Germany’s foreign policy-making culture as a peaceful state embedded in both the European Union and the Western international community.

As regards Spain, the problem is that its foreign policy has been rapidly developing since its democratisation after 1975, and that during the course of these developments, it has been subject to different motivations (Aixalà i Blanch 2005: 92ff.). However, with regard to policy towards Latin America there are domestic norms that have been constantly present at least since its access to the European Community in 1986: the double identity of being both European and ‘Iberoamerican’ (Barbé 2009, 2011),16 which can sometimes lead to tensions (del Arenal 2009b: 40). This foreign policy norm of ‘belonging’ to the Iberoamerican space is thus likely to substantially influence foreign policy activity towards Latin America and lead to high levels of activity in all areas. This means that in the case of Spain, both interests and domestic norms should contribute to the making of its Latin America policy and it is important to dis-

15Emphasis in the original.
16On the “Iberoamerican Community” (Comunidad Iberoamericana), see fn 7, p. 28.
entangle the two in order to understand the extent to which policy is driven by both types of factors.

Finally, in the UK, the factors underlying foreign policy-making in general have been shown to be relatively pragmatic (e.g. White 2001: 120; Forster 2000) and driven by what Forster terms – in the EU context – “a robust cost-benefit analysis”. Regarding policy activity towards Latin America, I therefore expect the impact of domestic norms to be relatively weak, and overall policy activity to be low (except, as discussed above, in the area of economic policy) and driven by interest-based factors rather than norms. However, the two case studies chosen here present some particularities. In the case of development policy, there has indeed been a strong drive towards poverty alleviation in the UK that might be driven by a domestic norm (Porteus 2005). In the case of policy towards Latin America in the European context, it is no secret that the UK has traditionally been more of an “awkward partner” in Europe (George 1994). Thus, Eurosceptic national norms might also affect how UK policy-makers carry out foreign policy towards Latin America within the EU framework (Whitehead forthcoming 2012). These issues will be further discussed in the two case study chapters. For now, let it suffice to say that factors rooted in domestic norms are expected to be less relevant in the UK than in Spain and Germany.

In spite of the above evidence for certain national norms arising from previous literature, it is important that the interviews with policy-makers remain open enough to be able to uncover norms that may be novel or unexpected (Gläser and Laudel 2010), an issue that will be discussed in Chapter 4. The impact of norms, however, is also likely to interact with the ‘interest’ variables – we might imagine, for example, that economic interests may ‘trump’ normative considerations about foreign policy. Similarly, there are some policy areas that are more susceptible to the impact of norms than others, making their study particularly interesting regarding the aforementioned interaction between different motivating factors: it is much more likely that domestic norms impact upon development policy towards Latin America than, for example, in trade and investment policy. The impact of domestic norms, therefore, is likely to create a more balanced map of foreign policy activity towards Latin America, for interest-driven foreign policy would mostly increase activity on the economic dimension and the governance dimension – in the case of the governance dimension, especially on the political dialogue component where issues of diplomacy and international politics are covered.
2.2.4 The Limitations of Liberalism: Extending the Framework

The baseline framework of my study is thus centred on liberalism-based explanations of foreign policy, drawing on both rationalist-liberal and constructivist-liberal factors. However, it is important to address the liberal framework’s limitations and show how it can be extended to improve upon these shortcomings.

The main issue for this study is the monocausal view of foreign policy a liberal approach takes, focusing exclusively on domestically originated preferences. The impact of the international level is largely exogenous to the liberal account of foreign policy. Yet the issue of the systemic level’s influence and its compatibility with a liberal framework is important and deserves a more detailed elaboration. A liberal focus brings with itself the need to discuss this investigation’s particular variant of the agency-structure problem: the reciprocal interplay between actors and structure is difficult to conceptualise in social science in general and in Foreign Policy Analysis in particular (Carlsnaes 1992: 249f).

At the risk of oversimplification, I do not want to pretend that I can even come close to solving this problem, and much less so within the scope of this study. Hence, I adopt a pragmatic approach by focusing on the ‘actor’ side of the coin while trying to hold as much as possible of the ‘structure’ constant through the application of the most similar systems design discussed previously. This is not to say, however, that the global systemic and institutional settings of the states under study do not matter. Although I consider the international system largely exogenous to my framework, it is unwise to ignore systemic factors entirely. In this section, I first outline which systemic factors this study considers relevant and how I expect them to be received in the three countries under study. I then go on to theorise the mechanisms by which they might operate and how I expect them to play out in the cases under study here.

Indeed, proponents of institutionalism argue that the frameworks within which policy-makers interact internationally – that is, macro-level factors – affect their preferences and the way they make (foreign) policy. National foreign policy-makers may adapt national foreign policy to rules or norms emanating from the international level. Because in particular Moravcsik’s theorising on liberalism, and his liberal intergovernmentalist theory more specifically (Moravcsik 1993; 1998), originated within the framework of the European Union, such criticism is also often located within that framework (e.g. M.E. Smith 2000; Risse and Börzel 2000; Lewis 1998; Sandholtz 1996). In 2005 an entire special issue of International Organization was dedicated to the question of such questions within a framework entitled “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe” (Checkel 2005). Most recently, Wong and Hill (2011)
and Moumoutzis (2011) have theorised the impact of the European level on general Member State foreign policy, and an edited volume by Ruano (forthcoming 2012) deals with the Europeanisation of foreign policy towards Latin America in particular. The aforementioned researchers thus focus mainly on the impact of the EU on Member States’ policy-making both in general and in foreign affairs in particular. This makes their work particularly pertinent to the case study on the interaction between national approaches and the EU’s foreign policy towards Latin America (Chapter 6).

Yet similar arguments might be made about the potential impact of international interaction more generally, making it relevant also for other aspects of foreign policy such as development assistance, which will be studied in detail in Chapter 5. Indeed, the impact of the wider international level on policy makers and policy-making has also been subject to exhaustive previous research (e.g. Slaughter 2004; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1997). While the basis of this study’s country selection is, in part, their similar positions in the international system and within Europe, this argument is hardest to uphold when it comes to the larger global scene, where the UK and Germany occupy more influential positions than Spain. The UK, for example, is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Germany and the UK have considerably larger economies than Spain, especially since the beginning of the economic crisis that has beset the country in the latter part of the period covered by this study.\(^\text{17}\) On the grand scale of things, it remains plausible to argue that the countries’ position in the global community is sufficiently similar to justify a main focus on domestic, that is, liberal explanatory factors. To some extent, all three are European middle powers in the international environment. However, country-specific factors might account for the potential differential impact of global-level factors. However, researchers differ about how the impact of the systemic level, be it the EU or the wider international context, comes about, as I will further discuss below.

How can the two frameworks be reconciled? As outlined above and in greater detail in Chapter 1, the country selection in this study is based on the idea that the countries in question have similar positions in the international system and at the EU level, and this is why a liberal focus is particularly well-suited to explain differences in their foreign policies towards Latin America. What is more, it can be argued that all formal foreign policy is made by officials in the relevant government ministries and agencies – mainly the ministries of foreign affairs,\(^\text{18}\) where they are firmly embedded in a domestic setting. There-

\(^{17}\)That said, the effects of the crisis were not fully felt in foreign policy until 2010 (Molina and Tovar 2011).

\(^{18}\)Recall that the definition of foreign policy proposed by Hill (2003) referred to “official external relations”.\)
fore, if there is a differential impact of the international or European level, this
is most likely brought about by domestic differences through which the impact
of systemic factors is ‘filtered’ (Risse et al. 1999). As Cortell and Davis (1996)
point out, policy-makers can invoke international rules and norms in making
national policy choices. This, then, is fully compatible with a liberal frame-
work in that the systemic level becomes a factor that influences the preferences
of domestic policy-makers. How this influence is received may then depend
on domestic features, such as the strength of interests or norms on a certain
issue. Additionally, as regards the impact of EU-level factors, a further aspect
needs to be taken into account that justifies the focus on mediation through do-
mestic factors. As indicated previously, all three countries analysed are large
EU Member States. Both Germany and the UK are pivotal states in the Union,
and Spain’s special relationship with Latin America promotes it to such a posi-
tion in policy towards the region. Their position within the EU should hence be
sufficiently similar to assume that if there are differences in the ways in which
EU-level mechanisms play out in the three countries, this should be a result
of their interaction with domestic factors. Nevertheless, in Chapter 6 I will test
hypotheses dealing with EU-level factors in order to ascertain whether they are
influential. However, since among my analysed cases there is no non-Member
State, if there is variation in how EU-level factors are received in the three
states under study, they are most likely to result from domestic factors (Mou-
moutzis 2011: 615). Therefore, while the European level may impact upon
national foreign policy, its impact is conceptualised in this study as mediated
by country-specific factors.

Figure 2.1 visualises the study’s overarching theoretical framework.

2.2.5 Systemic independent variables

Having conceptualised how the international and the EU level may impact
upon foreign policy-making, and how this impact might be mediated by do-
mestic factors, I now assess in more detail the possible ways through which
this impact may occur. As with the liberal factors, this study takes a prag-
matic approach to the possibility of interaction and complementarity of the
different independent variables. While I set out to assess which factors best
explain foreign policy activity towards Latin America in Europe, there is no
reason to believe that they should be mutually exclusive or could not be in-
teractive. Nevertheless, it will be crucial to carefully distinguish between the

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19 For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see also Moravcsik (1997: 522; 542ff).
20 Haverland (2006: 139ff) points out the need to include non-EU states within a similar setting if
the goal is to fully determine the impact of Europe. But if EU membership is constant, the impact
of Europe should be similar, unless there is variation in domestic factors.
different independent variables in order to reach coherent explanations of foreign policy-making towards Latin America. In this section I will again form some general expectations about the impact of the systemic variables, while I reserve the derivation of specific hypotheses for the case studies in order to be able to make them more fine-grained.

**Rational Adaptation to International and European rules**  One mechanism by which systemic, macro-level factors might come to influence foreign policy is the rational adaptation to international or European standards. The motivation for policy-makers to conform to such standards is governed by a logic of expected consequences. Slaughter (2004), for instance, conceptualises international governance networks in which policy-makers from different countries collaborate in solving common challenges and problems. Through interaction, the network becomes a “conduit for information” about the members of the network and “their competence, quality, integrity and professionalism” (Slaughter 2004: 54), and facilitates the creation of behavioural standards (Majone 2001: 272; see also Slaughter 2004: 54). Even if there exists an international norm about a certain type of behaviour, policy-makers may adhere to it in order to preserve their status as a ‘good partner’ with their international or European peers, as well as in order to retain influence and not be left out of
international decision-making circles. Therefore what Checkel (2005) calls “behavioral adaptation” to international rules might be an explanatory factor for foreign policy towards Latin America. I term this variable ‘rational adaptation’ in order to avoid confusion with other mechanisms, opting for the “behavioral adaptation” terminology employed by Checkel (2005), or ‘rational adaptation’, over Slaughter’s use of “socialization”, thus reserving the term for the context of the logic of appropriateness.

With respect to policy activity itself, as with domestic norms, the impact of rational adaptation depends on the policy area and international rule in question. For development policy, for instance, we may imagine a rule of using foreign aid to alleviate poverty (Baulch 2006). This would lead countries to focus their aid on poorer countries, both within Latin America and more generally, thus potentially leading policy activity away from this relatively rich region.21 Regarding interaction between national foreign policy towards Latin America and the EU level, there might be rules about sharing information with European partners, or accepting policies in which other EU members have very strong interests onto the national foreign policy agenda (Checkel 2005).22

Rational adaptation is, of course, more likely to have an impact in policy areas where a lot of international interaction occurs – as is the case, for example, in development policy and, even more so, in the European context. Rational adaptation to international rules may be particularly important for Spain. As I have already discussed (see fn 12, p. 30), although membership in the Western international community and the EU is a factor all three countries have in common and should by now have fully incorporated into their foreign policymaking process, Spain is still a relative newcomer to the international arena and might be particularly keen on being seen as a reliable and important international partner. Indeed, Spanish adaptation to international and European patterns has occurred in both foreign aid (e.g. Olivié 2004; Sanahuja 2009) and foreign policy both towards Latin America and in general (Torreblanca 2001; Baklanoff 1996; Grugel and Alegre 1991), but these may be the result of both rational adaptation, international socialisation (see below), or even a change in domestic norms. Therefore, the interviews will be vital in ascertaining which motivating factor is behind such patterns. Similarly, Germany has traditionally been eager to demonstrate its compliance with international or European rules (e.g. Aggestam 2000), and this study will try to shed further light on whether this is due to normative or consequentialist considerations – or both, thus contributing to a current wider debate in the literature about Germany’s foreign policy activity.

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21These dynamics will be discussed in much more detail in Chapter 5.
22Again, a specific hypothesis regarding rational adaptation in the EU context will be derived in Chapter 6.
policy motivations (e.g. Bulmer and Paterson 2010; Karp 2009). Britain, on the other hand, has been traditionally more of an international rule-maker (e.g. in foreign aid, Watkins 2010), so that the effect of rational adaptation is likely to be weaker here because there is little need for the UK to adapt to international rules for whose making it is partially responsible.

Overall, it is important to note that rational adaptation to international rules is unlikely to be independent of domestic interests. Departing from the idea that domestic interests should be the main driving factors of foreign policymaking, as discussed above, we can expect that the stronger domestic interests are, the more likely policy-makers are to forego their reputation and status in favour of reaching the national interest should there be a clash between the two. Thus, especially in the case of Spain interesting interaction between the two is likely, as interests might drive Spain towards a highly active policy, while international or European rules might favour the direction of policy activity away from the region. In Germany and the UK, where interests are weaker, such a clash should not be present and rational adaptation to international rules – if it does make an impact – can affect foreign policy activity more directly. At the same time, in particular the UK’s position as an international rule-maker should lower rational adaptation overall. These considerations indicate that complex interrelations between the different independent variables are to be expected, and Chapters 5 and 6 will shed further light on how they play out.

Socialisation into International and European Rules  On the other hand, it is also possible that they become socialised into international rules and norms, coming to accept them as the ‘appropriate’ way to behave in a given setting. In this case, policy-makers no longer operate within a logic of expected consequences, but one of appropriateness. There are two ways by which actors could theoretically be socialised, and Checkel terms them “Type I” and “Type II” socialisation. “Type I” refers to role playing: policy-makers internalise rules and behave according to them because they consider them appropriate given the forum. Yet they have not reflexively internalised these rules (Checkel 2005: 810). Such reflexive internalisation is necessary for “Type II” socialisation to have occurred. In this case, policy-makers have truly come to believe that a certain way of carrying out policy is the right way to go (ibid.: 812). However, for the purposes of this study, I exogenise the actual socialisation process. Instead, this study is interested in what policy-makers base their decisions on and whether or not they have been socialised, not how they have been socialised.

Yet if the international context is similar for the three countries discussed, as I have argued above, the question is how international socialisation can make
2.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

a differential impact in the three countries under study. As previously outlined, I conceptualise the independent variables emanating from the international level as mediated by the domestic context, in line with Risse et al. (1999). With international socialisation, I consider such interaction to take place in particular with domestic norms: if an international or EU-level norm resonates with a similar domestic norm, then it is more likely to have an effect than if this is not the case (Acharya 2004; Rittberger 2001b: 5; Boekle et al. 2001: 114). At least for the EU level, there is evidence that domestic norms are more influential for policy-making than international ones (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005), making the idea that domestic norms might mediate a country’s receptiveness to international norms plausible. Detailed hypotheses regarding these issues will be established in each of the case study chapters.

As discussed in the previous section, whether a country incorporates international rules into its foreign policy may be motivated by both rational adaptation or the result of policy-makers having been socialised at the international level, and finding out which dynamic is at play in Germany’s, Spain’s and Britain’s policy towards Latin America is one of the tasks of this investigation. Some country-specific expectations can, however, be given. As I have pointed out above, Spain is – in comparison to the other two countries – relatively new to the international community, but its policy-makers have by now had ample exposure to international and European interaction to potentially have been socialised (Barbé 2011). Nevertheless, given its shorter trajectory, the process may not yet be complete. As regards Germany, there is previous evidence for German foreign policy being guided by both domestic and international as well as European norms (Wagner 2002; Rittberger et al. 2001a). Finally, for the UK the above consideration that it has traditionally been an international pace-setter also applies here. As a norm-maker, it should therefore be more of a socialiser than a socialisee (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). For policy activity, making foreign policy in the light of international norms should, if anything, diversify policy activity across the different policy areas – although different norms may be at play that can have different effects on policy towards Latin America. This might apply, for example, to activity on the development component of the economic dimension, as outlined above, where having been socialised into an international norm of development policy as poverty-alleviating (as with rational adaptation or a similar domestic norm) might detract donor countries’ attention from Latin America. Closer attention to these aspects is paid by the respective case studies.

As with rational adaptation and domestic socialisation, however, I also expect interaction between domestic interests and the impact of international socialisation. If material factors do indeed matter at the limit (Fearon and Wendt
2003: 58), given Spain’s economic and political interests in the region its receptiveness to international norms might be attenuated when it comes to policy towards Latin America. Conversely, for the Germany and the UK, whose domestic and political interests in the region are lower, international socialisation could impact policy more directly if it were at play (see the previous paragraph for expectations).

2.2.6 Limitations of the Extended Liberal Framework

As all theoretical frameworks, this extended liberal theoretical account has its limitations and exogenises certain factors that may have an impact on foreign policy towards Latin America. However, it is impossible to take all factors into account in one single study. By holding some of them constant, including EU membership, the policy ‘recipient’ (Latin America), and – at least to some degree – the countries’ position in the international setting, it is therefore possible to minimise variation in these potential influencing factors.

One account this investigation does not consider in depth is that advanced in particular by historical institutionalists: it does not especially focus on providing an historically inspired account of critical junctures, unintended consequences and path dependence shaping foreign policy towards Latin America in Europe (e.g. Fioretos 2011; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). Of course, the idea that historical factors such as colonialism are at the root of divergent levels of foreign policy activity towards Latin America is highly intuitive and appealing. This is particularly so given that with Spain, one of the countries under study was in fact a colonial power in the region. Moreover, Britain had a vast empire that did not include Latin America (but did include parts of the Caribbean where the UK still has overseas territories), so that its focus may be drawn away from Latin America as a result of a traditional focus on other regions. This is a perfectly valid consideration. However, there are several aspects that led me away from providing an historical institutionalist account in the strict sense of the term.

Firstly, the fact that Britain, after the Latin American republics became independent quickly rose to a position akin to that of a quasi-colonial power (Fowler 2008: 67ff) somewhat weakens the argument that the UK does not have a history with Latin America. The question of why it turned away from the region is for researchers of history to answer, but the present work is concerned with what factors shape the UK’s (and the other two countries’) relations with Latin America today. While historical institutionalist accounts have a great deal of value, they require a different, more evolutionally-oriented research design than the one employed in this study, which essentially presents
2.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

a snapshot of foreign policy-making towards Latin America spanning roughly the past half-decade (see Chapter 1). Foreign policy and the diplomatic service in particular is a fast-moving field with high staff turnover, making it difficult to access previous members of Latin America departments at ministries of foreign affairs, for instance. A study with a more in-depth historical focus would thus have required a very different research methodology and a focus centred more exclusively on historical factors in order to get a handle on these issues.

More importantly however, this study claims that the factors a more historically based account might emphasise can be comprised within this study’s framework. For instance, one of the independent variables conceptualised by my investigation involves domestic norms. There is no reason why, for example, in Spain such a norm could not be historically based – Spanish policymakers may feel that they have a particular responsibility for a region where Spanish colonisers committed a range of atrocities, or for a region with which they have cultural and historical commonalities. Indeed, there is evidence from previous research in particular for the latter (e.g. Barbé 2009). Although this is historically based, it may have become a national norm into which policy makers could potentially be socialised and is therefore commensurate with the liberal constructivist approach contemplated above. It is rather obvious that levels of foreign policy activity towards Latin America have historical roots. However, how these historical roots have transformed into today’s explanatory variables for policy fields such as development policy or the interaction of national and European policy vis-à-vis the region is something that this study can explore. While not a historical institutionalist account, therefore, the investigation is nevertheless historically aware.

At the same time, I do not dive deeper into the group dynamics, bureaucratic and organisational processes, or the psychological factors that also form part of many FPA-based studies (Hudson 2007). Again, this is not to say that they do not matter – previous theorising and research, most famously by Allison (1971) – on organisational processes and bureaucratic politics – and Janis (1972) – on the influence of ‘groupthink’ on foreign policy – has shown that they do. But in the context of this investigation, where the goal is cross-case and cross-country comparison of foreign policy towards Latin America, a framework allowing for such comparison above the level of the individual or even small-group dynamics must be established. While it is important to be aware of the existence of ‘more macro’ and ‘more micro’ influencing factors, a single study cannot possibly take them all into account, especially if it wants to go beyond the in-depth study of one single case.

Yet another factor that has to be considered in a study of policy towards Latin America is the specific relevance of the United States as a potential in-
fluence on European countries’ policies towards Latin America (Grabendorff 2005). The UK’s transatlanticism has been shown to be particularly strong (Forster 2000: 47; Williams 2004: 912), and Bulmer-Thomas (1989b: 200) has also pointed to the US’s importance in Britain’s relations with Latin America. Similarly, previous research has shown that the US plays a role when Germany considers policy towards the region, taking into account US interests (Grabendorff 1993: 45f, 74ff), but at the same time wanting to ensure the US is not the ‘only game in town’ in Latin America (Bodemer 2006: 265). Finally, in the case of Spanish policy towards Latin America, the US’s role is very complex. Under the Conservative Aznar government, Spain tried to move closer to the US on policy towards Latin America, while the Socialist Zapatero government tried to recover some of its autonomy (del Arenal 2005: 115). Additionally, it matters who occupies the Oval Office: while Zapatero’s relations with Bush were frosty, he tried very hard to get on a better footing with Obama (Powell 2009). In a long-term perspective, pursuing a strong Latin America policy without compromising the relationship with the US has always been a balancing act for the Spanish government (Bodemer 1987: 84; Moltó 2010; Gratius 2010: 4).

However, there are two reasons that can be adduced to justify exogenising the ‘US factor’ to some degree. One is that US influence in Latin America and hence, by proxy, its influence on other countries’ policies towards the region is waning, both because Latin America is becoming more independent (Weisbrot 2011: 70) and because of declining attention from Washington (Gandasegui 2011). Secondly, as discussed above, the US is taken into consideration by all three countries. US influence as such is therefore constant across the three countries under study, and the way it plays out in each country is mediated by domestic factors. Even so, however, it is important not to lose sight of the US’s presence in European foreign policy-making generally and policy-making towards Latin America in particular.

2.3 Further Considerations

In this Chapter, I have shown where this investigation’s contribution to the extant literature on foreign policy-making towards Latin America lies: in providing a comparative, unified theoretical framework that can be applied across countries without losing sight of potential national specificities, it goes beyond the traditional focus on single cases or analyses of policy within the EU framework. While I focus on three countries that have been selected for their similarities and their importance within the international and European system, the framework could theoretically be applied to any EU Member State, although
2.3. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

its usefulness is the greatest when applied to countries with an autonomous national Latin America policy that do not carry out most of their relations with the region through the EU framework. This, I contribute to the unification of a disparate field that is full of unrealised potential, especially given that it opens up the possibility for the analysis of regular day-to-day foreign policy that is all too often ignored.

The chapter has also provided a conceptualisation of foreign policy, and policy activity towards Latin America in particular, which will be the subject of more in-depth conceptualisation in the next chapter, where it will be measured using an index constructed on the basis of fsQCA. Foreign policy is conceptualised here as consisting of three dimensions that are relevant for EU Member States: an economic, a governance, and a European dimension.

Furthermore, I have outlined the explanatory framework of this investigation, which rests on liberal foreign policy theory, thus focusing on domestic factors that may be able to explain the differences between the foreign policies towards Latin America of the three countries under study. The framework conceptualises two utilitarian liberal variables – economic and political interests – as well as a constructivist liberal one focusing on domestic norms about foreign policy. However, since it is unwise to ignore the wider European and international systems within which the three countries under study make foreign policy towards Latin America, I extend the liberal framework to include both rational adaptation to and socialisation into international (and European) rules and norms. While in this chapter, I have outlined some general implications for policy activity towards Latin America, the two case studies on development policy and interaction between national and EU-level policies towards Latin America will draw up more specific hypotheses based on the appropriate middle-range theories. In general, I expect that the more multi-causal the explanation for a country’s foreign policy towards Latin America, the more balanced its activity across the three dimensions will be, as I expect the utilitarian-liberal explanations to drive primarily the economic dimension and parts of the governance one. In addition, Spain will likely display high levels of activity across all dimensions, with the UK and Germany being considerably less active overall and concentrating activity especially on the economic dimension.

Let me now turn to empirically analysing these claims by measuring policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of the three countries.

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23 This caveat limits the framework’s applicability to the new EU Member States, whose Latin America policies are, for the most part, only just beginning to develop, and are doing so almost entirely within the EU framework.
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION AND FRAMEWORK
Chapter 3

British, German, and Spanish Policy Activity towards Latin America
In the previous chapter, I outlined the theoretical basis for the structure of this study’s overarching dependent variable: policy activity towards Latin America. ‘Policy activity’ represents a more tangible way of conceptualising foreign policy, since it facilitates operationalisation. It is, as previously explained, divided into three dimensions: an economic, a governance, and a European dimension, which are summarised in Table 2.1 (page 45) alongside their various sub-dimensions. In this chapter, the operationalisation of ‘policy activity’ and its measurement will be discussed in more detail. In order to make operationalisation and measurement comparable across the three countries under study, I will develop an index to score their policy activity towards Latin America using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA; Ragin 2000; 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009) in an innovative fashion.

The use of fsQCA to create an index provides two main advantages: firstly, it allows for the integration of both qualitative and quantitative data to create a systematic map of the data. It allows the small to medium-N researcher to dive deeply into the cases at hand without foregoing the advantages of a highly structured comparison. Secondly, it enables the researcher to structure data that are otherwise not easily comparable in an incremental process, exposing variation at different stages of the index aggregation procedure. The fuzzy-set scores resulting from indexing will be used to reveal variation that might lead to further theoretical and empirical insights. This permits the selection of particularly promising aspects of variation for further scrutiny through in-depth case studies. Based on the results of indexing, two particular cases will be subject to further study in the second part of this investigation: development policy and the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America. Although fsQCA has previously been used for ideal type analysis (Gran 2003; Kvist 2007), its potential to compile indices for structured comparison still remains under explored. This chapter thus contributes to the inquiry into the method’s potential for various aspects of scientific investigation, and to bridging the gap between different types of data.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I will refine the theoretical conceptualisation developed in Chapter 37 by developing indicators for the individual aspects of policy activity. I then go on to make the case for using an index to measure policy activity and lay out how to do so using fsQCA. The next step puts the method into practice by setting up the index, before I finally discuss the variation uncovered and assess its implications for this study.
3.1 Measuring and Operationalising Policy Activity towards Latin America

In the previous Chapter, I theorised the three dimensions of policy activity towards Latin America. It is the task of this section to fill this conceptualisation with life by operationalising the dimensions and their subcomponents with indicators that can be measured across the three countries under study. First, recall the motivation for re-conceptualising foreign policy towards Latin America as ‘policy activity’ towards the region. The three countries under study, Britain, Germany, and Spain, each operate a national foreign policy vis-à-vis Latin America. This study, based on an extended liberal framework, seeks to explain the origin of differences in these policies. However, ‘policy’ as such is not easy to operationalise and measure, so that a more tangible conceptualisation has to be found. ‘Policy activity’, as I show in this section, fits the bill rather well.

In this context, it is important to clarify the meanings of operationalisation and measurement. The latter refers to the process of presenting a concept in such a way that it can serve as part of an empirical statement. Often, the example of temperature is used (Brady 2004: 63f). How do we know whether it is hot, warm, or cold? And how do we know exactly how hot, warm, or cold it is? Stevens (Stevens 1946: 677) defines measurement as “the assignment of numerals to objects or events according to rules.” While one may reasonably argue that it is possible to measure without assigning a numeral – at lower levels of measurement, what is assigned is a category or a more general value (‘more’ or ‘less’) – Stevens’ definition makes sense in that measurement refers to assigning a classification to a concept. Whether that classification is numerical or qualitative is initially secondary, as is convincingly argued by Collier and colleagues. In fact, it depends on the subject of study, since “political and social attributes are not always quantifiable” (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forthcoming 2012). But in order to engage in measurement one must have a measurable, in other words, observable object. Furthermore, as Brady (2004: 63) points out, “Measurement […] is not the same as quantification, and it must be guided by theories that emphasize the relationships of one measure to another.” In the case of this study, the relationships between the individual concepts to be measured have been theorised in Chapter 2.

Operationalisation, then, refers to the part of the measurement process that takes the researcher from the concept to be measured to an observable variable (Miller 2007: 85f). The concept one wants to measure is often latent, that is, not directly observable – just like ‘foreign policy towards Latin America’. Therefore, the operationalisation step is required in order to find observable
implications of the concept and thus make it measurable. This is done through attaching a series of indicators to the concept (ibid.: 86), and it is much easier to find such indicators for ‘policy activity’ than for ‘policy’, since ‘activity’ implies that something one should be able to observe is happening.\footnote{Of course, since foreign policy is often subject to diplomatic confidentiality, not all aspects of foreign policy activity can be directly observed. The task, then, is to find indicators that are not only suitable, but also available to the researcher.}

I therefore opt for ‘activity’, that is, how much policy towards Latin America is carried out by each country to overcome the difficulty of transforming a latent concept into an observable variable. Differences in policy activity across the countries should then become evident from differences in the indicators. Developing these indicators is the task of the following paragraphs. When constructing these indicators, it is important to bear in mind that they have to be both valid (that is, they have to actually capture the concept the researcher wants to measure) and reliable (that is, the measurement results have to be reproducible by other researchers). Thus, the criteria for operationalisation have to be clearly specified and documented (ibid.: 93). In particular, small-N qualitative research has been criticised for privileging validity over reliability (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 152) by engaging in “thick description” that makes measurement very convincing and plausible (validity), but is difficult to cross-check by other researchers who do not have the same in-depth knowledge of the case (reliability). While reliability can evidently be a difficult issue in qualitative research, it is important to keep it at a maximum by ensuring transparency about the sources of data. As I will argue below, fsQCA facilitates this transparency due to its highly systematic approach. What is more, those sections of measuring policy activity based on qualitative data will be as well-documented as possible.\footnote{All transparency regarding sources can do little to mitigate the issue of information disappearing from the public domain as government websites are updated. Not all countries archive public web sites when a new version is uploaded, and not all of them do so reliably. In fact, in the particular countries under study, to my knowledge only the UK archives old versions of governmental web sites at the National Archives page (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/). Unfortunately, there is little that can be done about this except creating one’s own archive of web site versions that have been used. I have tried to do so as far as possible, and PDF versions of cited web sites are available upon request.}

In addition, the issue of cross-national comparability of indicators requires some attention. Comparative political research tends to struggle with what van Deth terms the “problem of equivalence” (van Deth 1998; see also Munck 2004: 115; Miller 2007: 92): the difficulty of developing indicators measuring the same concept across the cases under study. Country-specific idiosyncrasies often mean that the same indicator measures different things in different concepts, there is no functional equivalent to an indicator in the different cases under study, or that functionally equivalent indicators still work in different
3.1. MEASUREMENT AND OPERATIONALISATION

ways and therefore have to be measured differently to be compared (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Adcock and Collier 2001: 534ff). As I will show, the indicators developed for measuring policy activity towards Latin America present several varieties of the problem of equivalence. It is therefore important to develop what Przeworski and Teune term “system-specific indicators” (Przeworski and Teune 1970, Chapter 6) whenever there are no equivalents in the respective countries. Such system-specific indicators will be able to measure the same concept, for example economic policy activity towards Latin America, by referring to different indicators for each country. Even when indicators are indeed similar, such as in the case of cultural foreign policy, where cultural centres are used as an indicator for policy activity, national differences in distribution and functioning of the centres have to be taken into account. Adcock and Collier (2001: 536) term this type of indicators “adjusted common indicators”, because while the same indicator is used for all cases under study, it has to be adjusted to produce a valid measure across cases. Making indicators comparable is thus an important task not just to achieve measurement validity, but also to produce workable, meaningful indicators. As I argue below, the establishment of an index using fsQCA is helpful in this respect.

Finally, the number of indicators employed to measure a concept deserves some discussion. Introducing multiple indicators for the same concept can increase a measure’s validity (Miller 2007: 94f) and reliability (Ragin 2008: 75) by increasing the evidence in favour of a pattern. In particular, if qualitative evidence can be complemented with some numerical indicator, this may also increase its reliability, because such a numerical indicator tends to be easier to replicate. However, if the indicators do not co-vary, this might be a reason for the researcher to become suspicious of either the indicators’ validity or the dimensionality of the concept: perhaps it is obscuring variation that points to underlying dimensions driving such patterns. Yet it is also possible that a country, for whatever reason, focuses more on one aspect of the same dimension than another and thus scores differently on indicators of the same dimension. The issue of dimensionality is further discussed in Section 3.2.1, as it has been subject to – sometimes heated – debate in the literature (Blalock 1982: 109; Jackman 1985: 169; Miller 2007: 95f; Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forthcoming 2012).

3.1.1 Operationalising Policy Activity towards Latin America

In order for operationalisation to proceed, remember the dimensions and sub-components conceptualised in in the previous chapter (see also 2.1, page 45):

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3 Alternatively, I will use the terms ‘context-specific’ or ‘country-specific’ to designate system-specific indicators.
CHAPTER 3. POLICY ACTIVITY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

- the economic dimension (subcomponents: trade and investment, development)
- the governance dimension (subcomponents: political dialogue, cultural policy, civil society involvement)
- the European dimension (EU involvement in national policy towards Latin America across dimensions)

The dimensions, then, are the concepts for which indicators have to be found. The subcomponents of these dimensions, such as trade and investment policy or political dialogue are already much more concrete, thus easing the path towards finding observable implications. I will now briefly recall each dimension and discuss its operationalisation in turn.

3.1.1.1 Economic Dimension

**Trade and investment policy activity** Trade and investment policy activity, in particular, is difficult to operationalise for cross-country comparison, because it is an especially poignant case of the ‘problem of equivalence’ discussed above. While this may seem strange at first sight, given that both trade and investment flows themselves are easily quantifiable, the problem becomes apparent once one notes the difference between trade and investment as such (pursued by private companies) and trade and investment policy (pursued by the government). Comparing how different national governments deal with promoting their companies’ trade and investment abroad, and how actively they pursue this policy vis-à-vis a certain region is complex. Each country has quite specific ways of pursuing such policy. The trade and investment component will hence require the development of country-specific indicators.

Furthermore, trade and investment policy is among the many phenomena that Collier et al. allude to when stating that many “political and social attributes” are not easily quantifiable (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forthcoming 2012). Measuring trade and investment policy activity therefore has to be carried out qualitatively in the first place. There are no pure, comparable ‘numbers’ available on the activities each national government engages in to promote trade and investment opportunities for private business. Therefore, the researcher must dive deeply into the qualitative data on how governments view their role in trade and investment promotion and how they make trade and investment policy. To establish measures for policy activity towards Latin America in this field, I will use comparisons with each country’s policy activity towards other world regions wherever possible. In particular, Africa and Asia will serve as helpful yardsticks, since they are the two world regions with
which EU Member States have relationships approximating that with Latin America the most. All three are home to both developing and emerging countries and – aside from the countries of Northern Africa – they are not in the immediate neighbourhood. While it is important not to overemphasise the similarities – indeed, I have previously argued that Latin America is a good case for study precisely because it represents a kind of low-key relationship that most of Africa and Asia do not – what is required here is some independent external measure against which to classify policy activity towards Latin America. Asia and Africa do provide such a yardstick.

As outlined above, with qualitative data the challenge for the researcher is to explicate concisely, yet exhaustively, the classifications reached in the qualitative evaluation of cases. By doing so and laying open the sources from which the evidence adduced for measurement is drawn, this study hopes to balance validity and reliability as much as possible, keeping in mind King et al.’s aforementioned warning against foregoing reliability for validity in qualitative research (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 152).

Bearing the above considerations on multiple indicators in mind, this study introduces further indicators to strengthen the validity and reliability of the qualitative evidence. Just like the qualitative data, however, numerical evidence is not always easily comparable across countries. Comparison with external yardsticks, such as an individual country’s policy activity towards other world regions, enables the researcher to establish measurement. The reference region in this case is Asia, as both regions consist largely of middle-income and threshold countries. The following indicators were used:

- **Britain**: The number of Latin American countries classified by the British government’s trade and investment support agency, UK Trade and Invest (UKTI), as ‘emerging markets’ vis-à-vis Asia (UKTI 2010). These are countries where the British government intends to make special efforts to secure the UK’s position regarding trade and investment.

- **Germany**: The number of bilateral mixed economic commissions (Gemischte Wirtschafts- und Kooperationsräte) between Germany and Latin America vis-à-vis Asia (BMWi 2010). These commissions are made up of government officials and business representatives from both countries involved, and focus on promoting trade and investment cooperation between Germany and the partner country.

- **Spain**: Number of Planes Integrales de Desarrollo de Mercados (PIDM, Comprehensive Market Development Plans) with Latin America vis-à-vis Asia

\[ \text{4The use of various types of external yardsticks in fsQCA index creation will be assessed in greater detail in Section 3.2.2.1.} \]
(ICEX 2010). Similar to the British ‘emerging markets’, PIDMs cover countries where the Spanish government is making special efforts to promote trade and investment relations.

All three country-specific indicators aim at the same concept: the level of activity with which the three countries under study carry out economic policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America. Because there are no functional equivalents in each of the countries, context-specific indicators have been developed here.

**Development policy activity** While measuring trade and investment policy activity is a challenge, it is much more straightforward in the case of development policy: a readily available indicator that is comparable across countries exists in the form of the levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows towards Latin America. Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) regularly report their ODA contributions to the OECD according to a standardised reporting system, aimed at making the figures as comparable as possible. All three countries under study are members of the DAC, so that their ODA data can be obtained from the OECD’s statistics database (OECD 2011). Additionally, the database helps provide yardsticks against which to measure the levels of policy activity by comparing both Spanish, German and British aid flows to Latin America with those of the other DAC countries and flows to Latin America with those to other ODA recipients. I use the following indicators to represent development policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America (detailed numbers are shown in Appendix B):

1. Percentage of total DAC ODA to the Americas corresponding to Germany, Britain and Spain, respectively (2007-9 average).

2. Percentage of ODA to the Americas out of total national ODA (2007-9 average), compared to the other DAC members.

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5All figures used are gross ODA disbursements at current US Dollar prices, i.e. the money that actually went from the donor to the recipient country. This opens up the question of exchange rates. While Spain and Germany both use the Euro and should therefore have similar exchange rate fluctuations against the local currencies of the recipient countries and the US Dollar, the British Pound is detached from the Euro and may be subject to different fluctuation logics. Unfortunately, there is no easy mechanism to correct for this based on the OECD figures, so this is a risk the study has to live with. However, the Euro and the British Pound’s fluctuations against the US Dollar have been moving quite closely together over the 2005-10 period (Bank of England 2011; European Central Bank 2011a, 2011b). Since aid flows are measured in US Dollars, this mitigates the problem somewhat, although it does not do away with issues of fluctuation against Latin American currencies.

6Aid flows are averaged over several years because ODA disbursements sometimes fluctuate greatly between two years, for instance because of natural disasters that cause a spike in humanitarian assistance, such as the 2009 earthquake in Haiti. By considering several years it is easier to smoothen out such ‘special events’. 
3. Number of Latin American countries/subregions among top-25 ODA recipients (2007-9 average), compared with the other DAC members and the DAC average.

3.1.1.2 Governance Dimension

The governance dimension reflects policy activity on three subcomponents: political dialogue, cultural policy, and the integration of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) into policy activity. Quite similarly to the trade and investment subcomponent of the economic dimension, finding cross-nationally comparable indicators is difficult. Therefore, I again rely on the external yardstick of comparing policy activity towards Latin America to other world regions such as Africa and Asia. The governance dimension is difficult to capture qualitatively; instead I chose a number of indicators for the level of activity in each country. They are listed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Indicators for governance policy activity towards Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcomponents of Governance</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political dialogue</td>
<td>Travel diplomacy: bilateral visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural relations</td>
<td>Cultural centres (% of total), weighted by no. of countries in Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society policy activity</td>
<td>% of ODA channelled through CSOs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Political Dialogue**  With political dialogue, it is important to note that a lot of contact between countries happens ‘below the radar’ of public documentation at the working level of civil servants. However, high-level political dialogue in the form of bilateral visits of Secretaries and Ministers of State, Ministers, and Heads of State and Government, is usually recorded and made available on-line. The more frequent the exchange, the higher the level of policy activity. Because of the different government structures of the three states in question – Britain and Spain are monarchies, Germany is a federal republic, and their different representatives have varying functions – the frequency of travel to Latin America is not directly comparable. However, by comparing travel to Latin America with Africa and Asia, it is possible to gauge the level of policy activity towards Latin America. The indicators for each country are as follows:
• **Britain**: Travels of the Foreign Secretary, Prime Minister, Queen, and Prince of Wales (2006-10); Sources: Clarence House (2011); The Royal Household (2011)

• **Germany**: Travels of the Federal Foreign Minister, Chancellor, and Federal President (2006-10); Sources: Bundespräsidialamt (2009, 2011); AA (2009, 2011a); Bundeskanzleramt (2009, 2011)

• **Spain**: Travels of the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister, King, and Prince of Asturias (2006-10); Sources: Casa de Su Majestad el Rey (2009); Presidencia del Gobierno de España (2009); MAEC (2011); MAEC (2009b)

For each country, the percentage of visits to each of the three regions is calculated. From these sources, it is possible to gather a relatively complete picture of travel diplomacy and thus the political dialogue that occurs between the European countries and their counterparts in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

**Cultural Policy**  
In addition to political dialogue, the governance dimension also comprises cultural promotion on behalf of a country, as theorised in Chapter 2. Part of foreign policy consists in trying to promote a country’s own culture and language abroad. All three countries under study engage in cultural promotion through ‘cultural centres’ that teach the language and stage cultural events such as lectures, film screenings, or exhibitions. In Germany, the task is performed by a global network of 136 Goethe Institutes (Goethe Institut 2011b), largely funded by the Federal Foreign Office (Goethe Institut 2011a). The UK’s British Council has a network of 191 offices around the globe (British Council 2010, 2011b), which receive a large amount of government funding – about 30% of its turnover came from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 2009/10 (British Council 2011a). The task is slightly more complex for the case of Spain. Generally, Spanish cultural promotion is carried out by the Cervantes Institutes. However, Spanish is the official language in most of Latin America except Brazil, and no Cervantes Institutes exist in Spanish America. There are, however, Cultural Centres which promote cultural relations with the region. They exist in 13 Latin American countries (and in Equatorial Guinea). Overall, at the time of writing there were 73 Cervantes Institutes (Instituto Cervantes 2011a) and 17 Cultural Centres (MAEC 2009).

These institutes and centres are taken as an indicator for cultural policy activity, since they are largely publicly funded and play an important role in foreign cultural policy (Goethe Institut 2011a; British Council 2011a; Instituto Cervantes 2011a).

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7In some cases, more than one of the leaders participated in the same visit. In this case, both were counted.
Cervantes 2011b). Again, the comparison with Africa and Asia was used as a yardstick by taking the percentage of total centres in each of the three regions. In order to adjust for the fact that Africa and Asia might have more centres because there are more countries in the region, I weighted the percentage by the number of countries in one region as indicated by the United Nations Statistics Division (2009).8

Civil Society Involvement The final component set of the governance dimension is the level of policy activity channelled to Latin America through German, British, and Spanish civil society organisations (CSOs) active in the region. In all three countries under scrutiny, they receive state funding for their activities and therefore to some extent form part of the “official external relations” that constitute foreign policy according to Hill’s definition discussed in Chapter 2 (Hill 2003: 3). Therefore, CSO activity forms part of policy activity directed towards Latin America. As an indicator for CSO involvement, the amount of aid towards a region channelled through CSOs is used. However, the OECD database only lists overall ODA amounts channelled through CSOs, but does not break them down by recipient region. Therefore, I had to take recourse to national data in order to obtain the required figures (DFID/National Statistics 2009; BMZ 2008; 2009; 2010; MAEC 2009a). Again, the data are not comparable across countries, but have to be set individually against policy activity channelled through CSOs towards Africa and Asia. In each case, the latest available figures were used to calculate a three-year average, thus giving a more stable indicator than just relying on one-year data.

3.1.1.3 European Dimension

In order to map the EU level’s importance in Member States’ foreign policy towards Latin America, this study develops an indicator based on the analysis of national documents dealing with Latin America policy. On the basis of a coding scheme, the documents can be analysed. Given the small number of documents, qualitative hand coding is the most viable option, as quantitative content analysis relies on larger amounts of text. Additionally, the fact that the texts are in different languages complicates automated analysis (Krippendorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2005). In the case of Britain and Germany, recent documents on policy towards Latin America are available. Germany published a new strategy paper for its relations with the region in August 2010 (AA 2010). In November 2010, British Foreign Secretary William Hague gave a detailed

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857 in Africa, 42 in Asia (excluding Western Asia), and 24 in Latin America, excluding the Caribbean, but including Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.
speech outlining the UK’s relations with the region (FCO 2010). Finding the appropriate documents is more of a challenge for Spain, which does not have a document outlining its strategy towards Latin America because its policy is extremely broad (Gratius 2010). Therefore, I used the information that is published on the Spanish Foreign Ministry (MAEC)’s website on relations with Latin America (MAEC 2010), as well as an article by then Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero outlining Spain’s foreign policy (Rodríguez Zapatero, 2004), from which I coded the section concerned with policy towards Latin America. A more recent speech on relations with Latin America by then Foreign Minister Trinidad Jiménez (2010) is also included in the analysis. Although these documents are not strictly the same type, all of them are expressions of the official government line. They have undergone a careful governmental writing and editing process and can thus be assumed to be comparable articulations of policy towards the region.

Based on saliency theory (Budge et al. 1987: 24),9 and adapting a framework by Larsen 2009,10 in order to measure the EU’s involvement the study considers the relative importance of the EU level vis-à-vis other channels of action towards the region: bilateral policy, action in conjunction with the US, and action in conjunction with multilateral actors such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the UN. The coding scheme along with the coding results are discussed in Section 3.3 of this Chapter.

This section has developed indicators for measuring foreign policy activity towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK. While this has produced a fine-grained operationalisation of this study’s overarching dependent variable, these indicators now have to be aggregated into comparable measures of policy activity. In the next section, I show how the they can be unified within a coherent framework that enables their comparison across dimensions and countries by way of constructing an index using fsQCA.

### 3.2 The Index of Policy Activity

The indicators that have emerged from operationalisation are numerous and, in their present state, do not yield a comparative measure of policy activity towards Latin America. Some indicators are qualitative, others numerical. Some are comparable across countries, others are context-specific. Finally, they are different across the three dimensions and subcomponents of policy activity. How can such a complex set of indicators be usefully integrated and unified?

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9Saliency theory argues that the importance of an issue or actor in a policy area can be gathered from analysing the frequency – i.e. the saliency – with which it is mentioned in a policy paper.

10This will be further discussed in Section 3.3.3.
In line with Miller (2007: 94), I argue that an index can help overcome the problem of indicator complexity and the difficulties it presents for validation.

### 3.2.1 The Case for Indexing

Indices, according to Miller (2007: 94), are defined as “composite measures which combine two or more indicators on the basis of predefined rules.” In other words, if various indicators have been developed to measure the same variable, an index helps collapse them into one single measure. This is attractive for two reasons. Firstly, as the number of indicators increases, a measure is more difficult to validate (ibid.). Secondly, it makes the indicators much easier to understand and handle. The case of policy activity with the complex range of indicators conceptualised above is therefore a promising candidate for indexing. An index presents numerous advantages over other forms of mapping a variable. Over a mere description of policy activity on the basis of the above indicators, it adds manageability of the data. By attaching a score to each component, the evidence becomes more tangible and measurement should become more precise (Ragin 2008: 81). Additionally, if all indicators are placed on an equal footing by scoring them on the same scale, they become comparable not only across countries, but also across dimensions. Context-specific indicators can be homogenised into comparable index scores, while at the same time it becomes possible to compare, for instance, the indicators for economic policy activity with those for the governance dimension. An index is thus better able to systematically expose instances of both within- and cross-case variation.

Moreover, an index offers the opportunity for more fine-grained measurement than, for instance, a classificatory typology sorting the cases analysed into cells and referring each case to exactly one type (Lehnert 2007: 64; Ragin 2008: 75). As Miller (2007: 95) points out, indices can be based on typologies. If the researcher so desires, a typology could, likewise, be based – at least in part – on an index. However, in this study, I want to measure different levels of policy activity towards Latin America in as fine-grained a fashion as possible in order to unearth those instances of variation that seem promising regarding further investigation. Likewise, Babbie (2007: 175) points out that typologies involve summarising several variables, while an index is constructed to measure one variable – here, foreign policy activity as this investigation’s overarching dependent variable. A typology, at least of the classificatory type, is therefore not what is required. Instead, I seek to develop a more gradual measurement of policy activity than a classificatory typology offers.

This quest corresponds more to the goals of a continuous typology, in which cases form part of a type to a greater or lesser degree (Lehnert 2007: 64).
fact, the study that served as the inspiration for developing an index for policy activity using fsQCA (Gran 2003) constitutes such a typology: Gran uses fuzzy-set analysis to demonstrate the degree to which social services for abused children match ideal types. Devising different attributes, he classifies social service programmes, evaluating to which degree they conform to the ideal type. A fine-grained measurement of the degree of ideal-type conformation is permitted by the possibility of partial set-membership in fuzzy-set analysis (ibid.: 94).11 Similarly, Kvist (2007) uses fuzzy sets for what he calls ‘ideal type analysis’, in this case of different types of welfare state regimes. The index devised for the purposes of the present investigation, however, differs from Gran’s and Kvist’s typologies in that it is not used to sort cases into different types, but rather for mapping and measuring a variable. However, the basic idea of exploiting the benefits of fine-grained set membership offered by fuzzy-set analysis is the same. I will further elaborate on the implications of this issue in Section 3.2.2.2 on indicator aggregation.

Using fuzzy-set analysis for measurement has some tradition in the literature of development economics, where Schaich and Münnich (1996) have developed a measure of poverty based on fuzzy sets. According to Schaich and Münnich, it enables the placement of individuals at different levels of ‘membership’ in the population of the poor, that is, at different levels of poverty (ibid.: 444). They also discuss the possibility to include multiple indicators in the same measure (ibid.: 465f). It is easy to see the connection between their poverty index and the index of policy activity this study will construct: while Schaich and Münnich measure levels of poverty, I measure levels of policy activity towards Latin America. The argument that fuzzy-set analysis enables fine-grained measurement based on multiple indicators applies equally. The method of fuzzy-set QCA (Ragin 2000, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009), as I will discuss below, presents some very convenient possibilities for constructing an index based on the integration of both qualitative and numerical data using multiple indicators.

In the context of multiple indicators some attention should be paid to the question of dimensionality, especially because the word “dimension” has been used a lot in the previous sections conceptualising policy activity. There is an extensive body of literature on the question of the dimensionality of variables. Research methodologists tend to insist that “variables are supposed to be uni-dimensional” (Jackman 1985: 169), meaning that each variable should only capture one concept. Similarly, in his seminal book on social measurement, Duncan (1984: 227f) deplores social scientists’ reliance on indices because of

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11The concept of set membership and its implications for indexing using fuzzy-set analysis will be discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2.
3.2. THE INDEX OF POLICY ACTIVITY

the loss of conceptual clarity they entail, although he does accept them as a necessary evil, “for a merely pragmatic reason, to achieve data reduction.” (ibid.: 228). If multiple dimensions are hidden, these researchers argue, measurement is inadequate and causal inferences are misleading (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forthcoming 2012). This insistence on the unidimensionality of variables is why Miller (2007: 95f) identifies achieving unidimensionality as the main challenge of indices based on typologies.\(^{12}\)

However, other authors such as Collier et al. (forthcoming 2012) take a more pragmatic view of dimensionality, arguing that “unidimensionality is not a well-defined ‘end state’ in research”. Each indicator can be further disaggregated and may hide further dimensions, potentially leading into an infinite regress. The real challenge for both qualitative and quantitative researchers, Collier et al. maintain, is finding “the scope of comparison and level of aggregation – i.e. the degree to which indicators are broken down into their constituent elements – best suited to the analytic goals of the study”. It is therefore important to base the disaggregation of variables into indicators on theoretical motivations.

This study, while recognising the importance of unidimensionality in principle, sides with Collier and colleagues in that it is extremely difficult to guarantee, especially when a concept as complex as foreign policy is concerned. The theoretical motivations for the disaggregation of foreign policy activity into three dimensions reflecting levels of activity in different policy fields have been outlined in in Chapter 2. As for their further disaggregation, their subcomponents are sufficiently specific to yield meaningful ways of operationalisation that can serve as indicators for policy activity. I therefore assume that each dimension of policy activity is, in itself, unidimensional and that the indicators conceptualised in the previous section do not ‘hide’ further sub-dimensions, but are components of the same concept. The level of disaggregation chosen for the purposes of this investigation thus reflects both the theoretical issues discussed in the previous chapter and pragmatic considerations of employing suitable indicators for comparison.

The aggregation of the various indicators into one index thus entails a number of specific requirements. Firstly, as mentioned above, a method to assign scores to data from multiple sources in multiple formats is required in order to enable the combination of various scores into one. In the case of this study, the integration of qualitative data as well as numerical data in various formats (percentages, absolute quantities, shares). The unification of qualitative and quantitative data on the same index is unproblematic. As Brady points

\(^{12}\)Typologies can have one or several dimensions (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forthcoming 2012), while an index is generally unidimensional (Miller 2007: 95f).
out, "qualitative comparisons are the basic building blocks of any approach to measurement, thus bridging the 'quantitative-qualitative' divide by showing that the two approaches are intimately related to one another" (Brady 2004: 63, emphasis in the original). This is because alongside theoretical considerations, qualitative empirical knowledge ideally precedes any operationalisation. There is thus no reason why the two should not be rescaled onto the same index, and Ragin (2000) emphasises fsQCA's reliance on both qualitative and quantitative assessment in assigning scores, thus providing an ideal way of achieving this integration.

Additionally, foreign policy activity is a matter of continuous, not crisp levels. It would, of course, be possible to employ an ordinal scale, ranking policy activity as 'low', 'medium', or 'high', for instance. However, especially where data points lie closely together, such a scale is not fine-grained enough to take account of the variation. This may be the case, for example, when several countries all display relatively low levels of activity, but do differ nevertheless. Grouping them both into a 'low' category would entail a loss of information. While several authors discuss the idea that more information when choosing the level of measurement is not always better (e.g. Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forthcoming 2012; Lehnert 2007: 64, 70), in this case a fairly fine-grained measure of policy activity is necessary. Of course, the categories could be refined more by introducing subcategories such as 'low-medium', the assignation of scores in fsQCA permits an intuitive yet sophisticated rescaling of the different indicators, according to a strict procedure that allows for highly systematic and replicable measurement. As Miller (2007: 95) points out, indexing therefore requires the careful specification of aggregation rules, a requirement fsQCA is able to fulfil by way of its 'calibration' methods. The exact scoring procedure will be outlined in Section 3.2.2 below. Furthermore, the index will be used as a basis for selecting promising cases for further study. The step-by-step aggregation procedure of the various indicators can uncover variation at different steps of the process, so that case selection can be carried out in a very transparent manner. Finally, the middle-range theoretical frameworks that will be employed in the case studies will be able to take account of the different instances of variation exposed by the indexing procedure.

Indexing also requires careful justification of the index components' combination. The combination of the various subcomponents into dimensions has already been justified based on theoretical considerations regarding the composition of the three dimensions of foreign policy activity towards Latin America. However, the question of how much the different components matter within the dimensions must be considered and brings up the thorny issue of weighting the index (Miller 2007: 96). As discussed in the previous section,
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some of the indicators such as cultural centres in Latin America will require some internal weighting to reach a cross-country comparable measure (such as weighting by the total number of cultural centres a country operates in the world). These procedures will be outlined and justified as I set up the measurement of each indicator. However, the question is whether the indicators themselves have to be weighted against each other: is development more or less important than trade and investment policy regarding foreign economic policy activity? In the case of using fsQCA to compile the index, the problem to some extent resolves itself through the index values. In countries where development policy activity matters less, they will obviously receive a lower value on the development policy activity indicator.

But whether the subcomponents of the various dimensions carry the same weight each has to be justified theoretically. In the case of policy activity towards Latin America, I argue against the weighting of indicators, which is complex and introduces more questions than it is able to answer. How much more important than culture is political dialogue? Does the number of Latin American countries among the top-25 ODA recipient countries matter more or less than the percentage of total DAC aid to Latin America corresponding to Germany, Spain, and the UK? In particular with qualitative data it is difficult to introduce weights, as any attachment of a weight to a qualitative measure is to some extent decided subjectively by the researcher. Such ad hoc weighting can be problematic (Slottje 1991: 686; Booysen 2002: 127). There may be theoretical reason to believe that one indicator is more important than the other, but how does one decide whether it is twice or only one and a half times as important? Additionally, weighting the index makes the aggregation procedure of calibrating the fsQCA scores more complicated, thereby introducing further complexity and a potential source of validity loss. No matter how sophisticated the technique, as Booysen (2002: 127) puts it, “no weighting system is above criticism.” Similarly, Drechsler (1973: 18) points out that all weighting methods come with different kinds of weaknesses, making it impossible to identify the ‘best’ one. These difficulties, in fact, give rise to Babbie’s advice that equal weighting of indicators should be the norm, unless weighting is obviously indispensable (Babbie 2007: 162). This is the strategy employed by this study. Mainly, the reason is that apart from the additional complexity weighting introduces, a country with a high level of policy activity towards Latin America should display this activity in all aspects of the relationship, so that all aspects are important and there is no readily identifiable way in which they should be weighted. This is also the reason why in creating the final index value, I demand high scores on all indicators for a high final score.\footnote{The set-theoretic implications of this will be analysed in the next section.}
CHAPTER 3. POLICY ACTIVITY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

To sum up, an index of foreign policy activity towards Latin America will allow for the transparent aggregation of the indicators previously conceptualised into a fine-grained, intuitive measure that is comparable both across cases and dimensions. It will systematically expose variation in foreign policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Germany, Britain, and Spain. In the context of this study, the results will serve as the basis for the selection of cases for further investigation in Part II. That way, the index substantially contributes to placing the study on a sound methodological footing and facilitates case selection based on variation in the overarching dependent variable that may reveal promising insights when disentangled further.

Moreover, by constructing this index, I will introduce an element of comparability into foreign policy-making towards Latin America that has previously been missing from the relevant literature, as I have discussed in Chapter 2. Such an index should also be relatively easy to extend to other instances of foreign policy activity, be they additional cases of EU Member States’ foreign policy towards Latin America, or cases of foreign policy activity towards other countries or regions (in which case, it may be necessary to make some conceptual adjustments to capture the specificities of the recipient countries). In this respect, this study contributes to the literature seeking to systematically compare foreign policies.

3.2.2 Fuzzy-set QCA for indexing

In this section, I discuss how index construction using fsQCA meets the requirements and challenges in mapping foreign policy activity towards Latin America discussed above. Interestingly, the applicability of fsQCA to foreign policy analysis has already been demonstrated by Blatter et al. (2010) in a paper entitled “Preconditions for Foreign Activities of European Regions: Tracing Causal Configurations of Economic, Cultural, and Political Strategies.” They take their use of fsQCA one step further than this study by proceeding to a causal analysis of foreign policy. However, for the purposes of this investigation, fsQCA shines in its ability to summarise complex data, as I will show in the following paragraphs, and will not be employed for causal analysis.

In the first instance, however, a few fundamentals of fsQCA must be explained. Fuzzy-set QCA is a member of the family of Configurational Comparative Methods (CCM; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). It is based on Boolean set-theoretic logic: different conditions may work together to produce an outcome. This outcome is conceptualised as the membership (or non-membership) of the cases under scrutiny in a set as a result of their membership in the conditions (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Therefore, the extent to which cases display the
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conditions must also be conceptualised as set membership. Typically, fsQCA is associated with uncovering sufficient or necessary causal conditions for an outcome, but it is also possible to employ it for the simpler purpose of systematically summarising data (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 15; see also Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 3f), which is the use it is put to in this study. Additionally, it has previously been used for ideal type analyses (Gran 2003; Kvist 2007), some aspects of which will be exploited for this study. Because I am not proceeding to potential causal analysis, I stop at assigning membership scores in the ‘outcome’: policy activity towards Latin America. Formulated in set-theoretic terms, I am measuring the extent to which Germany, Spain, and the UK are members of three target sets that correspond to high activity on the three dimensions of policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America. It is also important to note that fsQCA researchers are wary of the term ‘variable’, preferring ‘condition’ instead of independent variable and ‘outcome’ instead of dependent variable (Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 405). However, because I am not designing an entire explanatory scheme on the basis of fsQCA as an approach, but rather use it as a tool for data summary, this study is justified in using fsQCA to map its overarching ‘dependent variable’. Indeed, Schneider and Wagemann point out that in multi-method designs, it is justified to stick with one kind of terminology to avoid confusion (ibid.). Within Charles Ragin’s four steps of comparative analysis (2000: 144), this measurement procedure thus corresponds to step one, during which cases are selected and the property space is drawn up. By setting up the three dimensions of foreign policy activity towards Latin America and their subcomponents, I have conceptualised a property space which is now further constructed by compiling an fsQCA index, on the basis of which cases for further study will be selected.

3.2.2.1 Scoring the Indicators

Fuzzy-set QCA was initially developed as an advance over earlier QCA methods that were only able to work with crisp sets (Ragin 2000). The crucial advantage of fsQCA over crisp-set QCA is that, rather than being dichotomised into either membership or non-membership in a set, membership can vary by degrees. It may take any value between 0 (fully out of the target set) and 1 (fully in the target set). The potential for the indicator values to vary continuously between 0 and 1 allows for a fine-grained measurement of policy activity towards Latin America that is considerably more powerful than, for example, a classificatory typology, or a classification of the cases into high, medium, and low levels of policy activity. It then becomes possible to combine the various indicators according to the aggregation procedures specified by fsQCA, com-
plying with the requisite of “predefined rules” in index compilation (Miller 2007: 94).

However, the scaling process in fsQCA works somewhat differently from other scaling methods. Usually, values are assigned to indicators on a continuous scale, varying for example between 0 and 1, or scaled empirically by taking the highest value found as the maximum and the lowest as the minimum (Miller 2007). In fsQCA, while the indicators vary between 0 and 1, there is an additional step involved that goes beyond the simple rescaling of data. As Gran explains, “measurement of fuzzy membership seems to require simply a recoding of quantitative data so that they vary between 0 and 1. [...] This standardization of variables from 0 to 1 is not the approach of fuzzy sets” (Gran 2003: 96, emphasis in the original). In fact, the researcher has to query the cases more deeply in order to assign – in the language of fsQCA, calibrate – the membership scores. For example, it may be the case that the data are not uniformly distributed, but ‘bunched together’ in clusters due to the presence, absence, or the level of certain conditions (for an in-depth discussion of the differences between quantitative measurement and measurement calibration, see Ragin 2008, Chapter 4). By carefully investigating the data and using in-depth knowledge about the cases acquired during the data collection process, the researcher can spot such ‘natural gaps’ between different outcomes and assign fsQCA scores accordingly.

Additionally, fsQCA scores are always calibrated against an external ‘yardstick’, meaning the set against which the cases are being scored (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 90ff). In this study, the yardstick can take three forms: the policy activity of other countries, policy activity towards other regions such as Africa or Asia on behalf of the three countries under study, and an ‘ideal type’. I now briefly discuss each yardstick in turn. Firstly, the yardstick can be constituted by a universe of other cases the three countries under study are being compared with. This is the case of development policy activity, for example, where I score the cases against the other members of the OECD Donor Assistance Committee. Here, there are sufficient data at hand to compare the three states with other countries. Based on a careful inspection of the available data combined with knowledge of the cases, the fuzzy-set scores can be assigned (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 4f). This yardstick type ascertains policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of the three countries under study by setting it against the policy activity of other countries not studied. This method is illustrated in detail in the section on quantitative data, using the example of one indicator of development policy activity.

Secondly, the yardstick can be constituted by policy activity of the countries under study towards other regions that are not Latin America but are in a way
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‘similar’. Africa and Asia are chosen in this study, as has been discussed above. This yardstick type is quite similar to the first in that there are ‘outside’ data available, although the focus of the comparison is slightly different in that it focuses on different levels of policy activity towards different regions within the same country to ascertain the level of policy activity towards Latin America. This is where the study makes a new contribution to using fsQCA as a tool, as to my knowledge this type of yardstick has not previously been employed.

Thirdly, if there are no external data available for comparison, or it would be beyond the scope of a study to obtain such data, it is possible to allocate membership scores with reference to an ‘ideal type’ (Gran 2003; Kvist 2007). To this end, it is necessary to consider what would constitute full membership, full nonmembership, and a maximum point of ambiguity regarding membership in the ideal type target set. Within the context of this study, this yardstick is used for instance in measuring policy activity towards Latin America on the European dimension. Based on the question of what would constitute full membership in the ideal-type set of countries with a highly active policy towards Latin America on the European dimension, I define the relevant points against which calibration is carried out. These ‘anchor’ or ‘cutoff-points’ are discussed in more detail below. It is important to note that the overall measure of foreign policy activity towards Latin America is also based on the notion of an ideal type (Gran 2003: 94; see also Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 143) – a country with a very active foreign policy towards the region would score highly on all three dimensions. However, as I have discussed above, while Gran has used this property to actually construct a typology, it can also be used to establish an index. In either case, it is important to be clear about what yardstick is being used at each step of index construction.

There are essentially two different ways of calibrating fsQCA scores, depending on whether one is dealing with qualitative or quantitative data. Both will eventually yield fuzzy-set membership scores that can be directly compared and combined. Fuzzy-set QCA’s potential to make qualitative and numerical evidence communicate on an equal footing is what makes the method so useful for the case at hand, since I do not dispose of numerical data for all the indicators and thus have to rely on qualitative evidence for part of the index. In the following, I briefly outline both calibration procedures.

**Qualitative Data** When dealing with qualitative data, the scores are allocated based on substantive knowledge about the cases (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Such knowledge can come from both primary qualitative data such as government documents and secondary literature, as I will demonstrate in this study. In this context, it is worth clarifying that if the re-
searcher has to rely on qualitative data, fsQCA is suitable only for indexing a small to medium number of cases due to the extensive familiarisation with the cases the method requires. Based on the analysis of the data, the researcher can then assign fuzzy-set membership scores to the cases at hand. Making the procedure explicit requires careful description of the data on which the calibration is based in order to make clear that the evidence has not been skewed or ‘filtered’ in order to suit the researcher’s hypotheses or intuitions – it is important that the researcher be aware of any bias, even unconscious, she may be subject to (George and Bennett 2005: 24). This harks back to the previous discussion regarding the potential trade-off between validity and reliability in “thick description” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 152). As outlined above, it is therefore indispensable to be transparent about data sources and as exhaustive as possible in their evaluation.\footnote{At the same time, it is important not to let the description spiral into an infinite regress and lengthy discussions of tangential data. Differentiating between relevant and irrelevant aspects of policy activity remains, unfortunately, a subjective endeavour. While establishing data validity is a matter of coherent, convincing description, reliability is still a thorny issue, no matter how convincing the description, since there are no ‘hard’, numerical facts and calculations easy to check and replicate. The only thing that can be done is to be as transparent as possible about one’s sources to facilitate cross-checks.} While this is not an easy task, this study will do its best to comply with these standards based on both government documents and secondary literature, attempting to construct as complete a picture of policy activity as possible from the information available. Furthermore, as Miller (2007: 88) points out, assigning numbers to qualitative data can be similarly difficult and problematic because “language does not lend itself to precise differentiation.” Fuzzy-set QCA, however, provides some helpful guidelines in assisting with the assignation of fuzzy-set scores: following the careful investigation of the data, each case receives a score between 0.0 (fully out of the target set) and 1.0 (fully in the target set), according to the degrees of set membership shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Degrees of membership for assignation of scores to qualitative data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>fsQCA score</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Fully in the target set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Mostly but not fully in the target set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>More in than out of the target set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>More out than in the target set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Mostly but not fully out of the target set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>Out of the target set</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ragin 2008: 95f
3.2. THE INDEX OF POLICY ACTIVITY

close enough grasp of the cases under study to be able to assess to what degree a case is within or outside the target set. In the context of this study, this is relevant mainly for the economic policy dimension’s trade and investment component. As laid out above, government material and secondary literature will be employed to evaluate the level of policy activity, seeking, wherever possible, the comparison with policy activity vis-à-vis other world regions, principally Africa and Asia. By using fsQCA to measure qualitative data, it is possible to mitigate the problem that “measurement in qualitative research is typically lacking in precision” (Ragin 2008: 81), while at the same time exploiting the in-depth qualitative knowledge acquired during the study of the cases.

Quantitative Data  Fuzzy-set calibration with quantitative data requires the same initial step of data querying in order to assess the distribution of the data. In this manner, fsQCA provides an advantage over traditional scaling methods in that it can take account of qualitative differences in numerical data that are not accounted for if the data are simply re-scaled, for instance on a continuous 0 to 1 interval. However, calibration is considerably less complex with numerical data, as numbers are more easily inspected for clustering than qualitative descriptions. Additionally, the calibration of numerical data can be carried out using the so-called “Direct Method of Calibration” (Ragin 2008: 87ff). It is implemented in the FSQCA software package (Ragin et al. 2006),\(^{15}\) which assigns the scores based on a specially developed algorithm. It is explained in detail by Ragin in his volume on fuzzy sets in social inquiry (2008: 90ff). In order for the algorithm to work, following the inspection of the numerical data the researcher must define three important anchor points, the so-called ‘cutoff-points’ (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 90):

- Full set membership (1)
- a crossover point of maximum ambiguity as to whether a case is more in than out of the target set (0.5)
- non-membership (0).\(^{16}\)

These cutoff-points are established on the basis of the aforementioned inspection of the data. An example is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.1, based on one of the indicators from the development dimension (see Section 3.1.1): official development assistance (ODA) to Latin America on behalf of the OECD DAC member countries (as percentage of total DAC aid) is plotted and the

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\(^{15}\)Note that while fuzzy-set QCA is abbreviated as ‘fsQCA’, the corresponding software package uses all capital letters (‘FSQCA’) for easier differentiation.

\(^{16}\)The software assigns a score of 0.95 for full set membership, 0.5 for the crossover point, and 0.05 for non-membership.
clustering of data points is observed. The resulting cutoff-points are specified at 15% (any point above is fully in), 7% (crossover point), and 1% (any point below is fully out), shown as horizontal lines in Figure 3.1.

Based on the cutoff-points, the fsQCA algorithm first transforms the raw data into log odds, and then uses the log odds to calculate membership scores.\(^\text{17}\) The cutoff-points thus act as the parameters against which the software’s algorithm calibrates the relevant data, attaching an fsQCA score to each case. Again, data from different sources can then be compared, which is highly advantageous given the problem of context-specific indicators described in the previous section. Despite the factors speaking in favour of fsQCA for index-

\(^{17}\)The formula for converting log odds into membership scores is:

\[
\text{Degree of membership} = \frac{\exp(\text{log odds})}{1 + \exp(\text{log odds})}
\]

(Ragin 2008: 91)
ing, the researcher must bear in mind that the calibration procedure of assigning fuzzy-set scores to the data adds an additional level of complexity. It is therefore important to both clearly report and carefully justify the choice for the cutoff-points forming the basis of the calibration in order to ensure the index’s reliability and validity.

Fuzzy-set QCA thus allows for the integration of heterogeneous indicators in two ways. On the one hand, it permits the scaling of qualitative data and its combination with numerical evidence on the same footing. On the other hand, context-specific data can be placed on the same scale of set-membership and thus be made comparable, assisting structured cross-national comparison (Ragin et al. 1996: 749; Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 13). This greatly facilitates the use of “system-specific indicators” (Przeworski and Teune 1970) to overcome the “problem of equivalence” (van Deth 1998) discussed above, hence ameliorating one of the difficulties in social science arising from the fact that “perfectly comparable cases for comparative analysis seldom exist” (George and Bennett 2005: 164). Overall, fsQCA is therefore very well-suited to integrate different types and sources of data, permitting the creation of indices that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to compile.

### 3.2.2.2 Aggregating the indicators

Having established the calibration procedure for fuzzy-set scores, it is equally important to establish the rules by which the data are aggregated (Miller 2007: 97). I take a step-by-step approach to compiling the index in order to report as much of the variation as possible. Since fsQCA is based on set-theoretic logic, the basic concept is that different subsets bring about a case’s degree of membership in a target set. As previously established, the target sets here are the three dimensions of policy activity (economic, governance, and European). A country with a highly active overall foreign policy towards Latin America would score 1 or close to 1 on all three dimensions. Each case thus receives membership scores for different component sets that together form the dimension. In this investigation, cases are scored on indicators that are taken to be subsets of the target set. A subset relation in fuzzy sets is indicated when membership scores in one set are consistently less than or equal to membership scores in another set – the outcome or target set (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 102).

As for the aggregation of the indicator subsets into a single value for each dimension, there are two possibilities. Each of them exposes different aspects of variation in the indicators. Sets can be joined through two operators, logical **AND** (set intersection, also symbolised by \( \cap \)) and logical **OR** (set union, also symbolised by \( \cup \)). With set intersection (AND), a compound set is formed that
requires a case’s membership in all relevant subsets of the target set. Logical **AND** is therefore reached by taking each case’s minimum membership score in the sets that are combined (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 96). For example, if a case reaches a score of 0.4 on the trade and investment component of economic policy and 0.6 on the development component, the membership score for the overall economic dimension resulting from set intersection would be 0.4. Therefore, set intersection applies a rather strict yardstick for high membership in the target set – a country has to score highly on all indicators to receive a high membership score (Gran 2003: 96). The combination of two sets through logical **AND** is visualised in Figure 3.3a.

Conversely, logical **OR** achieves the set union by taking the maximum value of each case’s scores on the component sets. This lowers the yardstick for a high membership score in a target set considerably. In the example above, the membership score in the economic dimension reached through the union of the trade and investment with the development component set would be 0.6. Under set union, it is therefore possible to achieve a high membership score in the target set even if a case scores highly only on one of the subcomponents. Set union is visualised in Figure 3.2b.

In most cases, when aggregating the indicator scores, I report both set intersection and set union because this uncovers some interesting variation among the cases that might be lost if only one is reported. A country may score highly on one component set but low on another, an aspect that is lost if only set union or intersection are shown. This normally minor issue is accentuated when there are differences on the various indicators for the same country. When scores are more homogeneous, the problem does not present itself. Reporting both values therefore eases the researcher’s task of finding instances of variation that merit further investigation. Additionally, it is theoretically reasonable to consider that even if a country displays high policy activity only on one subcomponent of a dimension, it can still have an overall high level of policy activity on that dimension due to high levels on said subcomponent. However, there are instances where there are theoretical reasons why only a high score on all the indicators should lead to a high overall score. Where this is so, I report only set intersection. In the present setting, this is the case of the European dimension, where it is important for a country to have both high levels of activity at EU level in absolute terms and in comparison to activity channelled through other external actors (such as non-EU international organisations). Of course, where there is only one indicator, there is no need to join any sets and simple calibration is sufficient to reach the fsQCA value of the subcomponent.

Additionally, in the final index, I only report set intersection for the component sets of the different policy areas: in order to classify as having an overall
3.2. THE INDEX OF POLICY ACTIVITY

Figure 3.2: Set intersection and set union

(a) Set intersection (logical \textit{AND})

(b) Set union (logical \textit{OR})
highly active policy towards Latin America, a country should achieve a high score on all the dimensions, thus justifying the use of logical AND.\(^\text{18}\) Therefore, the final index values are based on the intersection of intersected subcomponents, applying a particularly strict yardstick for high levels of membership. Nevertheless, fully reporting the intermediate stages of compiling index values by joining subsets is important. That way, the step by step aggregation of the fuzzy-set index allows the researcher to methodically expose variation both within and across cases. Indeed, the reporting of set union serves the purpose of somewhat mitigating the problem of a loss of variation through indexing (Duncan 1984). The final index value will give an overall indication of what policy activity towards the region looks like in the three cases under study, thus facilitating comparison between the three countries. The index compilation procedure is visualised in Figure 3.3 for further clarification.

In sum, a fuzzy-set index based on the strict and systematic calibration and aggregation rules of the fsQCA approach, comprehensively reported and clearly laid out, has the potential to make cross-national as well as cross-dimensional comparison both valid and reliable, while at the same time facilitating the integration of different types of data. In the following section, I proceed to

\(^{18}\)Recall that this is also the reason why the index is not weighted – all subcomponents are taken to be equally important within each dimension.
3.3 Indexing Policy Activity towards Latin America

In this section, I will put the operationalisation of the various indicators conceptualised in Section 3.1.1 into practice, taking each of the three dimensions of policy activity towards Latin America in turn. I will discuss each indicator and assign fsQCA scores in accordance with the calibration techniques laid out above. The section begins with an analysis of the economic dimension.

3.3.1 Economic dimension

3.3.1.1 Trade and investment policy

As outlined in Section 3.1.1, trade and investment policy activity is difficult to compare across countries because each country has specific ways of pursuing such policy.\(^{19}\) There are no pure, comparable ‘numbers’ available on the activities each national government engages in to promote trade and investment opportunities for private business. Therefore, the researcher must dive deeply into the qualitative data on how governments view their role in trade and investment promotion and how they make trade and investment policy. This involves taking recourse to government documents, websites, and secondary literature. It is here that fsQCA, with its ability to combine qualitative and quantitative evidence, shines as a method to establish sound comparisons based on both numerical data and the researcher’s qualitative knowledge of cases. As for comparability, with its possibility to measure policy activity towards a certain region against case-specific yardsticks, fsQCA provides a highly useful approach. In this case, I use policy activity towards Asia to establish a measure of the level of each country’s policy activity towards Latin America. The following paragraphs present the data upon which I will base the calibration of fsQCA index scores. I begin by outlining the qualitative evidence from government documents and the secondary literature.

Britain

Generally, the UK pursues a pro-liberalisation foreign economic policy agenda (Williams 2004). The UK is an extremely open economy highly dependent on both inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Hirst and Thompson 2000: 335), and this influences its policy. Latin America does

\(^{19}\)Remember the crucial difference between trade and investment as such (pursued by private companies and easily quantifiable) and trade and investment policy (pursued by the government and not easily quantifiable), discussed in Section 3.1.1.
not feature large on the UK’s agenda. The Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills’s latest Trade and Investment White Paper, entitled ‘Trade and Investment for Growth’, only contains a more detailed section on Brazil and a minor one on Mexico. While other regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean receive special regional sections, Latin America does not (BIS 2011). This is noteworthy given that Latin America’s economic growth in recent years and recovery from the global financial and economic crisis are acknowledged to have been impressive (BIS 2011: 29). However, the White Paper does not lay out either a deeper analysis of the region or a strategy on how to proceed. Brazil is treated in the context of the BRIC countries (BIS 2011), Mexico receives a paragraph as one of the ‘High-Growth Economies’ (BIS 2011: 39). No other Latin American countries are mentioned, thus indicating a low level of policy activity vis-à-vis the region.

The promotion of foreign economic relations is the remit of UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), a joint agency of BIS and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). In Latin America, UKTI focuses on the larger economies such as Mexico and especially Brazil. In smaller economies such as Bolivia, Uruguay, or Haiti, “lobbying on behalf of British companies may be carried out by the Head of Mission on a case-by-case basis” (UKTI 2011b). Overall, UKTI provides full services in 12 countries of Latin America (UKTI 2011a). In total, 52% of countries in the region are covered by full UKTI services, compared to 40% of Asia (17 countries with full services out of 42 countries overall), resulting in a relatively good coverage of Latin America. During the course of 2011, UKTI published a series of analytical papers on its foreign trade and investment policy (BIS 2011: 76). While Asia and Africa are both subjects of separate papers, Latin America is not.

The most intense trade and investment policy activities vis-à-vis Latin America are directed towards Brazil and Mexico. However, most of trade policy towards Mexico is carried out within Britain’s bilateral relations with NAFTA (FCO 2007: 17). In South America, Brazil has been designated a “High Growth Market” by UKTI (2010), and in 2006 a UK-Brazil Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) was established. The JETCO is designed to promote trade relations, develop the strategic economic partnership between the two countries, and will “examine why UK companies appear to under-perform in terms of trade and investment with Brazil” (FCO 2007: 17). Within the JETCO, the UK also works against trade barriers, in line with its global commitment to further liberalisation. With Mexico and Brazil, Britain focuses on two countries that are not only likely to attract the interest of UK investors in the near future, but that, considering their growing economic clout, are likely to also become ma-

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20The term “BRIC” refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
3.3. INDEXING POLICY ACTIVITY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

It is thus evident that the UK carries out a rather reduced economic and trade policy vis-à-vis Latin America. It focuses on those two countries that are likely to not only attract UK investment but also become sources of FDI in the future – Mexico and Brazil. At the EU level, within the context of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), the UK supports the conclusion of further trade and association agreements between the EU and Latin American countries and regions (BIS 2011: 61). Because of its penchant for further liberalisation and multilateralism (Williams 2004; Grugel and Kippin 2006: 288), Britain favours the further elimination of trade barriers between the regions, although this is not a feature of policy towards Latin America in particular, but rather of the UK’s general foreign economic policy orientation.

Germany

Germany’s strong export orientation is an important factor in its economic policy towards Latin America (BMWi 2011b). Since Latin America itself is also export-oriented and, in particular, the population’s purchasing power is on average still not very high, it previously did not represent a very attractive market for Germany’s high-level manufactured goods. However this is changing and is indeed recognised by the German government’s strategy paper for Latin America published in 2010 (AA 2010: 7, 33f). Because of Latin America’s good economic performance, the German government is becoming more interested in promoting economic ties with the region. The Ministry of Economics and Technology’s export website iXPOS (BMWi 2009) has special country pages informing potential exporters and investors about opportunities in Latin America maintained by the BMWi’s trade and investment agency Germany Trade and Invest (GTai). Such pages exist for seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. They are the most informative for Brazil and Mexico. A trend similar to that observed in the UK – focusing on those countries that are the most economically advanced – is apparent.

However, in the case of Germany, much of the information and logistic support that is provided by GTai’s British equivalent UKTI, is made available to German companies through the Chambers of Foreign Commerce (Auslandshandelskammern, AHKs) rather than by the government. The AHKs are financed and supported mostly by private companies in the relevant countries, although they also receive some state support. There are 21 AHKs in Latin America, three of them in Brazil (German Association of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) 2011), which have close links with the German diplomatic represent-
This is indicative of a general tendency: although all embassies in the region have business departments (AA 2011c), a lot of economic liaison activity is traditionally carried out by companies themselves. What Grabendorff observed in the early 1990s continues to hold: “German commercial and business interests […] are not coordinated by the embassies, but, rather, have their own representatives and cooperative networks in each of the Latin American countries” (Grabendorff 1993: 76f). Therefore, while governmental activity might be rather low, this is not necessarily a sign of loose ties with the region.

One important government actor in facilitating economic relations with Latin America is the KfW Banking Group and its agencies, the KfW Development Bank (Entwicklungsbank) and the German Investment and Development Association (Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH; DEG). The KfW Banking Group has five offices in Latin America: Bolivia, Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2011). The KfW Development Bank is mainly concerned with financial development cooperation, although it does have some funding for export and investment projects (BMWi 2011a). The DEG, however, finances German long-term investment in developing countries.21 It has opened three regional offices over the past decade: Lima, Peru, since 2007, Mexico City since 2003, and São Paolo, Brazil, since 2002 (DEG 2011). The sequence of opening dates is telling, with the Southern Cone (especially Brazil) and Mexico being of particular importance. In 2009, the DEG spent 20% of its financing commitments in Latin America, compared to 46% in Asia/Oceania, 8% in Europe and the Caucasus, 25% in sub-Saharan Africa, and 1% in Northern Africa and the Middle East, thus making Latin America the third largest receiver of its financing (DEG 2010: 69).

Overall, commercial policy activity towards Latin America thus remains only at a medium level, even though it is somewhat higher than in the UK. However, low activity on behalf of the Federal Government does not necessarily mean low-key relations Latin America as a whole, since some of the activities fulfilled by government agencies in the UK – or, as I will show below, in Spain – are taken over by the Chambers of Foreign Commerce. Within the EU, Germany supports further commercial agreements with Latin America (AA 2010: 54f) that will ease its entry into the region’s emerging markets.

Spain

Spain has a very active economic policy towards Latin America. Along with the EU, Latin America is one of Spain’s foreign policy priorities (MAEC 2010; Baklanoff 1996: 113). Spain operates a tight network of Economic and

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21 However, since the DEG also has a development remit, it invests only in projects that make sense from a development perspective and are socially and environmentally sustainable.
Commercial Offices (Ofecomes) around Latin America. They are located in all Latin American countries except Haiti, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, the small islands of the Caribbean, and Suriname. The two largest Latin American economies – Mexico and Brazil – have two Ofecomes each. The Latin American Ofecomes are located within the Spanish embassies and are well-staffed. As of April 2011, the one in Brasilia had 7 administrative staff members and 11 interns, and the one in Mexico City had 14 administrative staff members and 6 interns (Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITYC) 2011). Most country offices provide their own web pages with detailed information for Spanish firms on how to invest, as well as on Spanish bilateral relations with the host country. This contrasts especially with UKTI’s rather limited engagement in most Latin American countries.

For Brazil and Mexico, Spain had special market development plans that spanned the 2008-2010 period, although they had not been updated as of 2011 (Spanish Institute for External Trade (ICEX) 2010) that will be used as a numerical indicator below. They lay out Spain’s goals in these countries and how the government purports to achieve them. Like with the UK, there is an emphasis on those markets that are perceived to present not only opportunities for investment, but also sources of economic gain for Spain itself, for example as a source of tourism.

Spain has extensive bilateral programmes that it uses to further its economic interests in developing countries. Up until recently, credits from the Development Aid Fund (FAD) were intended to support Spanish companies investing in developing countries, in projects using Spanish goods and services (MITYC 2008: 8). The FAD’s main problem was that it was supposed to fulfil a double function as an instrument of development aid and of boosting Spanish exports. Aid conceded under the FAD was tied to Spanish firms and organisations carrying out the projects. This made separating the commercial from the development dimension difficult, and was harshly criticised in the OECD’s 2007 peer review of Spanish ODA (OECD 2007: 38). Under the 2009-2012 Plan Director de Cooperación Española (MAEC 2009c), the FAD been reformed to create two new instruments. One of them is the Fund for the Promotion of Development (FONPRODE), which consists of untied aid and is managed by MAEC. The second, the Fund for the Internationalisation of Enterprises (FIEM) is more commercially oriented and, accordingly, managed by MITYC. Its disbursements will only be counted as ODA when they correspond to the principles of cooperation policy.

Within the EU, Spain’s large agricultural sector can become a source of tension in commercial relations with Latin America, as they are competitors to some extent. Spain emphasises that future reforms of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) must be market friendly and not lead to market distortions damaging the development prospects of less developed countries (MAEC 2009c: Anexo 3, 56). It wants developing countries to be able to protect their most vulnerable agricultural sectors (MAEC 2009c: Anexo 3, 57). Nevertheless, there is certainly a tension between Spain’s generally pro-CAP outlook and its seemingly close relations with Latin America, when it comes to the negotiation of EU Association agreements with Latin American countries and regions (such as Mercosur), where agricultural issues represent a major obstacle in the negotiation process.

Overall, Latin America remains one of Spain’s priorities in the economic realm. The political efforts bear fruit: in fact, during the economic and financial crisis, its Latin American business has kept some Spanish companies, such as Telefónica, and banks, such as BBVA, afloat and growing despite the devastating domestic effects of the crisis (The Economist 2009). Regarding commercial policy, Spain is very active in Latin America and tries to situate itself as a competitive trade and investment partner. It does so both on the side of Latin American ‘customers’ and on the side of Spanish ‘providers’. It is noticeably more active bilaterally than the UK and Germany, especially through its ubiquitous and well-staffed Ofecomes. A similarity to the other two countries, however, is that Spain also increasingly focuses its commercial policy efforts on Brazil and Mexico, where it hopes to make a profit.

Assigning fsQCA scores to the qualitative evidence On the basis of the above analysis, it is now possible to assign fsQCA scores to trade and investment policy activity. Scores are assigned to the cases at hand using the procedure specified by Ragin (2008: 95f), according to the degrees of membership shown in Table 3.2, Section 3.2.2. The yardstick against which the countries are scored is of the ideal type variety, with the ideal type being a country that focuses all or most of its foreign trade and investment policy on Latin America. Such a country would receive a membership score of 1.0. Given the above analysis, none of the three countries could be assigned full membership. I therefore assign conservative fuzzy-set scores for the qualitative aspects of this analysis (thus potentially overestimating activity on behalf of the UK and Germany while underestimating it on behalf of Spain). The resulting scores are shown in Table 3.3.

Hence, there are different levels in trade and investment policy activity towards Latin America, with Spain being rather active and the UK and Germany being less so. I now add numerical indicators that should confirm and complement the results of the qualitative analysis.
3.3. INDEXING POLICY ACTIVITY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

Table 3.3: Qualitative fsQCA scores for trade and investment policy activity towards Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>fsQCA score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adding numerical evidence Above, I discussed how the use of multiple indicators can make measurement more valid and reliable. I therefore add some numerical indicators to the trade and investment component of economic policy activity. Recall the indicators conceptualised in Section 3.1.1:

- **Britain**: The number of Latin American countries classified by UKTI as ‘emerging markets’ vis-à-vis Asia (UKTI 2010).

- **Germany**: The number of bilateral mixed economic commissions (*Gemischt Wirtschafts- und Kooperationsräte*) between Germany and Latin America vis-à-vis Asia (BMWi 2010).

- **Spain**: Number of *Planes Integrales de Desarrollo de Mercados* (PIDM, Integral Market Development Plans) with Latin America vis-à-vis Asia (ICEX 2010).

Further recall that these are measured against Asia as an external yardstick of policy activity, and that they are context-specific indicators, as no directly comparable ones are available. As the data are numerical, the calibration of scores can be carried out according to the “Direct Method of Calibration” (Ragin 2008: 87ff) using the FSQCA programme (Ragin, Drass and Davey 2006; cf. Section 3.2.2.1). Therefore, the cutoff-points have to be carefully specified.

Based on the above data, I then calculated the percentage of the total taken by Latin America and Asia for each indicator. To receive full membership, a country has to be at least as active towards Latin America as it is towards Asia. I therefore subtract the percentage for Latin America from that for Asia. What makes this procedure elegant is that it takes into account that other regions are also targeted by policy activity (by calculating the percentage of the total), but only Latin America and Asia are pitted against one another in the comparison (by subtracting one from the other). Additionally, by using percentages, the numbers become comparable across countries, although the indicators were initially context-specific. I therefore set the cutoff-points as follows:

- **Fully in**: Difference ≤ 0 – a country displays the same level of activity, or more, towards Latin America as it does towards Asia.
• **Crossover point:** Difference = 25 – a country’s activity towards Asia is 25 percentage points higher than towards Latin America.

• **Fully out:** Difference ≥ 40 – The difference between activity towards Latin America and Asia is higher than 40 percentage points, making policy activity towards Latin America very low in comparison to Asia.

The results of the calibration process are summarised in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: **Numerical indicators for trade and investment policy activity towards Latin America**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>fsQCA score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Emerging markets</td>
<td>Latin America: 3(^a) (16.7%)&lt;br&gt;Asia: 9 (50%)&lt;br&gt;Total: 18&lt;br&gt;Difference: 33.4</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Bilateral mixed economic commissions</td>
<td>Latin America: 1(^b) (2.63%)&lt;br&gt;Asia: 11 (34.21%)&lt;br&gt;Total: 38&lt;br&gt;Difference: 31.58</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Market Development Plans</td>
<td>Latin America: 3(^a) (25%)&lt;br&gt;Asia (33.3%)&lt;br&gt;Total: 12&lt;br&gt;Difference: 8.3</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Argentina, Brazil, Mexico<br>\(^b\) Brazil

These results show that the tendency obtained from the qualitative analysis is largely confirmed. Spain displays by far the strongest level of policy activity with almost full set membership, while activity in Britain and Germany is relatively low, although it does exist. This is also in accordance with the expectations established in the previous chapter: the Spanish economic sector clearly has the strongest interests in Latin America out of the three countries under study. It therefore comes as little surprise to a utilitarian-liberal framework that its government would also carry out the most active trade and investment policy towards the region. Next, I move on to completing the economic policy dimension with evidence from development policy.
3.3.1.2 Development policy

As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the indicators for development policy activity are based on the levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) going to Latin America, as reported in the OECD’s statistics database. This makes cross-country comparison relatively easy. The external yardstick against which activity is measured is constituted by the other DAC members (the relevant detailed ODA figures are shown in Appendix B). Given this data availability, I again employ the “Direct Method of Calibration”, as with the numerical trade and investment indicators. The cutoff-points for full set membership, the crossover point and full nonmembership are based on careful inspection of the data, as described in Section 3.2.2.1. The indicators and their cutoff-points are specified as follows:

1. Country percentage of total DAC ODA to the Americas, 2007-9 average. This indicator represents the level of activity vis-à-vis other donors.
   - Cutoff-points: 15% (full membership), 7% (crossover point), and 1% (full nonmembership). The cutoff-points are based on steps in the data pointing to qualitative differences; cf. also Figure 3.1 (page 96).

2. Percentage of ODA to Latin America out of total national ODA, 2007-9 average. The external yardstick is provided by the other DAC members. This indicator represents the level of development policy activity towards Latin America in comparison to other regions.
   - Cutoff-points: 20% (full membership), 7.93% (crossover point; percentage of total DAC ODA going to the Americas), and 0.1% (full nonmembership).

3. Number of Latin American countries/regions among top-25 ODA recipients, 2007-9 average, compared to the other DAC members and the DAC average. This indicator demonstrates the importance of Latin America among the top recipients of ODA from the three donor countries under scrutiny.
   - Cutoff-points: 12.5 (full membership; more than half the countries in the top-25 are in Latin America), 2.47 (crossover point; 2007-9 overall DAC average), and 0 (full nonmembership).

In order to obtain one value for each country, the membership scores from each indicator are intersected using the logical AND operator, as discussed in Section 3.2.2.2. This applies strict criteria for full set membership, as a country
would have to score highly on all three indicators to obtain a high membership score for the set of countries with very high development policy activity towards Latin America. The results are summarised in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5: *fsQCA* scores for Quantitative Evidence on Development Policy Activity towards Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>fsQCA Score</th>
<th>Intersected score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in Table 3.5 show that in the field of development policy, Spain is highly active, achieving full or almost full membership on all three dimensions. It is, in fact, the second largest DAC donor after the US. British development policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America, on the other hand, is very low. It is important to note in this context that the UK has shut down its bilateral development policy programme with Latin America. The only Latin American country DFID currently works with in Latin America is Brazil within the emerging markets context – it has no programme within the country (DFID 2011). This result is therefore not at all surprising, but the question of why the UK operates such a low-key development policy vis-à-vis Latin America poses some questions. Is it because the UK does not have substantial economic or political interests in Latin America? Or because Latin America is relatively rich in comparison to other developing regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa, and does not ‘need’ development assistance any more? While this result may be consistent with the liberal-utilitarian explanation, competing explanations drawing on the influence of domestic or international norms, as well as rational adaptation to international rules – as outlined in Chapter 2 – might also wield explanatory power. Chapter 5 will thus disaggregate the motivations for giving aid to Latin America further in order to shed light on these questions. These issues also feed directly into the observations on Germany: if Latin America does not ‘need’ development assistance, why does Germany continue with its programme? Because as Table 3.5 shows, Germany’s policy activity is considerably higher than the UK’s. It remains at the lower end, but Germany scores rather highly on indicator (1), i.e. policy activity towards Latin America in
3.3. INDEXING POLICY ACTIVITY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

comparison to the other DAC donors. Germany accounts for 11.5% of total DAC ODA to the Americas region in the 2007-9 average, making it the third most important DAC donor behind the US (25.8%) and Spain (23.0%). Thus, Germany is an important donor for Latin America, but Latin America is not a very important recipient for Germany. This potential loss of fine-grained differentiation has been discussed in Section 3.2.2.2. It is important not to lose sight of such variation in the indexing process. However, since the process is laid out step by step, the researcher can always go back and identify instances of interesting variation for further scrutiny. The variation does not simply ‘disappear’ during aggregation, but remains tractable.

Indeed, on the basis of the variation discovered in this step of the indexing procedure, I choose development policy as one of this investigation’s case studies in order to ascertain policy makers’ motivations in carrying out such widely disparate development policies towards one and the same region. In the next step, the results so far are integrated in order to generate one single score per country for the economic dimension.

3.3.1.3 Integrating the evidence

Having obtained scores for both trade and investment as well as development policy activity, the two component sets can be joined to obtain one membership score per country on the economic policy activity dimension. I report both set intersection and set union scores to lose as little variation as possible. The results are shown in Table 3.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Trade and Investment</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Overall score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qual. score</td>
<td>Quant. score</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For both set intersection and set union, Spain is far ahead of Britain and Germany in terms of economic policy activity towards Latin America. It scores highly on all subsets, both from qualitative and quantitative evidence. Looking at set intersection only, which applies the stricter criteria for full set membership, the UK’s activity is very low, while Germany is more outside than in the set, and Spain is more in than out. The tendency, however, is the same both
in set intersection and set union. Looking at all scores individually allows one to appreciate the richness of variation in the data. Britain, on the whole, is more active in the trade and investment area than in development assistance. Germany scores similarly for both subcomponents, and Spain scores higher on development assistance than on trade and investment, reflecting the high level of Spanish activity in development policy towards Latin America. This finding is interesting from a theoretical point of view, as it points into the direction of factors beyond liberal utilitarian explanations for foreign policy activity.

3.3.2 Governance dimension

In this section, I measure policy activity on the three subcomponents of the governance dimension: political dialogue, cultural policy, and the integration of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) into policy activity. Where required, I again rely on context-specific or common adjusted indicators and the external yardstick of comparing policy activity towards Latin America to other world regions such as Africa and Asia. A number of indicators for the level of activity in each country have been conceptualised in Section 3.1.1. In the following, I lay out how the data for each subcomponent was gathered and calibrated to construct fsQCA membership scores.

3.3.2.1 Political Dialogue

The first subcomponent of the governance dimension is political dialogue. The chosen indicator for this component is high-level bilateral visits from each country to Latin America vis-à-vis Africa and Asia. Due to each country’s specific governmental characteristics, the indicator has to be adjusted for each context, so that whose visits are counted varies across the cases. The indicators for each country are thus as follows:

- **Britain**: Travels of the Foreign Secretary, Prime Minister, Queen, and Prince of Wales (2006-10); Sources: Clarence House (2011); The Royal Household (2011)

- **Germany**: Travels of the Federal Foreign Minister, Chancellor, and Federal President (2006-10); Sources: Bundespräsidialamt (2009, 2011); AA (2009, 2011a); Bundeskanzleramt (2009, 2011)

- **Spain**: Travels of the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister, King, and Prince of Asturias (2006-10); Sources: Casa de Su Majestad el Rey (2009); Presidencia del Gobierno de España (2009); MAEC (2011); MAEC (2009b)
Although the representatives travelling vary, the indicator is in fact comparable across countries if one focuses on the percentage of visits to Latin America vis-à-vis those to the two reference regions. The same cutoff-points are thus established for all three countries as follows:

- **Fully in**: 50% of visits are to Latin America (a country dedicates at least as much activity to Latin America as it does to Asia and Africa together)

- **Crossover point**: 25% of visits are to Latin America (slightly less than the same amount of activity is dedicated to Latin America as to each of the other two regions)\(^{22}\)

- **Fully out**: 15% of visits are to Latin America (countries do send a representative to each region at some point, so less than 15% appears a reasonable threshold for full nonmembership)

The results of the calibration process are reported in Table 3.7. British policy activity is very low, Germany’s reaches a low-medium level, and Spain’s activity level is very high.

**Table 3.7: fsQCA scores for Political Dialogue with Latin America**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bilateral visits</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
<th>fsQCA score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America: 8</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa: 13</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia: 29</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America: 17</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa: 28</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia: 38</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America: 89</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa: 58</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia: 26</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3.2.2 Cultural Policy

The second component of the governance dimension is cultural foreign policy. As mentioned in the operationalisation section of this chapter, all three countries under study engage in cultural promotion through ‘cultural centres’ that teach the language and stage cultural events such as lectures, film screenings, or exhibitions. Again, some national idiosyncrasies have to be taken into account and have been discussed in section 3.1.1, such as the fact that Spain does

\(^{22}\)In order to provide a conservative figure, 25% rather than 33% (which would mean an exactly equal distribution of activity across the regions) was chosen.
not have Cervantes Institutes in Latin America except Brazil, but does operate Cultural Centres (centros culturales) that can be used as an indicator. The adjusted indicators are thus as follows:

- **Germany**: number of Goethe Institutes in Latin America vis-à-vis Africa and Asia (Goethe Institut 2011a).
- **Britain**: number of British Council offices in Latin America vis-à-vis Africa and Asia (British Council 2010, 2011b).
- **Spain**: number of Cervantes Institutes/Cultural Centres in Latin America vis-à-vis Cervantes Institutes and Cultural Centres in Africa and Asia (Instituto Cervantes 2011a; MAEC 2009).

Again, the comparison with Africa and Asia was used as a yardstick by taking the percentage of total centres in each of the three regions. In order to adjust for the fact that Africa and Asia might have more centres because there are more countries in the region, I weighted the percentage by the number of countries in one region as indicated by the United Nations Statistics Division (2009). However, the networks are not comparable across the three countries under study due to their different distribution of cultural centres across Latin America, Africa and Asia: Spain and the UK have a greater regional focus than Germany, which distributes its Goethe Institutes more evenly on the whole. Such differences translate into different cutoff-points for full set membership, the crossover point and non-membership:

- **Britain**: fully in: 0.8; crossover point: 0.4; fully out: 0.1.
- **Germany**: fully in: 0.6; crossover point: 0.3; fully out: 0.1.
- **Spain**: fully in: 1.5; crossover point: 0.3; fully out: 0.1.

The results of calibration are shown in Table 3.8.

While Spain in particular, but also Germany, operate quite an active cultural policy towards Latin America, this is not the case for the UK. Britain scores quite a low membership score for the set of countries with a highly active policy towards Latin America, although the cutoff-points were adjusted by country to better fit its distribution of cultural centres.

### 3.3.2.3 Civil Society engagement in policy towards Latin America

The final component set of the governance dimension is policy activity channelled through CSOs. Therefore, the three-year average (2007-9; 2006/7-2008/9

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23 See footnote 8, p. 83 for the exact numbers.
3.3. INDEXING POLICY ACTIVITY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

Table 3.8: fsQCA scores for Cultural Policy Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cultural Centres</th>
<th>% of total no. of cultural centres</th>
<th>Weighted % by no. of countries in region</th>
<th>fsQCA score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Latin America: 11</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa: 35</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia: 46</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Latin America: 16</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa: 17</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia: 25</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Latin America: 24</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa: 13</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia: 7</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in the case of Britain) of funding on behalf of the government to CSOs for projects in Latin America was conceptualised as an indicator. This is compared to funds channelled towards Africa and Asia. Table 3.9 summarises the indicators and aid figures.

Table 3.9: Percentage of aid funding towards Latin America channelled through Civil Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>% of total DFID bilateral aid</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>19.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to region</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asia excl. Middle East</td>
<td>9.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>% of gross bilateral ODA to</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>19.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>region</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asia excl. Middle East</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>% of gross bilateral ODA to</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>27.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>region</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>28.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asia excl. Middle East</td>
<td>12.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) % of total DFID bilateral aid to region channelled through NGOs; 2006/7-2008/9 average. Source: DFID/National Statistics (2009).

\(^b\) % of gross BMZ aid to region channelled through Churches, Political Foundations, and other NGOs; 2007-9 average. Source: BMZ (2008; 2009; 2010).

\(^c\) % of gross bilateral ODA to region channelled through Development NGOs; 2006-8 average. Source: MAEC (2009a).
National cutoff-points are chosen because the data are not cross-nationally comparable and there seem to be different base lines for involving CSOs in policy activity. While Spain shows rather high overall levels of CSO activity, this is much less the case for Germany and the UK, where levels are rather similar. The cutoff-points are set as follows:

- **Britain**: fully in: 20%; crossover: 10%; fully out: 7%.
- **Germany**: fully in: 20%; crossover: 10%; fully out: 6%.
- **Spain**: fully in: 30%; crossover: 25%; fully out: 10%.

Table 3.10 shows the fsQCA scores for the three countries under scrutiny.

Table 3.10: **fsQCA scores for policy activity channelled through Civil Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>fsQCA score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, policy activity towards Latin America channelled through civil society is relatively high. Even the UK, which scores low on all other indicators, achieves a high score here. Germany also directs a surprisingly high level of policy activity towards the region via CSOs. Spain, finally, displays a somewhat surprising distribution. Its level of policy activity directed at Latin America through CSOs is lower than for Africa (although not by a huge amount), a departure from Spain’s overall pattern. What is interesting for the purposes of this study is that across all three countries, policy activity in terms of funding channelled through CSOs is very high. Latin America therefore appears to be a ‘good region’ for CSO involvement across the board.

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24 However, it is important to note that the UK abandoned a programme by which it channelled funding to Latin America through CSOs, the so-called Programme Partnership Agreement (PPA), in 2010. The scores with newer data should therefore be considerably lower.

25 This is in line with the high level of governance activity deployed by its political foundations, who are important actors in the German CSO landscape (Werz 2005: 378f).
3.3.2.4 Integrating the evidence

In the next step, the above evidence is combined to obtain a single score for the governance dimension. As with the economic dimension, set intersection as well as set union are applied and reported. Table 3.11 shows the results.

Table 3.11: Policy Activity towards Latin America: Governance Dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Dialogue</th>
<th>Cultural Policy</th>
<th>Civil Society Involvement</th>
<th>Overall score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Set intersection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For set intersection, which applies a harsher yardstick for full set membership, Spain scores the highest, Britain scores very low, and Germany scores low but higher than the UK. Set union scores, however, reflect the UK’s and Germany’s high scores on Civil Society involvement, pushing both countries’ membership scores to full set-membership. This demonstrates the value of reporting both intersection and union scores, as it allows the researcher to lay open the variation contained in the data.

3.3.3 European Dimension

Finally, when assessing the foreign policy of a European Union Member State, it is important to consider the role of the EU level, as theorised in Chapter 2. In order to map the EU level’s importance, the following national documents dealing with Latin America policy were hand coded:

- **Germany**: “Germany, Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategy Paper by the German Government” (AA 2010).

- **Britain**: “Britain and Latin America: Historic Friends, Future Partners” (2010 Canning Lecture given by Foreign Secretary William Hague, 9 November 2010; FCO 2010).

- **Spain**: “Política exterior de España en Iberoamérica” (Spanish foreign policy in Iberoamerica; MAEC 2010), “La nueva política exterior para España” – section on relations with Latin America (“The new foreign policy for Spain”; Rodríguez Zapatero 2004), “Comparecencia ante la Comisión
To ascertain the EU’s importance, I considered the relative importance of the EU level vis-à-vis other channels of action towards the region: bilateral policy, action in conjunction with the US, and action in conjunction with multilateral actors such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the UN. A coding scheme was devised on the basis of a framework by Larsen (2009) and adapted for the purposes of this investigation to take account of the relevant channels of policy through which EU Member States may carry out their policy towards Latin America. Larsen discusses the various ways in which EU Member States consider the EU’s agency when making foreign policy, pointing out that the “degree of national intertwining with EU foreign policy” must be ascertained (ibid.: 544). In his study, he is therefore primarily concerned with whether states carry out foreign policy primarily through, partly through, or not through the EU (ibid.: 547). While these mechanisms of interaction will again be useful in Chapter 6, at this point I am interested in the overall importance of the EU level in Member States’ relations with Latin America as well as the importance of the EU level vis-à-vis other potential channels of the relationship. Therefore, I have devised a coding scheme that uncovers the extent of the involvement of different policy channels when a Member State carries out its policy towards Latin America. The channels considered are:

- bilateral
- European
- with the US
- multilateral.

Recalling the discussion in the previous chapter (see Section 2.2.6) of the international setting within which national policy towards Latin America is made in EU Member States, these are the channels within which Germany, Spain, and Britain might conceivably carry out foreign policy towards the region. The coding scheme resulting from these considerations can be found in Appendix B, along with some coding examples from the policy documents. The results of the hand coding are shown in Table 3.12.

The EU level plays a different role in each Member State. In absolute terms, it is the strongest in Spain, the second strongest in Germany, and the least strong in Britain. For Germany and Britain, the results are not surprising.
Table 3.12: Importance of the EU level in policy towards Latin America for Britain, Germany and Spain (% of total sentences coded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>86.05</td>
<td>66.50</td>
<td>44.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>06.98</td>
<td>18.45</td>
<td>28.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>02.32</td>
<td>00.00</td>
<td>03.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>04.65</td>
<td>15.05</td>
<td>23.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

given the existing literature on Germany as rather Europeanist and the UK as rather Eurosceptic and having strong transatlantic ties (Katzenstein 1996; Wallace 2005: 55). Much more puzzling at first sight is the strength of the EU in the Spanish case. Given Spain’s emphasis on Latin America as a foreign policy priority (Jiménez 2010: 106), one might expect a much higher importance of the bilateral level. A possible explanation for this pattern could be that Spain conducts a highly active policy in all forums precisely because of Latin America’s importance. This explanation finds potential support in the fact that Spain also scores quite highly on the ‘multilateral’ dimension and the highest out of the three countries on US involvement. The heavy emphasis on the multilateral framework stems from Spain’s involvement in the Iberoamerican Community, which involves cooperation in many policy areas and regular meetings at all levels, including an annual Summit of Heads of State and Government.27

Given these considerations, it is worth ascertaining the importance of the EU vis-à-vis potential outside alternatives. This can be done by taking the difference between activity carried out within the European framework and the sum of the other two channels (US and multilateral), shown in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3.13. Germany is the country where the EU matters comparatively more than in the other two, Spain reaches a medium level and in Britain, the picture is the most balanced with the EU being just as important as the multilateral framework and the US combined. This makes sense given the secondary literature, which tends to classify Germany as very Europeanist, Spain as Europeanist but torn between a European and Iberoamerican identity, and the UK as heavily oriented towards the US and the multilateral framework (Wagner 2002; Wallace 2005; del Arenal 2004: 3; Grugel and Kippin 2006: 288).

In order to define the cutoff-points for fuzzy-set calibration, a target set must be defined. I take this to be the set of countries where most of policy activity is carried out within the EU framework vis-à-vis other channels, both in absolute terms (Table 3.13, column 2) and comparing the EU with outside

27 Member states of the Iberoamerican Community are Spain, Portugal and Andorra on the European side, and 19 Latin American countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Overall Importance of EU</th>
<th>Importance of EU among non-bilateral channels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From Table 3.12, % of sentences in policy documents indicating activity within the EU framework.*

**Table 3.13:** Role of the European level in policy towards Latin America

\[
EL - (US + Multilateral) = Diff between sentences coded "EU" and sentences coded "US" and "multilateral" in policy documents
\]
alternatives (Table 3.13, column 4). Therefore, the intersection of both sets is needed to reach the overall fsQCA score for the European dimension.

For membership in the set of countries who carry out most of their policy within the EU context in absolute terms, I set the cutoff-points as follows:

- **Fully in:** 50% (a majority of policy activity in absolute terms is carried out within the EU framework)
- **Crossover point:** 20% (less than a quarter of policy activity is carried out within the EU framework)
- **Fully out:** 5% (all countries have to carry out at least some of their policy within the EU framework, namely where the EU holds competences, such as in commercial policy)

The resulting fsQCA scores are reported in column 3 of Table 3.13.

For membership in the set of countries who carry out most of their policy within the EU context compared to other non-bilateral channels, the cutoff-points are specified as follows. Remember that the scores are based on the difference between activity within the EU context and activity within other contexts: \( EU - (US + Multilateral) \). A country carrying out as much policy in the EU context as in other contexts would receive a score of 0, which is the point at which it is fully out of the set of countries conducting most of their policy within the EU rather than other contexts. In theory, the difference between the EU and other channels can go to 100 minus the percentage of bilateral policy:

\[
\lim_{(US+Multilateral)\to 0} \left( EU - (US + Multilateral) \right) = (100 - \text{Bilateral})
\]

Given the strength of bilateral action in all three countries, a result of 5 for \( EU - (US + Multilateral) \) is reasonable for full set membership. The following cutoff-points are thus set:

- **Fully in:** 5
- **Crossover point:** 2
- **Fully out:** 0

The results of the calibration are reported in column 5 of Table 3.13.

Finally, the resulting set intersection scores for the overall EU dimension are reported in column 6 of Table 3.13. Note that no country achieves a very high membership score, because none scores highly on both absolute policy activity

\[28\text{In order to provide a conservative figure, 20% rather than 25% (which would mean an exactly equal distribution of activity across the channels listed in Table 3.12) was chosen.}\]
within the EU context and policy activity within the EU context compared to other non-bilateral channels. The UK scores low on both counts. Germany scores high on the importance of the EU among non-bilateral channels, but receives only a medium score on the overall importance of the EU. Spain scores high on the overall importance of the EU, but low on the importance of the EU vis-à-vis other non-bilateral channels, because of the Iberoamerican Summit Process.

3.4 Results and emerging puzzles

Having obtained scores for all three dimensions, an overall picture of variation across Britain, Germany and Spain emerges. Table 3.14 displays the final index results. Here, I report the scores for set intersection only, given that they apply the stricter requirements for a high final score. In order to be counted as having a very high level of policy activity towards Latin America on a dimension, the countries under study have to reach a high score on all subcomponents of the three dimensions. Following the same logic, I base the final set intersection on those scores that have resulted from the intersection of subsets in the cases where I have reported both scores, thus reaching overall conservative index values for each country on each dimension.

Table 3.14: Policy activity towards Latin America in Britain, Germany and Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Economic Dimension</th>
<th>Governance Dimension</th>
<th>European Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.14 shows some interesting variation in policy activity towards Latin America that can lead to future research questions on the reasons for such differences. Britain receives low scores for all three dimensions, indicating that it conducts a rather low-key policy towards Latin America. Germany fares better than the UK, but still receives scores indicating that its level of activity in policy towards Latin America is rather low, with the partial exception of the EU dimension. Although still more in than out of the set of countries with a high level of policy activity within the European, it is the most active country out of the three countries studied in this chapter. Spain, finally, scores the highest on all counts except the EU dimension. What, then, can be made of this evidence?
3.4. RESULTS AND EMERGING PUZZLES

Fuzzy-set QCA’s step-by-step approach allows for exposing variation within and among the cases as the index is being constructed. Although some variation may not show in the final index, it remains tractable and easily identifiable throughout the index creation procedure. Especially with qualitative data, a less strictly structured way of aggregating evidence and making it comparable can make it more difficult to identify such variation. This convenient property of fsQCA allows the researcher to systematically query the cases under study and choose especially significant or puzzling instances of variation for further investigation.

One example is development policy. Germany scores very highly on one of the indicators, namely the percentage of total DAC ODA to Latin America, meaning that it is one of the most important DAC donors to Latin America. Meanwhile, the UK scores very low on all development policy activity indicators, and Spain receives very high scores. What accounts for such differences? How is it that the same region receives such vastly different amounts of ODA from different European donors? A second example of variation that merits further attention is the EU dimension. Evidently, the interaction between the national policy towards Latin America and the EU’s policy towards the region differs in the three countries. For example, Spain is very active within the EU overall, but is almost as active in the multilateral context. How can the two-level interaction be conceptualised and how can the differences be explained?

It is these two cases – development policy and interaction with the European level – that will be the subject of deeper investigation in the second part of this study. In-depth comparative case studies will attempt to further disentangle and explain the variation uncovered through the indexing procedure. In that sense, indexing with fsQCA provides a highly tractable and systematic tool for summarising and mapping complex data in small to medium-N analyses. Both the final index values and the intermediate scores resulting from calibrating various indicators can serve as a basis for further case selection. What is more, the method permits the integration of very different types of data, both qualitative and numerical, placing them on the same footing. This allows for structured comparison even when numerical data is available only for some but not all aspects of the cases under scrutiny, thus facilitating both cross- and within-case comparison. It provides for the better comparability of qualitative data and is able to exploit the in-depth knowledge of cases the small to medium-N researcher acquires during the data collection process, taking it into account during the calibration procedure. By doing so, it allows the researcher to create a systematically comparative map of the data, in this case the overarching independent variable of the study. This is in itself a contribution to both the application of fsQCA as a research tool in general, as well as to
the comparative study of foreign policy, in this case towards Latin America, in particular. As discussed in Chapter 2, systematic comparison is something the body of literature on Latin America policy-making in Europe is presently lacking. By providing a framework that can be adapted to not only other countries’ Latin America policy, but also to policy towards other regions, this study contributes to the quest for improving systematic comparative foreign policy analysis. More specifically, while it was previously clear that policy towards Latin America differs among Germany, Spain, and the UK, we now know where exactly the variation lies, because it has been systematically exposed. As a result, it is now possible to construct adequate middle-range theoretical frameworks within the overarching theoretical model conceived in Chapter 2 in order to explain the variation uncovered here.

3.5 Conclusions and Outlook

In this chapter, I have operationalised and mapped this study’s overarching dependent variable by conceptualising it as policy activity towards Latin America and finding appropriate multiple indicators for its three dimensions, economic policy, governance, and the European dimension of policy towards Latin America. The chapter has then laid out how to summarise the indicators using an index based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Fuzzy-set QCA permits the integration and systematic comparison of various types of data, thus facilitating both within- and cross-case comparison in small to medium-N analysis.

In systematically exposing the variation among German, Spanish, and British policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America in a step-by-step fashion, I have shown that overall, Spain’s policy towards Latin America is the most active, while Germany’s reaches a medium to low level, and the UK operates a rather low-key policy towards the region. However, by providing a very fine-grained map of the empirical panorama, I have uncovered much more deeply rooted and less crude variation among and within the three cases. By doing so, this chapter has laid the basis for the selection of particular aspects for further study. In particular, development policy and the interaction of national policy towards Latin America and the EU’s policy towards the region will be the subject of two in-depth case studies. Explaining such variation will require more fine-grained middle range theoretical frameworks that nevertheless situate themselves within the general theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2. It is the discussion of the selection and further introduction of these two cases to which I now turn.
Part II

Case Studies
Chapter 4

Case Studies: the Framework
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY FRAMEWORK

The first part of this investigation has introduced, theorised, and conceptualised foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe. Chapter 2 has outlined the state of the literature as well as the general theoretical foundations of this study, which seek to explain foreign policy-making towards Latin America within an extended liberal framework (see Figure 2.1, page 64 for a graphical overview of the framework). In Chapter 3 I have drawn up a systematic map of foreign policy activity vis-à-vis the region on behalf of Germany, Spain, and the UK, using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to construct an index. The index serves two purposes. Firstly, it exposes variation on the investigation’s overarching dependent variable, foreign policy activity towards Latin America, in a comparable way. In so doing it contributes to the study of comparative foreign policy more generally, as well as to the analysis of Latin America policy more specifically by introducing a systematic comparative element that has hitherto not been a strong point of the literature on policy-making towards Latin America in Europe. Secondly, as indicated in the previous chapter, the variation revealed by the indexing procedure is used to select two aspects of foreign policy towards Latin America for more intensive study: development policy on the one hand, and the interaction of national policy with the EU level on the other.

In this short introduction to the second part of the study, I further discuss the motivations for selecting development and interaction with the EU level for in-depth case study analysis. I then go on to discuss the methods used for analysing the two cases, their advantages as well as their limitations and how I purport to mitigate them. The remainder of Part II is then dedicated to the case studies.

4.1 Case Selection: Development and EU-level Interaction

In Chapter 3, I carefully operationalised and measured variation in policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Britain, Germany, and Spain with the use of fsQCA to create a systematic index. As opposed to other indexing methods, fsQCA clearly uncovers differences not only in the final index values, but also in the stages leading up to the compilation of the eventual index. This step-by-step process of index aggregation has revealed some particularly noteworthy instances of variation that merit further attention. In order to further disentangle and explain foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe, I therefore select two cases that will be subject to in-depth case studies in this part of the investigation. The two chosen aspects, as indicated in the pre-
vious chapter, are development policy and interaction between national policy and the EU’s policy towards Latin America. This section reviews and further motivates the selection of these two cases by putting it into a methodological perspective.

4.1. CASE SELECTION

4.1.1 Case Selection: Methodological Remarks

As I have outlined in Chapter 1, the selection of cases for study has two components in the context of this investigation. The first, country selection – that is, the selection of Germany, Spain, and the UK for study – has been motivated in the first chapter. The second concerns the selection of aspects of foreign policymaking towards Latin America and is discussed in this section. In order to refer to these aspects, I will use the term “cases” because they are conceptualised as two in-depth case studies that make up the second part of the research project. Of course, the country selection carried out in Chapter 1 to some extent conditions how the cases for further study are selected. As previously explained, the countries have been chosen in part because the selection of Germany, Britain, and Spain allows me to keep some aspects constant: all three countries are Member States of the European Union, all three – for the purposes of this study – can be considered ‘great powers’ within the EU and ‘middle powers’ within the global context, and finally, all three operate an autonomous Latin America policy. I am, therefore, working with what has commonly come to be termed a ‘most similar systems’ design (MSSD) emerging from the country selection: a design where some systemic variables are held as constant as possible, while those whose effect one is interested in are allowed to vary (della Porta 2008: 214). In the context of this study, as explained in Chapter 2, the factors that vary are mostly domestic factors, which hence become the independent variables of this study. However, the liberal framework was extended to accommodate the impact of system-level variables such as EU membership, which are conceptualised as mediated by the national context.

For this reason, in order to make the most of the study’s explanatory potential with regards to policy-making towards Latin America in Europe, the cases analysed should be carefully selected. I am interested in the impact of domestic-level factors, as well as certain systemic factors, potentially mediated by domestic variables, on foreign policy-making towards Latin America, as well as the mechanism through which they work. In that sense, I am moving within the ‘causes-of-effects’ framework of many qualitative researchers (Mahoney and Goertz 2006: 230) who seek to identify the causes of certain

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1Della Porta (2008: 215) discusses the limitations of the most similar systems design and points out that it is usually not possible to hold the desired factors completely constant, so that one always has to reckon with some residual influence of variation in these factors.
outcomes and their interaction.

In order to analyse and disentangle these factors within the complex process of foreign policy-making, I will employ process-tracing, which will be further discussed in Section 4.2. Vennesson defines process tracing as “a research procedure intended to explore the processes by which initial conditions are translated into outcomes” (Vennesson 2008: 224). Since process-tracing involves the deep investigation of cases, the number of case studies this study can accommodate is limited to two for practical reasons. Gerring (2004) discusses the tradeoffs involved when settling on case study research and choosing cases (see also della Porta 2008: 213). By incorporating two cases and comparing three countries, this study is able to mitigate at least some of these limitations. Including several countries is able to overcome, at least to some extent, the problem of ‘boundedness’ involved in case study research: because of their narrow focus, case studies, according to Gerring, “often produce inferences with poorly defined boundaries”, while cross-unit (here, cross-country) analyses are less likely to do so because the research design allows the investigator “to test the limits of an inference in an explicit fashion” (Gerring 2004: 347). Similarly, choosing to study two areas of policy-making towards Latin America can help identify common or diverging factors in determining the making of Latin America policy in Europe. Of course, it is important that one be aware of the limitations of the study of two cases. It is difficult to carry generalisations over into other areas of foreign policy-making and into foreign policy-making in other countries and towards regions other than Latin America. Gerring (ibid.: 348) refers to this as the problem of representativeness. Studying elements of one case – policy towards Latin America – ensures that they are comparable among each other (homogeneous), but limits the extent to which findings can be carried over to other areas. Being aware of these limitations is important in order not to overstate the significance of the findings (George and Bennett 2005: 84). While the study of development policy-making and the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America can give some indications of the factors that are at work in foreign-policy making more generally, it is vital to be aware that the results are circumscribed in the following ways.

Firstly, the independent variables conceptualised in Chapter 2 may play out differently in different countries, and are indeed likely to do so. This does not only apply to the three countries under study here, but evidently also to countries that are not considered by this project. Therefore, while some basic generalisations about foreign policy making in general and towards Latin America in particular can be made, it is important to bear in mind that other countries’ policies towards the region are made within specific national contexts that may
alter the impact of the different independent variables.

Moreover, because of the research design that considers EU Member States only, the findings are also limited to such states. While the MSSD employed allows me to reduce variation in the independent variables to a manageable degree, it also limits the generisability of the findings to states that correspond systematically to those under study. Similar dynamics might thus, for instance, be at work in countries such as France or Italy, but may play out differently in non-EU states, or even in smaller or new EU Member States. One of the preconditions for case selection in this study was that the countries under consideration should bring an autonomous national policy towards Latin America to the table, which is the case only to a very limited degree in the new Eastern European Member States. Small states are similarly limited in carrying out autonomous foreign policies comparable to those of relatively large states such as Germany, Britain, and Spain.

In addition, because of the methodological choice for process tracing that is conditioned by the nature of the research project as a comparative small-N design with a potentially equifinal impact of the independent variables, the number of policy areas studied is limited to two: development policy and interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America. As with the country selection, this case selection means that while the same independent variables are likely to be at play in other policy areas, there might be additional factors influencing these issues, or the independent variables might play out differently from the ways I find in this study. Therefore, I can give general indications as to what impacts upon policy-making towards the region and how these factors interact, but there is always a possibility that this works out in different ways depending on the policy area in question.

My investigation thus contributes, firstly, to the study of foreign policy-making towards Latin America – it can give indications as to foreign policy-making more generally, but it is likely that in particular the ways in which the various independent variables interact with one another depends also on the ‘recipient region’ of foreign policy. Secondly, as indicated above, the study makes a valuable contribution to the analysis of foreign policy-making in (large) EU Member States. Although the generalisability of its results is limited by the factors outlined above, the study’s framework may very well be extended not only to the analysis of other countries’ policies towards Latin America, but also to other regions. One interesting point of departure for further research might thus be the comparison between policy towards Latin America and policy to-

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2 For the motivations behind the selection of Germany, Britain, and Spain, see Chapter 1, Section ??.
wards Africa and Asia, for example. Furthermore, the study is situated in the more general contexts of development policy-making on the one hand, and the interaction between policy-making at the national level and the European level – particularly in foreign policy – on the other. Both these contributions will be discussed in more detail in the case study chapters following this introduction.

Based on these considerations, the two cases have been selected for reasons of both empirical variation and theoretical relevance, as I will show in the next two sections. As George and Bennett (2005: 83) point out, when selecting the cases, the primary criterion should be relevance to the research objective. Since I am concerned with Latin America policy in Europe, and I am selecting the cases based on the conceptualisation of foreign policy towards the region that preceded mapping the dependent variable, the relevance of the chosen cases is given. Additionally, I will further motivate their theoretical relevance below. Moreover, George and Bennett (ibid.) call for cases to be selected in order to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem.

Firstly, in order to identify the varying effects of the explanatory variables that will be conceptualised for each case study more specifically but have broadly been outlined in Chapter 2, variation in the dependent variable is required (George and Bennett 2005: 81). As Van Evera (1997) points out, selecting cases with extreme values (high and low) for study, that is, maximising variation in the dependent variable, makes omitted variable bias less likely because it “lowers the likelihood that any third variables have enough impact to produce this result and also ensures that these variables’ necessarily extreme values will call attention to themselves if they do produce this result” (ibid.: 61; see also p. 80f). By combining MSSD in selecting the countries under study and maximising variation in the dependent variable, I hope to be able to control for the impact of third, not theorised factors sufficiently to discover them if they do have an impact. I therefore choose cases that differ considerably in the levels of foreign policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America. Secondly, as discussed above, control for external factors is provided by the country selection carried out prior to mapping foreign policy activity.

### 4.1.2 Empirical Variation

As laid out in the previous chapter, both development policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America and the interaction of national policy with the EU level present not just a high level of variation, but also vary in interesting ways. An analysis of this variation can help disentangle the drivers of foreign policy towards the

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3While such an extension would potentially require the introduction of further independent variables and some reconceptualisations, the general MSSD set-up could be kept by looking at the policies of the same EU Member States.
4.1. CASE SELECTION

region in the cases under study and can potentially give indications regarding foreign policy-making in Europe more generally. As mentioned above, since the country selection is based on maintaining certain factors constant, it is vital to have variation in the dependent variable in order to tackle the identification of explanatory variables and the mechanisms through which they drive Latin America policy (Van Evera 1997). Table 4.1 recapitulates this variation, which is useful to bear in mind for the following paragraphs. Recall that the scores correspond to each country’s membership in the set of countries with a high activity towards Latin America in development policy and involvement with the EU level, respectively.

Table 4.1: Foreign Policy Activity towards Latin America – Development policy and EU Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>EU Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.1.2 and 3.3.3 for details on the measurement and assignation of scores.

Regarding development policy activity, the question of how it is possible for the very same region to receive such vastly different levels of attention on behalf of three EU Member States arises directly from the disparate membership scores. The UK’s very low involvement is the most noticeable. Home not only to a very influential development ministry, the Department for International Development (DFID) but also to various influential development NGOs, such as Oxfam, and research institutes, such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the UK holds an international status as an important donor with in-depth expertise in development policy (Porteus 2005: 283; Watkins 2010: 2). Yet, as its index score on development policy activity shows, the UK seems to ignore Latin America almost completely. Indeed, as I showed in Chapter 3, the UK’s activity in development policy towards the region is low across all indicators (see Table 3.5, page 108): it neither accounts for a large share of total OECD DAC aid to the Americas, nor does it dedicate a significant share of its national aid to the region or include a Latin American country among its top-25 ODA recipients. Spain, on the other hand, veers towards the other extreme, scoring nearly full membership on all indicators. Finally, Germany lies in the middle, albeit towards the lower end. However, it does score quite highly in terms of its share of DAC aid to Latin America, and is slightly above the DAC.

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4The higher the number, the greater set membership. For an in-depth discussion, see 3.2.2.
average in terms of the national aid share it dedicates to the region. Therefore, if aid were mainly poverty-oriented, one might expect a more homogeneous distribution of development policy activity among the three countries. Likewise, if aid were mainly economically oriented, the distribution would make some more sense, but the UK’s disregard for the region is still quite puzzling given that it does have some trade and investment interests in the region (Gru- gel and Kippin 2006), and Latin America’s economies have been growing. Similarly, in that sense, one might expect some more engagement from the German side. It is therefore worth investigating what drives the very different levels of activity on this subcomponent of economic foreign policy.

As for the European dimension, activity levels are also disparate, even though the differences are not quite as large as those found in development policy activity. Here, the puzzles lie more with the German and Spanish case than with the UK. While Britain is traditionally viewed as rather Eurosceptic (e.g. Wagner 2002; Wallace 2005) and its low level of involvement with the EU’s policy towards Latin America is therefore not that surprising, Germany has traditionally been seen as rather Europeanist (e.g. Rittberger 2001a; Wagner 2002), and Spain’s approach to European integration has often been to see Spain as the problem and Europe as the solution, to paraphrase Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset. Indeed, Baklanoff describes Europeanisation as Spain’s main foreign policy objective since the late Franco period (Baklanoff 1996: 112; see also Kennedy 2000: 106). Additionally, it has been seen as a ‘bridge’ between the EU and Latin America and, in particular, sees itself this way. In fact, the Spanish (and Portuguese) Accession Treaties to the European Communities included a joint declaration on how their entry to the EC could strengthen Europe’s relations with Latin America (Member States of the European Communities 1985). However, recently Spain’s success of providing the EU’s connection to Latin America has been critically scrutinised by researchers, who consider that Spain has not managed to fulfil expectations regarding European-Latin American relations (Kennedy 2000: 12f; Moltó 2010). Spain’s low score on the European dimension of policy activity stems from the low importance of the EU among other non-bilateral channels, chiefly driven by the high importance of the Iberoamerican framework (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3). Overall Spanish involvement with the EU is higher, but with a score of 0.69 still not as close to full membership as one might expect of a country that constitutes the ‘bridge’ between the EU and Latin America. Again, therefore, the variation both within and across cases on the European dimension deserves some further attention.

In line with the methodological considerations discussed above, these two cases thus respond to several aspects of case selection. On the one hand, by virtue of their being aspects of the dependent variable conceptualised in the pre-
4.1. CASE SELECTION

Previous chapter, they are representative of policy towards Latin America more generally – of course, bearing in mind the above limitations. Secondly, I have shown how they expose instances of variation that can be fruitfully explored through process tracing. In the next section, I discuss their theoretical relevance.

4.1.3 Theoretical Relevance

In addition to the methodological and empirical considerations outlined above, development policy as well as interaction between national foreign policy and the EU’s Latin America policy are relevant to this study’s theoretical framework. When selecting cases for further study, as della Porta points out, sometimes “good cases are not the most typical, but the most telling, because they help to clarify theoretical problems” (della Porta 2008: 216). It is therefore worth considering, in the context of this study, what constitutes a ‘telling’ case. Whether it is also ‘typical’ or not is secondary; in fact, what might make a case telling could be precisely the fact that it is typical. In this investigation, I have conceptualised a theoretical framework whose goal is to contribute to explaining foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe (Chapter 2). I have also laid out how the more in-depth study of cases will require the use of middle-range theories dealing with the particular issue at hand. Therefore, I require cases that are both able to contribute to the explanatory effort and have middle-range theories available that allow for such an endeavour. As Venesson notes, both case-study research and process tracing require the prior existence of theoretical frameworks for fruitful research to take place (Venesson 2008: 236). This is given in both the literature on development policy, and the literature on the interaction between national (foreign) policy and the EU level. The theoretical building blocks have been galvanised into a general framework in Chapter 2. It is the task of the case studies to enrich this framework with concrete theoretical expectations in order to test them empirically.

In the development realm, there have been heated discussions on whether development policy and the allocation of aid are primarily the results of utilitarian considerations (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007) or of norms (e.g. Lumsdaine 1993). So far, there has been no final adjudication on the issue. If anything, the most widespread yet disputed consensus is that both aspects matter. However, as I will outline in Chapter 5, the debate over the circumstances under which they matter is far from closed. While this investigation does not pretend to provide an adjudication between utilitarian and normative independent variables, it can hope to contribute to bringing the two camps closer together by elucidating to what extent they are complementary.
and how variables theorised by both approaches impact development policy-making towards Latin America in Europe. Likewise, in the literature on the interaction of Member States’ national policy with the EU level, there is a vivid debate in the literature on the extent to which Member State foreign policies have been Europeanised (e.g. Wong and Hill 2011; Ruano forthcoming 2012), what mechanisms are at play in the interaction between national and European (foreign) policy (e.g. Radaelli 2004; Mounitzis 2011; M.E. Smith 2000; 2004), and the attitude different Member States take towards EU foreign policy – and why they take it (e.g. Wagner 2002; Bulmer and Paterson 2010; Torreblanca 2001). This study seeks to contribute to the field by determining how different independent variables impact foreign policy-making and how they might combine to explain country-specific foreign policy activity and characteristics by assessing the impact of the variables conceptualised in Chapter 2. In particular, where several variables predict the same or similar outcomes, case studies can help disentangle the mechanisms at work (George and Bennett 2005: 207). Additionally, both foreign policy-making in the EU and development policy are vividly discussed in the political science literature at this point in time and are the subject of recent publications (e.g. Mounitzis 2011; Wong and Hill 2011 for foreign policy and the EU; Milner and Tingley Submitted 2010; Feeney and McGillivray 2008 for development policy). In that sense, therefore, this investigation is able to contribute to ongoing debates in the academic literature.

4.2 How do we know? Methods for analysing foreign policy-making in EU Member States

Having motivated the selection of two cases for further study, the next section discusses how to go about analysing them. The question is how the sometimes equifinal impact of different independent variables can be disentangled, while at the same time accounting for the potentially complex interaction of mechanisms that eventually give Latin America policy in the respective countries its shape. As I demonstrate in the following paragraphs, process tracing provides a way of doing so. The analysis will be based mainly on interview data, although other publicly available government documents and secondary literature will also be employed. The strengths and limitations of the approach are the subject of the following paragraphs.
4.2. METHODS

4.2.1 Process tracing

As Fearon and Wendt (2003: 62) point out, it may be difficult to empirically distinguish different motivations for the behaviour of policy-makers, especially if only behavioural data are available. It may be that several theories predict the same or a similar outcome, a phenomenon called equifinality. Equifinality is, indeed, one of the issues of social scientific research that in-depth case studies are considered particularly apt for dealing with (George and Bennett 2005: 76), alongside the study of causal mechanisms, meaning the interaction of different factors in order to produce an outcome (Checkel 2006: 366).

One method often employed by case-study researchers is process-tracing, which is considered especially well-suited for uncovering social mechanisms and their functioning, as well as for dealing with equifinality (George and Bennett 2005: 207). Process tracing as a term was coined by Jack Goldstone (1991; see also George and Bennett 2005: 159) in a study on “Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World”, although the practice is in fact older than that. One famous example is Theda Skocpol’s seminal volume “States and Social Revolutions” (1979). Most approaches to process tracing “emphasize the identification of a causal mechanism connecting independent and dependent variables” (Vennesson 2008: 232), although it is often likely that more than one mechanism is at play (Checkel 2006: 368). In addition to its benefits for uncovering social mechanisms, Checkel also considers process tracing to be especially suitable for both differentiating different independent variables and analysing their connections and interactions: “it is extremely useful for teasing out the more fine-grained distinctions and connections between alternative theoretical schools” (ibid.: 366).

Frequently, process tracing is associated with the tracing of historical processes (e.g. Bennett and Elman 2006b: 459; George and Bennett 2005: Chapter 10). However, George and Bennett (2005: 208f) point to a fundamental difference between process tracing and historical analysis in that process tracing places a strong emphasis on theory development and theory testing, as the present study does. Therefore, I argue that process tracing is suitable not only to trace historical developments but to trace all sorts of social processes, even if they develop within a short period of time that is difficult to classify as ‘historical’ striceto sensu. ‘Historical’, then, refers merely to the fact that a process is unfolding over a certain period, no matter how short. This understanding is confirmed by Vennesson’s description of process tracing as “a research procedure intended to explore the processes by which initial conditions are translated into outcomes” (2008: 224). Clarifying this is important for the context of this investigation, which after all deals with a ‘snapshot’ of policy towards
Latin America as made at the time of investigation and a few years prior. As discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2 (p. 68), it does not dive deeper into an historical analysis of its sources, even though in the case of the interaction between national and European policies towards Latin America a historical overview is provided to give a sense of developments since the beginning of European integration.

Process tracing has been used in various manners (Vennesson 2008: 231). In the context of this study, I will use it to uncover the influence of different, potentially complementary or competing, independent variables on policy towards Latin America by looking at how it is made in Germany, Spain, and the UK. Process tracing comes in a variety of types. It is therefore important to classify my own research within the variants of process tracing in order to demarcate its domain of application more clearly. George and Bennett (2005) suggest the following variants:

- **Detailed narrative**: a “story presented in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about” (ibid.: 210)

- **Analytic explanation**: “an **analytical** causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms” (ibid.: 211)

- **More general explanation**: “a general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process [...] consistent with the familiar practice in political science research of moving up the ladder of abstraction” (ibid.)

Given the conceptualisation of this investigation and the evidence provided so far, I aim to use it in the sense of an analytic explanation strategy. Embedded within a theoretical framework, I search for the drivers of Latin America policy in the three countries under study, using the examples of development policy and interaction with the EU level. As Gerring (2007: 173) points out, “the hallmark of process tracing [...] is that multiple types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single inference.” In the next section, I assess how this study performs such triangulation by the analysis of interviews at the national level, the European level and with Latin American diplomats, as well as the analysis of government documents and the supplementary use of secondary literature. Before proceeding, however, it is important to consider the challenges and pitfalls of process tracing.

As any method, process tracing comes with its own set of issues a researcher has to bear in mind. The challenges of process tracing are particularly well summarised by Checkel (2006: 367ff) and Vennesson (2008: 237f). In the following, I briefly consider those that matter the most for this study. Firstly, according to Checkel, process tracing encourages non-parsimonious theories, connec-
4.2. METHODS

ted with a danger to lose sight of the ‘bigger picture’ and becoming drawn into a regress of ever more ‘micro’ analyses of the mechanisms at work. (Checkel 2006: 367). This is because the social mechanisms considered in process tracing may be so complex that they turn into “everything matters” explanations. It is therefore important to consider alternative explanations as alternatives and not ignore negative evidence (Vennesson 2008: 238). When considering different explanatory variables, I thus have to ensure that negative evidence – or a lack of evidence – is not ignored or unduly dismissed. This study thus intends to follow Checkel’s call to “take equifinality seriously” (Checkel 2006: 370) by considering whether influencing factors are complementary or competitive. Additionally, the researcher’s desire to provide as complete explanations as possible may lead to an ever-deeper analysis of causal mechanisms. It is therefore important to draw a line at which to stop. Since this study is based on interviews with policy-makers, this is to some extent determined by the empirical data. In theory, I could go down to the personal level in determining the drivers of policy towards Latin America, as well as small-group dynamics involved at the relevant institutions. However, in order to ensure comparability across the case studies and countries, I focus on explanatory factors provided by the extended liberal framework conceptualised in Chapter 2 and thus on factors emanating mainly from the meso-level without losing sight of the impact of macro-level variables, but exogenising more ‘micro’ factors.

Another challenge is that some variables remain unobservable even in process tracing (Checkel 2006: 367). What is more, Vennesson (2008: 237) points out, the empirical sources employed in process tracing and their treatment require a high level of accuracy to ensure reliability. The reliability of qualitative data has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter (see Section 3.1.1). The approach taken in the remainder of the investigation is similar: I will ensure transparency about sources and data treatment as much as possible in order to keep reliability at the highest possible level. Again, this is an issue that is particularly relevant to foreign policy, where policy-makers’ motivations cannot be directly observed and are, moreover, often clouded in diplomatic confidentiality. Below, I outline the triangulation strategies adopted by this investigation to mitigate the problem, even though it cannot be completely solved. In the following paragraphs, I discuss the data analysis methods employed by this study and how they are used to ensure that both validity and reliability are kept at a maximum. Note that in this introductory chapter, I discuss chiefly those aspects applying both case studies, since case study-specific issues will be discussed in the respective chapters.
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY FRAMEWORK

4.2.2 Interviews

I have indicated above that the empirical evidence for this study is based mainly on elite interviews with officials at the relevant national ministries of foreign affairs and the development ministries or agencies. The institutions were chosen because the foreign ministries represent the institutions with the most comprehensive overview of policy towards Latin America, while the development ministries and agencies are experts regarding the particular case study of Chapter 5. There are several reasons for the choice of elite interviews; in the following, I outline the use to which the interviews will be put and discuss why elite interviews are an appropriate method to obtain the required evidence.

Why Elite Interviews? In order to explain the choice for elite interviews as the main data source, it is important to understand how they will be used. In this study, I wish to elucidate the factors that drive policy-making towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK. In order to do so, I choose two promising case studies that can give further insight into the issue at hand, the first one focussing on development policy, and the second one focussing on the interaction between national and EU policies towards the region. In both cases, only a limited amount of publicly available data exists. In the case of development policy, aid statistics collected by the OECD can be used. These data are reported by donor countries to the OECD according to a cross-country reporting system, making them as comparable as possible. They are readily available at the OECD’s Statistics Database. However, while these data can tell us something about how development aid to Latin America is given on behalf of the three countries under study, the statistics themselves can only give rise to some ideas about why aid is given in a certain way. They cannot give a precise account of the motivations behind aid allocation, especially when various theoretical currents predict similar behaviour, that is, in cases of equifinality. As outlined in Chapter 2, it is often difficult to distinguish between outcomes resulting from different independent variables. Equifinality therefore represents an obstacle to be overcome by this study.

Similarly, in the case of national-EU level interaction in Latin America policy-making, government documents will be used to ascertain some of the interaction mechanisms, as well as providing some indications about motivations for such interaction. However, they are less than plentiful and, on their own, would provide too thin a base of evidence. Additionally, the publicly available government documents are generally quite good to assess what a country is

5It is, of course, important to be aware that officials from other institutions are also involved in policy-making towards Latin America, such as the ministries of the economy. Nevertheless, given limited time and resources, a choice for the most relevant institutions had to be made.
4.2. METHODS

doing with regard to Latin America policy, which is why they were used in the fsQCA indexing procedure. However, they are somewhat less good at laying out the *motivations* for a particular cause of action. Overall, government documents are a very useful source of information, but are better used as supplementary evidence.

Even more importantly, when it comes to foreign policy making, information is often not publicly available at all for reasons of confidentiality. Therefore, a way must be found to test equifinal theoretical predictions and complement publicly available data with more precise information about the motivations behind policy-making towards Latin America. In order to do so, interviews with policy-makers represent an adequate option to obtain the required information about the factors that motivate foreign policy-making. While they might not be able or willing to tell all, it is often possible to get vital information from officials, particularly if the confidentiality of the interviews is granted.\(^6\) From a theoretical perspective, it is worth recalling the definition of foreign policy as a country’s “official external relations” (Hill 2003: 3). Since I am trying to ascertain the factors that drive foreign policy towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK, it seems more than reasonable to obtain information about these factors from those who are involved in policy-making on a day-to-day basis. Although, as will be discussed below, interviewees may give strategic answers, interviews provide an opportunity to remedy the problem of equifinality at least in part by permitting the researcher to query policymakers directly about their motivations. The choice for elite interviews as such is therefore fairly trivial. As Richards (1996: 199) puts it, elites “hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as a political scientist is concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public.” This makes them highly useful sources of information for a study of foreign policy-making.

**Semi-Structured Interviews** In terms of form, I chose semi-structured interviews, because they allow for both detail and depth, give an insider’s perspective, and can be used for hypothesis testing (Leech 2002: 665). Semi-structured interviews involve a relatively detailed interview guide designed to specifically probe the causal relationships the researcher has theorised. They can contain both open and closed questions and can, in some circumstances, also serve to obtain additional factual information, although Leech advises against asking for information that could be obtained through other sources (ibid.: 666). Through open questions, it is possible not to condition the interviewee when asking about her motivating factors. In that sense, open-ended questions max-

\(^6\)Confidentiality and its implications are discussed below.
imise response validity, as respondents can organise their answers within their own frameworks. Interviewees tend to prefer open questions, because they can explain why they think what they think (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674), especially if they are experts on the subject and are involved in shaping it, as policy-makers are with foreign policy. Additionally, open-ended questions allow for the possibility of capturing issues not covered by the theoretical framework, thus helping to avoid omitted variable bias, as well as the problem that the mechanisms theorised work differently than anticipated. To this end, it was important to structure questions in such a way to prompt answers regarding the relevance of certain processes, as well as questions eliciting an explanation of these processes (Gläser and Laudel, 2010, 125f). One relevance-question and its follow-up explanatory process question, for example, was the following (taken from the EU case study, Chapter 7):

Relevance question: Are there aspects of policy towards Latin America that should remain at the bilateral level rather than being dealt with at the EU level? If so, which ones?

Process question: How does your country try to make sure the policy remains bilateral?

By asking questions this way, the interviewer can first probe whether the issue is important at all. If an interviewee does not think any policy area should remain exclusively bilateral, then there is no need to question them about the process of achieving this.

However, open-ended questions make some aspects of interviewing more difficult, as it takes longer to conduct the interviews, transcribe the answers, and prepare the transcripts for evaluation (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). It is thus important not to formulate the questions too openly, since this might give rise to irrelevant responses. Furthermore, the evaluation, in this case the coding of the interviews, has to be carefully designed to ensure the necessary analytic rigour, maintaining the richness of individual responses but sufficiently structured that the interviews can be subjected to analytic techniques (ibid.: 675). For an in-depth discussion of the appropriate degree of openness of questions, see Gläser and Laudel (2010: 131ff).

Sampling  While the choice for elite interviewees as such is relatively easy, ‘getting in the door’ and speaking to the appropriate policy-makers is harder. In principle, random sampling is often the ideal in social scientific research, a practice that stretches to elite interviewing in many cases (Tansey 2007). However, Tansey points out that in elite interviewing for process tracing, completely random sampling is often less-than-ideal, because the research interest is in
4.2. METHODS

Table 4.2: National-level Interviews – Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU interaction</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not all development interview partners could be asked about the EU and vice versa, normally for reasons of time constraints. Therefore, the total number of interviews relevant for each case study is not equal to the total number of interviews carried out in the study.

very specific events and processes (ibid.: 768), so that it is important to ask the people who will actually be able to say something about it. In the case of this study, the situation is relatively plain. There is a very limited number of officials involved in foreign policy-making towards Latin America, and it is therefore quite easy to achieve a good coverage of the ‘total population’, once one gets the relevant appointments. Because of the small size of the policy-making community, snowball sampling was used. Snowball sampling, also called chain referral sampling, refers to the use of one point of contact in order to get in touch with others (Goldstein 2002; Tansey 2007). It is particularly useful in the case of a sometimes secretive elite such as foreign policy-makers and diplomats, where knowing one person can be the entry ticket to the entire institution. In the case of interviews in Spain, for example, one former deputy head of unit set up interviews within the entire State Secretariat for Iberoamerica.\(^7\) In the case of such a small population, essentially, concerns of sampling tend to be secondary – the researcher will try to conduct as many interviews as possible. In total, for the purposes of this study, 27 interviews with national officials were carried out. Table 4.2 shows an overview of the relevant national-level interviews for each study.

In this context it is important to be aware of the limitations introduced by not getting interviews with certain people (Goldstein 2002: 669), as well as by the small population size itself. If one cannot interview people from all geographical units of a ministry concerned with Latin America, for example, it is possible that some issues that are of importance only with regard to certain Latin American subregions or countries remain unobserved. Additionally, if the population is very small, even if all relevant partners can be interviewed, distortions may result from the population size. In the case of the German development ministry, for example, the relevant population was nearly ex-

\(^7\)As previously mentioned, this state secretariat was later incorporated into one State Secretariat for External Affairs and Iberoamerica.
haunted with three interviewees. Even though the coverage may be excellent in such cases, if an interviewee forgets to mention an issue or does not want to talk about it, with such a small population it is less likely that somebody else will. It is therefore important to be aware of such issues and take them into account when evaluating the interviews. While they can tell us a lot about the factors that matter in foreign policy-making towards Latin America, there may be influencing factors that remain in the dark by omission – intentional or unintentional – on behalf of the interviewees. This is a problem that is particularly pertinent in the case of the UK. The FCO team working on Latin America is tiny, and there is currently no team within DFID, since the Latin America programme has been dismantled. It was therefore extremely difficult to track down the relevant former DFID officials. Other ways of obtaining and backing up the information received therefore had to be found and are discussed below. Nonetheless, there is no way around admitting that evidence for the British case is the least valid and reliable.

Strategic rhetoric, unwillingness, and unawareness George and Bennett state that in order to assess the evidentiary value of sources, one has to consider “who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances” (George and Bennett 2005: 99f; emphasis in the original). Contemplating these issues for interviews with foreign policy-makers, one invariably comes to the conclusion that interviewees might give strategic answers, awareness of which is important in assessing the interviews. Interview partners may be strategic in several ways. Firstly, interviewees are members of the policy-making elite and have an incentive to overstate their own or their organisation’s involvement in the process (Berry 2002: 680; Tansey 2007: 767). While exaggerations of personal or organisational involvement are somewhat less relevant for this study, whose primary focus is not on inter-agency and group dynamics or personal factors, such overstatements of course stretch into both the importance of Latin America within a country’s foreign policy (nobody likes to admit that their area of expertise is not very relevant), and the importance of their country in the wider international setting – this is particularly relevant for the EU case study, where policy-makers have a strong incentive to overstate their country’s involvement in and influence on the EU’s policy towards Latin America. Interviews thus have to be carefully cross-checked in order to gain an impression of the potential magnitude of the exaggeration problem (Berry 2002: 681).

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8The size of the population is an issue in all three countries when it comes to development policy. However, fortunately all development interviews could be supplemented with interviews at the foreign ministries, where officials also have some development policy experience. Similarly, the development interviews could be used in the EU case study as well, where development policy is an area of interaction between the national level and the EU level.
Moreover, the problem of strategic rhetoric may influence the way in which policy-makers represent their motivations in an interview. For example, admitting that development aid might be commercially oriented may not be a statement an official is willing to make in an interview, neither on nor off the record. While officials may intentionally misrepresent their motivations, but on the other hand they are sometimes the only source of further information, making them inevitable interview partners in certain studies (Davies 2001: 74). However, they might simply ‘parrot’ the official government line, taking recourse to confidentiality and refusing to reveal any information beyond what is stated in publicly available official documents (Gläser and Laudel 2010: 181). In such a case, there is little one can do. It is therefore important to probe the interviewees, try to get them to “critique their own case” (Berry 2002: 681) using questions such as ‘In the literature, academics are saying that..., yet you are telling me... – why are the scholars not buying your argument?’, and, obviously, cross-checking motivations across different interviews. Gläser and Laudel (2010: 178ff) give a series of very useful tips for developing strategies to deal with different types of interviewees (such as the particularly distrustful, secretive, chatty, etc.). Repeating them here is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is important to be aware of such potential pitfalls to be able to anticipate them and deal with them appropriately.

Unawareness of the influence of certain factors is another difficult issue. Interviewees are not always able to identify subtle influences of certain variables, a difficulty especially of mechanisms like socialisation, which are important for example in the EU context. Policy-makers may not actually be consciously aware that they have been socialised, since this is the result of a slow, often unconscious process. This problem refers back to the issue of latent, unobservable variables discussed in the previous section (Checkel 2006: 367). The interviewer therefore has to carefully consider how the influence of such variables can be recognised, and design the evaluation of the interviews accordingly. For example, when looking for the effects of socialisation, one has to query the interview transcript or protocol for explicit or implicit references to norms or ideas that have been acquired by the interviewee through a process of interacting with his or her policy-making context both at the national and the European level. These issues will be further elaborated upon in the individual case study chapters when discussing the coding schemes for the interviews.

**Timing and Staff Turnover** The national-level interviews were carried out between the spring of 2010 and the summer of 2011. This brings with it several factors of timing. Firstly, governments changed. For example, interviews in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were carried out a few months after
the British general elections of May 2010, so that officials were sometimes not yet sure how things would work under the new government. Additionally, the EU level context is changing. Interviews at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAEC) were conducted during the Spanish EU Presidency of 2010 and shortly thereafter. This was a period of important changes within the EU, as the Treaty of Lisbon was being implemented with all its consequences for EU external relations, such as the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the recent designation of the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, and so on. This state of affairs was very much on interviewees’ minds and sometimes translated itself into statements of insecurity about policy-making motivations. Such issues are unfortunately entirely beyond the researcher’s control, and they have to be borne in mind when evaluating the interviews.

Additionally, staff turnover in foreign policy-making is high due to the rotational systems implemented particularly in the ministries of foreign affairs. Occasionally, the foreign policy researcher is confronted with interview partners who have been on the job for only a few months and do not have any, or very little, prior experience of Latin America. Institutional memory, unfortunately, is not the forte of foreign policy-making institutions. Again, these problems can only be remedied by asking as many people as possible and trying to get interviews with officials at different levels of seniority. Often, heads of unit and higher-level civil servants in charge of a region have long-standing experience in that area, and make excellent sources of information about continuity and change in foreign policy-making towards Latin America. Additionally, there is theoretical reason to assume that foreign policy is a relatively stable issue area, where nuances may change across governments, but the fundamental motivations remain the same: evidence for foreign policy continuity has been found for all three countries under study (Aggestam 2000: 65; Kennedy 2000: 106; Williams 2004: 912).

However, some scholars consider the impact of the time policy-makers are exposed international networks crucial for the impact these networks might have on their behaviour (see e.g. Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005), especially when considering the EU level. In this study, as previously discussed, I do not consider the impact of time. Most national-level interviewees were heads or deputy heads of unit, in some cases Director Generals, who have been in the diplomatic service and potentially in the geographic department for a fairly long time, although some desk officers were also interviewed. It is therefore fairly safe to assume that on average, they have had significant exposure to both their national and the international or European level during the course of their career. Moreover, research suggests that such impact may occur quite fast,
although it is not ‘sticky’ once policy-makers are taken out of interaction with the higher-level environment (Beyers 2010: 915f). Therefore, despite some issues that must be considered, it is safe to assume that at least in part, the factors influencing policy-making towards Latin America remain the same across governments and officials in charge.

Confidentiality All interviews carried out for the purposes of this study were confidential, meaning that statements from the interviews may not be attributed to the person who made them. Overall, confidentiality is one of the main concerns in carrying out interviews with foreign policy-makers. Especially since the advent of WikiLeaks, they are very concerned about interview material appearing in the public sphere. Additionally, the small size of the policy-making community means that certain statements could easily be traced back to the individuals who made them – just mentioning their nationality might be enough in some cases. In the analysis of a sensitive ‘moving target’ such as foreign policy, a lot depends directly on the relationship between the policymakers concerned. Furthermore, many interviewees are still in their posts at the time of the results’ publication, so that it is indispensable to respond to policymakers’ concerns about anonymity in order to not disturb the on-going policy process. For a discussion of the various dimensions of anonymity and their legal implications, see Gläser and Laudel (2010: 55f), as well as Goldstein (Goldstein 2002: 671).

In this context, it is worth briefly discussing the issue of interview recordings and transcripts. Taping the interview is often regarded as indispensable by interview methodologists (Gläser and Laudel 2010: 157f; Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 675). If interviews are not recorded, the time that passes between the interview and the moment of writing up a protocol, along with re-interpretations and cognitive biases on the side of the researcher may distort the results. What is more, protocolling the interview puts an additional strain on the researcher, who has to ask questions, write, and think about the interviewee’s response all at the same time (Gläser and Laudel 2010: 157f). On the other hand, interviewees may be less forthcoming with information when they are being recorded than otherwise (Richards 1996: 202; see also Gläser and Laudel 2010: 157). However, Gläser and Laudel (2010: 158) claim that the distortion arising from protocolling interviews from memory is worse than the potential bias produced by the presence of a tape recorder. In the case of foreign policy elite interviewing, I disagree. Due to foreign policy-makers’ strong concerns with confidentiality, some of them outright refused to be taped. Others, in turn, openly stated that they would give different information based on whether or not the interview was recorded. Finally, two interviews were car-
ried out by telephone and thus could not be taped. In these cases, I opted for the additional information over taping the interview. Because I was interested in information beyond the official record, it was vital to obtain as much of it as interviewees were willing to provide. In total, 15 of the 37 interviews conducted for this investigation could not be taped (including the two telephone interviews). When interviews were not recorded, interview protocols based on the notes taken during the interview were written up as soon as possible after the interview, and in all cases on the very same day the interview was conducted, in order to minimise the loss of information (Richards 1996: 203). In the context of this study, I exclusively cite directly from interview transcripts. Protocols are coded but never cited directly to support an argument. Where direct citations are reported, linguistic imprecisions such as the repetition of words, or the use of fillers (such as ‘uh’) are removed. Such a removal is indicated by ellipses within square brackets ‘[...]’, and relevant content is not removed. Anonymised transcripts and protocols in the original language can be provided upon request. Interviews were conducted in Spanish, German, and English; all translations from the Spanish or German are by the author.

4.2.3 Interview Evaluation

Based on the above considerations and the theoretical goals of this investigation, the method for evaluating the interview transcripts and protocols must be chosen. Due to the issues of confidentiality discussed above, a method of evaluation guaranteeing interviewees’ anonymity had to be employed. Additionally, the amount of material collected required a method that would facilitate keeping track of the evidence. Given these parameters, I opted for evaluating the interviews using the MAXQDA software package (VERBI Software 1989-2010). ‘QDA’ stands for ‘qualitative data analysis’. With MAXQDA, as with most Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) packages, it is possible to code interviews for evidence of the postulated hypotheses. It allows for assessing competing hypotheses and multiple codings of the same passage. Additionally, transcripts and protocols can be queried for new issues that might not be covered by the original hypotheses. Coding schemes for each of the two case studies were therefore developed making use

9Gläser and Laudel (2010: 153f) also debate the utility of telephone interviewing, as control of the interview is not as good and the amount of information obtained is lower than in a face-to-face setting. Again, I advocate a pragmatic approach. Conducting an interview by phone is better than not conducting the interview at all, given the small size of the population relevant to this study.

10CAQDAS packages are often associated with grounded theory (MacMillan and Koenig 2004: 182ff; Bong 2007: 260ff), however, it is not strictly necessary to use them in this fashion. Instead, they can just as well be used for their practical benefits such as facilitating the handling of larger amounts of data and extracting coded passages more easily, as well as for hypothesis-guided analysis.
of the colour-coding and structuring possibilities of MAXQDA. They can be found in Appendix D for the development case study, and in Appendix E for the EU case study, respectively. Moreover, a comment can be attached to each coding, and these comments can be exported so that in the case of codings in “Other” categories, more specific observations could be attached to the codings through the comment function.

In the case study on development, I designed a coding scheme for the interviewees connecting the postulated independent variables with motivating their development policy decisions regarding Latin America. Because of equifinal predictions arising from the theory, it was important to ensure the explicitness of the connection between independent variable and policy. For example, code 2a National Norm Poverty Alleviation was only assigned if a national norm of poverty alleviation was cited as the motivating factor for allocating aid to Latin America as a whole or a specific country. Additionally, a code entitled Other Concentration and were introduced to be able to code for motivations that did not correspond exactly with the explanatory variables postulated for the concentration of development aid towards Latin America. That way, it is possible to uncover other motivating factors that make an impact upon development policy towards the region.

In the EU case study, codes were assigned for the postulated explanatory variables (variable codes) as well as for the mechanisms through which the variables were theorised to be at work (mechanism codes; Gläser and Laudel (2010: 208f) call these ‘causal dimensions’, but I prefer to maintain the term mechanism to be consistent with the process tracing terminology). For example, one such postulated variable was domestic interests, while the mechanisms for interaction of the national level with the European level were strong and weak uploading as well as downloading. Therefore, code 1a was constructed to designate issues identified by the interviewee as being of particular interest to her country. Codes Uw and Us were designate strong and weak uploading, respectively, while D designates downloading. The mechanism hypothesised was that strong interest would lead to strong uploading, that is, trying to take one’s national stance to the EU level and push for its implementation there. The combined code for this mechanism is 1aUs. The presence of statements coded 1aUs indicates support for the hypothesis.

However, the existence of individual codes for the independent variables and mechanisms also allows the researcher to spot the emergence of new patterns that were not originally theorised. For example, if – hypothetically speaking – strong domestic interest caused downloading, the investigator would find instances of 1a combined with D. If many such instances occur, there may
be evidence for a causal path not postulated by the theoretical considerations. MAXQDA’s possibility to inspect code co-occurrences allows such patterns to be spotted relatively easily. Additionally, a code called Other was devised to be able to code sections that did not fit any of the hypothesised variables or mechanisms. MAXQDA allows all codes to be automatically extracted. They can then be inspected in a table, making it easier to spot patterns within the other category than if they had to be extracted manually, so that new variables or mechanisms can be identified.\footnote{In the identification of such variables and mechanisms, the researcher has to be careful to ensure that they are indeed new rather than different manifestations of already postulated relationships in order to avoid over-specifying the explanations.}

The very same property also allows for an analysis of the codings based on saliency theory, attributing greater importance to those codes that occur with greater frequency (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987). However, saliency theory has to be taken with some caution. As I have outlined above, interviewees may overstate certain mechanisms at the expense of others to appear in a more favourable light or because they are unaware of some issues. Therefore, while the frequency of codings can give important pointers regarding their importance, it is unwise to take such frequency analysis entirely at face value without discussing its implications and limitations.

As for the practical procedure of coding the interviews, Gläser and Laudel (2010: 210) recommend using paragraphs as the unit of analysis, because sentences or parts thereof tend to be too short to be interpreted meaningfully. However, in my experience this varies considerably depending on the interviewee. Germans and Spaniards tend to formulate longer sentences than British interviewees, for instance, so that here it is sometimes possible to code one sentence or even part of a sentence. Additionally, the length of sentences varies depending on the individual. For these reasons, I handle the unit of analysis more flexibly. Neuendorf (2005: 71) defines a unit in content analysis as “an identifiable message or message component”. Such a unit can be used in several ways, one of which is measuring a variable, which is what I am doing here. Based on the definition of a unit as an identifiable message or message component, I fix the units to be coded in the analysis of interviews as a ‘meaning unit’, that is, a unit to which an identifiable message or message component can be attached. This comes closest to the unit Neuendorf discusses as a “verbal clause” (ibid.: 72). The problem is that since the content analysis of the interviews is based on transcripts and protocols, that is, on natural language, clauses are often incomplete, or the same clause may contain several messages (Gottschalk and Bechtel 1995: 126). For the variable codes, sometimes a few words are enough, while for the mechanism codes normally at least part of a
sentence and up to several sentences is required. By proceeding this way, I can keep the length of the coding segment variable.

What, then, can this analysis tell us about the hypotheses postulated in the case studies? The presence of statements indicative of support for a certain hypothesis can very well be taken as evidence for the influence of a factor. Nevertheless, their absence does not necessarily mean that a certain factor is not influential. It might be that other factors are simply more important or, in the worst case, that interviewees – despite conducting as many interviews as possible – have given only part of the answer. Additionally, the strength of the influencing factors can be gauged. It is rather unlikely that only one factor drives the interaction mechanisms, and much more likely that evidence for more than one hypothesis will be unearthed. If several interviewees repeatedly mention the same factor, it is very likely to have a stronger influence than if only one interviewee mentions it. Again, however, given the small size of the population and thus of the sample, this possibility must be considered with the appropriate caution. Therefore, while the method is not able to confidently disconfirm the influence of factors, it can very well confirm their presence, as well as the strength of their influence to a certain degree.13 However, the evidence has to be validated using other sources, to whose discussion I now turn.

4.2.4 Triangulation

The various virtues and limitations of elite interviews have been laid out above. Due to the method’s limitations, it is wise to supplement the evidence collected from the interviews at national level with other sources in order to minimise the problems arising from the small population size and sampling issues, as well as potentially strategic rhetoric, forgetfulness, or concerns about confidentiality on behalf of interviewees, for instance. Triangulation promises to do just that. According to della Porta and Keating, triangulation “is about using different research methods to complement one another” (della Porta and Keating 2008: 34). However, it is also possible to triangulate sources rather than methods, which is what interview methodologists recommend in order to back up the validity of the results from interviews (Richards 1996: 204; Davies 2001: 78; Berry 2002: 680). Davies, for example, recommends a “triangulation triad” of primary sources such as interviews and documentary sources, along with secondary literature (Davies 2001: 78). In this study, I triangulate the data obtained from national-level interviews with further interviews with EU officials and Latin American diplomats, as well as with evidence from policy doc-

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13 Gläser and Laudel (2010, 247ff) provide an in-depth discussion of causal analysis using interview data.
uments. Finally, the evidence will be considered within the context of already existing secondary literature, which can help situate the present study within the context of policy-making towards Latin America and, more generally, foreign policy-making in Europe. In the following, the use of triangulation interviews and policy documents is further discussed.

4.2.4.1 Triangulation interviews

In order to increase the validity and reliability of the results from the national level interviews, I triangulate them with further interviews from different sources, which I will discuss individually in the following paragraphs. However, some general remarks can be made. All further elite interviews were evaluated using the same qualitative content analysis method as in the case of the primary interviews (i.e. using MAXQDA). The coding schemes used for the triangulation interviews were the same as those of the national-level interviews, except that country codes were introduced to indicate whether a statement was tied specifically to Germany, Spain, the UK, or any combination of the three. By using MAXQDA’s code correlations tool, it was then possible to extract the importance of each explanatory variable for each individual country. By introducing new sources of information, the triangulation interviews can therefore give greater validity to the evidence based on the national-level interviews. However, they suffer from their own varieties of the pitfalls discussed above, which have to be taken into account when it comes to their evaluation.

A total number of six additional interviews was carried out with EU officials at the Council, the Commission, and the EEAS involved with Latin America policy at EU level. Interviewing EU officials was, of course, particularly helpful for the EU case study. However, because the officials deal on a regular basis with their counterparts from all three countries under study as well as officials from other EU Member States, they bring to the table a comparative perspective that is highly useful for the entire investigation. Since the EU is also involved in development policy towards Latin America, they were also able to make some contributions to the development case study. Of course, EU officials suffer from their own ‘versions’ of the biases reported in the above section. They may have incentives to overstate the impact of the EU on national foreign policies and the importance of the European policy towards Latin America. Furthermore, by virtue of their role in bringing together the different Member States, they have an obligation to be ‘diplomatic’ and might be reluctant to criticise individual Member States. Finally, just like Member State officials, they may be unaware of certain processes, or unwilling to admit the influence of certain factors. Just like in the national-level interviews, these limitations must
be considered in interpreting the evidence from the EU-level interviews. However, the triangulation of national- with EU-level interviews has a number of advantages. Firstly, they may corroborate the evidence for the causal mechanisms discovered in the national-level interviews. What is more, by bringing in a comparative angle because of officials’ regular dealings with all 27 Member States, they can aid this study’s task of putting the different national policies into perspective. By the same virtue, they offer the possibility for at least some generalisation beyond the three countries under study. Last but not least, because EU officials are not subject to the same strategic incentives as national officials, they may put the distortion of evidence resulting from the national level into perspective, at least to some degree.

Similarly, four triangulation interviews were carried out with Latin American diplomats based in Brussels, bringing up the total number of triangulation interviews to ten. As with the national-level and the EU officials, Latin American diplomats have their own set of restrictions when granting interviews. These include concerns about confidentiality – after all, the diplomats still have to work with their European counterparts and are thus legitimately concerned about not offending anybody –, the problem of strategic rhetoric, and so on. The problem of unawareness is particularly pertinent to interviews with Latin American diplomats, who have even less possibility than EU officials to ‘peer into’ the policy-making process within the Member States under study. However, they are indeed able to offer valuable additional information. They bring in a valuable outside perspective providing noteworthy insights into a number of factors: firstly, on the perception of the motivating factors in Member States’ foreign policy towards their region. Secondly, from their vantage point of closely observing proceedings without actively participating, they have a valuable perspective on the interaction between the national level and the EU level. Thirdly, by virtue of their experience as observant representatives of their respective home countries, they are able to provide insight into the perception of EU Member States’ development policy towards Latin America from the recipient countries’ point of view. Fourth and finally, although they are constrained by other parameters (such as, in the true sense of the term, being diplomatic), Latin American officials, similar to EU officials, offer a comparative perspective the national-level interviews cannot provide.

Therefore, while they cannot make the investigation perfect, the triangulation interviews can at least mitigate some of the problems contained in the national-level data, thereby increasing its validity.

14Due to limited time and resources, unfortunately, no Latin American diplomats based in the European capitals could be interviewed, although this would have enhanced validity even further.
4.2.4.2 Policy documents

As I have discussed above, official documents on policy towards Latin America are too scarce to be the main source of evidence regarding the motivations for policy towards Latin America. However, they can offer valuable initial and supplementary information that can be used to cross-check the evidence obtained in the interviews. They will be used for this purpose in the EU case study. For this part of the investigation, national policy documents were first coded to reveal the mechanisms by which national and EU-level policy towards Latin America interact in the three countries under study. Although they are most certainly strategic and, as I have outlined above, may sometimes not give very clear indications of motivations for a certain policy, it is possible to tease out some information from them, for example through coding. They are potentially the outcome of a long negotiation process within the government (van der Mast and Janssen 2001; Janssen and van der Mast 2001), and thus reflect the consensus that determines a country’s foreign policy, just like a party manifesto determines a party’s line on different issues (Budge et al. 2001: 6) – often, they are statements of intent. Additionally, as Larsen (2005; 2009) demonstrates, it is possible to develop coding schemes that take account of the mechanisms involved in foreign policy-making. The EU case study exploits this potential in order to determine the aforementioned mechanisms of interaction. Policy documents can therefore be used in a fruitful manner to both inspire interview-based research – through uncovering mechanisms that will then be further investigated in the interviews – and to cross-check the evidence from the national-level and the triangulation interviews. In the EU case study, they are also used for this latter purpose to further corroborate the evidence from the interviews. In that sense, by introducing publicly available information into the analysis, the use of policy documents not only contributes to further validating the evidence, but also to increasing reliability by working with documents that can be easily cross-checked.

4.3 Outlook

In this introductory chapter, I have motivated the choice for development policy and the interaction of national and EU-level policy towards Latin America as cases for in-depth study within this investigation’s framework. Both development policy and national-EU level interaction are of particular theoretical relevance and have displayed cross-country variation in the previous chapter. Their further study is thus particularly promising.

Moreover, I have shown how this study will employ process tracing based
on OECD data (for the development case study), government documents (for the EU case study), and elite interviews with national policy-makers in order to determine the factors that influence policy towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK. These data will be triangulated with interviews conducted at the EU institutions and with Latin American diplomats. This chapter has also discussed some of the pitfalls of the methods employed by this study, outlining its scope and limitations, and has clarified how I purport to deal with them. It is now time to put these methods into practice by turning to the study of development policy-making towards Latin America in Spain, Germany, and Britain.
Chapter 5

Tracing the Complexity of Aid: Development Policy towards Latin America
5.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces a first case study to shed light on how foreign policy towards Latin America is made in Europe. It focuses on German, Spanish, and British development policy towards Latin America. As I have shown in Chapter 3 and discussed in the previous chapter, this is an area where the three EU Member States under study display wide variation in their policy activity that merits further attention. Given that the Latin American countries have reached a certain level of development, one would expect donors to behave similarly towards them if all donors are taken to behave more or less in the same way, as has been suggested by some (Feeny and McGillivray 2008). However, while Spain dedicates a very large share of its overall aid budget towards Latin America, the UK has shut down its bilateral aid programme with the region as of 2008 (DFID 2009). A programme remains with Brazil to take account of its “important role in global development”, and another residual aid programme with Nicaragua “as it becomes a middle income country”, switching delivery from bilateral delivery to the Nicaraguan government to other channels such as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and multilateral donors (ibid.), has now also closed down. Germany, meanwhile, might be expected to harbour similar intentions as the UK, given that its country recipient list is in a continuous process of consolidation. Additionally, while its economic interests in Latin America are somewhat larger than the UK’s, they are definitely not as large as Spain’s. Nonetheless, Germany continues to run an autonomous bilateral programme with Latin American countries and there do not seem to be intentions of shutting it down, although aid in absolute numbers has decreased over the years.

In Chapter 3, I have mapped out variation in development policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Germany, Spain, and the UK. The variance found is once again displayed in Table 5.1. The first section of this chapter

Table 5.1: fsQCA index values Development Policy Activity towards Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fsQCA value</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Of course, the same region may ‘mean’ different things to different donors. For example, Latin America is economically more important to Spain than the the UK or Germany, a factor that has to be taken into account.

2This is in part the case because some Latin American countries ‘graduate’ from the OECD’s list of countries eligible for ODA, as their levels of development rise.
study, situated within the overarching theoretical framework conceptualised in Chapter 2. Based on the framework, I then proceed to further flesh out how aid is delivered to Latin America by Britain, Germany, and Spain. In order to obtain first indications of how aid is allocated, I map allocation patterns and lay out the preliminary conclusions regarding the way in which the three countries allocate aid to Latin America: is it more oriented towards poor countries or towards emerging markets, or both? Is Latin America an exception in this respect, or does it reflect the patterns also found in overall aid delivery? To this end, I plot so-called aid concentration curves to visualise the amounts of aid received by Latin American countries relative to their poverty levels. By complementing the evidence from OECD data with evidence from interviews, I then proceed to analysing these patterns in more depth and to finding explanations for why Germany, Spain, and the UK give aid to Latin America the way they do.

The chapter presents both substantial and methodological innovations. In the methodological realm, I introduce a more intuitive way of plotting aid concentration curves, mitigating some problems the curves have hitherto struggled with. This is discussed in depth in Section 5.4. In the area of development research, I innovate upon previous research in trying to explain the concentration of aid by looking at three important donor countries’ behaviour in one region in detail. Earlier, mostly quantitative studies, have produced a wealth of results and explanations that are often contradictory. As I will show in the first part of this chapter, development policy is a very complex endeavour varying on so many levels that with large-scale studies it is difficult to trace the reasons for why countries out such policy in a certain way. Although a small-N in-depth study makes generalisations more difficult, it seems worth looking at a smaller section of development policy behaviour in order to gain a deeper insight into what motivates policy-makers in their development policy decisions. The argument for taking a small-N approach, essentially, is the idea that aid allocation is so complex that in large-N studies looking at all (or most) donors and all (or most) aid recipients in the world, potentially even across time, produce explanations that are either extremely specific because of the framework conditions introduced, or extremely broad. The result tends to be that many factors matter, or that ‘it depends’. By taking a closer look at a few donors with some common characteristics and holding the recipient region constant, I hope to shed more light on some aspects of donor behaviour by placing them under the magnifying glass of a small-N study. Additionally, by relying on interview data, it is possible to trace the processes of development policy-making beyond

3Faust and Ziaja (2011: 6) also point out that looking at different time periods may account for the disparate findings in these studies.
publicly available ODA data. That way, this study may be able to overcome the problem of equifinality in development policy research at least to some extent, thus complementing large-N studies on the issue.

On the other hand, the study further complements existing studies on development aid in the three countries under study, both more general ones and those focusing explicitly on the study of development policy towards Latin America (Manuel de la Iglesia-Caruncho 2011; Faust and Ziaja 2011; Sanahuja 2009; Rocha Menocal et al. 2008) by introducing a comparative element. To what extent are motivations similar or different, and how does such variation come about? Additionally, extant research comparing the behaviour of various donors (e.g. Lancaster 2007) and studies on the development policies of other EU Member States (e.g. Carbone 2007) will be complemented by this study. By situating itself on the middle ground between single-country case studies (both quantitative and qualitative) and large-N comparative studies, this investigation contributes to a deeper understanding of the factors impacting upon development policy and their interaction.

I find that indeed, factors based on utilitarian liberalism and constructivist liberalism, but also the international environment do matter. However, domestic political and economic interests are found to be the main driving factors. Yet I also show that depending on the national context, the independent variables theorised in the analysis of development policy combine in unique ways to bring about different outcomes. This is why an in-depth analysis of the development policies of a limited number of countries towards Latin America can provide interesting insights and uncover potential areas for future research, thus complementing earlier large-N studies with novel evidence.

5.2 Aid to Latin America – but how?

All three countries involved in this study give ODA to Latin America, but they do so in different ways. This chapter pays particular attention to the concentration of aid in different countries and in the region as a whole vis-à-vis aid to the rest of the world. This should give an indication of what aid to Latin America is supposed to ‘do’. Is it directed largely at countries with a large population share below the poverty line? Then we can assume that aid is poverty-oriented, thus targeting the poorest, as prescribed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs; Baulch 2003: 13). Is it directed largely to big countries that are doing relatively well, such as Brazil or Mexico? In this case, we might suspect that aid serves other purposes, such as helping potentially interest-

\[^4\text{Whether the aid actually reaches the poor within the poorest countries is a different matter, however.}\]
ing markets develop faster, or geopolitical considerations (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). This area has been approached mostly through quantitat-ive studies, but researchers disagree about the motivations for development aid to a surprisingly large degree. As Berthelémy (2006: 179) states, “the consensus now is that, whenever these variables are relevant for the explanation of aid allocation, one needs to introduce them all together in so-called ‘hybrid’ models”. However, such hybrid models like the one employed by Berthelémy himself tend to find that everything somehow matters and that this also de-pends on how the allocation model is specified (Berthelémy 2006: 187f). In other words, the explanatory power of such models is high, but their broadness leaves the curious researcher with a plethora of open questions. By look-ing more closely at the behaviour of three important donor countries towards one single region, this study can help shed some light on differing donor mo-tivations, holding the recipient region constant. This section begins by showing the differences in aid allocation to Latin America among Germany, Spain and the UK.

5.2.1 Aid to Latin America

The amount of aid each country gives to Latin America varies substantially across Germany, the UK and Spain. Table 5.2 summarises developments in ODA disbursements over recent years. Note that with aid data, there is always a time lag of at least one year, often more, for the latest available data. The descriptive statistics here are based on data obtained from the OECD statistics database, whose reporting rules make the figures as comparable as possible.

Table 5.2 illustrates in more detail the findings from Chapter 3 that Spain gives extraordinary amounts of ODA to Latin America in comparison to the other two countries and to both the DAC total and DAC-EU. Germany lies more or less within the DAC/DAC-EU average, and the UK gives very small amounts. (see also Appendix B for an overview of development aid figures within the DAC). Departing from this overview and from the map of development policy activity that has emerged in Chapter 3, the question of how to explain this scenario arises. Why does aid to Latin America look the way it does?

5.3 Theoretical framework and Expectations

The overarching theoretical framework based on Foreign Policy Analysis for the entire study was conceptualised in Chapter 2 for the analysis of foreign policy-making within an extended liberal theoretical setting incorporating mo-
## Table 5.2: ODA to Latin America in Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total aid disbursement to Latin America*</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2004-8 average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>% of total ODA going to Latin America</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of total ODA going to Africa</td>
<td>43.81</td>
<td>46.56</td>
<td>60.39</td>
<td>38.31</td>
<td>36.07</td>
<td>37.28</td>
<td>45.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of total ODA going to Asia</td>
<td>31.14</td>
<td>35.26</td>
<td>20.58</td>
<td>29.49</td>
<td>40.81</td>
<td>26.83</td>
<td>31.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Total aid disbursement to Latin America</td>
<td>996.83</td>
<td>727.47</td>
<td>576.42</td>
<td>608.47</td>
<td>943.15</td>
<td>1034.56</td>
<td>770.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total ODA going to Latin America</td>
<td>19.03</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>8.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of total ODA going to Africa</td>
<td>30.42</td>
<td>34.44</td>
<td>45.59</td>
<td>27.99</td>
<td>31.79</td>
<td>27.48</td>
<td>34.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of total ODA going to Asia</td>
<td>32.04</td>
<td>44.74</td>
<td>29.51</td>
<td>49.80</td>
<td>43.63</td>
<td>36.19</td>
<td>40.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Total aid disbursement to Latin America</td>
<td>704.44</td>
<td>883.01</td>
<td>876.56</td>
<td>1264.61</td>
<td>2283.05</td>
<td>1616.45</td>
<td>1202.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total ODA</td>
<td>42.76</td>
<td>37.38</td>
<td>35.95</td>
<td>34.74</td>
<td>42.18</td>
<td>33.17</td>
<td>38.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of total ODA going to Africa</td>
<td>24.66</td>
<td>33.54</td>
<td>26.97</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>35.17</td>
<td>26.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of total ODA going to Asia</td>
<td>14.81</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>18.21</td>
<td>13.41</td>
<td>14.81</td>
<td>13.35</td>
<td>15.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC total</td>
<td>Total aid disbursement to Latin America</td>
<td>7074.98</td>
<td>6608.35</td>
<td>6406.51</td>
<td>6600.42</td>
<td>8224.15</td>
<td>7647.14</td>
<td>6982.882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total ODA</td>
<td>10.57</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>8.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of total ODA going to Africa</td>
<td>33.48</td>
<td>29.96</td>
<td>39.29</td>
<td>31.82</td>
<td>30.21</td>
<td>33.01</td>
<td>32.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- % of total ODA going to Asia</td>
<td>33.61</td>
<td>46.11</td>
<td>32.73</td>
<td>36.82</td>
<td>37.68</td>
<td>32.30</td>
<td>37.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures are in current million US-Dollars.

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Table 5.2: ODA to Latin America in Comparison

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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY: THE COMPLEXITY OF AID
tivating factors from both liberal utilitarianism and liberal constructivism. Additionally, I pointed out that it was important to be able to account for the mediation of influencing factors at the global level, such as rational adaptation to international rules or socialisation into international norms, by the aforementioned liberal factors. In this section, the task is to adapt the overarching framework to the case of development policy. In addition to shedding light on the motivations of foreign policy towards Latin America in the three cases under study, the seemingly eternal scholarly battle over whether aid is egoistic or altruistic (or both) makes a perfect case for ‘bridge building’ between a logic of expected consequences and one of appropriateness. Do Germany, Britain, and Spain give aid to Latin America because they ‘want something’, or because they adhere to norms stipulating that foreign aid is ‘the right thing to do’? This study tackles the question in the following way: the three countries’ overall development policy activity towards the region, as mapped in Chapter 3, sets the overarching question of why it is so varied. Looking at the variation in more detail, the concentration of Germany, Spanish and British aid to Latin American countries as compared to their poverty levels can give us an indication of whether aid is poverty-oriented or not (Baulch 2003).

Motivating factors for development policy have been the subject of intense debates in the academic community ever since the beginnings of foreign aid after World War II, and they roughly correspond to the independent variables discussed in Chapter 2. Some have found that donors give aid in order to buy concessions from developing countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). Others have found evidence for aid allocation corresponding to strategic development goals (Bermeo 2010). This means that donor countries allocate aid in order to further development, but they strategically do so in countries with which they already have ties. Others, in turn, have argued from a constructivist perspective that giving reflects a shared norm of helping the poor (Lumsdaine 1993). Why do the findings exhibit such variation? There are several reasons for this, but the most comprehensive answer to this question is that aid allocation is much more complex than it seems at first sight and than many studies allow. Allocation can vary along several dimensions, and the reason for the literature’s disparate findings is that it probably does. Indeed, a paper by Berthélémy (2006: 187f) is an impressive demonstration of how nigh on everything can become statistically significant as a motivating factor for aid allocation, and of how this also depends on the indicators chosen to represent the independent variables.

On the other hand, some researchers have recognised that the “diversity of domestic constellation across donor countries creates a need to complement broad cross-country studies with specific case studies focussing on single
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY: THE COMPLEXITY OF AID

donors” (Faust and Ziaja 2011: 2). Of course, such an approach in turn has the
drawback of making it difficult to generalise beyond the findings on one single
country. Similarly to large cross-country studies, even country-specific studies
relying on statistical analyses find that much depends on the model specific-
(ibtid.: 15f), and they are unable to account for outcomes that could be
explained either by norm-based or interest-based behaviour (ibid.: 14f). By
taking a small-N comparative approach, I hope to be able to better isolate the
influence of domestic-level factors by holding external factors constant, while
at the same time introducing an element of comparability that should allow
at least for some generalisation. Additionally, by conducting interviews with
officials responsible for making development-policy, it is possible to at least
encroach upon equifinality’s territory, although it is impossible to conquer it
completely. The rationale behind these considerations has been outlined in
depth in Chapter 2.

Development policy involves several dimensions. On the one hand, for
the donor government it involves answers to the two-step question of whether
to give aid to a country and if so, how much (Berthelémy 2006: 179; Carey
2007: 453). Secondly, for answering both parts of this question, criteria must
be applied on behalf of the donor. As outlined above, the development studies
literature is replete with investigations into what motivates these decisions.
Essentially, the drivers considered belong to three camps:

1. Donor interests. This encompasses a wide variety of strategic, economic,
and political interests considered by the donor when deciding whether
and how much to give (Morgenthau 1962; Maizels and Nissanke 1984;
Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Younas
2008).

2. Recipient need. If the needs of the recipient are the main motivating factor
of a donor government, then policy activity and, by extension, aid should
be primarily concentrated in the poorest countries (Baulch 2003; 2006).

3. Recipient capacity and governance. This is motivated by efficiency con-
siderations. ‘Efficiency’, or ‘effectiveness’ as it is also called,5 refers to
the capacity of aid to reduce “poverty, malnutrition, disease, and death”
(Easterly and Pfutze 2008: 29). Aid is supposed to be more efficient in
countries who have the institutional capacity to administer it correctly, as
well as in democratic countries with a good human rights record, or gov-
ernance record more generally (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Carey 2007).
Recipient capacity and governance can be both a goal of aid (aid goes to

5I will be using these terms interchangeably, as appears to be custom in the literature.
projects of institution-building, for example) and an instrument of conditionality (aid as a reward for good governance), making it problematic to identify which direction its effect is ‘supposed to’ go in: should aid be given to those countries who already show a good institutional and governance track record (and, by extension, be withheld from those who do not), or to those who are most in need of building such institutions? Similarly, an argument can be made that stopping aid to recipients with a poor capacity or track record would result in a complete loss of potential influence (Luard 1992: 304; Carey 2007: 457).

While the two former schools of development aid motivations are already senior (Morgenthau 1962; White 1974), the issue of recipient capacity and record is newer and has become an issue of greater concern since the introduction of aid conditionality into the equation of development assistance, more or less since the late 1980s (Carey 2007: 450f). Note that donor interests as motivating factors in aid allocation correspond to a utilitarian-liberal view – the donor country gives aid in order to obtain political or economic benefits from it. Recipient need, as well as recipient capacity and governance, in turn, follow a logic that may respond either to domestic or international norms, as well as rational adaptation to international rules. On the one hand, if a donor country gives aid to the needy, or its goal is to allocate aid where it can make a difference in terms of aid’s proclaimed goal, poverty reduction, one may assume that the basic motivation is one of goodwill, or “idealism” (Carey 2007: 452) rather than interests – at least in the first instance.

There may, however, be three sources of norms stipulating that aid should be poverty-oriented. Firstly, norms about the poverty orientation of aid may emanate from the domestic level, in accordance with liberal constructivism. Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007), for example, show that rising ODA levels in South Korea were due to the emergence of domestic norms about the poverty orientation of aid. Therefore, policy-makers may have been socialised in a policy-making environment where the poverty alleviating goal of aid is taken for granted.

Secondly, norms may emanate from the international level. All three countries under study here are members of the OECD’s Donor Assistance Committee, and are also involved in the work of various multilateral donors, including the World Bank, the European Union, and international development

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6 For the purposes of this study, poverty reduction or poverty alleviation is taken in the broadest sense of the term, referring not only the most ‘obvious’ forms of poverty such as starvation, which is not necessarily a problem in large parts of Latin America. I also include the goal of alleviating other impediments to socio-economic development such as poor political and fiscal governance, discrimination and the curtailing of human and civil rights, as well as unfavourable environmental factors, among others. The idea behind this is that these factors go hand in hand with full development, which is unattainable without their realisation.
banks. Additionally, Feeny and Mc Gillivray’s finding that donors’ aid allocations have responded to changes in developmental criteria following the setting up of the Millennium Development Goals (Feeny and McGillivray 2008: 526) speaks for the influence of international norms on donor policy. As Carol Lancaster (2007: 5) puts it, the history of foreign aid “reflects the development of an international norm that the governments of rich countries should provide public, concessional resources to improve the human condition in poor countries.”

Finally, there is a theoretical current emphasising the rational adaptation of states and their policy makers to international rules as a result of seeking to maintain their reputation and status as a full and worthy member of the international community (Slaughter 2004; Checkel 2005), in this case the community of donors. For the case of development policy, Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007: 223) consider this idea when discussing that aid giving may be motivated by “social participation or social roles and obligations”, as different from “doing right or doing one’s duty”. As I laid out in Chapter 2, however, it is important to be aware of the domestic mediation of international factors, be they rational adaptation or the internalisation of international norms about development policy. Poverty orientation of aid may thus be the result of several causes, and this study attempts to determine which ones hold for aid concentration in Latin America on behalf of Spain, Germany, and Britain. Summing up, donor interests, as well as recipient need, capacity and governance, therefore, reflect basic ideas about what purpose it is aid should serve. However, in the case of need, capacity and governance, it is nevertheless possible for the donor’s eventual behaviour to conform to rationalism when it comes to deciding about development policy, despite the underlying idealist motivation.

These driving factors, then, should be visible in the way donor governments concentrate aid in certain developing countries (or not), that is, what Latin American countries receive how much aid. The rationale behind focusing on the concentration of aid is that depending on the motivation behind development policy, aid should be concentrated differently in different countries and regions depending on their characteristics. Assuming as a baseline that aid is primarily geared towards alleviating poverty, it should be concentrated in the poorest world regions, or in the poorest countries within a region (Baulch 2003), which is the case I am dealing with here. If aid concentration

Note that I am not primarily concerned with the decision to include or exclude certain countries from the recipients’ list in this study, but rather with how the concentration within Latin America is carried out. However, the British decision to close its bilateral Latin America programme amounts to a choice for the exclusion of all Latin American countries except Brazil and Guyana from the list. In addition, I will compare aid concentration in Latin America with data for the rest of the world, so that Latin America as a whole remains the main focus of the study.
deviates from this pattern, that is, countries receive a much lesser (or greater) share of aid than would correspond to their poverty levels, the researcher must assume that something other than poverty alleviation is at the heart of the distribution decision.

Following from the above considerations and the framework outlined in Chapter 2, I hypothesise several relationships of motivating factors and development policy activity in Latin America, based both on a logic of expected consequences and of appropriateness.

5.3.1 Independent Variables

In the following, I outline how I expect the different independent variables arising from the previous paragraphs to influence development policy towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and Britain. I assume that the factors motivating development policy affect the concentration of development assistance in Latin America as a whole, as well as across different Latin American countries. Aid concentration is taken as an indicator for development policy motivations. The basic assumption underlying the choice is that if aid is concentrated primarily in poor countries, aid allocation is based on the needs of the recipients rather than the interests of the donors, and is thus indicative of a logic of appropriateness motivating the donor country. However, these basic expectations must be refined and alternative explanations considered. In line with the overarching framework, I consider motivating factors emanating from the domestic level, and conceive international-level factors as mediated by the domestic – the policy-makers’ – level, as outlined both in the previous section and in Chapter 2. I now proceed to drawing up theoretical expectations about the factors determining development policy towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK.

Both the concentration of aid to Latin America as compared to other world regions or overall aid, and the concentration of aid within Latin America are of interest. I define the following independent variables and observations that should be made if the theoretical relationships postulated hold.

**Economic Interests** The idea that development aid might be used to further the economic interests of the donor country has been widely considered by the development literature. Indeed, economic variables have become a staple in large-N studies on development aid allocation (e.g. McKinlay and Little 1977; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemé 2006, etc.). Recently, Younas (2008) has found that aid is used by donor countries to influence aid recipients to buy their manufactured goods – aid may there-
fore be commercially oriented. It does make intuitive sense that by furthering development in potential markets, donor countries might try to expand opportunities for their businesses in terms of both trade and investment. In particular, one may expect aid to middle-income countries to be more commercially oriented (Milner and Tingley Submitted 2010: 14), because evidently these countries make more promising markets than low-income countries. Therefore, it would be logical to see development aid towards Latin America to be especially driven by economic considerations: the region consists almost exclusively of middle-income countries, and economic growth has been quite stable in recent years. Concerning the concentration of aid, we should then observe aid to Latin America as a whole not to be poverty-oriented. Within Latin America, it should be disproportionately concentrated in those countries that represent large potential markets for the three donor countries under study, principally the richer countries including, for instance, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, but also Chile and Peru, which has seen particularly fast growth (GDP grew by more than 7% each year since 2006, except in 2009, and GNI grew by similar figures, according to the World Bank World Development Indicators 2011). Regarding the three donor countries, as discussed in Chapter 2, Spain is the one with the most important economic stakes in the region and is thus most likely to use its development assistance to the region to further such interests. Germany has lower, but still above-EU average trade, while the UK has below-EU average trade with Latin America (Eurostat 2009). As I have shown in Chapter 3 and summarised again in Table 5.1 (p. 158) the corresponding levels of policy activity match the expectations discussed in Chapter 2 at least in principle: Spain is the most active, Germany takes a middle position, and the UK’s development policy towards the region is practically non-existent. I therefore hypothesise:

\[ H_{1a}: \text{The stronger a donor’s economic interests in Latin America, the more development policy activity should be focused on those countries representing potentially interesting trade and investment partners. This tendency should thus be particularly strong in Spain, less strong in Germany, and the least in the UK, in order of descending economic stakes in Latin America.} \]

As laid out above, economic interests driving development policy should translate into aid concentration that is unrelated to Latin America’s overall poverty levels. Richer countries should receive disproportionate amounts of aid. In addition, in the interviews carried out for the purposes of this study, I would expect policy-makers to motivate development policy with their respective country’s economic and trade relations with the region as a whole and particular
countries. This is one area where one has to be particularly aware of strategic rhetoric, as discussed in the previous chapter, because it is quite likely that policy-makers are not ready to admit to the commercial orientation of their country’s aid. Interviews therefore have to be carefully coded to find potentially elusive evidence for the commercial orientation of development policy. The codebook according to which the evidence was scrutinised can be found in Appendix D.

### Political Interests

Strategic political interests are another motivating factor to be considered among the potential drivers of development policy. Development assistance as a tool of foreign policy has been analysed by researchers since very early on, especially in the context of the Cold War (Morgenthau 1962; McKinlay and Little 1977). Again, political interests are by now a staple independent variable in large-N studies on aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthelémy 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, etc.). In particular, aid may serve to buy votes in the United Nations as considered by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007: 254), although Alesina and Dollar (2000: 37f, 46) earlier pointed out the difficulties in disentangling whether aid causes UN votes, or UN votes are indicative of alliance patterns that condition aid (they advocate for the latter). In the case of Latin America, the use of aid for political-strategic goals is particularly interesting because there is a growing awareness that Latin American countries’ importance on the world stage is growing, as discussed in detail for example in Germany’s strategy paper for Latin America published in 2010 (Auswärtiges Amt 2010: 6ff). Three Latin American countries are now members of the Group of 20 (G-20), Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Likewise, Mexico hosted the COP-16 climate change conference in 2010. Donor countries therefore might have good reason to provide development assistance ‘goodies’ to such potentially important political partners. Additionally, security concerns in the sense of ‘new security’ considerations may play a role, as much of the world’s cocaine as well as other drugs continue to come out of Latin America (Brombacher and Maihold 2009). Political interests may therefore form part of policy-makers’ preferences when considering development policy towards Latin America. As with economic considerations, one would then expect aid to be overall not poverty-oriented in Latin America, and policy activity should rather be focused on those countries that are politically important, like the ones mentioned above.

In the case of Spain, its status as a former colonial power in Latin America must be considered. Spain has colonial ties with nearly all Latin American countries except Brazil, Suriname, and Guyana (where, in turn, the UK
is a former colonial power). Colonialism has been shown to heavily influence whether a donor allocates a lot of aid to a recipient country or region (see, for example, Alesina and Dollar 2000; Carey 2007). Therefore, it is a factor to be considered in the context of political reasons for aid allocation. While, however, colonial ties might explain the large amounts of aid Spain allocates to Latin America overall, with the exception of the aforementioned three countries that are not former colonies, they should not impact differently upon the concentration of Spanish aid within Latin America, which is a nice feature of singling out one recipient region. Nevertheless, the Spanish interviews should be scrutinised particularly carefully for colonialism as an impacting factor. It will, however, be treated as part of the political interest variable, because colonialism is indicative of a particularly close bilateral political relationship. In the case of Spain, therefore, I expect rather high scores on this factor.

In the cases of Germany and the UK, on the other hand, an impact of political interests should indeed lead to a concentration of development policy activity in the political ‘heavyweights’ of the region, in particular Brazil, Mexico, and to some extent Argentina. Additionally, countries that are the source of insecurity in terms of drugs trade, such as Colombia or Central American countries, might also receive a special share of development policy activity on account of such issues.

I hypothesise:

\[ H_{1b}: \text{The greater a donor's strategic-political interests in Latin America, the more development policy activity should be focused on countries that are important political partners for the donor under study, and aid is overall not poverty oriented. Political interests should be especially important for Spain across the entire region on account of its colonial ties with the region, while they should be lower for Germany and the UK, which are expected to focus their development policy activity more selectively on countries that are considered important political partners.} \]

Overall, in a similar fashion to economic factors driving aid, if political interests are a factor, aid to Latin America should overall not be poverty-oriented and go disproportionately to important political partners such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Unfortunately, these coincide also with those countries that are economically interesting. Interviews should help to shed some light on this instance of equifinality.

Overall, in the interviews, I look for explicit connections on the part of the interviewees between development aid and political considerations. What was said in the previous paragraph about strategic rhetoric, however, applies similarly.
5.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EXPECTATIONS

Domestic Norms  As outlined above, however, there is also the possibility that norms about aid giving influence development policy towards Latin America. The idea that aid is motivated by recipient need is essentially as old as development assistance itself and has been discussed early on (e.g. White 1974; McKinlay and Little 1977). More recently, Lumsdaine (1993) made a sophisticated case for the impact of humanitarian concern in the donor countries influencing development assistance throughout the Cold War. Similarly, Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007) show how the development of domestic values over helping the poor have impacted South Korean ODA levels in recent years. The idea that policy-makers have been socialised into such a norm prior to or upon entering the development policy-making world in their home country thus seems plausible, and it might even be the case that they are especially susceptible to such a norm, as they might choose their career path based on wanting to make a difference to the poor.9 However, in this study, I am not interested in how policy-makers have been socialised, but whether they have been socialised, so that the socialisation process as such is considered to be exogenous to this framework. In considering national socialisation, I borrow from the literature on the subject that has evolved in EU studies, as discussed in Chapter 2. In the EU, national-level socialisation has been shown to be important in national policy-making (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005). If national socialisation is at work with respect to norms regarding the EU, there is no reason why it should not be at work with respect to norms regarding development policy.

As discussed in Chapter 2, observing socialisation is difficult. Many studies of socialisation have struggled to operationalise it in a way that does not leave room for rationalist interpretations (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1062). Of course, this study cannot solve all the methodological problems associated with the concept of socialisation,10 but by providing a clear conceptualisation of socialisation’s status as an exogenous independent variable for the purposes of this study, as well as by triangulating different sources, this investigation can provide a plausible account of the factors at work.

I therefore test for the impact of a national norm stipulating that development assistance should be granted to alleviate poverty, in the widest sense of the word, in developing countries. If this is the case, poorer countries should receive more aid (Baulch 2003). What forms exactly such domestic norms might take in the individual countries is, in the case of development assistance, unlikely to vary largely between the three countries under study. All three are donor countries where there might be a domestic norm that it is right

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9This, indeed, is one of the reasons why it makes sense to interview policy-makers rather than rely on public opinion data, like Milner and Tingley (Submitted 2010) have done.
10These issues are discussed in depth by Beyers (2010).
to help the poor. Aid should therefore, if anything, be focused on the poorer countries of Latin America rather than those that are promising emerging markets or political partners. Why, then, does the level of development policy activity still differ so widely between the three of them? In terms of overall levels, if development policy activity is motivated by a national norm of poverty alleviation, it would be plausible that a donor withdraw some of its aid from the region because it is by now relatively ‘rich’. This may explain the UK’s, but also Germany’s relatively low levels of policy activity on the development dimension. But to explain cross-country variation in activity it must be considered national norms about poverty alleviation might interact with other factors to produce the outcomes on the dependent variable observed in Chapter 3. If, as the utilitarian-liberal approach discussed in Chapter 2 would propose, the key goals of foreign policy-makers are economic (and potentially political) well-being (Moravcsik 1998), although ideational factors might also be at play (Moravcsik 1997; Wagner 2002; Koenig-Archibugi 2004), well-being might trump norms. In this case, we would expect domestic norms about poverty alleviation to play a greater role in Britain and Germany, where material interests are lower and leave more ‘wiggle room’ for normative factors, than in Spain with its substantive economic interests in Latin America. I thus would expect that:

\[
H_{2a}: \text{The stronger a domestic norm about poverty alleviation in a donor country, the more development policy activity should be concentrated in the poorest countries of the region and overall aid to Latin America should be poverty-oriented. This is expected to be more likely in Germany and Britain, where material interests are lower, than in Spain.}
\]

The countries receiving the bulk of aid from donors motivated by domestic norms should therefore be the poorest countries of Latin America, while the richer ones should receive less. It is, however, important to note that from the concentration of aid alone, it is not entirely clear whether development policy results from a domestic norm of poverty alleviation. This is because donors may decide to allocate aid to countries where it is most efficient, that is, in countries that are well-governed and have the administrative capacity to handle the inflow of large amounts of assistance (Baulch 2003; Berthelémy 2006; Bermeo 2010), a property often referred to as absorptive capacity. Therefore, if aid is not strictly poverty-oriented, this does not mean that a national norm stipulating poverty alleviation through aid does not exist. We might see aid concentrated in the middle band of recipients, favouring neither the poorest nor the richest, and the interviewees have to be queried for considerations regarding absorptive capacity. Regarding aid to Latin America as a whole, it is possible that
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Interviewees adduce the poverty orientation of aid for reducing overall development policy activity towards the region, as it is relatively rich and does not strictly correspond to the ‘neediness’ required to receive aid. Overall, in the interviews, I look for specific evidence linking development policy to a domestic norm about aid giving and aid being ‘the morally right thing to do as country X’.

**International Norms** However, as indicated above, the norm of using aid for poverty alleviation does not necessarily have to be a domestic one. Because policy-makers are in frequent interaction with their international counterparts and officials of international donor agencies, an international norm of poverty alleviation might be responsible for the poverty orientation of aid (Lancaster 2007: 6). In fact, Faust and Ziaja (2011) note a recent trend in studies to find more development-friendly aid allocation than previously, which might be an indicator of the maturation of such an international norm. Actors, therefore, might have been socialised internationally rather than domestically. This is another reason for focussing on policy-makers rather than public opinion (see above), because the general public is not subject to such socialisation processes. Again, the question of how policy-makers become internationally socialised is beyond the scope of this study. I want to see whether international norms about giving to the poor impact development policy towards Latin America, and therefore do not differentiate between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ socialisation, or what Checkel calls “Type I” and “Type II” socialisation (Checkel 2005: 804). While ‘thick’ socialisation involves the complete internalisation and taken-for-grantedness of international norms, ‘thin’ socialisation means that actors conform to a norm because it is ‘appropriate’ in a given social setting (such as the OECD DAC), that is, they play a role. Note that this is still different from rational adaptation, which will be discussed below and involves a purpose-driven adaptation to rules.

However, as I have outlined in detail in Chapter 2, international factors are likely to be mediated by a country’s domestic context. Since Spain, the UK, and Germany largely participate the same international fora that might be responsible for their policy-makers’ international socialisation, including the DAC and the EU, the differential impact of international socialisation ought to be explained with reference to domestic factors at play in each individual country. I therefore hypothesise in addition that international norms about poverty alleviation have a greater impact in countries where there exists a similar national norm that reinforces the international one (Rittberger 2001b: 5; see also Boekle et al. 2001: 114). The coincidence of international with national norms is therefore important. Again, as with national norms a country with higher
economic or political stakes in the region may also be less responsive to an international norm about poverty alleviation. This makes the impact of international norms on development policy activity towards Latin America more likely in Germany and Britain than in Spain. Yet at the same time, Britain is seen as more of a ‘norm maker’ than a ‘norm taker’ in the international development policy community (Watkins 2010). Therefore, it can be expected to be more of a ‘socialiser’ than being socialised internationally. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 897) put it, “[n]orms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community.” I thus expect the effect of international norms to be lower in the UK than in Germany.

Yet the domestic context influences not only the receptiveness to an international norm, but also its interpretation. An international norm about poverty alleviation can impact the concentration of aid, leading it to be focused on the poorer countries of the region. On the other hand, it can also be interpreted in a way that leads to the reduction of overall development policy activity towards Latin America by reorienting it towards the poorest countries of the world, especially those of Sub-Saharan Africa. This could explain the lower overall levels of policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Britain and Germany than of Spain.

\[ H_{2b}: \text{The stronger international norms about poverty orientation impact a donor’s development policy activity towards Latin America, the more it should be concentrated in the poorest Latin American countries and overall policy activity towards the region should be lower. The effect should be stronger if } H_{2a} \text{ also holds. The impact of international norms is expected to be the strongest in Germany, whose material stakes in the region are lower than those of Spain. Impact in the UK is expected to be lower because of its role as a ‘norm maker’. As for Spain, I expect its political and economic interest to mitigate the impact of international norms.} \]

Clearly, the observable implications regarding the concentration of aid are the same for hypotheses 2a and 2b, namely that the poorer countries of Latin America should be receiving the most aid, and that this tendency is potentially toned down by considerations of efficiency. This is a case of perfect equifinality of theoretical predictions. Therefore, in this context the evidence from the interviews is vital. If policy-makers have been internationally socialised, they should make explicit references to such international norms. Contributing to the international effort of realising the MDGs as ‘the right thing to do’ or ‘appropriate’, for instance, points to the impact of international socialisation. As indicated above, I expect such tendencies to be stronger in countries where
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Policy-makers are also socialised into national norms about poverty alleviation. The evaluation of the interviews will also have to pay attention to the kind of interpretation national policy-makers give to international norms.

Rational Adaptation As I have indicated previously, there is one further potential alternative explanation for the concentration of development assistance in Latin America that lies outside the framework of a logic of appropriateness: the rational adaptation to international standards. Note that there may still be an international rule or norm stipulating that development policy should be oriented towards the neediest countries, but the motivation for policy-makers to conform to this rule is governed by a logic of expected consequences. Slaughter (2004), for instance, conceptualises international governance networks in which policy-makers from different countries collaborate in solving common challenges and problems – such as, for example, underdevelopment and poverty and their unpleasant consequences for the donor countries, such as global migration. Through interaction, the network becomes a “conduit for information” about the members of the network and “their competence, quality, integrity and professionalism” (Slaughter 2004: 54, and facilitates the creation of behavioural standards (Majone 2001: 272; see also Slaughter 2004: 54). Even if there exists an international norm about poverty alleviation, the individual donor country’s policy-makers might not necessarily be socialised into it, but rather adhere to it in order to preserve their international status as a ‘good partner’, as well as in order to retain influence and not be left out of international decision-making circles like the DAC.

Therefore, in adherence to international rules about development policy, what Checkel (2005) calls ‘behavioral adaptation’ might be another explanatory factor. I term this variable ‘rational adaptation’ in order to avoid confusion with other mechanisms.11 Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007: 232) consider such concerns about status as a motivating factor for South Korea to substantially increase its ODA levels: “a desire to be counted with the more developed nations as a part of the OECD.” In a sense, South Korea displays some parallels to the Spanish case, since both were recipients of ODA until relatively recently. One might thus expect Spain to be particularly enthusiastic about international development policy rules due to a desire to enter the prestigious club of donors as a fully-fledged member with a good reputation. Its policy activity towards Latin America should then be quite strongly poverty-oriented, although it will be interesting to see how Spanish policy-makers square this

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11 As mentioned in Chapter 2, in order to avoid confusion between the different variables I opt for the ‘behavioural adaptation’ terminology employed by Checkel (2005), or ‘rational adaptation’, over Slaughter’s use of ‘socialisation’, thus reserving ‘socialisation’ for the context of the logic of appropriateness.
with potential demands to re-orient policy activity away from Latin America towards the world’s poorest countries. Again, its substantial economic and political interests in the region may play a role in explaining its continued high policy activity there. In a similar vein, Germany and the UK, two long-standing donors, have incentives to maintain their influence rather than being left out. This could explain their lower policy activity towards Latin America in the development realm. Germany has been argued to be keen on being accepted as a ‘good’ member of the international community (Karp 2009), so that rational adaptation can be expected to be at least partially responsible for its development policy activity towards Latin America. This should lead to a concentration of aid in poorer countries. But the UK, who has been recognised as an international rule-maker, especially in the realm of development policy (e.g. Watkins 2010), actually has rather less need to adapt rationally to rules for which it is itself partially responsible. Therefore, the impact of rational adaptation is expected to be relatively low for the UK. The corresponding hypothesis is as follows:

\[ H_2c: \text{Stronger rational adaptation to rules of the international donor community should lead to development policy activity being concentrated in the poorest Latin American countries and an overall poverty orientation of aid to the region. Rational adaptation to international rules is expected to be important both in Spain and Germany, while in the UK, it is expected to be less relevant.} \]

Again, because the observable implications of this potential driving factor of development policy are indistinguishable from those of the hypotheses based on a logic of appropriateness, the interviews must be taken into particular consideration here. I thus look for the interviewees explicitly connecting poverty-oriented aid towards Latin America as a result of adhering to international standards as a result of rationalist considerations with reference to maintaining or obtaining a good reputation with or influence in the international donor community.

Figure 5.1 shows a graphic representation of the explanatory framework for aid concentration in development policy towards Latin America based on the general theoretical framework conceptualised in Chapter 2 (cf. Figure 2.1, p. 64).

5.3.2 Further Considerations

Having drawn up the theoretical expectations regarding the concentration of aid to Latin America, a number of additional factors must be considered. One
is the impact of domestic politics on development policy. Tingley (2010: 47; see also Fleck and Kilby 2006) finds that “as governments become more conservative, the share of GDP committed to foreign aid effort declines.” There might thus be an influence of domestic politics and government change on development policy. In the period covered by this study and during which interviews were carried out, the government changed both in Germany and in the UK. In Spain, the same Socialist government was in power throughout the relevant period. In Germany, the current development minister even proposed abolishing the development ministry during the election campaign (Frankfurter Rundschau 2009), so it is possible that some factors may have changed since the government change. Similarly, the change from a Labour to a Conservative government after 13 years may have left its mark on Britain’s aid policy. However, at the same time, economic and political-strategic interests do not normally change with the government. Thus, while it is important to inquire about the potential effect of a government change, this is more likely to affect normative considerations than interest-based ones. Additionally, development aid is highly ‘sticky’, as Carey (2007) demonstrates. Because economic and strategic interests are slow to change, because bureaucracies do not adapt immediately to the new government, and because aid is often spent as part of programmes running over the course of several years, changes resulting from a new government coming into office will take time to
manifest themselves. Moreover, the available figures consider the period prior to the government change. Nonetheless, it is important to take this issue into account, and interview partners were constantly probed to consider changes between the previous government and the new one. Indeed, more often than not, they volunteered their own considerations on the issue.

While the UK and Germany have had a government change that may have impacted development policy in general and policy towards Latin America in particular, Spain has been under the firm grip of an economic crisis since late 2008. Similarly to the government changes in the other two countries, the figures considered in this study come from before the onset of the crisis. Additionally, it took a while for the economic pressures to manifest themselves in development policy funding, but aid has indeed been cut as part of the general efforts to reduce the government budget since 2010 (AECID 2011). Again, it is important to take Spain’s economic situation into account when discussing the findings, and interview partners were asked to evaluate the issue. Most recently, the government change in Spain has fused the Foreign Ministry’s State Secretariat for International Cooperation with the State Secretariat for External Affairs, indicating that development policy might be put on the back burner as Spain seeks to consolidate its exit from the debt crisis.

Overall, with the present research design, I hope to shed a closer light on the equifinal predictions the theoretical framework entails. In the first instance, I use data available from the OECD to obtain a first picture of what aid concentration looks like in the three countries under study. From these data, it should be possible to glean first insights into the factors potentially at play in German, British, and Spanish development policy towards Latin America. However, due to the aforementioned equifinality problematic, I rely on interviews with policy-makers in order to further disentangle the different motivating factors. Taken together, concentration in connection with the interview results should enable conclusions about the motivating factors of development policy vis-à-vis Latin America in the three countries under study.

5.4 Helping the Poor or Fulfilling Own Interests?
The Concentration of Aid in Latin America

As I have theorised above, aid can vary with the recipient – donors might give predominantly to poorer countries or predominantly to countries they consider strategically important (whether for economic or political reasons). Additionally, aid can vary with the recipient region. In one region, donors might prefer giving aid to the poorest countries, while in another, they may focus on prom-
5.4. **HELPING THE POOR OR FULFILLING OWN INTERESTS?**

Ising emerging markets or states that are pivotal to the security of a region. Furthermore, aid can vary with the donor. Some donors might give according to development considerations, others according to strategic development considerations, and others according to entirely different considerations, such as historical or colonial ties. At the same time, it is of course possible for aid to vary according to donor and region. Spain, given its strong economic interests in Latin America, for example, might target emerging markets there to further these interests, while in Africa it might target its aid at the poorest countries for development reasons. Finally, aid can vary within donors over time, for example as a result of a government change. Given the heterogeneous evidence in the literature, it is highly likely that such complex variation is precisely what happens. It is easy to see why different patterns might emerge depending on the chosen model, the variables held constant, or the time periods investigated. It is thus worth looking more closely at aid allocation by different donors to the same region during a very short time period in order to reach a deeper understanding of whether – and how – such complex variation occurs.

### 5.4.1 Visualising the Concentration of Development Aid to Latin America

The concentration of development aid in certain countries can be visualised with so-called aid concentration curves. Such curves plot a measure of aid – such as aid commitments, disbursements, or loans – from one or several donor countries or organisations against a population measure, such as the population living below a certain poverty line, the population with a certain education level, and so on. By plotting these curves, one can therefore ascertain the extent to which aid is oriented towards the poorest countries in a sample (Baulch 2003). However, the traditional way of plotting aid concentration curves comes with some disadvantages, which is why I introduce a novel methodology of normalising the curves.

**Constructing Aid Concentration Curves**

The traditional methodology of constructing aid concentration curves is well explained in Baulch (2003: 3ff). However, I introduce a new methodology of normalising the curves that merits further discussion. Aid concentration curves plot the cumulative share of aid received by the countries included in the curve on the y-axis, a procedure which I maintain. “Cumulative share” means that the percentage share of each country is added to the sum of percentage shares of the previous countries, until with the last country, 100% is reached. To illustrate this, if four countries A, B, C, and D have percentage shares of A=20%, B=50%, C=20%, and D=10% respect-
The x-axis traditionally plots each recipient country’s cumulative share of some deprivation measure, such as the share of the total population living below the globally accepted poverty line of 1.25 US-Dollars per day.\textsuperscript{12} A segment of the aid concentration curve thus corresponds to each recipient country. For the case of Latin America, this would mean the following: on the x-axis, 100% is the total number of Latin Americans living below the poverty line. Each country’s percentage share of the total Latin American poor is calculated, and the cumulative shares are based on these figures. A country with a large population will thus have a longer line than a very small country. This procedure presents some difficulties and trade-offs, which I will discuss below.

Aid concentration curves have also been called ‘aid Lorenz curves’ (White and McGillivray 1995), but they display a crucial difference to traditional Lorenz curves. In addition to the two variables – poverty and aid – plotted against each other, a further ranking variable is introduced to place the recipient countries in the right order before plotting the curve. The countries are normally ranked by per capita income, so that the curve begins with the lowest-income country at the bottom left and ends with the highest-income country at the top right. Introducing this ranking variable enables the concentration curve to cross the diagonal, thus allowing the researcher to draw conclusions about whether aid is predominantly targeted at countries with a large population share of $1.25/day poor (the curve lies to the left of the diagonal), or to richer countries (the curve lies to the right of the diagonal; Baulch 2003).

The difference I introduce is in the values represented on the x-axis. Traditionally, as discussed above, the x-axis shows the recipient countries’ cumulative shares of a deprivation measure, such as the $1.25/day poor. For example, if I were to plot the concentration of German aid to Latin America, the x-axis would show each country’s cumulative share of the total Latin American population living below the poverty line. Basing the x-axis on a poverty headcount figure means that each country’s share depends on the size of its population. A big country like Brazil would have a very long line, simply because it has a large population and is therefore home to a large share of Latin America’s poor. It will therefore easily seem as if Brazil is not receiving ‘enough’ aid in comparison to its poor. This is counter-intuitive, as Brazil is overall a relatively rich country. To visualise the problem, the concentration of German aid to Latin America according to the traditional methodology is shown in Figure 5.2 as an example. The issue is evident: Brazil has a relatively long line that is also com-

\textsuperscript{12}This threshold has been criticised by some (Deaton 2001, 2010; Reddy and Pogge 2010). Nevertheless, it provides the closest thing to an ‘objective’ measure of poverty one can get, and is widely used. For the rationale behind the poverty threshold – which used to be placed at 1 US-$, but was raised to 1.25 – see Ravallion et al. (1991).
5.4. HELPING THE POOR OR FULFILLING OWN INTERESTS?

Figure 5.2: Example Aid Concentration Curve, Traditional Method

![Diagram](image)

paratively flat. It is hardly intuitive to claim from this curve that Brazil receives a very large amount of German aid. However, this is indeed the case, as Brazil accounts for an average of 13.20% of total German gross ODA disbursements to Latin America in the 2004-8 period, more than any other country except Nicaragua with 14.66% (calculation based on OECD 2011).

In order to mitigate this issue, it makes sense to normalise the concentration curves to the percentage of each country’s population living below the poverty line. Note that the basis for calculating the percentage shares is no longer the total Latin American population, but each country’s poverty share. To stick with the previous example, Brazil has a large number of poor, but only has a poverty share of about 8.00%, compared with 15.81% in Nicaragua, the other major recipient of German aid (World Bank 2011). The procedure for calculating the cumulative percentages is thus as follows.

- **Step 1:** obtain each country’s poverty share figures directly from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, i.e. the percentage of a country’s population living below the poverty line. Convert these into
decimal shares (e.g. 54.9% becomes 0.549).

- **Step 2**: sum the figures obtained in step 1 across all Latin American countries to obtain the basis for the calculation of cumulative shares.

- **Step 3**: calculate each country’s cumulative percentage share of the figure obtained in step 2.

Following step 3, the length of each country’s curve segment now no longer depends on the size of the country’s population, but rather on its poverty share. This does away with the problem of long, flat lines for relatively rich countries, and is a more intuitive representation of the concentration of aid. The slope of each line segment still varies with the cumulative percentage of total aid a country receives. The steeper the slope, the more aid the country receives in relation to its $1.25/day poor. If aid is poverty-oriented, the line segments corresponding to each country should be getting flatter as the curve reaches the segments of the richer countries. If the curve rises steeply, a country receives a disproportionately large amount of aid in comparison to the share of its population living below the poverty line. If the curve is relatively flat, a country receives little aid in comparison to its poor.

Figure 5.3 shows the aid concentration curve for ODA to Latin America from the member states of the OECD’s Donor Assistance Committee (DAC), alongside some explanations.

**Data** The population figures (total population and percentage living beyond the 1.25 $/day threshold) were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database, available on-line (World Bank 2011). The data used to calculate the cumulative percentage share of aid going to each Latin American country was obtained from the OECD’s Statistics Database, also available on-line (OECD 2011). In this case, I adhered to the standard set by Baulch (2003: 3) of using total aid disbursements, since this represents a good measure of the money that was actually spent by the donor rather than, for example, committed.

As for ranking the countries along the curve, gross national income per capita (GNI/capita, Atlas method) figures from the World Bank’s WDI database are normally used (see e.g. Baulch 2006). They provide some advantages such as smoothing the impact of exchange rate and price fluctuations. Unfortunately data availability is problematic in this case, as no GNI/capita data are available for Haiti. Haiti is by far the poorest country in Latin America and hence important for the purposes of this exercise. I therefore used GDP/capita figures from the WDI database to rank the countries instead. Since using GDP,
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Haiti: low-income country (at the bottom left of the curve); a large share of the Haitian population is poor (long curve segment), but Haiti receives relatively little aid in comparison to its poor population (flat slope).

Nicaragua: country characteristics similar to Haiti, but Nicaragua receives disproportionately more aid in comparison to its share of the population below the poverty line (the slope is steeper than the diagonal).

Colombia: still has a relatively large share of poor people (its line segment covers a relatively large share of the x-axis), but receives enough aid to push the curve slightly across the diagonal.

Brazil and Mexico: relatively high-income countries (at the top right of the curve) with a relatively small population share below the poverty line (short curve segments). Nevertheless, they receive a lot of aid (steep slope).

General remarks: The DAC countries’ aid to Latin America is overall regressive, as it only crosses the diagonal once and very briefly. This pattern is driven by the fact that Haiti, with its huge population share of $1.25/day poor receives disproportionately little aid. Additionally, it is remarkable that some richer countries towards the top of the curve, with a low share of the population below $1.25/day, such as Brazil and Mexico, receive a lot of aid in comparison to their populations’ poverty share.
a productivity measure, as an indicator for income is not ideal, I checked the effect of this on the ranking of countries (data availability permitting). While the replacement did lead to minor changes in the ranking of the countries under scrutiny, the general picture did not change significantly: In some cases, countries switched places depending on whether they were ordered by GNI/capita or GDP/capita, but the difference was never more than two spots up or down.

For greater convenience, Table 5.3 shows a summary of measures, the indicators used to construct them, and their sources.

In some cases, aid can fluctuate considerably between one year and the other, for example if a natural disaster has caused a spike in humanitarian aid to one certain country. Therefore, I take a five-year average for 2004-8 in order to smooth out such irregularities. Similarly, the figures in particular for the 1.25 $/day poor fluctuate considerably between years, and a considerable amount of data points is missing. Such fluctuations were also encountered by Baulch (2003), who rightly pointed out that they are rather implausible, as poverty rates are relatively slow to change over time. He opted to replace implausible data from the year 2003 with the corresponding 2002 data. Since I am working with a five-year average, this problem is somewhat mitigated in my case, however. As opposed to the OECD aid figures and the World Bank population figures, no data is available for this indicator for 2009 yet, thus inspiring the overall 2008 cutoff point. Due to the fluctuations and the missing values, I summed up the data points available for the 2004-8 period and divided them by the number of points available. For example, in the case of Peru, data is available for 2005, 2006, and 2007, so I took these three figures, added them together and divided them by three to obtain the average used in the analysis. In some cases, there is no poverty share data available for the time period in question. This is the case, for example, for Haiti, where the latest available data are from 2001. I have, however, already pointed out the importance of Haiti in the aid context as the poorest Latin American country. In the graphs showing aid to Latin America below, I thus plotted the curve twice, once excluding Haiti and once including it. In this particular case, this procedure is justifiable on the above-mentioned grounds that the poverty share is a relatively slow-moving indicator, and that data from 2001 may still be reasonably proximate to the 2004-8 average. It is important to note that for some countries there are no estimators in the WDI data at all, for example Cuba. While this is rather unfortunate, it means that these countries have to be excluded from the plot (Baulch 2003: 8). Figure 5.4 plots the aid given by Germany, Spain, and the UK to Latin America in the 2004-8 period. A list of country abbreviations

\[13\text{The same thing was done for GDP/capita, where in some cases the 2008 data was still missing and the 2004-7 average was used.}\]
Table 5.3: *Indicator and Source Summary - Aid Concentration Curves*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative % of aid</td>
<td>Total ODA disbursements, current US-$ (% of total used to calculate cumulative percentages)</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative % of population living on under 1.25 US-$/day, normalised to population size</td>
<td>Country poverty shares used to calculate cumulative percentage</td>
<td>World Bank WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income</td>
<td>GDP/capita, current US-$</td>
<td>World Bank WDI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
is provided in Appendix A.

**The Suits Index**  
Aid Concentration Curves can be complemented by a measure called the Suits Index to ascertain whether an aid concentration curve is overall progressive or regressive. The Suits Index $S$ was developed by American economist Daniel B. Suits, originally in order to measure tax progressivity (Suits 1977). The index is similar to the Gini Coefficient,\(^{14}\) but while the Gini Coefficient varies between 0 and 1, the Suits Index can vary between -1 and 1. A Suits Index of -1 for an aid concentration curve would correspond to a case where a donor gave all its aid to the poorest country included in the curve. A Suits Index of 1, on the other hand, would mean that a donor gives all its aid to the highest income country included in the curve. Finally, a Suits Index of 0 stands for a completely equal distribution of aid, that is, an aid concentration curve along the diagonal of the graph (Baulch 2003: 4f). The method for calculating the Suits Index is found in Appendix C. The Suits Index for the concentration curve pictured in Figure 5.3 is 0.19, meaning that overall aid from the DAC countries to Latin America is moderately regressive. In the following, I will report the Suits Index value for each concentration curve plotted.

**Limitations of Aid Concentration Curves and the Suits Index**  
The limitations of the aid concentration curve methodology and the accompanying Suits Index are discussed in detail by Baulch (2003: 5). Their main drawback for the purposes of this study is that they are descriptive, not explanatory. From the concentration curves and the Suits Index, we can only gather whether or not aid is poverty oriented, but they do not give indications for why this is so. This is particularly important where hypotheses make equifinal predictions. The concentration curves and Suits Index values must therefore be complemented with interview data in order to achieve insights into which factors motivate the particular concentration patterns. A by-product of this issue is that the concentration curves as well as the Suits Index reflect the poverty orientation of aid, but do not take account of the fact that perhaps poverty is not the only criterion for aid allocation. Especially if donor countries apply conditionality criteria for good governance or give predominantly to countries with the institutional and administrative capacity to ‘handle’ the aid, this might lead to a concentration curve that is not poverty-oriented. Therefore, it is dangerous to conclude that a certain donor’s aid is interest-driven simply because its concentration curve is not poverty-oriented. The investigation must go beyond Suits Index values.

\(^{14}\)The Gini Coefficient is used to measure the distribution of income within a society – it is 0 for complete income equality and 1 for complete income inequality, i.e. the extreme case that all income is concentrated in one unit of analysis, such as a household or person (Suits 1977: 748).
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and concentration curves to ascertain the motivating factors of aid.

5.4.2 Aid Concentration in Latin America in Comparative Perspective

Figure 5.4 shows the aid concentration curves for 2004-8 average gross disbursements to Latin America in current US-Dollars for Germany, Spain, and the UK. Both the curves and the Suits Index values indicate that aid to Latin America from all three countries is moderately regressive, that is, on average not poverty-oriented. Spain, with a Suits Index value of 0.14, distributes its aid most equally among the Latin American countries, while Germany displays the most regressive behaviour with a Suits Index value of 0.29, and the UK lies roughly in the middle. Only the Spanish curve ever crosses the leading diagonal for a prolonged stretch of the curve. The UK crosses it, but quickly reverts back to below the diagonal. Spain crosses the line in the top half of the curve, meaning that it allocates substantial amounts of aid to countries which are not necessarily the poorest. Nevertheless, given Spain’s status as a former colonial power in Latin America and the fact that in terms of volume it allocates considerably more ODA to Latin America than the other two countries, it is important to note that the shape of its concentration curve as such is not hugely different from the other two countries’ curves. It appears that while colonialism may drive Spain’s overall allocation of aid to Latin America, allocation within Latin America, where nearly all countries were previously Spanish colonies, may well be driven by considerations similar to those taking place in the other two countries. What is remarkable about the comparison is that all three countries allocate very little aid to the country with the lowest GDP/capita in the region – at the very bottom of the curve – Haiti. The dismal Haitian record essentially drives all three concentration curves into being regressive – if it were not for Haiti, the picture would look rather different. I now proceed to discussing each concentration curve in more detail.

Germany German aid to Latin America, shown in Figure 5.5, is the most regressive out of the three (Suits Index: 0.29). The most remarkable aspect of the German curve is that it rises in steps, meaning that it is predominantly driven by a small number of countries. The recipients to be singled out here are Nicaragua, Peru, and Brazil, as well as, to a much lesser extent, Bolivia, Honduras, and Colombia. What is interesting is that the three most extreme cases do not reveal much of a pattern in terms of orientation towards countries which are poor both in terms of income and population share of $1.25/day poor: Nicaragua is the country with the second lowest GDP/capita on the
Figure 5.4: Aid to Latin America in Comparative Perspective

UK, German, and Spanish Aid to Latin America
Concentration Curves (2004-8 Average)

Suits Index
UK: 0.17
Germany: 0.29
Spain: 0.14
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curve, Peru is at the top end of the curve’s middle section, and finally Brazil is located towards the top. It seems that Germany focuses not only on very poor countries, but also on countries with concentrated pockets of poverty. On the other hand, it is also the case that Brazil and Peru happen to be relatively high-growth economies. Combined with the fact that Germany’s aid concentration curve also rises very steeply for the two highest-income countries, Mexico and Chile, economic factors such as the search for potential markets may also be driving the allocation of German aid. This distribution may correspond more closely to a logic of strategic aid allocation, as Brazil and Mexico are strategically important emerging economies that harbour not just market, but also global political potential. There is some evidence of such thinking on behalf of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), who published a strategy paper on such countries, termed ‘anchor countries’ (“Ankerländer”) in 2004 (BMZ 2004). These included Brazil and Mexico, but also Argentina, which is not currently a ‘partner country’ of German development cooperation as such (BMZ 2011). In the case of Germany, therefore, we find some indication that aid may be poverty-oriented as well as interest-oriented. Therefore, it is the task of this investigation to further disentangle this pattern through interviews.

Spain Spanish aid to Latin America is less country-focused than German aid, and it is also more poverty-oriented. The Spanish curve has the lowest Suits Index value (0.14) out of the three countries under study, and if it were not for Haiti, the curve would actually overall be progressive. If any countries stand out as disproportionate recipients of Spanish aid, these would be Nicaragua and Guatemala. However, most of the middle section of the curve from Nicaragua to Peru receives amounts of Spanish aid that are disproportional to the share of poor within their populations, with the exception of Paraguay (which receives less) and Bolivia (whose curve segment is nearly parallel to the leading diagonal). This allocation pattern drives Spanish aid to cross the diagonal with aid to Ecuador. In comparison with the German curve, it is remarkable that not only is Spanish aid more evenly distributed, but the high-income countries receive considerably smaller shares of Spanish ODA than is the case with German ODA. This is interesting considering that Spain has substantial economic interests in Latin America that had led me to hypothesise Spanish aid to be mostly interest-driven, including substantial allocations to potential markets, i.e. the high-growth, high-income countries of the region. Of the ‘richer’ countries, only Peru and Colombia receive consider-
Figure 5.5: German Aid to Latin America

German Aid to Latin America Concentration Curve (2004-8 Average)

Suits Index: 0.29
Figure 5.6: Spanish Aid to Latin America

Spanish Aid to Latin America Concentration Curve (2004-8 Average)

Suits Index: 0.14

able shares of Spanish ODA, while Brazil and Mexico receive relatively little. Therefore, in the Spanish case there is compelling first-sight evidence for the poverty-orientation of aid leading to the suspicion that Spanish development policy as manifested in aid allocation within Latin America may actually be overall norm-driven. Nevertheless, recalling the hypotheses theorised in the previous section it may well be the case that poverty orientation is the result of rational adaptation, which was theorised to be a strong factor for Spain. It will therefore be interesting to trace the equifinality that might cause the shape of Spain’s aid concentration curve. To what extent is the allocation of Spanish ODA motivated by norms? Or is it the fact that all countries except Brazil are former colonies of Spain that overrides the economic motivations in the case of allocating aid to the whole of Latin America? Interviews should shed further light on these questions.
Britain  The British aid concentration curve displays certain similarities to the ‘steps’-pattern already observed in the German curve, meaning that there are some countries driving the curve’s rise, while others receive relatively little aid. The drivers here are Nicaragua, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, and Brazil. Especially Bolivia, but also Peru and Brazil receive particularly large shares of British aid relative to their poverty share. With a Suits Index value of 0.17, the curve is mildly regressive, rather similar to the Spanish one. However, this example demonstrates the advantage of plotting aid concentration curves over merely reporting a Suits Index score, as different aid concentration patterns may lead to similar scores: while the Spanish slope increases constantly during the mid-segment of the curve and slows down towards the end, the British curve slows down in the middle and picks up again towards the end. Aside from Peru, the countries in the mid-section of the curve receive relatively low shares of ODA from the UK. In contrast to the pattern seen from Spain and Germany, Colombia also receives relatively little. Moreover, unlike the Spanish curve, the British one does not cross the diagonal for an extended segment. Only Brazil very briefly pushes it across the 45 degree line. Panama is the real surprise here – why does this tiny country with a relatively high GDP/capita and low share of the population below the poverty line receive so much British aid? The overall pattern points to a potentially two-fold motivation for British aid to Latin America. At the bottom, with the exception of Haiti, aid appears to be largely poverty-oriented, as the poorest countries receive large aid shares. At the top, however, countries also receive relatively large shares, pointing to economic or political motives. Interviews, therefore, must dive more deeply into the roots of British poverty orientation regarding the bottom end of the curve and the potential interest orientation towards the top end.

5.4.3 Is Latin America Special? A Comparison with the Rest of the World

In addition to the concentration curves for Latin America, I also constructed aid concentration curves for overall German, Spanish, and British ODA in order to check to what extent Latin America stands out from overall aid allocation patterns. In order to visualise the comparison, both the ‘global’ curve and the Latin American curve are plotted in the same graph. The curves are shown in Figures 5.8 to 5.10. In order to plot the curves reflecting the overall concentration of aid, the same methodology was used as for the Latin American ones, generating a consolidated list of 98 recipient countries for which the required data were available.
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Figure 5.7: British Aid to Latin America

UK Aid to Latin America Concentration Curve
(2004-8 Average)

Cumulative Share of Population living on less than $1.25/day (%), normalised to country population size

Suits Index: 0.17
Figure 5.8: German Aid Concentration in Latin America and the World

Suits Index aid to Latin America: 0.29
Suits Index total aid excl. Latin America: 0.49
Figure 5.9: Spanish Aid Concentration in Latin America and the World

Spanish Aid Concentration Curve
(2004-8 Average)

Cumulative Share of Aid (%)

Cumulative Share of Population living on less than $1.25/day (%), normalised to country population size

Suits Index aid to Latin America: 0.14
Suits Index total aid excl. Latin America: 0.47
Figure 5.10: UK Aid Concentration in Latin America and the World

UK Aid Concentration Curve
(2004-8 Average)

Cumulative Share of Aid (%)

Cumulative Share of Population living on less than $1.25/day (%),
normalised to country population size

Suits Index aid to Latin America: 0.17
Suits Index total aid excl. Latin America: 0.22
In Figures 5.8 to 5.10, the solid lines represent the aid concentration curves for Latin America and the dashed curves represent aid to the rest of the world (excluding Latin America). Both the curves and the Suits Index values show that for all three countries under study, aid to Latin America is more progressive than aid to the rest of the world. This pattern is particularly striking in the case of Spain, less so in the case of Germany, and the weakest in the case of the UK, meaning that the UK is overall more poverty-oriented than the other two countries. Latin America is therefore ‘special’ to the extent that Germany, Spain, and the UK allocate aid towards the region in a way that is more commensurate with the share of each country’s poor than is the case for aid to the rest of the world.

The question is then to what extent Latin America matters in the concentration of total ODA. The concentration curves in Figures 5.11 to 5.13 plot two curves, one showing concentration of the country’s total aid, while the second one shows total aid excluding aid to Latin America. The curves thus demonstrate the extent to which aid towards Latin America matches the country’s overall aid concentration pattern. The closer the curves, the more similar the fashion in which aid is concentrated in Latin America and the rest of the world. Similarly, the Suits Index values show this pattern. The larger the difference between the Suits Indices for the two curves, the greater the difference between the poverty orientation of total aid and aid to Latin America. It is important to note that since the curves are normalised for each donor country, the absolute values of the Suits Index and the differences between them are difficult to compare across countries, so that comparison is limited to within-country values.

The curves show that the match between aid to Latin America and the overall concentration of aid is the closest in Germany. The curves look very similar and only begin to split up roughly half-way along the curve, when overall aid becomes less regressive than aid excluding Latin America. The Suits Index changes only slightly from 0.45 for total aid to 0.49 for aid excluding Latin America. This means that for Germany, the overall concentration of aid is slightly more evenly distributed when we include Latin America. This is surprising given the picture in Figure 5.5, which shows that German allocates disproportionate amounts of aid to some relatively rich Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile. For Spain, the difference between the two curves is by far the largest, showing a relatively large mismatch between the way in which aid is concentrated in Latin America and the rest of the world. Since Latin American countries are on the average relatively rich, and the other major recipient of Spanish ODA is Africa, which is comparatively poor, this finding is not surprising. It is supported by the Suits Index values of 0.57 for
Figure 5.11: The Impact of Aid to Latin America on Overall Aid Concentration in Germany

Suits Index German total aid: 0.45
Suits Index German total aid excl. Latin America 0.49
Figure 5.12: The Impact of Aid to Latin America on Overall Aid Concentration in Spain

Spanish Aid Concentration Curve (2004-8 Average)

Suits Index Spanish total aid: 0.57
Suits Index Spanish total aid excluding Latin America: 0.48
Figure 5.13: The Impact of Aid to Latin America on Overall Aid Concentration in Britain

Suits Index UK total aid: 0.14
Suits Index UK total aid excluding Latin America: 0.22
5.5. CORROBORATING THE EVIDENCE

Total Spanish ODA and 0.48 for ODA excluding Latin America, showing that the poverty orientation of Spanish ODA increases if Latin America is excluded (although the Suits Index remains rather regressive). Interestingly, however, Spanish ODA is much more poverty-oriented within Latin America, as has been shown in Figure 5.6, with an only mildly regressive Suits Index of 0.14. Finally, the UK shows a picture similar to the German one in terms of the pattern of aid concentration. Excluding aid to Latin America makes the overall concentration curve more regressive, i.e. less poverty-oriented. The larger difference between the two curves and between the Suits Index values (0.13 for total ODA and 0.22 for ODA excluding Latin America) shows that the mismatch between the UK’s overall aid allocation pattern and the allocation of aid in Latin America is larger than in Germany, however – similar to the pattern for Spain. Overall, UK aid concentration in Latin America appears to be more evenly distributed than aid concentration in the rest of the world.

Overall, therefore, it becomes clear that aid allocation is a very complex process not just among recipient countries, but also within recipient regions and among donors. For example, evidence from Germany and the UK may support the findings of Tingley (2010) that aid to low-income countries is more development-oriented, while aid to middle-income countries – such as those of Latin America and the Caribbean – is more commercially oriented if we look at how the aid is concentrated within Latin America. Yet at the same time, both countries seem to distribute their aid towards Latin America more evenly than their overall aid. Spain, on the other hand, contradicts Tingley’s findings the other way around – the concentration of its aid within Latin America does not seem to be commercially oriented, while the weight of Latin America in Spain’s overall aid allocation may point in the direction of economic interests or colonial history playing a role.

Overall, therefore, the concentration curves have given first indications of what aid to Latin America looks like and what its drivers might be. However, the evaluation of the interview data must provide further indications as to what motivates development policy to Latin America in order to disentangle the explanatory factors.

5.5 Corroborating the Evidence – Analysis of Interviews

It has become evident that choices for aid concentration are highly complex and vary with donors, recipient countries, and recipient regions. Tracing these processes in depth for the case of aid to Latin America from Germany, Spain,
and the UK offers a unique opportunity to elucidate the reasons behind some contradicting findings in the previous literature. The case study therefore contributes to a more complex, in-depth understanding of the rationales behind foreign aid, especially in EU Member States. I have shown that aid allocation to Latin America is generally more poverty-oriented than the overall allocation of ODA by the three countries under study. This is at odds with previous findings that have shown a tendency for aid to middle-income countries to be more commercially oriented than aid to low-income countries (Tingley 2010).

At the same time, there are some interesting particularities in each country’s aid concentration within Latin America that merit further attention. What is, for example, the reason behind Spain’s low level of aid allocated to Brazil? What drives the large amounts of German aid to both Nicaragua and Brazil? The answers to such questions can help to better understand the overall rationale behind the aid allocation process in countries with different levels of commercial interests, historical ties and cultural similarities with the recipient region.

In the second part of this chapter, therefore, I evaluate the interviews carried out for this study with regard to supplementing the patterns found in the above data. Based on the study’s explanatory framework, I build up coding schemes for both the national-level interviews and for the triangulation interviews. As I have outlined in the previous chapter, in the context of this study, the interviews provide a possibility to query those who are actually responsible for making development policy towards Latin America about the factors driving the country’s aid policy towards Latin America. I complement previous quantitative studies by asking policy-makers about their motivations, which provides an opportunity to further open the black box of aid motivations (it is, however, important to bear in mind the limitations of interviews discussed in the previous chapter). I begin with a discussion of the results from the national-level interviews. They were coded according to the coding scheme conceptualised in Section 5.3, which can be found in Appendix D. The results for the various hypotheses conceptualised in the theoretical framework section are summarised in Table 5.4.

In the following paragraphs, I discuss the results and their implications. Regarding the hypotheses on the concentration of development aid in Latin America, I find the strongest support for interest-based hypotheses in Germany and the UK, while in Spain, support for the hypotheses supporting poverty orientation considerations is stronger. As I pointed out at the beginning of this

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15One option to connect the evidence obtained in my interviews with policy-makers to quantitative studies would be to expand beyond policy towards Latin America by carrying out a representative survey among policy-makers, which would represent an interesting point of departure for future research.
5.5. CORROBORATING THE EVIDENCE

Table 5.4: Development Case Study: Results of national-level interview analysis (% of total evidence for hypotheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_{1a}$: economic interests</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{1b}$: political interests</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{2a}$: domestic poverty alleviation norm</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>22.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{2b}$: international poverty alleviation norm</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>25.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{2c}$: rational adaptation to international poverty alleviation rule</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>22.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

chapter, multiple motivating factors for allocating certain amounts of aid to different Latin American countries and to Latin America as a whole are at play. Below I analyse their relationships among each other and assess the differences across the three cases under study.

5.5.1 Germany

Economic Interests  Germany shows the greatest evidence for the influence of economic interests on policy activity out of the three countries under study. This somewhat contradictory to what the hypothesis on the impact of economic interests ($H_{1a}$) postulated. While Germany does have economic interests in the region, the expectation had been that this would be relatively more important for Spain. German interviewees are between open and reluctant to admit the influence of economic interests on development allocation. While the mutual benefit of companies and aid recipients was as far as some would go in admitting that economic considerations played a role, others openly admitted that Mexico, Brazil and Peru were at an advantage over other Latin American countries in the compilation of the list of countries to receive development aid, because trade flows mattered in the selection. This confirms the picture of the development aid curve that poverty orientation does not seem to be the only consideration in German development policy towards Latin America (and even more generally, since the selection rules matter for all potential recipient countries).
In general, interviewees point out that roping economic actors into public-private partnerships (so-called PPPs) is nowadays not necessarily seen as a bad thing, but rather as a way to augment otherwise limited aid funding. However, they tie this recent development to the change of government in 2009. As one German interviewee stated:

“All this support for private economic actors is a new aspect, a new feature of the new leadership. I mean, the strengthening of cooperation with the private economy, and thereby at the end also a strengthening of the German industry’s competitive position in Latin America.”

The strengthening of PPPs as a result of the government change is actually mentioned in the government’s coalition treaty as an initiative setting the new government apart from the old one (CDU, CSU and FDP 2009) – although since the German ODA figures come from before the government change, it is perhaps not as new a feature as the coalition treaty would have one believe. Indeed, as one German interviewee put it, such structures are also more frequent in Latin America “due to the increased ability of local partners there to pay for services” – that is, due to their relatively high levels of economic and institutional development. This idea was expressed in all three donor countries under study: by having private enterprise participate in development policy, it is possible to mobilise additional funding and have both sides – the recipient country and domestic enterprises – benefit at the same time.

Hence, in Germany there appears to be a political-ideological component to the involvement of private actors in development aid, supporting the pattern found by Tingley (2010; see also Fleck and Kilby 2006) that government ideology influences the motivations behind aid giving. However, the fact that patterns consistent with pro-economic aid policy could be found even before the government change is also coherent with the idea that domestic preferences remain constant over time, and that perhaps changes in ideology matter more for poorer recipients than for richer ones, where aid tends to be more economically oriented irrespective of the government’s ideology (Tingley 2010: 47). There seems to have been a coincidence between political change in Germany and a realisation that Latin America is a region of important economic potential. While not the most fundamental part, the involvement of private economic actors in development policy activity could help further German economic interests in the region and reap the benefits of said economic potential. Therefore, Germany is staying involved in development policy towards the region, putting an emphasis not just on the poorest countries, but also on those that promise economic gains.
Political Interests  Despite the somewhat surprising importance of economic interests, political interests in the region matter even more for the allocation of German development policy activity towards Latin America, in accordance with Hypothesis 1b. The relatively strong focus on Mexico and Brazil is explained with the countries’ rising global importance, not just economically, but also in international politics. This focus corresponds directly to the relationship between political interests and development policy activity postulated in Hypothesis 1b. As one interviewee put it, Brazil and Mexico as “global partners” play a special role: development aid is not important for their budgets, but instead serves to facilitate and enhance the bilateral relationship. It is not the defining factor of policy towards these countries, but a “support pillar” of the general foreign policy relationship. Such statements are in line with the idea of a German strategy paper on “anchor countries” published in 2004, of which Brazil and Mexico formed part (BMZ 2004). These “anchor countries” were not only emerging countries, but also politically pivotal partners in their respective regions. Although the strategy is currently being revised, interviews revealed that the role of the two countries would remain similar. German interviewees were keen to point to the donor capacities Brazil and Mexico are currently building up, an involvement in which is seen as an opportunity for the “transfer of interests”. Additionally, the new government appears to be keen to strengthen development policy with Colombia, which is seen as a reliable political partner. “This was a political decision to strongly intensify cooperation over the last year. We practically tripled it,” one official claimed, a statement that was confirmed by other interviewees. Germany has, overall, a relatively wide approach to the countries it considers politically important in the region and also includes Mexico and to some extent Colombia in this group, with Colombia’s rising importance being a recent political decision. This broad understanding is, at least partially, at the root of Germany’s overall medium-level development policy activity discovered in Chapter 3.

Domestic Norms  Domestic norms of poverty alleviation, as postulated in Hypothesis 2a, also play a role in German development policy towards Latin America, although in Germany they seem to be the least relevant out of the three countries concerned. This low level of impact on development policy activity is somewhat unexpected, as I hypothesised national norms to be a stronger influence in Germany than in Spain (although the British case is, as I will discuss below, consistent with the hypothesis). Despite the relatively low level of importance, German interviewees do emphasise that Latin America consists mainly of middle-income countries, so that poverty alleviation in the traditional sense matters most in only a few countries, such as Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. Interestingly, one interviewee noted in the context of these countries that they are not economically important for Germany, making the competition between the interest-orientation and poverty-orientation of aid palpable. In the richer countries of Latin America, at the same time, poverty alleviation does play a role in the widest sense of the term. German development policy in these countries focuses on, as one official listed, “strengthening democracy to create a social balance, strengthening governance, and then also environmental, climate, and biodiversity protection”. The crucial point is thus that for Germany, a domestic norm of poverty orientation is not enough reason to pull out of Latin America completely, although interviewees do mention that more and more Latin American countries ‘graduate’ from the list of recipient countries. Nonetheless, German policy-makers are not as decisive in exiting from the region as their British counterparts. As with political interest, the issue is one of Germany defining ‘poverty alleviation’ very widely, especially for the richer countries. Under the new government, however, several interviewees pointed out that interests are beginning to trump poverty alleviation, as expected by Hypothesis 2a, and as the overall distribution of evidence for Germany shows. As one interviewee stated, the fight against poverty is not the only criterion for the new government, which takes into account global politics and economic interests as well. However, the aid concentration curve with earlier data indicates that this is not a new phenomenon, and indeed, the multiple drivers of German aid have also been found by previous studies (e.g. Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Berthelémy 2006).

However, the national norm of poverty alleviation is also intertwined with recipient countries’ capacity to handle the aid. As one German interviewee put it, the development-orientation of the partner countries is “a precondition”: the question is not only whether a country is poor, but also whether it can and will administer aid appropriately, a problem especially in the Central American countries, where governance is particularly weak. As a consequence, one official worried that these countries “might fall off the edge” and cease to receive aid if things continue to deteriorate further. Colombia, Peru, Brazil, and Mexico, on the other hand, are perceived by German policy-makers to be development-oriented, so that the fact that they continue to receive aid is the result not only of interest-based considerations, but also of efficiency concerns.

International Norms  Turning to Hypothesis 2b, while German policy-makers sense that there is indeed an international norm of poverty reduction which it is appropriate to follow, this is considerably weaker than the corresponding national norm. Indeed, one interviewee was keen to point to the extent to which the national norm about poverty alleviation preceded the international focus
5.5. CORROBORATING THE EVIDENCE

on this issue:

“they [the MDGs] play a prominently important role in political discourse. But I do not think that they caused a major shift in accent, because I think that German development cooperation was, already without the MDG’s existence, already strongly oriented towards it [poverty]. [...] One might say the MDGs... afterwards German aid somehow reoriented itself completely, but that is not how it was. Because that was already an integral part of our own development cooperation.”

What is important to note, however, is that the international norm evidently serves to reinforce the national norm in this case, as postulated in Hypothesis 2b. The MDGs, as this particular official pointed out, are important in German development policy discourse, but they did not reorient aid – whereas, as I will discuss below, this was very much the case in Spain. However, in reply to the question of whether there were elements of German development policy in Latin America that responded to a global agenda, another official stated “when we say global development cooperation strategy, that would be the pursuit of the MDGs [...] Environmental and climate protection are of course part of the MDGs, and they are embedded there.” Thus, German policy-makers do accept the influence of international norms on their development agenda with the region and seek to embed their policy within such international goals.

**International Rules: Rational Adaptation** While there is some evidence for the impact of international socialisation, I do not find evidence in Germany for rational adaptation to international rules, even though Hypothesis 2c expected it to matter in Germany because of its wish to be recognised as a fully-fledged ‘good’ international partner. The reasons for this absence of evidence are thus not entirely clear from a theoretical point of view, although there is some evidence pointing to the idea that Germany might no longer be in a position of ‘courting’ the international community for recognition (e.g. Karp 2009; see also Bulmer and Paterson 2010).

Recall, furthermore, that the absence of evidence for a hypothesis does not necessarily mean that there is no influence of a particular explanatory variable, just that no indications for it have been found. It may thus well be the case that Germany does adapt to international rules out of a desire to maintain its status as a ‘cooperative member’ of the international donor community. Further investigation beyond the scope of this study is required, however, to truly ascertain the reasons for the absence of evidence for rational adaptation in Germany and Britain when it comes to motivations for the concentration of aid to
Latin America and in certain Latin American countries. There is, indeed, a grey zone between following international rules motivated by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Hypothesis 2b) and a ‘logic of consequences’ (Hypothesis 2c). Even the most careful coding of interviews can sometimes not disentangle the two logics, a problem that applies also to all three cases under study and may contribute to the lack of evidence for rational adaptation. Sometimes officials make statements about the impact of the international level on their national policy-making without explicitly linking them to a logic of appropriateness or expected consequences, and then it is not possible to code these statements into one or the other category. Therefore, the lack of evidence in the German case must be taken with the appropriate caution.

Summary: Germany The overall medium level of development policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Germany is accounted for by several factors. Firstly, economic factors play a surprisingly important role despite the – in comparison to Spain – relatively low economic stakes of German economic actors in the region. This is reflected in the focus of German aid concentration on economically important countries of the region, as well as in the interviews. Although economic factors were present even before 2009, the coming to power of a liberal-conservative coalition government in 2009 combined with a realisation of Latin America’s economic growth potential and has led to a greater involvement of the business community in development policy towards the region.\(^{16}\)

Political factors, however, play an even more important role. Germany’s relatively broad definition of what makes for a politically important partner – from the up-and-coming global actors Brazil and Mexico to politically ‘likeable’ Colombia – accounts, at least in part, for a relatively wide spread of German development policy activity towards the region and overall medium levels of activity. Interestingly, such a broad definition also applies to the interpretation of ‘poverty alleviation’ in Latin America. Although utilitarian-liberal factors clearly trump the impact of this factor arising from domestic considerations about what distribution of development policy activity is appropriate, it is nevertheless an important concern. While it leads to a focus on some Latin American countries at the poorer end of the spectrum, German policy-makers consider that even in the richer countries poverty alleviation and thus development policy activity has its justification in the broad sense of eradicating barriers to full economic development.

\(^{16}\)It must be noted that under the guidance of a minister from the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the greater involvement of economic actors in development policy is visible also in other regions. Yet the coincidence of this change in mentality with the realisation that Latin America is an important growth region does make policy towards the region unique.
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This liberal constructivist variable interacts with the impact of socialisation at the international level to some degree. While policy-makers consider the national norm prior to the formation of international norms about focusing development policy activity in poorer countries, especially in the context of the MDGs, this international norm does reinforce domestic concerns about the goal of development policy being poverty alleviation. Even so, because of the domestic definition’s breadth, this does not translate into a wholesale exit from Latin America.

Finally, it is interesting to observe within the context of the academic discussion about Germany’s place in international society that I do not find evidence for rational adaptation to international development policy rules as might have been expected. It lends support to the idea that Germany’s actions on the world stage are gradually less affected by its necessity to gain others’ recognition than they were after the Second World War and throughout the Cold War. On the other hand, it might also be that there is a temporal component at work: during this period of over sixty years, what began as rational adaptation might have become more deeply embedded and German actors might have become truly ‘socialised’ into considering obedience to international development policy rules appropriate. This idea might be an interesting point of departure for future, more historically oriented research on the impact of time on actor socialisation. Nonetheless, it should not detract from the finding that, as theorised by my extended liberal framework, domestic interests do indeed seem to be the key driving factors behind German policy activity towards the region.

5.5.2 Britain

Economic Interests In the UK, consistent with theoretical expectations given its relatively weak economic interests in the region, economic factors \((H_{1a})\) matter much less in determining policy activity towards Latin America than they do in Germany. According to one interviewee, British firms are reluctant to engage in the region due to – in part prejudiced – ideas about how doing business in Latin America is a difficult affair. Nonetheless and similarly to the German case, a British official commented that under the new Conservative-Liberal government there has been “definitely a push towards the private sector, to get more private sector funding”. This reinforces the notion of a political-ideological aspect to private actor involvement in development aid, specifically within the context of PPPs, as discussed in the case of Germany. Indeed, in the UK, this is the only context within which economic issues were discussed at all by the interviewees.
Political Interests  There is, on the other hand, strong evidence in the case of the UK that political interests are important in determining development policy activity towards Latin America ($H_{1b}$). Indeed, such evidence is considerably stronger for the British than for the German case. The balance between the two types of domestic interest in the case of Britain is in line with liberal-utilitarian expectations that the strength of interests influences their importance in policy-making, as the UK’s economic interests in Latin America are even lower than Germany’s.

Indeed, political reasons are among those that account for Latin America’s overall low weight in British development policy activity. Security concerns in Afghanistan and Iraq have swallowed up large shares of the UK aid budget according to one interviewee, but the same interviewee also pointed out that this was not a recent phenomenon. Rather, the fact that Latin America never had a large programme within British development policy is partially due to historical-political – that is, colonial – reasons that have caused Africa and Asia to predominate. This also helps explain why Guyana still receives British bilateral aid: it is part of the aid effort towards the Caribbean. While this is not within the scope of this study, in the Anglophone Caribbean there appears to be strong support for political considerations in aid allocation. As I have outlined in Chapter 2 (see p. 68), this study does not provide an explicitly historical-institutionalist account. The case of the Latin America programme within UK development assistance is, however, a case in point of how this investigation needs to be historically aware. Latin America was never hugely important to Britain, but at the same time this has made it easier for political arguments about its low place in development policy activity to take hold.

The importance of political interests in British development policy activity becomes even clearer when considering the evidence provided by interviewees that within Latin America, political considerations condition where policy activity is directed, that is, the concentration of UK aid among the countries of the region. The fact that after closing down nearly all bilateral programmes with Latin America, only Guyana and Brazil continue to receive aid speaks volumes. The case of Guyana has already been discussed. In the case of Brazil, the importance of political considerations in maintaining the programme is clearly spelled out by interviewees. The programme, according to them, was maintained in order to take account of Brazil’s global role as an emerging power. Indeed, the DFID officials working on the programme are based within the British embassy rather than a DFID office and liaise explicitly with the Brazilian government on issues including the rise of Brazil itself as a donor country. The close relationship between DFID and the local embassy is exceptional considering that development and foreign policy as handled by
the FCO tend to be quite separated in Britain, according to the interviewees. Given that Brazil is the only Latin American country with whom DFID still carries out development work, the political motivation of this cooperation weighs heavily on the overall motivations of UK development policy activity towards Latin America. Additionally, although this has been discontinued, the FCO did at one point have an aid programme in Colombia arising out of security concerns. Overall, therefore, political motivations far outweigh other factors in driving what is left of the UK’s development relationship with Latin America. Latin America is not politically important enough for the UK to be highly active, but those countries that are important – in particular Brazil – concentrate nearly all the policy activity that is directed at the region.17

Domestic Norms Lending support to Hypothesis 2a, the influence of a domestic norm about poverty alleviation is strongest in the UK, which arguably has the lowest ‘utilitarian’ interests in the region, especially in economic terms. In addition, this national norm plays out in a particularly interesting fashion, for it is this norm that is in part responsible for the closure of the bilateral aid programmes with Latin America and the UK’s low level of development policy activity towards the region. When questioned about DFID’s decision to pull out of the region almost completely, interviewees agree that it corresponds to a decision in the late 1990s, that is, at the beginning of the Labour Government’s first legislature. It appears that the decision had two roots, on the one hand, the desire to decrease DFID’s footprint by getting rid of small programmes that were not perceived to be making a big impact. Indeed, (former) DFID officials previously involved with Latin America unanimously stated that the programme had been so small even before its cancellation that it was almost impossible to make a noteworthy impact through allocation decisions or conditionality. The second cause of the Latin America programme’s closure, however, was the strong perception that aid had to be focussed on the poorest countries. As one interviewee stated,

“there was a big rethink about [...]”18 aid to middle income coun-

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17It is important to note that under the new government there have been efforts to step up British policy activity towards the region that point into the direction of the UK taking note of Latin America’s growing political importance, although these have not taken place in the realm of development policy. These include the reopening of a diplomatic post in Central America and the scaling up of other Latin American posts. “We are embarking on a large-scale shift in network resources announced by the Foreign Secretary to shape a future network that reflects the shifting power dynamics in today’s world. [...] We will open new posts in Kyrgyzstan, South Sudan, El Salvador and, when local circumstances permit, in Madagascar and Somalia. We will also strengthen our small and medium size posts across the Asia-Pacific region, in Latin America and in parts of Africa, the Middle East and Central and South Asia. (FCO 2011: 2; emphasis added).

18Please note that, as discussed in Chapter 4, when there are ellipses in citations from the interviews, this is normally due to the fact that they are based on interview transcripts. As interviewees
tries. And Latin America, although we know there are large numbers of very poor people in Latin America, and pockets of genuine poverty in the region, on the whole, [...] most of the countries slipped into the middle-income bracket. And there was [...] a decision within DFID under the then New Labour government to focus aid very much on the very poorest countries. So there was a general decision to start closing down some of the traditional bilateral aid programmes also in Latin America.”

As a result, the Latin America programme was gradually dismantled. There was, initially, one low-income country left in the region, Nicaragua, where a residual programme remained “as it becomes a middle-income country” (DFID 2009). Indeed, the decision was not uncontroversial within the policy-making community, as there appeared to be the potential for parliamentary resistance from a group of pro-Latin American MPs. The decision was thus taken to re-channel aid through what was called a Programme Partnership Agreement (PPA) with a number of British NGOs (DFID 2008). Initially designed to run over three years, no decision was taken to prolong the programme’s life at the change of government in 2010, so that even the PPA has now run out. In the case of the UK, therefore, the normative decision to focus aid on the poorest countries combined with domestic political dynamics and led to the dismantling of British bilateral aid to Latin America.  

The UK was able to codify the norm of poverty alleviation in the International Development Act of 2002, which states that development assistance may be provided whenever “the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty” (UK Parliament 2002, Part I, 1(1)). The norm has thus been enshrined in legislation and subsequently impacted British development policy as a whole. As a result, UK development policy is now focused mainly on Africa and, to a lesser extent, on Asia (DFID/National Statistics 2009). One interviewee pointed out that there was indeed a deliberate effort on the part of the government to detach aid from interest-based considerations, at least under the Labour government: “Aid is there to do something that’s morally right, not strategic.”

As in the German case, however, poverty orientation does not automatically mean that the poorest countries receive the most aid. Incidentally, Latin

19It is important to note that Latin America was not the only region affected by the reorientation of British aid towards the poorest countries. Interviewees were very clear that this was not an issue that was specific to Latin America, but that offices were also closed in other middle-income countries, for example in Eastern Europe.
America provides an excellent example of how this impacts upon aid allocation both on behalf of Britain and Germany: the case of Haiti. Recall from the aid concentration curves that Haiti is the main reason for why the curves of all countries under study are regressive: it is Latin America’s poorest country, yet it receives disproportionately little aid. Britain and Germany have both taken conscious decisions not to work with Haiti bilaterally. One main reason is Haiti’s lack of absorptive capacity: as one former British official pointed out, many other donors such as Canada are highly active in Haiti, and its capacity to absorb aid is very low. Thus, poverty orientation may also lead to countries with more administrative and absorptive capacity getting more funds.

It will be interesting to see how the strong domestic norm of poverty alleviation develops under the new Conservative-Liberal government, although interviewees do not anticipate substantial changes. However, the strength of the British national poverty-alleviation norm has had repercussions beyond British policy towards Latin America, as will be further discussed below. Because of Britain’s strong influence on the international donor community, it was able to take its national poverty reduction norm to the international level and act as a norm-maker there. While of course interviewees’ claims about the extent of the UK’s influence on the international arena must be viewed with the appropriate caution, it is noticeable that the UK’s impact – along that of other countries such as the Nordic states – is also recognised by interviewees from the other countries under study and the triangulation interviewees, as I show further on. The UK’s domestic norm of poverty alleviation has therefore had an impact beyond the UK, as well as on all aspects of British development policy, including towards Latin America, although it does compete with – mainly political – interest-based factors that have, for example, enabled the duration of DFID’s work in Brazil.

**International Norms**  Support for the impact of an international norm of poverty alleviation, however, is fairly low in the UK. This lends support to the theorising of Hypothesis 2b, which stated that the UK as a norm-maker at the international level could be expected to be more of a ‘socialiser’ than a ‘socialisee’. Given the strength of the *pre-existing* domestic norm, the fact that an international norm to the same effect has a weaker impact is not at all surprising. One interviewee stated that in the context of reorienting resources towards the poorest countries, the international context did matter, but that it was actually the UK and the Nordic countries who led the way on this issue. This finding is theoretically interesting, as the interaction between national and international norms has also been theorised to the effect that international norms are more likely to resonate in countries where there is a similar domestic norm
(e.g. Checkel 1999: 81; Rittberger 2001b; Boekle et al. 2001). This idea does make sense, although the role of the respective country at the international level must be carefully taken into account. A country which is a norm-maker at the international level is more likely to implant its domestic norm there than to be socialised by others, whereas the relationship between national and international norms postulated above applies better to countries that are norm-takers. How a country’s position as a maker or taker of international norms comes about has been the subject of a comprehensive body of research (e.g. Börzel 2002; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

**International Rules: Rational Adaptation** While in Germany, I did expect rational adaptation to international rules, this was less the case for the UK (Hypothesis 2c), so that the fact that I do not find evidence for it is not surprising and lends support to the theoretical expectations postulated. Again, given Britain’s substantial influence on the making of this rule, there was no theoretical reason to expect it to adapt to an international rule in whose crafting the UK itself was instrumental. Another potential explanation lies in the fact that by now, British policy activity towards the region is so low (Latin America accounts for a mere 2% of total UK development assistance; see Table 5.2) that Britain does not see the need to signal ‘good behaviour’ in a region where it will not be noticed. Even so, however, it is important to consider the caveats discussed in the section on Germany: a lack of evidence for the impact of a variable does not necessarily mean that it is not at work at all.

**Summary: Britain** The most remarkable thing about the UK’s development policy towards Latin America is its virtual nonexistence, which this section has sought to explain. As expected, economic interests do not play much of a role for British development policy towards Latin America, as they are rather low. Political factors, on the other hand, are relatively much more important than in the other two countries under study. In some aspects, their impact exhibits similarities to the German case in that they lead to policy activity being focused on recipients that are considered politically important. However, the British definition of ‘politically important’ is much sharper than the German one and entails a strong focus almost exclusively on Brazil. This ‘Brazilianisation’ of British policy towards Latin America has entailed a move away from other countries, although it is not solely responsible for the low level of policy activity towards the region. In the realm of domestic political interests, political-historical factors also play a role in that they have made it easier to detach policy activity from Latin America and towards other regions, such as the Caribbean or Africa. The issue of definitions, however, also applies to the so-
cialisation of British policy-makers into a very strong domestic norm of poverty alleviation. While German policy-makers operate within a rather broad definition of poverty alleviation that allows them to include ‘more developed’ countries, the British norm is much more geared towards focusing development policy activity on the world’s poorest countries and is, in conjunction with the other factors discussed, responsible for the low level of policy activity towards Latin America. Indeed, Britain has become a norm-maker at the international level, so that I do find little evidence for international socialisation and rational adaptation to international norms and rules to whose establishment the UK itself has contributed considerably.

5.5.3 Spain

Economic Interests The fairly low importance of economic factors in determining Spanish development policy activity towards Latin America comes as a surprise to utilitarian-liberal theory given the substantial economic interests Spain has in the region (cf Hypothesis 1a). There is some reason to believe that in this case, the interview results must be taken with a pinch of salt due to the possibility that interviewees are being strategic. Spain has, in fact, been harshly criticised by its last DAC Peer Review (OECD 2007) for its large amounts of tied aid, that is, aid attached to the condition that the recipient country make a purchase in the donor country or carry out projects in conjunction with companies from the donor country. While several interviewees confirm that this has been an issue in the past, however, they are adamant to point out that Spain has been working to reduce its tied aid. The source of the problem, as confirmed by the DAC Peer Review, was a fund called Fondo de Ayuda al Desarrollo (FAD; Fund for Development Aid), which was counted as ODA, but was in fact a fund “to aid exports”, as one interviewee explained, and to help Spanish companies enter Latin American markets, which had “nothing to do with the rest of cooperation”. Indeed, the FAD has recently been dismantled to become the Fondo para la Promoción del Desarrollo (FONPRODE), administered by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID), and the Fondo para la Internacionalización de la Empresa (FIEM), administered by the Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITYC). FONPRODE will consist strictly of development-oriented untied aid, while FIEM funds will be ODA eligible only if they comply with DAC rules (Gobierno de España 2011; 2010; Sanahuja 2009). Therefore, while in earlier years, there was a use of FAD funding to help Spanish enterprises along in Latin America, interviewees concur that the government has in recent years made a conscious effort to untie aid from economic interests. Indeed, these findings chime with the pattern found in
the Spanish aid concentration curve that the richer and more rapidly-growing countries of Latin America do indeed receive proportionally little development assistance.

One interviewee, however, points to the issue of including private actors in development policy that also appeared in interviews with British and German policy makers. Roping economic actors into PPPs is now seen as a way to augment otherwise limited aid funding. But while in Britain and Germany there was a political component to the involvement of private actors in development policy through PPPs, in Spain it is seen by policy-makers as the result of the maturation of Spanish development assistance rather than of domestic political ideas. This indicates that Spain continues to see itself as a ‘young donor’, which, as I will discuss below, impacts quite strongly upon its motivations for development policy in other respects as well. Spanish interviewees agreed with their British and German counterparts, however, in that Latin America with its relatively high levels of development and its relatively well-developed public institutions is particularly suited for the application of PPPs.

**Political Interests** In Spain, political interests (Hypothesis 1b) matter to a similar degree as economic interests. Unsurprisingly, Spanish officials point to the historical connection between Spain and its former Latin American colonies. This relationship is in part political, as I have previously discussed and interviews have confirmed, as Spain uses Latin America to project itself internationally and increase its global clout. This is clearly reflected in the level of development policy activity towards Latin America, even though Spain’s colonial past with the region also has a normative dimension that will be further discussed below. “There are historical and cultural ties with Latin America we cannot deny”, one official stated, “so Latin America remains very important to us.” However, there are also some more recent political factors that have impacted upon Spain’s development policy towards the region, one of them being migration. One interviewee admitted that while the demographic pressure emanating from Latin America was not as strong on Spain as on the United States, it has nevertheless had an impact on development policy towards the region. This has taken the form of co-development programmes to try and involve migrants themselves in development cooperation and put, for example, their remittances to developmental use. However, the official stated, these programmes had not been graced with a great deal of success so far.

The relatively low importance of economic and political interests comes as
5.5. CORROBORATING THE EVIDENCE

a bit of a surprise for the Spanish case, where liberal-utilitarian theorising postulated that given Spain’s strong interests in the region should be a, if not the key motivating factor. Even though taken together, the ‘domestic interest’ variables still account for about 30% of the evidence, it is surprising that overall, normative factors account for more. Let me thus turn to the discussion of the impact of norms on development policy activity towards Latin America.

**Domestic Norms**  Regarding Hypothesis 2a, the domestically-rooted poverty alleviation norm matters nearly to the same degree in Spain as it does in Germany. This is interesting, as I had hypothesised it to matter less due to Spain’s greater economic and political interests in the region. However, in so far as a domestic norm over poverty alleviation might impact upon the overall level of development policy activity towards the Latin America, it does enter into conflict with Spain’s close historical relationship with the region. This relationship is so deeply ingrained in both the public’s and the policy-makers’ thinking about Latin America that policy-makers repeatedly referred to Latin American countries as “brothers” or having a “brotherly relationship” with them. As one interviewee put it,

“as much as we, the Spanish society, should support the world’s poorest countries, if you ask someone the one-hundred Euro question, to divide it between Africa and Latin America, I am convinced that in the majority of cases they would put quite a lot more in Latin America than in Africa. Although at a more general level, they will say that more aid has to be given to Africa.”

However, the poverty-orientation of Spanish aid is slowly increasing, although, as I discuss below, this is probably more the result of international-level dynamics. Nonetheless, diverting aid from Latin America appears to be morally very difficult for Spain. While Chile is theoretically on the road to graduating from Spanish development aid, one interviewee pointed out that to the date, policy-makers have not been able to close AECID’s Technical Cooperation Office (OTC) in Santiago. “It was traumatic. [...] The decision was included in the current Development Plan from 2009. Until today, though, they do not know how to do it”, the interviewee explained.

However, poverty alleviation has been a priority within Latin America, in line with the picture emerging from Spain’s aid concentration curve in the region. This, indeed, appears how Spain has been trying to resolve the cognitive dissonance between the norm of orienting aid towards the poorest countries and its Latin American vocation. In fact, the Socialist government has made strong efforts to untie aid from other objectives, despite domestic pressures to
make it conditional. In Bolivia, for example, where Spanish companies were negatively affected by nationalisations, business interests and parts of the media were trying to push the government to condition its aid, one interview partner reports. Nonetheless, the government maintained “a clear position that the two things could not be connected, that [...] [development] cooperation has its logic and we want to maintain this, beyond [...] commercial or economic conflicts”, as one interviewee explained. But, as will become clear in the following, this poverty orientation is much more the result of international influences than of domestic norms in Spain.

**International Norms** Spain is the country where an international norm has had the most relative impact by far out of the three countries under study. In contrast to the UK’s role as a ‘norm-maker’ of development policy at the international level, Spain very much appears to be a norm-taker in this respect. Evidence shows that an international norm of ‘aid to the poorest’ appears to have made considerable impact on policy-makers. One Spanish interview partner who has been involved in development policy-making for a long time actually described a fundamental change in this respect since the coming into power of the Socialist government in 2004: “Spain had a model one academic called ‘typically Spanish’,21 [...] ‘our [development] cooperation is different, and that in itself is good’. [...] This has changed.”

This reorientation of Spanish development aid caused Africa to surpass Latin America for the first time in 2007 in terms of total Spanish aid funds with 1,180.1 million Euros vis-à-vis 1,070.8 million Euros (MAEC 2008: 50).22 The Millennium Development goals, according to interviewees, have made a particular impact on Spanish development policy-makers: “Spain completely supports the MDGs.” However, as with the national norm of poverty alleviation, any international norm has to compete with Spain’s special relationship with Latin America. One official admits that international decisions regarding the goals of development such as the Paris Declaration or the Accra Agenda have not been fully incorporated in Spain, because of its historical ties with Latin America. Therefore, as another interviewee stated, while the MDGs were “a central element” for the Socialist government’s development policy – one that is accepted by policy-makers without questioning it – they did cause “some dilemmas in the Latin American case [...] They are written for low-income countries... the poorest countries in the world.” The tension between the acceptance of an international norm on the one hand and domestic traditions on

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21The original word used was “castizo”, which refers to something that is typically or traditionally Spanish.
22However, Africa was the main recipient of Spanish multilateral aid, while Latin America continued to receive the largest share of bilateral funds.
the other thus had to be resolved.

This was achieved by giving Spanish development policy a particular twist, which came to be known as “ODM Plus” in Spanish development circles (ODM being the Spanish abbreviation for the MDGs). “We wanted to be within the MDG framework”, an interviewee explained, “but adapt it to the Latin American reality. [...] And we saw that this involved working in three areas: democratic governance, social cohesion [...] and thirdly, economic development.” Similarly, the MDGs were incorporated into the Spanish development agenda vis-à-vis Latin America by adjusting the concentration of aid among the various countries and moving towards the poorer ones: “the MDGs were incorporated by the concentration of lower middle-income countries within the region [...] the compromise was [...] we’re not going to treat Brazil the same as Bolivia [...] Brazil does not need aid.” Thus, Spanish development policy-makers readily incorporated the international norm of giving aid to the poorest, but such socialisation occurred only within limits as it partially conflicted with domestic preconceptions about aid, with which it had to be reconciled. Therefore, it would be wrong to speak of an unreflective internalisation of international norms in this case. While the norm was indeed internalised, the way in which it was turned into development policy practice was very much premeditated and rational, although the underlying adaptation was to some extent motivated by considering the Millennium Development Goals an appropriate course of action.

Spain’s role as a norm-taker at the international level can be explained with its relatively recent appearance as a donor (García-Calvo Rosell 2003); up until the early 1980s it was actually a recipient of development assistance, and it was not until the early 2000s that its aid seriously took off. However, in Spain, the acceptance of poverty reduction as a goal of development assistance is as much a question of appropriateness as it is of rational adaptation, as I will show in the next section. In terms of normative development, however, Spain is the only one out of the three where the international norm is more influential than the national one – to some extent, therefore, Spain’s membership in the international community has socialised policy-makers into considering poverty alleviation as a fundamental goal of development aid, which shows in the poverty-oriented distribution of aid within Latin America.

**International Rules: Rational Adaptation** There is, however, also considerable evidence for the impact of rational adaptation to international rules on Spanish development policy activity (Hypothesis 2c). It matters, according to the evidence, just as much as the international norm about poverty reduction, and only slightly less than the idea that adhering to international norms is mor-
ally right. Therefore, while the norm of poverty orientation has been internalised to some degree, it is also a rational response to international demands that has caused Spanish aid to the least developed countries to rise considerably over the past years. Spanish interviewees are happy to admit that Spain wants to be recognised by the international community of donors, including its EU partners, as a worthy member. Initially, in fact, “the only area where it could demonstrate some capacity for cooperation was Latin America”, as one interviewee put it. Later on, as development cooperation funding rose, more money has been going to Africa in response, it seems, both to the diffusion and acceptance of the norm that aid should go to the poorest, and a desire to be more like the other donor countries: “the new [Socialist] government wanted us to be [...] much closer to the orthodoxy [...], which said that we had to increase [development] cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, and, to a lesser extent, with Asia.” Similarly, this adaptation is clearly a response to the international demand: “at all international development agendas, they were demanding of us to direct our increase in resources to least developed countries”. However, as with the internalisation of poverty orientation as a norm, rational adaptation has been bounded by domestic preconceptions about where Spanish aid should go. The importance of Latin America may have diminished in terms of its share of aid, where Africa now receives a similar proportion, but in absolute numbers, Spain remains committed to the region. Nevertheless, the adaptation to international rules has left its mark on Spanish development policy activity towards Latin America. Along with the partial internalisation of poverty orientation as a norm, the desire to be accepted as a fully-fledged member of the international donor community contributed to a very specific ‘Spanish way’ of orienting aid towards the poorest Latin American countries.

Summary: Spain Aside from displaying the highest level of development policy activity towards Latin America, Spain also displays the most varied evidence regarding its motivations. Interestingly, its strong economic and political interests in the region matter less than expected according to evidence from the interviews. There appears to be a an element of evolution in Spanish assistance to Latin America that has been strongly influenced by the international level through processes of both rational adaptation and socialisation into norms emanating from the international level. Indeed, it seems to be the case that Spanish development activity towards the region was more interest-driven earlier and has become more poverty-oriented in recent years as Spain became an ever more active donor.

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23Some caution is appropriate with reference to the differences between evidence for hypotheses 2b and 2c.
In comparison to Germany and Britain, Spain’s current development policy activities within Latin America are, indeed, more poverty-oriented in terms of aid concentration, which is corroborated by the strong evidence for normative factors and rational adaptation to the prevailing international rules from the interviews. With this distribution of policy activity within the region, Spain attempts to resolve the tension between the increasing perception that aid needs to be poverty orientated and the both utilitarian and normative pressures to maintain the strong focus on Latin America. While in the past, Spain’s strongly expanding ODA budget has allowed it to increase aid to Africa at the same time as keeping up its activity in Latin America, the country’s deep economic crisis will force it to prioritise and it will be interesting to see how the new Spanish government will handle this task.

Overall, current political and economic factors matter only marginally. Political considerations in the shape of historical colonial ties, however, do matter for the disproportionate amount of aid allocated to the whole of Latin America. Within the region, differences in the political importance of the countries appear to be less relevant. Economic considerations have been a more decisive factor in the past, particularly during the 1990s, than they are now. The Socialist government has made efforts to untie aid from economic drivers by abolishing the FAD funding line and replacing it with two new funds, only the development-oriented of which is entirely ODA eligible (FONPRODE). How this will affect aid to Latin America in practice, however, remains to be seen, since FONPRODE’s rulebook was only approved in summer 2011.

**Summary** Overall, it has become clear that development policy activity is driven both by domestic political and economic interests and the understanding that giving aid to underdeveloped countries is morally appropriate. While the former applies particularly to Germany and the UK’s aid to the richer Latin American countries – Mexico, Brazil, and to some extent Peru and Colombia –, aid to the poorer Latin American countries is more motivated by poverty alleviation norms, arising from both the domestic and the international context. This lends support to the findings of Tingley (2010), who finds that aid to richer countries is often more interest-driven, while aid to poorer countries responds more strongly to a logic of appropriateness. Especially in the UK, however, the national poverty-orientation norm is so strong that it has indeed led to the dismantling of almost all aid to Latin America, except for a chiefly interest-motivated programme with Brazil that takes account of the country’s growing global importance and its emerging role as an international donor. In the case of Germany, there is a similar tendency to dismantle aid towards the richer Latin American countries, while Germany does not leave the poorer
ones. The reason for this most probably lies in the fact that Germany’s national norm about poverty alleviation is less strongly developed than the British one, and in particular under the new government, considerations regarding the absorptive capacity of aid recipients and interest-based considerations are gaining traction. Britain has, in addition, emerged as a norm-maker at the international level, so that both international socialisation and rational adaptation have had little impact on British development policy towards Latin America. In Spain, however, while economic and political – notably ex-colonial – factors do matter, the international level is very important in determining the concentration of Spain within Latin America. While the large amounts of aid channelled to the region can only be explained with its historical and cultural relations that have turned into a national norm of Latin America as a ‘brother’ whom one cannot cut off aid, the distribution of this aid within Latin America corresponds to poverty orientation arising from three sources: a national norm that aid should go to the poorest countries, the acceptance of an international poverty-orientation norm – which is likely to be partially responsible for the creation of the domestic norm to the same effect, given Spain’s recent emergence as a donor –, and its rational adaptation to international rules in order to become accepted as a fully-fledged member of the international donor community.

For all three countries, the evidence from the interviews nicely corresponds to and complements the data shown in the aid concentration curves and the Suits Index values. Thus, this study has shown so far how the variables conceptualised by the extended liberal theoretical framework combine, mediated by each country’s domestic context, to produce specific patterns of development aid concentration in Latin America. In the following, I assess complementary evidence from the triangulation interviews.

5.5.4 Additional evidence from triangulation interviews

The triangulation interviews, because they were carried out with EU officials and Latin American diplomats based in Brussels, carry considerably less weight for this case study than for Chapter 6. This is because neither EU officials nor Latin American diplomats in Brussels have much insight into what is happening at the domestic level regarding development policy-making. Interviews carried out at the EU’s DG Development/EEAS proved most useful in this regard, as they can be taken as interviewees with representatives of a multilateral donor organisation to some degree. Therefore, rather than providing a fully-

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24 The EU’s hybrid situation between a multilateral donor organisation and an international organisation due to the distribution of competences between the Union and its Member States in development policy has already been outlined and must of course be considered.
In general, interviewees emphasise economic motivations, with this being the strongest for Spain. This contrasts with the findings from the national-level interviews, although is not surprising given Spain’s substantial economic interests in the region and is more consistent with Hypothesis 1a than the interviews with Spanish development policy-makers, indicating that there may indeed be an element of strategic rhetoric at the national level. Spain is continuously pushing for more aid to Latin America, one interviewee stated, “because they know that then 60, if not more percent of that money have the chance to benefit the Spanish economy.” However, the interviewee also admitted that this was not limited to Spain: “Of course everyone tries to get as much as possible out of the Community [development aid] budget [...] raised by the 27 for their own industry.” However, while the impact of economic considerations could be pinpointed for Spain and Germany in the interviews, this is not the case for the UK, which may be because its economic interests in the region are the smallest out of the three countries under study. Additionally, another interviewee explained that Member States try and influence the EU in favour of their own development policy, especially when priorities change, which was, for example the case after the German change of government. Interviewees also confirmed the notion that Britain is particularly influential regarding development policy, not just towards Latin America, thus reinforcing the statements of British officials themselves and adding to the theoretical notion of the UK as a ‘norm-maker’ at the international level (Hypothesis 2b). Germany, however, was also mentioned among the generally influential states, while the Spaniards do have special clout with regard to Latin America. Yet one interviewee mentioned that the influence on EU development policy is also “a question of capacity”, so that Germany and Britain were better off in this respect than Spain, whose institutional capacity was seen as more limited.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the motivation behind the EU’s development policy – in addition to regionally specific factors – is fundamentally seen as poverty alleviation. This points to two issues. Firstly, it is a further indication that normative considerations at least partially drive development policy in the EU. Secondly, there exists a norm at the EU (i.e. the international level) into which policy-makers could potentially be socialised, thus ex post facto justifying the theoretical considerations behind Hypothesis 2b. Overall, however, the triangulation interviews give further support to the evidence produced in the previous section: the drivers behind development policy towards Latin

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25In fact, national officials from other countries also reinforced this notion by stating that because of British expertise in certain sectors, they were listened to more and had greater legitimacy than other donor countries.
America are fundamentally complex and involve the interaction of normative and rationalist considerations, although rationalist considerations regarding the realisation of domestic interests tend to carry the day.

5.6 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have adapted the study’s general explanatory framework to development policy-making towards Latin America by conceptualising explanatory variables within the framework developed in Chapter 2 in order to explain development policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Germany, Britain, and Spain. In order to do so, I analysed the concentration of aid within the region, as well as Latin America’s general standing vis-à-vis other areas of the world. I then complemented the results with an analysis of elite interviews. As suspected in the introduction, the picture is highly complex. Nonetheless, some general tendencies can be observed.

As was to be expected given the results of previous research, both normative factors based on a logic of appropriateness and factors driven by a logic of expected consequences matter. Aid concentration, as expected, is chiefly driven by domestic political and economic interests, but I also found considerable evidence for the impact of domestic as well as international norms. However, with regard to international rules, it is important to recognise that the impact of socialisation processes policy-makers have been subject to interacts with rational adaptation to international rules in order to maintain or achieve the status of fully-fledged membership in the international donor community. This is particularly important in the case of Spain, whose aid concentration within Latin America is the most poverty-oriented out of the three countries studied. Spain is still a relatively ‘recent’ donor and its policy-makers remain rather preoccupied with being accepted as ‘good’ donors internationally. Overall, the impact of the international level depends on domestic factors as well as on the position of the country under study within the international setting. In the case of Britain, for instance, a strong national norm has contributed to making it influential in the international donor community, a ‘norm-maker’. The impact of the international level on Britain, in turn, is therefore lower.

In Germany and the UK, there is evidence that poverty orientation matters more in poorer countries, while interest-based considerations dominate when allocating aid to the richer countries of Latin America, in line with previous findings by Tingley (2010). This explains why both countries give some substantial shares of their aid to some very poor, but also to some of the region’s rich countries. Indeed, in the UK a strong national norm about the poverty
orientation of aid has strongly contributed to dismantling the bilateral aid programme with Latin America. Interest-based considerations, however, motivate the UK to continue running a programme with Brazil as an emerging global power. Germany on the other hand, due to its somewhat greater interests in the region, as well as broader conceptions of both the political importance of Latin American partner countries and the notion of ‘poverty alleviation’, maintains a broader profile, but the essential pattern is similar to the British one.

Interestingly, I find that the lower policy activity towards Latin America, as laid out in Chapter 3, the less relevant Latin America-specific considerations are in accounting for policy activity towards the region. This is a factor that has not, as far as I am aware, been specifically theorised in the literature, since ‘special relationships’ have traditionally been approached through a ‘colonialism’ variable, which fails to capture the full implications of this finding. Indeed, such a special relationship seems to make the drivers of development policy activity more complex and varied, since the specificities of the recipient region are given greater importance. The driving factors in Germany and particularly in the UK are thus more reflective of general development policy considerations than in Spain. Evidently, Spain is a special case with regard to Latin America. As a formal colonial power, its close ties to the region on all levels – cultural, historical, economic and political – impact upon its development policy towards the region. In particular, Spanish policy-makers find it very difficult, bordering on impossible, to reduce or withdraw aid from Latin American countries even if they, like Chile, have reached substantial levels of economic development that make justifying aid to these countries increasingly hard. However, within Spain, aid to the region is very much poverty-oriented as a result of both normative considerations and rational adaptation to international rules, in particular to those established in the MDG context. This shows how the impact of international-level factors is indeed mediated by the domestic context of each individual donor country.

Overall, different motivating factors matter in all three countries under study, but the ways in which they matter and, in particular, interact among each other are conditioned by domestic preference constellations – both normative and rational – that are unique to each country. Therefore, a closer look at these country-specific interactions through the lens of a small-N case study is very fruitful in order to go beyond previous quantitative studies’ finding that different factors matter, by looking at how and why they matter differently in various contexts.
Chapter 6

Interacting with another Level: National Policy towards Latin America and the EU’s Latin America Policy
6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I discussed the importance of EU membership in the foreign policy-making of EU countries (see p. 61), and conceptualised a European dimension of foreign policy activity towards Latin America (see Section 2.1.2.3, p. 47). Because of the level that integration has reached in the EU, foreign policy-making is nowadays practically unthinkable without taking into account the European level and its interaction with national foreign policy. Nevertheless, as I have shown in Chapter 3, levels of policy activity, that is, the extent to which the three countries carry out their Latin America policy within the EU framework vis-à-vis other channels, vary considerably. Table 6.1 recapitulates this variation.

Table 6.1: fsQCA Index Values European Dimension of Policy Activity towards Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fsQCA value</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter thus focuses on the policies towards Latin America of Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the European context in order to explain the variation found. Since EU membership is a constant among the three countries under scrutiny, domestic factors ought to be at its root, so that the liberal framework conceptualised in Chapter 2 should be suitable for analysing this phenomenon. However, because of the constant bidirectional interaction between the EU level and the domestic context, the framework has to be adapted in order to explain such variation by focussing on the mechanisms of such interaction. In this chapter, therefore, I conceptualise an explanatory model for the interaction between national Latin America policies and the EU’s policy towards the region that situates itself within the context of this study’s overarching theoretical framework. In order to be able to conceptualise the analysis and derive hypothetical expectations about what interaction should look like, I employ a framework based on Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; 1997; 1998). However, I extend this framework through a liberal constructivist perspective, which allows for the incorporation of ideational aspects into state behaviour. Additionally, I draw on literature that is able to incorporate the ramifications of actor socialisation and rational adaptation at the European level, as well as the potential impact of the EU’s institutional framework. In this sense, the framework takes into account similar explanatory variables as

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1 As previously mentioned, Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 145, fn 18) points out that liberal constructivism and what Moravcsik calls ideational liberalism (1997: 515) amounts to the same approach.
6.1. INTRODUCTION

those employed in the previous chapter regarding development policy, but adapts them to the EU-domestic interaction context. I then go on to assess this framework empirically.

Regarding the countries under study, both Germany and the UK should be particularly instructive, as they are pivotal Member States of the EU with a great deal of influence on the Union’s policies. Nonetheless, both countries exhibit foreign policy traditions that set them apart from one another and from other large EU members such as France. Studies have shown that Germany has generally been more willing to Europeanise its policies than other Member States (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005; Wagner 2002; Manners and Whitman 2000). In the UK, on the other hand, there is a strong tradition of Euroscepticism that impacts upon all aspects of its interaction with the EU level (Wallace 2005: 55). At the same time, Spain’s special relationship with Latin America allows it to punch above its usual weight in the Union when it comes to the EU’s action towards Latin America, thus promoting it to ‘great power status’ in this particular area of EU external action. The chapter conceptualising the dependent variable has resulted in a relatively low fsQCA score for Spain on the European dimension, as the EU has relatively little importance in Spain’s Latin American policy compared to a very strong bilateral component, and runs side by side with Spain’s own Ibero-American Summit process. In this chapter, I seek to uncover the mechanisms through which the three Member States under study take their relationship with Latin America to the EU level. Two principal questions guide the analysis. How do Member States carry out their policy towards Latin America within the EU framework? And what explains the way in which national and EU policy towards the region interact?

Again, as expected by the study’s theoretical framework, I find that interaction is driven predominantly by domestic interests. Where they are strong, the three countries under study try to ‘upload’ them to the EU level by attempting to influence the EU’s stance on an issue. Differences in the intensity of preferences lead to variation in the intensity with which they are pursued, and the breadth of issues covered by such attempts to ‘upload’. When interests are weak and it does not cause disadvantages, Member States are prepared to accept issues defined at the EU level onto their national policy agenda. Additionally, the institutional distribution of competences between the national and the EU level also impacts upon the way in which Member States pursue their Latin America policies. Finally, there is also evidence for the impact of both national and EU-level norm. However, the various influencing factors interact differently in the three countries under study, as I will show in the following. While this study is not able to account for all aspects of the interaction processes at work, the depth with which it is able to compare and contrast the
policies of these three important Member States is able to uncover novel aspects of EU-national level interaction in foreign policy-making towards Latin America that may carry implications for other Member States as well as policy towards other third regions.

The chapter is structured as follows: I first give a brief historical overview of how each country’s relationship with Latin America has developed in the European context. In the next step, I provide a theoretical conceptualisation of the interaction between national and European Latin America policy and derive expectations about what interaction should look like. I then move on to an empirical test of the framework and a detailed discussion of the results. The final section concludes and embeds the results within this study’s wider framework.

6.2 National Latin America policies in the EU context

Why should we study foreign policy-making in EU Member States and its interaction with the EU level? Despite several decades of European-level cooperation and institutional reform, Member States still retain very strong national foreign policies as well as an important influence on EU action in foreign affairs. This applies both to foreign policy in general and policy towards Latin America in particular. European cooperation in Latin American affairs took off in the early 1980s when the Member States began working together in order to help resolve the Central American crises (Bodemer 1987: 75). It was further strengthened by general institutional reforms, such as the Maastricht Treaty, which turned European Political Cooperation (EPC) in foreign affairs into the CFSP, and by specific changes such as the founding of a biregional strategic partnership and the institutionalisation of biannual EU-Latin America and Caribbean (EU-LAC) summits in 1999. Therefore, there is now a distinct European dimension to policy-making towards Latin America. Yet national policies continue to exist and interact with the EU level in different ways and intensities.

Institutionally, Latin America policy within the EU context is mostly carried out through two advisory bodies of the Council, AMLAT and COLAT, although commercial issues fall within the realm of the Trade Policy Committee (prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, known as the Article 133 Committee). AMLAT and the Trade Policy Committee are Working Groups of the Council, involving national officials based in Brussels. COLAT is a format in which national officials from the capitals meet once per month in Brussels to coordinate aspects
of policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean.

In order to assess interaction between national Latin America policy and the EU’s policy towards the region, I first conceptualise different interaction mechanisms before moving on to generating expectations about how they might be explained. In this context, the literature on Europeanisation (e.g. Moumoutzis 2011; Radaelli 2004; Börzel 2002) is helpful, although there has been a vivid discussion within this literature regarding the nature of Europeanisation and the ways in which it affects national policy. In this study, I take Europeanisation as such to be an exogenous process. Foreign policy has been ‘Europeanised’ to some extent because the European level plays a role in national foreign policy-making. This study is interested in the mechanisms through which the national and the European level interact as a result of Europeanisation, not the process of Europeanisation as such. This approach corresponds more to the way FPA literature on EU Member States (Manners 2002; Larsen 2005, 2009) takes the European level into account, framing it in terms of mechanisms through which national foreign policies interact with the EU level. Finally, literature on EU foreign policy is helpful whenever it deals with the interaction between foreign policy at the EU level and national policy (e.g. Smith 2000). In order to capture this interaction, I make use of two concepts, the ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ of policy to and from the EU level. By explaining why uploading and downloading occur the way they do in the three Member States under study, I hope to be able to shed light on the reasons for the varying levels of policy activity on the European dimension unearthed in Chapter 3. In the following section, I conceptualise uploading and downloading, show how they can be empirically observed, and how relevant they are in German, Spanish and British policy towards Latin America.

6.3 Conceptualising Uploading and Downloading

Assuming that states have an interest in taking their national policy to the European level, they might try to ‘upload’ national policy to the EU, as Börzel argues (2005; 2002). However, Börzel’s argument about uploading is linked to the idea that uploading a national model or policy to the EU level reduces the cost of national adaptation to the ‘new’ EU model or policy. Moumoutzis, however, discards the adaptational pressure argument for foreign policy as the EU does not have legal instruments to pressure the states into national adaptational costs low.

\[2\] While technically, as the EU’s competences in foreign policy evolve, Europeanisation remains on-going, policy-makers operate under a given level of Europeanisation at a given point in time.

\[3\] The idea is that in countries who successfully upload, there is then a better fit between the EU’s policy and the extant national policy, necessitating little adaptation and thus keeping adaptational costs low.
tion. But there are other instrumental reasons for trying to upload one’s foreign policy and use the EU strategically, such as privileged access to information about others’ policy, or being able to ‘punch above the weight’ of one’s national foreign policy (Moumoutzis 2011: 614ff). In order to avoid the confusion that has been associated with the term ‘uploading’ (Radaelli 2004; Moumoutzis 2011), I define it as a country’s attempt to take its policy and approach to the EU level. It is important that uploading does not necessarily have to mean that a country tries to get the other Member States to adopt the same stance (‘strong uploading’). For ‘uploading’ to be present it is enough that a country present its national policy or a policy initiative to the other Member States (‘weak uploading’). Even more importantly, under this definition, uploading does not entail the passing of competences to the EU level, nor does it need to. Analogous to the Europeanisation process, the distribution of competences between the national and European level that results from Europeanisation is exogenous to my framework. The question is what, given a certain level of Europeanisation and distribution of competences, motivates state representatives to try and upload national policy.4

The reverse mechanism is ‘downloading’ (Börzel 2002). Again, in order to avoid confusion about what ‘downloading’ entails, I move away from definitions that might include structural or institutional adaptation to EU rules or norms, as included in the ‘goodness of fit’ argument (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001: 2f), where adaptation is the result of pressure emanating from the EU level, and new institutional features are incorporated particularly well by states who have an institutional set-up similar to the one defined by the EU. As with ‘uploading’, such adaptation is assumed as given through the process of Europeanisation. Downloading thus refers to accepting a policy issue on the national agenda as it emanates from the EU level.

It is important to clarify these issues, because ‘Europeanisation’ has been defined and approached in different ways. Although my strict definitions of up- and downloading limit the overall scope of the explanandum, it seems more fruitful to work with well-defined, albeit narrower concepts, than with broader concepts that blur “the boundaries between cause and effect, between dependent and independent variables” (Wong and Hill 2011: 11). Even Wong and Hill’s own conceptualisation of Europeanisation includes, aside from uploading and downloading, a third dimension that incorporates the gradual convergence of identities and interests (ibid.: 6). Yet the question of whether this is a driver or an outcome of Europeanisation remains. By exogenising the

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4Note that the institutional distribution of competences can still have an impact on whether states try to upload their policy on a certain issue or not, which is further discussed below. However, in this study I do not deal with changes in the distribution of competences.
6.3. UPLOADING AND DOWNLOADING

process of identity change and considering the mechanisms of interaction as a potential result of this process, a more clear-cut assessment of drivers of such interaction is possible – while, of course, all this is not to say that studies focusing on said process are without merit. In this study, however, I opt to treat uploading and downloading as mechanisms of interaction between national policy and the EU level that can potentially be explained with reference to the outcome of policy-makers having been influenced by the EU level as an independent variable. I outline this framework below.

One aspect of up- and downloading that is beyond the scope of this study is the issue of non-geographically specific policy areas, such as migration or human rights policy in general. It has been suggested, for example, that Spain has downloaded migration policy from the EU level as a whole (Cornelius 1994: 362). However, downloading a policy as such does not mean that a country cannot try to influence the way such policy is applied in its relation with a certain region, which is the case I am concerned with in this study. For example, to continue with the example of migration policy, the adoption of the so-called Returns Directive in 2008 and Spanish support for it evoked harsh criticism from Latin America of both the EU and the Spanish government in particular. However, Spain then took a leading role in explaining the implications of the Directive to its Latin American counterparts (Acosta 2009), thus taking the lead in EU relations with the region.

6.3.1 Uploading and Downloading: Observable Implications

In order to explain these interaction mechanisms, it is vital to know what uploading and downloading look like. Ideally, one would take a look at EU and national priorities in policy towards Latin America to see to what extent they are congruent. In practice, observing uploading and downloading is not that easy, because congruence says nothing about the direction in which the interaction went, or whether there was interaction at all – after all, the EU might come up with similar priorities for other reasons, such as influence from other Member States or demands from Latin American countries. The challenge is thus to find a way of including directionality in the interaction.

Regarding uploading, the above definition means that evidence for attempts to actively influence EU policy towards Latin America by bringing one’s own policy stance to the EU level and potentially – in the case of strong uploading – seeking for it to be adopted must be identified. Downloading is more difficult to observe. It is more passive in orientation, and the direction of the mechan-

ism is reversed: downloading will be noticed on the national agenda rather than on the EU level. Downloaded aspects of policy are those that would not be on the national agenda were it not for the fact that the EU is dealing with the issue. The ‘requirement’ for downloading to be observed is thus not only that the EU deal with an issue, but that this issue appear on the national Latin America policy agenda in a certain fashion (or even at all) because of EU interaction. Unfortunately, unlike in the case of development policy, no readily comparable numerical data are available to glean an insight into patterns of uploading and downloading. Therefore, in order to give an indication of uploading and downloading in Germany, Spain and the UK, I hand-coded policy documents from the three countries to assess the strength of the mechanisms.\(^6\) Note that these are the same texts that have already been assessed in Chapter 3 to determine the level of Latin America policy activity in the EU context. Using the same texts and applying a different coding scheme to them ensures coherence of the material used. In the case of Germany, I used the strategy paper for its relations with the region published in August 2010 (AA 2010). As for UK policy, Foreign Secretary William Hague’s November 2010 speech outlining the UK’s relations with Latin America is used (FCO 2010). Finally, for Spain I used the information that is published on the Spanish Foreign Ministry’s website on relations with Latin America (MAEC 2010), the section on Latin America of an article by then Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero outlining Spain’s foreign policy (Rodríguez Zapatero 2004), and then Foreign Minister Trinidad Jiménez’s speech before the Senate Committee for Iberoamerican Affairs (Jiménez 2010).\(^7\) Of course, like the development aid data used in the previous chapter, the evidence drawn from the policy documents must be further investigated and corroborated, which I do through interviews, as well as an additional in-depth analysis of the policy papers in the light of the theoretical expectations outlined below.

In order to distinguish processes of uploading and downloading, I further fine-grained a framework conceptualised by Larsen (2009) for the analysis of EU Member States’ foreign policy, which I already used to determine the overall level of policy activity on the European dimension in Chapter 3. Larsen uses government documents to assess whether a state conducts its foreign policy within, partly within, or without the EU (see also Manners and Whitman 2000), and whether it is more of a maker or a receiver of EU foreign policy. For the present analysis, I further adjusted this framework to be able to take account

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\(^6\)See the discussion on hand-coding as the most appropriate option in Chapter 4.

\(^7\)Recall that although these documents are not strictly the same type, all of them are expressions of the official government line on policy towards Latin America, having undergone a careful governmental writing and editing process. They can therefore be considered comparable articulations of the motivations of policy towards the region.
of the mechanisms of interest. I assess the way in which the countries’ policy towards Latin America interacts with the EU level by coding relevant sentences of the document into “the EU as the only or main actor” (downloading), “Country and the EU acting together” (two-way process), and “Country acting through the EU” (uploading). Based on saliency theory (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987: 24), I then calculated the percentage of sentences coded into each category in order to assess the importance of each mechanism. The results of the document analysis are shown in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Content analysis of government documents (% of total number of sentences coded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU as main actor</td>
<td>00.00</td>
<td>13.16</td>
<td>31.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country and EU</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>18.42</td>
<td>18.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country through EU</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>68.42</td>
<td>43.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In all three countries, there is ample evidence of trying to act ‘through’ the EU, i.e. of uploading one’s own national policy, as the strongest mechanism of interaction. Interestingly, however, this is actually the strongest in Germany, which has a traditionally Europeanist reputation. Furthermore, uploading is the weakest in Spain. Instead, the Spanish documents are those that provide the clearest evidence of the EU having its own ‘actoriness’, even more so than Spain and the EU acting in parallel or jointly. It therefore appears that at least for Spain, Europeanist rhetoric trumps rhetoric on achieving the national interest, while in Germany and the UK, appearing to push the national interest seems more important. A potential explanation for this phenomenon is signalling. While Spain has to make an effort to appear particularly ‘Europeanist’ because it is often suspected of ‘using’ the EU to further its national interest. Germany and Britain, on the other hand, which could be accused of not seeing their interests through on Latin America and leaving EU-LAC policy to Spain, have an incentive to portray themselves as particularly assertive.

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8 As discussed in Chapter 4, saliency theory argues that the importance of an issue or actor in a policy area can be gathered from analysing the frequency – i.e. the saliency – with which it is mentioned in a policy paper.

9 Assertiveness and high percentage points in the document analysis must not be confused with an overall high level of activity in EU policy towards Latin America. A country which is overall not very active might still be assertive and try hard to upload when it does act.
6.4 Theoretical Framework and Expectations

In order to explain the pattern uncovered above, I adapt the overarching liberal theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2 to the EU-national interaction context by basing this case study’s explanatory framework on Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI; Moravcsik 1993; 1997; 1998). LI’s two-level perspective of a liberal domestic policy-making process and ensuing intergovernmental negotiations is particularly helpful for this analysis (Moravcsik 1993: 480). I therefore depart from a liberal-utilitarian base line in which state representatives act based on cost-benefit calculations when trying to up- or download. However, as laid out in Chapter 2, the framework has to be extended in order to fully capture the complex interaction process. LI-based independent variables have to be tested against alternative explanations based on a liberal-constructivist account in which policy-makers base their decisions to up- or download on considerations of the ‘appropriate thing to do’, predicated upon national norms of behaviour (Wagner 2002; Checkel 2005). Therefore, this chapter includes ideational factors as a possible explanation. Furthermore, factors emanating from the EU level that might influence the interaction between national and European Latin America policies. Firstly, up- and downloading may not only depend on cost-benefit calculations, but also on the institutional framework in which policy-makers operate (Jupille and Caporaso 1999). Secondly, norms may – potentially in addition to the domestic level – also emanate from the EU level, where foreign policy-makers continuously interact. This may lead them to consider up- and downloading in terms of European norms they have been socialised into (Hooghe 2005; Smith 2000). Of course, however, this has to be tested against an alternative explanation, according to which adapting interaction to European rules might be based on cost-benefit calculations – conforming might bear benefits, or not conforming might impose costs that lead policy-makers to rationally adapt the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America (Checkel 2005; Slaughter 2004). This leads to a framework which considers explanatory variables emanating both from the domestic and the European level, as well as interaction resulting both from a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness. It is the task of this chapter to find out whether and when the various factors are at play.

6.4.1 Independent Variables

In the following, I conceptualise the explanatory variables, as well as laying out their empirical implications. The study is based on confidential semi-structured interviews with national officials and a set of triangulation inter-
views with EU officials and Latin American diplomats based in Brussels, as discussed in Chapter 4. I therefore also give some indications of what evidence for these variables might look like in the interviews carried out for this study. The complete coding scheme for both national-level and triangulation interviews can be found in Appendix E.

**Domestic interests** Within a liberal-utilitarian framework, policy towards Latin America is determined at the national level by aggregating the interests of both state and non-state actors (Moravcsik 1997).\(^{10}\) Depending on the policy area, national positions are then taken to the EU level intergovernmentally through the Council, in the case of Latin America policy most frequently the AMLAT Council Working Group and the COLAT coordination meetings. Even in trade policy, where the negotiation of agreements is entrusted to the Commission, the negotiation mandate for such agreements is determined through intergovernmental negotiation. Westphal observes the importance of national interests in the EU’s foreign policy process towards Latin America, confirming the utility of a liberal-intergovernmental framework (Westphal 2005b: 354). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that state representatives may push their national interests vis-à-vis Latin America to be incorporated in the EU’s policy through ‘strong uploading’: the stronger national interest in Latin America, the stronger involvement with the EU should be. One reason for this is that policy-makers can use the EU to ‘punch above their national weight’ in external relations, in this case with Latin America (Manners 2002; Larsen 2005). What they might not be able to achieve on their own could potentially be achieved by using the collective bargaining power of the EU. This component is particularly strong in economic affairs, but might also apply to areas like external democracy promotion in which the EU has a history (Jünemann and Knodt 2007).

Downloading is more difficult to conceptualise in this context. When would policy-makers be willing to have their country’s Latin America policy be ‘dictated’ by the EU level? Only policy-makers in states with weaker interests in some areas might be willing to ‘download’ issues from the European agenda, and only if they either hope to reap benefits from downloading, such as the ability to strike a package deal or link the issue to support from the other country on another issue area (Putnam 1988). Alternatively, downloading might occur if there are no costs attached to it or they are low enough to make it acceptable. As in Chapter 5, I would therefore expect domestic interests to be the most influential in the country with the strongest economic and political

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\(^{10}\) However, this aggregation is beyond the scope of this study, which looks at the two-level interaction between these aggregated national policies and the EU level.
interests in the region, Spain. They should matter less in Germany, and even less so in Britain. I thus expect the following behaviour:

\[ H_1: \text{The stronger a Member State's interest in an issue vis-à-vis Latin America, the harder its representatives try to 'upload' its policy to the European level, and the more likely 'strong uploading' becomes. As a corollary, only where interest in an issue area is weak might they be willing to 'download' issues from the EU agenda, if this brings other benefits or costs are very low. 'Strong uploading' should matter the most in Spain, less in Germany and the least in Britain. Britain and Germany should be more willing to 'download' policy.} \]

In order to observe uploading as a consequence of interest in an issue, in the interviews I thus look for references to issues in which the Member State in question has a particularly strong interest in connection to references at attempts to upload the national stance on this issue due to cost-benefit calculations. But what would the willingness to download an issue in the case of weaker interest look like from a utility maximising perspective? Here, I look for evidence for linking different issues or trying to strike package deals.

In this realm, it is particularly important to triangulate the data, as national-level interviewees have strong incentives to misrepresent their action in various directions: to appear more active than they actually are, or to appear less interest-driven than they actually are. Triangulation interviewees, therefore, were asked whether any country was particularly keen to take its national stance to the EU level and what they thought motivated this activity.

**Institutional framework**  It is important to note that interaction between the national and the EU level in external relations not issue independent. This is due to the distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States, that is, on the institutional context within which the state representatives are moving. The specific institutional properties of the EU that give it supranational competence over certain policy areas set it apart from other international contexts and warrant the introduction of the institutional framework as a separate independent variable. Jupille and Caporaso (1999: 432) point to the ways in which “institutions structure incentives.” In our case, incentives are structured by whether an issue area is EU competence or not. In intergovernmental issue areas, such as foreign policy *per se*, Member States can still pursue their own policy and therefore circumvent the EU if they do not achieve their interest. However, in communitarised issues such as commercial policy, national options are nonexistent or highly limited. States have to accept whatever is decided at the EU level. Therefore, I also expect that uploading is stronger in issue
areas where competences lie with the EU. State representatives have a greater incentive to try and see their national interest realised at the EU level, because it is the only way to achieve it. In relations with Latin America, this is primarily the case in commercial policy. In that sense, the institutional framework – a factor emanating from the EU level – acts as an intervening variable between trying to achieve one’s interest and attempting to ‘upload’ one’s policy to the EU level. Being aware of these institutional constraints is important in order not to overestimate the importance of uploading in areas such as commercial relations between the EU and Latin America, where states might try hard to upload even if interests are relatively weak. Without awareness of the institutional context, policy activity in the commercial realm, for example, might otherwise be mistaken as evidence for \( H_1 \), thus leading to an overestimation of evidence for the liberal-utilitarian hypothesis. In terms of country specific expectations, Britain in particular but also Germany should concentrate their uploading efforts in areas of EU competence – notably trade –, while Spanish uploading efforts should be more balanced across policy areas due to the country’s more pronounced and varied interests in Latin America. In terms of downloading, on the other hand, areas of EU competence should be where one might see instances of Spanish downloading when it is unable to upload its own policy. The second hypothesis is thus as follows:

\[ H_2: \text{State representatives try particularly hard to ‘upload’ their national policy to the EU level in areas that are of EU competence, because they do not have national means at their disposal to reach their national interest. Countries with lower material interests (Britain and Germany) are expected to focus their uploading efforts in these areas, while Spain’s uploading activity should be more balanced across issues. Downloading is more likely in these areas than in others for countries with stronger interests, since they must accept EU decisions.} \]

In the national interviews, I thus look for evidence of uploading that is explicitly connected by the interviewees to the EU holding supranational competences in an area. If there is evidence for \( H_2 \), interviewees might state that they try to influence EU commercial negotiations with Latin American countries or regions through the negotiation mandate, because otherwise they could not achieve their trade interests vis-à-vis the region. The difference to evidence for the first hypothesis is that interviewees are expected to make reference to uploading because there is no other way to achieve their interest. If they are not successful, they must accept whatever the EU does on their behalf – they are ‘forced’ to download.
In the triangulation interviews, I take evidence for \( H_2 \) to be present if interview partners connect a country’s uploading attempts to the EU’s institutional framework, or downloading to there being no other way.

**Rational adaptation** Although the liberal-utilitarian framework provides a compelling potential explanation for the interaction between national and EU-level Latin America policy, it has to be extended in order to provide room for other possible explanations. For instance, interaction may be affected by strategic adaptation to EU rules, that is, by factors emanating from the EU level (Checkel 2005). This is akin to the impact of rational adaptation to international rules about development policy conceptualised in Chapter 5. Anne-Marie Slaughter proposes the notion of governance networks where policymakers from different countries – and potentially their supranational counterparts – work together to respond to common global challenges and problems (Slaughter 2004). Cooperation at the EU-level may therefore lead to the adherence to certain norms and rules that ease cooperation. It is important to note that in this framework, policy-makers still respond to a logic of consequences: rule-adherence involves establishing and maintaining a good reputation as a reliable partner in repeated interactions (ibid.: 54f). Thus, in making Latin America policy, cooperation at the European level may be due to common interests vis-à-vis Latin America, for example in trade policy. Through interaction, the network becomes a “conduit for information” about the members of the network and “their competence, quality, integrity and professionalism” (ibid.: 54), and facilitates the creation of behavioural standards (Majone 2001: 272; see also Slaughter 2004: 54), such as sharing national initiatives at the EU level (weak uploading) and cooperating with fellow Member States on issues they have brought forward (downloading). The danger of losing a good reputation makes it costly for the network members to defect from cooperation. Similarly, Checkel postulates that strategic calculation that can lead Member States and their representatives to adapt their behaviour to “the norms and rules favoured by the international [in this case, European] community” (Checkel 2005: 809).

Based on careful calculation and the strategic maximisation of interests, agents may hence decide that the best option is to adhere to EU-level rules and norms. Otherwise, the result might be a bad reputation or the loss of a good one, including being ‘shamed’ by EU partners (Slaughter 2004; Checkel 2005: 808). Given that in foreign policy cooperation there are few material incentives to reward cooperative partners, social rewards and punishments are those that matter. Therefore, it could be expected that instead of socialisation mechan-

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11 See Chapter 2, p. 64, for the use of ‘rational/behavioural adaptation’ versus ‘socialisation’.

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isms based on a constructivist logic, rational behavioural adaptation may be at work. But how, then, could one explain national variation in support for EU-level policy-making vis-à-vis Latin America? Essentially, for a state not to care enough about its reputation to adhere to the aforementioned behavioural standard of cooperating with fellow Member States, it must have a more attractive alternative bearing benefits that outweigh the costs of not adhering to EU-level rules and norms. This would occur if the country can achieve its interest vis-à-vis Latin America on its own, rather than by cooperating with its European partners, if its interests in Latin America are much stronger than those of the other Member States and therefore they are unwilling to take action at all – these two might hold for Spain –, or if it already has a reputation as a ‘bad European’ and therefore there are no costs attached to losing a good one – this might hold for the UK with its traditional reputation as an “awkward partner”, to use a phrase coined by Stephen George (1994). Germany, on the other hand, has traditionally had a reputation for being keen to keep a reputation as a ‘good European’, although this has recently become subject to debate (e.g. Bulmer and Paterson 2010). For the purposes of this study, I am going to assume as a point of departure that rational adaptation is relatively ‘sticky’ and continues to be a goal of German policy-makers, but this investigation will contribute to elucidating whether this is really the case. Therefore, I hypothesise that:

\[ H_3: \text{The stronger a Member State’s desire to maintain a reputation and status as a ‘good partner’ with fellow representatives in the EU network, the more it adapts rationally to EU rules. This can lead to a willingness to download policy towards Latin America that is important to other Member States. It may also lead to (weak) uploading to be seen as cooperative. Such rational adaptation is expected to be the strongest for Germany, less strong for Spain, and the least strong for the UK.} \]

Observable implications of strategic adaptation are explanations of uploading and downloading advanced by the interviewees motivated with a desire to be seen as ‘good partners’ by their counterparts from the other Member States. Similarly, in the triangulation interviews, evidence for reputation-seeking and status-maintaining behaviour as motivating factors for downloading and (weak) uploading is sought. Especially in the interviews with EU officials, the question of reputation and status should become evident if it is a relevant motivating factor: statements to the effect of ‘if a representative is unwilling to deal with an issue back home, country will get a bad reputation with the others’ are indicative of support for \( H_3 \).
Domestic socialisation  However, the interaction between national foreign policy towards Latin America and the EU level may also be influenced by policy-makers having been been socialised into certain norms at the national level, in line with liberal constructivist thinking. I therefore also test hypotheses emphasising a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989; 2004). It is possible to conceptualise both uploading and downloading as resulting from the socialisation of national policy-makers. Checkel (2005: 804) defines socialisation as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community.” As Beyers (2010: 911) points out, the term ‘socialisation’ suffers from product-process ambiguity in that it refers to a process of socialising actors as well as an outcome of actors having been socialised. In the context of this study, I am concerned with socialisation as an independent variable: the question is whether policy-makers have been socialised and whether this impacts up- and downloading. Based on this framework, state representatives might take their national policy initiatives to the European level or download policies onto the national agenda because it is what they consider ‘appropriate’ behaviour.

Indeed, Koenig-Archibugi (2004) finds that willingness to go the European route is variable across Member States. Domestic socialisation may thus play a role. Therefore, I test the potential impact of domestic socialisation, which emanates from the domestic level just as liberal utilitarian factors do, and has been shown to be important in previous socialisation research (e.g. Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005). In the context of this study, what matters is the foreign policy-making culture into which domestic actors are potentially socialised (Rittberger 2001a: 112f; Katzenstein 1996: 20f), and the “reality constructs” within a state that determine its representatives’ behaviour (Wagner 2002: 178). In a liberal constructivist framework where norms emanate from the domestic level, the ‘given community’ into whose norms policy-makers are socialised is the domestic network of foreign policy-makers, specifically those concerned with Latin America policy-making. Therefore, I term this variable ‘domestic socialisation’, in line with Hooghe (2005).

As with preferences as conceptualised within the utility maximisation framework, there is room for cross-national variation in domestic socialisation. Previous research by Beyers (2005) on policy-making in Council Working Groups (CWGs) is particularly relevant for this study. Firstly, EU policy towards Latin America is also largely made in a CWG setting. Secondly, Beyers shows variation among the Member States regarding what they consider appropriate for EU-level policy-making (Beyers 2005: 931f). It is important to note that he deals with ‘supranationalist’ versus ‘intergovernmentalist’ attitudes in Member States, a dichotomy somewhat less relevant for the case of Latin Amer-
External relations remain intergovernmental to a relatively large degree. However, it is not too far-fetched to assume that more ‘supranationalist’ states are generally more favourable of EU-level approaches, while ‘intergovernmentalist’ states are less so. Based on the 1996 Elite Eurobarometer Survey, Beyers finds that policy-makers in the founding members of the EU – including Germany – are more favourably inclined towards supranational policy-making. Policy-makers from countries belonging to the 1986 enlargement round – including Spain – are still more in favour of supranational than intergovernmental approaches. Finally, the first enlargement batch – including the UK – is more intergovernmentalist than supranationalist in orientation. Of course, the relevant Elite Eurobarometer is now 15 years old and things may have changed, given for example the recent ‘Eurosceptic turn’ in German governmental rhetoric (see e.g. Bulmer and Paterson 2010). What are the implications of these findings for up- and downloading? Policy-makers socialised in a pro-European domestic culture may, firstly, be more willing to download issues from the European level because they assume this to be appropriate action – even if no benefits accrue to their country from downloading. Secondly, they may upload for different reasons than policy-makers deciding based on utility maximisation or socialised into a Eurosceptic way of policy-making: uploading by nationally socialised pro-EU actors would be motivated by a domestic norm of sharing national initiatives with the EU level. A policy-maker socialised in a Eurosceptic national environment, on the other hand, would be more reticent regarding both up- and downloading, as well as seeing policy-making towards Latin America as primarily bilateral. Of course, the outcome of socialisation depends on the kind of norm policy-makers are socialised into. With German and Spanish policy-makers, it is likely that the norm in question is a pro-European one, as both countries have been shown to have a rather pro-EU outlook (e.g. Wagner 2002; Barbé 2011). However, in Spain it is possible that pro-EU norms coincide with the strong interests the country has in Latin America, making their pertinence somewhat less likely. Moreover, there has been shown to be a tension between pro-European norms and belonging to the Iberoamerican Community (del Arenal 2009: 32). In the UK, on the other hand, such socialisation is much less likely due to the country’s scepticism over Europe (Whitehead forthcoming 2012; Wagner 2002). In fact, there might even be potential for ‘negative socialisation’ here, although research has shown that UK foreign policy is more ‘Europeanised’ than policy-makers are willing to admit (Bulmer and Burch 2009; Forster 2000), so that assuming such ‘negative

12 For further discussions of national attitudes towards the EU supporting these findings, see e.g. Baklanoff (1996); Katzenstein (1996); Manners and Whitman (2000); Wagner (2002); Wallace (2005).
socialisation’ may be a step too far.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, I hypothesise:

\begin{quote}
$H_4$: The more ‘Europeanist’ the norms into which state representatives have been socialised at the domestic level, the more they are willing to download issues onto the national agenda although they might not accrue benefits from this action or even incur costs. Similarly, the more likely uploading is to be motivated with a domestic norm of sharing national initiatives, even if it brings no additional benefits. Such behaviour is expected to be stronger in Germany and Spain than in the UK.
\end{quote}

Note that the previous considerations on the operationalisation of socialisation (see p. 58) apply also to domestic socialisation in the European context, which is difficult to observe (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1062). As in Chapter 5, by providing a clear conceptualisation of socialisation’s status as an exogenous independent variable for the purposes of this study, as well as by triangulating interviews from different sources, I provide a plausible account of the factors at work. One of socialisation’s main issues is that it is not easy to discern from empirical evidence whether an actor is socialised or strategic (Flockhart 2004: 377), because the resulting behaviour might be the same. Especially across countries, it is hard to compare data because policy-makers’ training and careers differ, so their socialisation processes may be different (Beyers 2010: 918). By considering the process per se exogenous to my study, this problem is slightly mitigated: what matters is not how, but whether policy-makers are nationally socialised and whether this has an impact on how they interact with the EU-level when making policy towards Latin America. However, recognising a ‘nationally socialised’ policy-maker is also not trivial. In the interviews, I look for evidence indicating that uploading or downloading was indeed motivated by a nationally-based norm and a logic of appropriateness. It therefore is important that there be no reference to rational calculation of costs and benefits. The key difference between uploading motivated by liberal utilitarian factors and uploading motivated by liberal constructivist factors is that ‘constructivist uploading’ does not happen with the goal of achieving something, but simply because it is considered the ‘right thing to do’ in one’s country.

Even so, it is still difficult to ascertain whether such interaction is really due to a nationally accepted norm or because actors are being strategic. Therefore, EU-level interviewees were asked whether there were countries they perceived as \textit{bona fide} Europeanists or Eurosceptics – because they were \textit{generally} particularly willing to share national initiatives or accept EU-level initiatives or because they were \textit{generally} reticent about EU-level action \textit{vis-à-vis} Latin

\textsuperscript{13}What is more, the UK has traditionally been in favour of EU foreign policy cooperation, as long as it remained intergovernmental (e.g. Whitehead forthcoming 2012; Forster 2000)
6.4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EXPECTATIONS

Scholars have, however, also argued that state representatives can be socialised through processes at the EU level through a change in beliefs about how foreign policy should be conducted, and as a result change their practices of foreign policy-making. They thus consider socialisation through repeated interaction (Checkel 2005: 806), meaning that constant cooperation at the EU level changes the way national policy-makers work together and conceptualise foreign policy-making (e.g. Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005; Smith 2000). In this case, the ‘given community’ into which actors are socialised is the EU-level network of policy-makers involved in external relations with Latin America. Sociological institutionalism thus endows institutions and their norms, rules and practices with the ability to socialise national actors into a certain type of behaviour (Lewis 2003: 99). In line with Beyers (2010), I term this variable ‘European socialisation’. Since all three countries under study are by now long-standing members of the EU, their representatives are more or less equally exposed to such stimuli, for example through constant interaction in the AMLAT and COLAT groups,\(^{14}\) as well as communication, such as through the COREU communication system.\(^{15}\) A ‘European reflex’ might thus have become established.

The implications of such socialisation for the interaction between national and EU policies towards Latin America, conceptualised in terms of up- and downloading, are as follows. Actors who have been socialised at the EU level may download issues onto their national agenda motivated by a European norm that stipulates the appropriateness of dealing with issues at the EU level, although they might not derive benefits from this, or incur costs from handling an issue they might not otherwise deal with. Similarly, they may upload policy initiatives by communicating their national initiatives,\(^{16}\) thus opening them up to comments (positive and negative) or participation from their EU partners – even if this is not advantageous from a utilitarian perspective. There is no ulterior interest behind such action, it is simply thought ‘the right thing to do’. National foreign policy-makers are socialised at the European level if they have a sense of belonging to a European-level community, (Checkel 2005:

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\(^{14}\)See Chapter 127, p. 146 for considerations on the impact of the length of time policy-makers have spent in such fora. I assume that as long as policy-makers are exposed to EU-level policy-making towards Latin America – which the interviewees were – there is good reason to believe that European socialisation may have an impact, since according to Beyers (2010: 915f), it occurs relatively fast.

\(^{15}\)COREU (Correspondence Européenne) is a network for EU Member States and the Commission to communicate on foreign policy matters. “COREUs” are similar to faxes, but are confidential and encrypted.

\(^{16}\)See Smith (2004: 745) on the ‘communication reflex’. 
in which there is an atmosphere of cooperation and trust. As discussed in Chapter 5, state representatives may reach this logic of action via “Type II” or ‘thick’, as well as “Type I” or ‘thin’ socialisation (Checkel 2005: 804). As previously discussed in Chapter 5 regarding the effects of international socialisation, for the purposes of this investigation it does not matter through which route actors have arrived at socialisation. What matters is that they arrive there and can be considered ‘socialised’.

As in the previous chapter, I assume that international – here, EU – level norms interact with potentially pre-existing national norms. It is not unreasonable to conceptualise the relationship as mutually reinforcing or sequential, with one influencing the other. Previous work on socialisation (e.g. Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005) has indeed shown national factors to have a strong impact, with European socialisation exerting only limited effects. As was the case for domestic socialisation regarding domestic norms of development policy in the previous chapter, I therefore hypothesise that domestic socialisation may in fact mediate the effect of European socialisation: the stronger national norms about the positive aspects of EU foreign policy, the more receptive to European socialisation national policy-makers are likely to be. In line with the expectations of H4, I thus expect EU-level socialisation to fall on more fruitful ground in Germany and Spain than in the UK. Again, however, in Spain there is a potential clash between socialisation dynamics and material interests in Latin America that might reduce the impact of European socialisation.

H5: State representatives who have been socialised at the European level are more willing to download issues onto the national agenda although they might not accrue benefits from this action or even incur costs, motivated by European norms. State representatives who have been socialised into a pro-European domestic policy-making culture at the national level are more likely to also be subject to European socialisation. I expect European socialisation to exert a stronger influence in Germany and Spain than in the UK.

In the interviews with national foreign policy-makers, I take support for H5 as given if interviewees refer to European norms or belonging to an EU-level community as the motivation for interaction between the national and the EU level, only if it comes without any reference to cost-benefit calculations. Any such reference would immediately lead to the rejection of the socialisation hypothesis (Moumoutzis 2011: 622). Again, however, evidence from national-level interviews has to be cross-validated, which is why in the triangulation

17Note that Type I socialisation is different from rational adaptation (see above; Checkel 2005: 804). With rational adaptation, there is an incentive to adhere to EU-level rules, although they might be social rather than material. Type I socialisation occurs absent such an incentive.
interviews, especially with EU officials, I asked how cooperation among the Member States worked and what it was based on. Answers referring to a sense of community and mutual trust, as well as working together on the basis of common norms can be taken as evidence for European socialisation, while a connection with ‘achieving a common interest’ or other types of cost-benefit calculations invalidates the European socialisation hypothesis.

6.4.2 Further considerations and overview

In Figure 6.1 I give a visual overview of the framework conceptualised above. It is situated within the overall FPA framework and the theoretical conceptualisation discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1, p. 64). It is important to note that the independent variables conceptualised here point at the policy-makers rather than the up- and downloading mechanisms directly, because the policy-maker level is where decisions are taken.

For the sake of completeness, note that other channels of action than policymaking in the EU context and bilateral action must be borne in mind, since Member States may also take their policy to fora outside the EU. For example, they may chose to work with the Organisation of American States (OAS), the United Nations, or with other, non-EU states such as the US. Spain even has its own multilateral forum for interaction with Latin America, the Iberoamerican Process. The researcher must be aware of this in order not to fall into the trap of overestimating Europe’s importance. However, for the purposes of this study, only the mechanisms of interaction with the European level are of interest. They are shown in Figure 6.1.

In Table 6.3, I summarise the independent variables and their hypothesised effects on up- and downloading.

In addition to the independent variables, an interaction between $H_4$ and $H_5$ is expected, in that the representatives of a country that have been nationally socialised into a pro-EU culture are also more likely to adhere to EU-level norms as a result of European socialisation.

6.5 Policy towards Latin America in the European Context – Historical Developments

In this section, I assess the historical evolution of policy towards Latin America in a European context. To this end, developments since the beginning of membership in the European integration process for each country are briefly analysed. I discuss how membership in the European project influenced policy
towards Latin America increasingly as integration progressed. Additionally, the entry of Spain (and Portugal) into the European Community in 1986 gave the relationship a new quality. Finally, it reached its current form with the creation of a “Strategic Partnership” between the two regions in 1999.

6.5.1 Germany: From advocate to bystander?¹⁸

Immediately after World War II, the task was to re-build relations with Latin America. Economic ties were quickly re-established, and when the young Federal Republic gained full sovereignty in foreign affairs, political and diplomatic relations were equally quick to return (von Gleich 1968: 27, 30). However, Germany’s policy towards the region remained cautious as Latin America was seen as a domain of the United States (Mols and Wagner 1994: 58), and foreign policy focused on relations with its Western neighbours and the security relationship with the US (Grabendorff 1993: 43). In this sense, Germany’s West European focus can be seen as an early, indirect impact of the European context upon its policy towards Latin America: it kept the Federal Republic busy with other issues, such as the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Com-

¹⁸A more detailed analysis of the historical development Germany’s role within EU-Latin American relations can be found in Trueb (forthcoming 2012b).
### Table 6.3: Independent variables and their effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Uploading</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Downloading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;: Domestic interests</strong></td>
<td>State representatives try to upload national policy to the EU level (strong uploading).</td>
<td>Only occurs if it entails benefits (package deals, issue linkage) or costs are nonexistent or negligibly low.</td>
<td>Occurs when states fail to upload their interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;: Institutional Constraints</strong></td>
<td>State representatives try particularly hard to upload their national interest when competences lie with the EU level.</td>
<td>(Weak) Uploading in the sense of initiative sharing occurs as a result of EU-level incentives to accept European initiatives on the national agenda.</td>
<td>Downloading occurs as a result of EU-level incentives to maintain a good reputation and status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H&lt;sub&gt;3&lt;/sub&gt;: Rational adaptation</strong></td>
<td>(Weak) Uploading in the sense of initiative sharing occurs based on a national norm of cooperating with EU partners and incorporating EU-level initiatives into the national agenda.</td>
<td>(Weak) Uploading in the sense of initiative sharing based on a European norm of cooperating with EU partners and accepting European initiatives on the national agenda.</td>
<td>Downloading occurs based on a European norm of cooperating with EU partners and accepting European initiatives on the national agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H&lt;sub&gt;4&lt;/sub&gt;: Domestic socialisation</strong></td>
<td>(Weak) Uploading in the sense of initiative sharing occurs based on a national norm of cooperating with EU partners and incorporating EU-level initiatives into the national agenda.</td>
<td>Downloading occurs as a result of EU-level incentives to accept European initiatives on the national agenda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H&lt;sub&gt;5&lt;/sub&gt;: European socialisation</strong></td>
<td>Downloading occurs based on a European norm of cooperating with EU partners and accepting European initiatives on the national agenda.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first direct impact came through the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and the ensuing efforts to create a common market, including a common external tariff and a common commercial policy. Additionally, Latin American products became subject to competition from the former colonies of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands for which a special preference system was established under the Treaty of Rome. The estab-

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19To date, Central and South America remain excluded from the European Partnership Agree-
lishment of the ACP system was particularly important for German relations with Latin America since Germany was the region’s biggest commercial partner within the EEC (von Gleich 1968: 50). Germany tried to establish conditions more favourable to Latin America, but did not succeed (von Gleich 1968: 51). Similarly, the introduction of the CAP and its protectionist effects have strained European-Latin American relations ever since the 1960s (Krumwiede and Nolte 1994: 7). Germany has sought to reduce this strain but has not entirely managed. The banana regime is a particularly clear example of Germany’s difficulties in ‘uploading’ its preferences in this regard. The Treaty of Rome included the so-called ‘banana protocol’, which granted Germany a special right to import bananas duty-free (for an overview of the initial situation, see Sutton 1997: 9). But this was an exception to the preference system rather than making German practice the rule for the entire EEC. Therefore, the establishment of the common market has limited Germany’s policy towards Latin America by reducing its autonomy in trade affairs (Grabendorff 1993: 75; Bürvenich 1995: 7; Hofmeister 1999: 11). Germany’s inability to break up the preference system in favour of its own interests – which even coincided in this case with those of Latin America – shows that even a large Member State such as Germany may be unable to ‘upload’ its preferences when they clash with others’ strong interests. The fact that Germany tries, however, is indicative of evidence for Hypothesis 1.

Germany’s political relations with Latin America came to be affected by the European context with the establishment of EPC in 1970. However, already in 1963 (and again in 1967), the Federal Government called for the intensification of political dialogue, the recognition of Latin America and Europe as a ‘community of fate’ with a common Western heritage, as well as the desire to create greater European solidarity with Latin America and increased coordination and intensification of Latin America policy within the Western European Union (WEU), the EC, the OECD, and NATO (Kullack-Ublick 1987: 48). It is important to note that this happened even before EPC came into being. European thinking was therefore a feature of German policy-making towards Latin America very early on. This supports Hypothesis 4, that is, a willingness to Europeanise policy based on a domestic political culture or norm facilitating such Europeanisation. Yet the EC and the WEU were not the only organisations deemed important in this context. NATO and the OECD also played a role. Germany had European priorities, but its pursuit of Latin American policy beyond bilateral relations was not limited to Europe.

Although Latin America was not a policy priority for Germany, it played agreements (EPAs) that have been concluded with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states under the Cotonou Agreement.

250 CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY: INTERACTING WITH THE EU LEVEL
the role of advocate for Latin America at the European level, particularly re-
garding economic issues (von Gleich 1968: v; 51). If even for its advocate,
Latin America was not a priority, then how could it be a priority at the EEC
itself? What is more, since EPC was not designed specifically as an instru-
ment geared towards Latin America, this early Europeanisation of policy is
again best seen as a side effect. Within the EPC framework, there was little
concern with Latin America during the 1970s. Only in the case of Nicaragua
could positions be galvanised into a common position in 1979 (Bodemer 1987:
75). Indeed, the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were prob-
ably the finest hour of Germany’s advocacy for Latin America within Europe.
During the Central American crisis, Germany was instrumental in shaping the
EC’s approach. In particular, the conference of foreign ministers at San José in
1984, involving the EC and Commission representatives, Spain and Portugal,
the Central American states and the Contadora countries, was pushed within
Europe by Germany’s Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Henze 1991:
20). There were several reasons for this commitment. On the one hand, ac-
cording to Krumwiede and Nolte (1994: 3), it was motivated by the desire to
maintain US strategic attention and resources in Europe and to prevent Ger-
many’s most important ally from making a costly mistake. In this case, the EC
offered Germany a possibility to be present in Central America without risking
a head-to-head disagreement with the US (Karthaus 1994: 86). Member States
can thus use the European level to ‘hide behind’ when this is convenient, in-
dicative of the strategic use of the European level where it furthers a country’s
interest.

German policy-makers, on the other hand, were keen to point out their
normative motivations: offering assistance to Central America in overcoming
its problems through democracy and regional cooperation (Genscher 1987a:
61f). Genscher (ibid.: 62) saw developments as follows: “I am convinced that
with this initiative a new page has been opened in the history of Europe and
Latin America. […] Germany has taken on a special role in this.” While this
might be an overstatement, the San José Conference did initiate biregional co-
operation, which still marks EU-Latin American relations today – a success-
ful example of ‘uploading’ a German initiative to the EC. Biregional cooper-
ation, in turn, was supported by German policy-makers who believed that
Europe could serve as an example of the positive effects of regional integra-
tion (Kullack-Ublick 1987; Genscher 1987a).

Increased attention was drawn to Latin America not only by the Central
American crisis, however, but also by the Falklands/Malvinas conflict between
the UK and Argentina, and by the debt crisis that shook the region during
the 1980s. The case of the Falklands is a demonstration of the extent to which
Germany was convinced by the early 1980s that “any demonstration of interest in Latin America should be European, rather than purely German, in nature” (Grabendorff 1993: 75). Although supporting the British position bore costs for Germany, given its ties with Argentina and its conviction that all diplomatic means should be exhausted before taking recourse to military power, it did support trying to find a common European position on the issue (Benecke et al. 1993; Grabendorff 1993).

The accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 introduced a new element into the equation. Since the beginning of integration, Germany had seen its role within Europe as that of an advocate – low-key, but advocate nonetheless – of Latin America within the EC (von Gleich 1968; Meyer-Landrut 1987; AA 1987). However, this began to change in the 1980s, when German policymakers placed great expectations for EC-Latin American relations in the accession of Spain and Portugal to the Community. Their presence, it was hoped, would give Latin American issues a greater weight in the foreign policy process of the Community (Genscher 1987a; 1987b; Möllemann 1987). A further element in this equation was the end of the Cold War and the ensuing reunification of Germany. Its costs and consequences, it was feared, would cause Germany to ‘turn East’, leaving it with fewer resources to expend in Latin America (Grabendorff 1993). Similarly, Mols and Wagner (1994: 72) note that in the 1990s, overall European presence in Latin America stagnated as the EU became increasingly inward-focused. Internal change, manifested in the Maastricht Treaty, seemed to absorb its energy. However, as the restructuring of the EU deepened integration, the potential for joint external action also increased through the creation of the CFSP and its instruments. To some extent, the accession of Spain and Portugal, reunification, and further European integration created a new understanding of the European dimension in German policy towards Latin America. Turning away from Germany as a ‘creator’ of EC policy towards the region, the new understanding was that perhaps some aspects were better dealt with at the European level where Spain and Portugal were the chief protagonists.

This overview shows the growing importance of the European level in German policy towards Latin America as integration proceeded. As new policy areas were affected, the European level also became more relevant to German Latin America policy in those areas. Overall, this brief historical analysis shows some support for both the rationalism-based and the constructivism-based hypotheses. Generally, Germany has been both willing and able to upload its preferences to the EU level regarding Latin America. Nevertheless, where these preferences have clashed with the strong interests of other Mem-

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20 The Falklands conflict will be further discussed in the section dealing with the UK.
6.5. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

6.5.2 The United Kingdom – The “Indirect Uploader”\textsuperscript{21}

The UK joined the EC in 1973, coinciding with the establishment of EPC (Aktipis and Oliver 2011). Although it had previously had a very active policy towards Latin America, even becoming a sort of ‘informal imperial power’ after the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the 19th century (Miller 2005: 33), the importance of Latin America in British foreign policy had been steadily declining for decades. Thus, by the time the UK joined the EC, Latin America held very little importance for it, except for its former colonies and remaining overseas territories in the Caribbean. Rather than actively influencing Europe’s emerging policy towards Latin America, Britain thus became an “indirect uploader” (Whitehead forthcoming 2012). It successfully managed to include its former imperial possessions in the ACP countries under the preference system previously created at the insistence of the Netherlands, France, and Belgium. This affected the Community’s relations with Latin America negatively – the region remained outside the system, while the addition of further countries after British accession increased the number of developing countries that had better access to the EC market than Latin America.

Additionally, closer ties with Europe further reduced the UK’s available resources for relations with the non-European and non-Commonwealth world. British foreign policy was largely focused on relations with the Commonwealth, the US, and increasingly Europe (Bulmer-Thomas 1989b; Fawcett and Posada-Carbó 1996, 198). In particular, the ‘special relationship’ with the US conditioned the UK’s approach to Latin America in the Cold War period. As Hart puts the UK’s position on Latin America during the 1970s: “where Washington led, London followed” (Hart 1988: 11). Bodemer (1987: 86) goes as far as calling the UK a ‘brakeman’ for establishing a distinct Western European role in the Central American conflict due to its regard for the US, stating that within the EC, the British government was perhaps most firmly opposed to a clearly defined EC opinion on Central America. Nevertheless, however, the Thatcher government eventually participated – albeit grudgingly – in the San José process, and opposed the US naval blockade of Nicaragua’s harbours (O’Shaughnessy 1988: 8; Whitehead forthcoming 2012). The case of the UK’s participation in the San José process as a reluctant follower rather than an initiator places it in the position of a ‘downloader’ on this issue and has several implications for our hypotheses. On the one hand, it is supportive of Hypothesis\textsuperscript{21}.

\textsuperscript{21}This term is introduced by Whitehead (forthcoming 2012).
1: on issues where Britain does not have a strong interest, it may ‘download’ policy from the European level. At the same time, if it considers a different forum or state – in this case, the US – more adequate as a partner for dealing with an issue, it will try to forego the European level. In this particular case, the UK even tried to hamper a distinct EC role in the Central American conflict because of its consideration that this should be better dealt with by the US.

However, the most remarkable episode about the UK’s Latin America policy acquiring a European dimension is most certainly the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict. After the Argentinean military had invaded the islands, which are a UK overseas territory, the EC quickly condemned the invasion. The UK then asked its fellow EC members to ban Argentinean imports. Within two weeks of the invasion, the import ban was put into place, an unusually speedy move on the part of the Community (Edwards 1984: 295). In this sense, the episode supports Hypothesis 1 in that the UK tried – and managed – to ‘upload’ a position to the European level on an issue in which it had a very strong interest. Nevertheless, Geoffrey Edwards also points out that the UK used its connections to the US, which had good relations with the Argentine military government, and the UN, in order to see its position through. In fact, he points to the importance of the UN in first rallying the other EC Member States around the UK’s position. Later, however, the EC was relegated to an almost secondary position, which may have contributed to the embargo falling apart as Italy and Ireland withdrew their support. Nevertheless, eight of the ten Member States remained faithful to the embargo, causing Edwards to state that “the continued imposition of sanctions in the middle of an armed conflict by even eight member states cannot, in Community terms, be considered unsuccessful” (ibid.: 296). Thus, in the event, the UK’s action is indicative of its strong interest in the issue. At the same time, it used the EU to ‘punch above its own weight’: while a unilateral embargo on Argentina would not have hurt much given the UK’s low trade volume with the country, an embargo imposed by the EC Ten had a much stronger impact (ibid.: 300). Lisa Martin argues that the UK managed to ‘upload’ its position through skilfully linking Community support for the UK position in the Falklands Conflict to other issues such as an ongoing dispute over the EEC budget and the CAP. Through this move, the UK could garner the support of Member States who were reluctant to impose sanctions on Argentina (Martin 1992: 153). The Falklands issue can still unexpectedly erupt onto the European agenda today, as evidenced at the 2010 EU-LAC Summit in Madrid (Reuters 2010), where Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner called for opening negotiations on the Falklands. What is important to note here is that the Falklands are listed as a UK overseas territory in the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, so that the entire EU recognises them as a UK possession (Council of the European Union 2010: 334). However, as the Falklands Conflict subsided, so did the UK’s peak in involvement with the European-Latin American relationship. As such, this episode illustrates that Britain can take a strong and active role in shaping the relationship when it wants to do so. Yet, most of the time, the UK chose to remain aloof, using the EU to advance its interests when these were strong and it was convenient.

In general, however, its Euroscepticism and its low interest in the Latin American region has prevented the UK from playing a very strong role in the European-Latin American relationship. It has managed to influence European Latin America policy mainly as an ‘indirectuploader’ of its foreign policy priorities which lie clearly outside Latin America – with the notable exception of the Falklands Conflict. Since the UK’s direct involvement in European Latin America policy-making is quite low, it therefore makes sense to take into account more strongly the indirect impact on European-Latin American relations of UK action within the Union. The most important example is that of incorporating its own former colonies into the ACP preference system, which deteriorated the terms of trade between the Community and Latin America by increasing the number of countries with advantageous access to the Common Market that Latin America did not enjoy. This pattern is a familiar one: as I showed in the previous chapter, the UK’s lack of a bilateral development policy towards Latin America means that what influences its relationship with the region is mostly the indirect impact of more general attitudes.

6.5.3 Spain – Driver or Brakeman?

Spain was the last of the three countries under study to access the European Communities in 1986. Along with Portugal, the accession of Latin America’s former colonial powers to the EC, it was expected by many – not least other EC member states, as we have seen above –, would mark a new era for European-Latin American relations. In fact, Spain’s accession treaty contained a declaration by Spain articulating its particular interest in Latin America and a declaration by the Member States on the need to intensify European-Latin American relations (European Communities 1985; Member States of the European Communities 1985). The declaration stated the need to avoid disturbances to Spain’s imports from Latin America and the intent to find “permanent solutions in the context of the generalized system preferences, when next revised, or of other mechanisms existing within the Community” (European Communities 1985). From the beginning, Spain thus tried to ‘upload’ its preferences to the European level and use the Communities as a means to achieve its Latin
American interests. Ideally, of course, Spain would have liked to extend the preferences given to the other countries’ former colonies under the ACP system to Latin America. However, to date, Spain has failed in this intent (Kennedy 2000: 119), similar to Germany, who had tried the same prior to Spanish accession (see above). Only in the case of Haiti (a former French colony) and the Dominican Republic (which had changed hands between Spain and France in terms of colonial rule) did it succeed in achieving their inclusion into the Lomé Convention in 1987 (Baklanoff 1996: 115). Why?

According to Hypothesis 1, Spain with its strong, especially economic, interests in facilitating trade with Latin America, should have tried hard to ‘upload’ its preferences in this respect. Like Germany, however, Spain came across very strong interests of the other EC Member States whose former colonies were under the ACP system, and who had an interest in maintaining the status quo. The Spanish case thus supports the finding of the German case that when countering the strong interests of other Member States, it is difficult for a country to ‘upload’ its own interests, even if it is a large Member State or has particular interests in one area. Additionally, Spain, as a late accessor to the Communities and recently democratised state, was placed in the position of rule-taker rather than rule-maker (Baklanoff 1996: 112). The then Socialist government saw Europeanisation and modernisation in tandem (Kennedy 2000: 106), so that Spain, at least initially, was concerned to bring Spanish policy in line with European norms, similar to the ‘rule taker role’ it takes in international development policy (cf. Chapter 5). One sectoral area of foreign policy that reflects this is development policy, which, since Spain’s accession, began orienting itself along the European model (Varela Parache and Varela Parache 2003). This may be indicative of support for Hypotheses 3, 4, or 5, which predict adaptation through socialisation or rational adaptation mechanisms. There are most likely elements of all three, and it will be interesting to see how this plays out in today’s policy-making. On the one hand, Spanish Socialist policy-makers operated in a national policy culture of seeing Europeanisation as a good thing. On the other hand, their socialisation through interaction at the European level may indeed have been enhanced by this belief, thus supporting the idea that national norms can provide fruitful ground for European-level norms to fall on. However, it may also have been spurred on by the desire to establish a good reputation and ‘serious member’ status with fellow EU partners. This contrasts sharply with the case of the UK, which joined the EC with a much less receptive attitude. In the case of trade preferences for Latin America, however, the positive Spanish attitude did not help it establish its preferences against the strong interests of others.

However, the first time Spain actively came in touch with the European
policy towards Latin America actually preceded its accession. Spain and Portugal as accession candidates with strong Latin American ties, it was decided, should participate in the first ministerial summit at San José to help solve the Central American crisis (Torreblanca 2001). In the words of Bodemer (1987: 81), the Socialist government of Spain was the one displaying the greatest commitment to solving the crisis. Along with Willy Brandt from Germany and Bruno Kreisky from Austria, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González was one of the most active members of the Socialist International promoting a stronger role of Europe in foreign policy in general and in Central America in particular (ibid.: 94).

Spain took the Council Presidency twice during the period between accession and the mid-1990s: in 1989 and in 1995. Both Presidency terms were characterised by attempts at intensifying European relations with Spain’s primary zones of extra-European foreign policy interest: the Mediterranean and Latin America (Torreblanca 2001; Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla and Figueroa 2008). According to Kennedy, however, Spain was more successful at ‘uploading’ its policy interest vis-à-vis the Mediterranean than Latin America (Kennedy 2000: 120ff). The region was closer to the interests of other EU members with Southern borders, such as France. Meanwhile, Spain remained relatively lonely in its search for important Member States with an interest in Latin America that went beyond declaratory statements. Nevertheless, Spanish accession to the EC and in particular the Spanish Council Presidencies did give European-Latin American relations greater impetus: at least now there was an EC Member State who kept on insisting in the importance of relations with the region, even if this was not always successful. The literature is divided between a more pessimistic assessment along the lines of Kennedy (2000) and more positive assessments along the lines of Torreblanca (2001), who writes that “Spanish membership of the EU has added to or substantially strengthened the Latin American and Mediterranean profile of European foreign policy”. Given the relatively low level from which European-Latin American relations departed when Spain joined the Communities, Torreblanca is probably right on a relative basis, while Kennedy’s assessment more closely matches absolute achievements.

However, already in 1981, Spain began diversifying its relations with Latin America within the framework of the Iberoamerican Community of Nations (Baklanoff 1996: 105). The idea was born in the context of the preparations for the 500-year celebrations of the discovery of Latin America, and the first Iberoamerican Conference took place in 1983. At that time, it was mainly Spanish diplomacy that propelled the emerging community in the style of the Commonwealth or the Francophonie forward (del Arenal 2004: 5f). The Iberoamer-
ican Community was substantially fortified in 1991 with the beginning of annual Iberoamerican Summits. Through the Iberoamerican Community, Spain began to establish an additional and unique mechanism through which it could channel its policy towards Latin America. As the Iberoamerican Summit process became institutionalised, the Iberoamerican component of Spain’s foreign policy began exhibiting signs of tension with the country’s European commitments (ibid.: 9). The creation of the Iberoamerican Community and the Summit process established a possibility for Spain to circumvent the EU. As discussed above, the European option has not always been able to fulfil Spain’s needs as a mechanism for channeling Latin America policy. Thus, the development of the Iberoamerican Community as a parallel mechanism has to be seen as an alternative option, where the EU’s distribution of competences allows. The establishment of the Iberoamerican Community and its tension with the EU framework are manifestations of a more general identity conflict between Spain’s European and Iberoamerican identities, as Esther Barbé (2009: 144f) points out. We will see below how these tensions play out in today’s Spanish policy vis-à-vis Latin America.

Overall, since its accession to the EC in 1986, Spain has very actively tried to ‘upload’ its special relationship with Latin America to the European level. However, success has been limited due to other Member States’ strong interest in preserving the status quo, particularly in trade preferences, and their lack of genuine interest in closer relations with the region. At the same time, membership created an additional way to channel policy towards Latin America. Simultaneously, though, increased involvement in the EC and deepened integration created a new, ‘European’ dimension to Spanish foreign policy that took away some of the attention Spain might otherwise have dedicated to Latin America. The establishment of the Iberoamerican Community of Nations and the corresponding summit process, however, created a parallel policy channel for Spanish relations with the region, which Spain could use as an alternative to both purely bilateral and European-Latin American relations.

6.6 Testing the Framework

The mechanisms under study in this context, uploading and downloading, are difficult to observe directly due to the confidentiality of the policy-making process. The actual motivations for decision-making remain in the dark, unless policy-makers are asked, which is what this study will do through interviews. In the following section, I provide and discuss the results of the analysis of interviews with policy-makers at the national level. These were triangulated
with interviews carried out with EU officials involved with Latin America at the Council and the EEAS (which includes staff previously based in both the Commission and the Council who have been moved as a result of the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional innovations), as well as with Latin American diplomats based in Brussels, who are also involved in EU-Latin American affairs. In order to disentangle the different mechanisms at work, the interviews were hand-coded according to the codebook provided in Appendix E. In Table 6.4, I list the observable implications searched for in both the national-level and the triangulation interviews, before proceeding to a discussion of the results in the following section. The implications listed refer to the ways in which national policy-makers justify their actions and decisions during the interviews, and to how the triangulation interviewees related their national counterparts’ decisions.

6.6.1 National-Level Interviews

Table 6.5 shows the results of the interview analysis. Regarding the levels of evidence for each hypothesis, the evidence for the impact of domestic interests is somewhat surprising, as I expected it to be the strongest in Spain, which has the most important economic and political interests in Latin America. Yet it is actually the strongest in the UK, whose interests are the weakest out of the three countries under study. Indeed, the order of importance is exactly reversed: the less important domestic interests are, the stronger their influence on the interaction between national policy towards Latin America and the EU level.

In the case of institutional constraints, I did expect a fairly strong influence on the UK’s up- and downloading activity, which is confirmed by evidence. However, I expected the distribution of consequences between the national and the EU level to have less of an impact in Spain than in Germany. The factors underlying these results will be outlined below based on the interview data. In the case of rational adaptation to EU-level rules I did indeed expect a stronger impact in Germany and Spain than in the UK, so that the distribution of evidence conforms to the hypothesis. For the impact of domestic socialisation into pro-EU norms, I hypothesised a stronger impact on policy in Germany and Spain than in the UK, which is confirmed, although I hypothesised the impact to be stronger in Germany than in Spain due to Spain’s stronger interests in the region that might to some extent ‘trump’ such norms. Finally, the distribution of evidence for EU-level socialisation turns out to be as expected: the strongest in Germany, followed by Spain, and little – indeed, no – evidence in the UK. What cannot clearly be confirmed is the hypothesised connection
Table 6.4: Summary of Independent Variables and Implications for Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Implications for Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_1$: Domestic interests</td>
<td>National-level interviewees refer to national interests to motivate uploading. Triangulation interviewees refer to domestic interests of Member State in question motivating its action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_2$: Institutional Constraints</td>
<td>National-level interviewees refer to making particular efforts at uploading in connection with issue areas of EU competence. Triangulation interviewees refer to Member State in question making particular efforts at uploading in areas of EU consequence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_3$: Rational adaptation</td>
<td>National-level interviewees refer to EU-level incentives (keeping or achieving a good reputation) to justify uploading and downloading. Triangulation interviewees refer to Member State in question being keen on maintaining status and reputation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_4$: Domestic socialisation</td>
<td>National-level interviewees refer to national norms in justifying uploading and downloading. Triangulation interviewees refer to national norms in Member State in question that lead it to share national initiatives and incorporate EU-level initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_5$: European socialisation</td>
<td>National-level interviewees refer to European norms in justifying uploading and downloading. Triangulation interviewees refer to European norms in Member State in question that lead it to share national initiatives and incorporate EU-level initiatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

between pro-EU domestic norms and the impact of European socialisation: domestic socialisation appears to be stronger in Spain than in Germany, but European socialisation is lower, but in the UK there is no evidence for either.
6.6. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK

Table 6.5: Results of national-level interview analysis (% of total evidence for variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Interests</td>
<td>73.24</td>
<td>81.82</td>
<td>71.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Constraints</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>11.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Adaptation</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Socialisation</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>11.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Socialisation</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to disentangle the evidence further and assess the interaction between the different independent variables, these results require an in-depth discussion to which I now turn.

Germany

**Domestic Interests** In Germany, evidence for $H_1$ is the second strongest out of the three countries under study. This is in line with the recent literature’s findings that Germany is becoming more assertive in the EU as a whole, including foreign policy (e.g. Daehnhardt 2011; Bulmer and Paterson 2010). Policy towards Latin America is not an exception to the general tendency that Germany tends to upload rather than download (Daehnhardt 2011: 53). Disentangling $H_1$ further shows that there is also some evidence that countries are willing to accept others’ strong interest on their national agenda in areas of lesser interest, or if downloading in an area of lesser interest brings some other benefit, such as the possibility to strike a package deal.

Both national level and triangulation interviews indicate that Germany’s actions are mostly commercially driven, although Germany has an opinion on most policy issues vis-à-vis Latin America. This is reflective of its own relatively low-key but broad national approach towards the region.

**Institutional Constraints** Interestingly, and in contrast to what Hypothesis 2 postulated, evidence for stronger uploading in areas of EU competence is the weakest in Germany out of the three countries under study, although it does play a role. German diplomats are well aware that in some issue areas they have to go through the EU, especially in trade. Nevertheless, this does not seem
to be an issue for much concern for them, since uploading is not that frequently explicitly connected with the EU’s distribution of competences. This is in line with the evidence discussed in the previous paragraph that Germany has an opinion on most issues which it expresses at EU level. Theoretical expectations led to the hypothesis that institutional constraints should be relatively more important in causing countries with overall lower interests in Latin America to try to upload, because they have lower incentives to do so in other areas. However, at least for the case of Germany this connection does not seem to hold. In the next section, I discuss the reasons for this behaviour.

Rational Adaptation to European Rules There is some evidence for rational adaptation to European foreign policy-making towards Latin America in the German case, but it is much weaker than evidence for $H_1$. At the same time however, it is stronger than evidence for $H_2$, showing that there is evidently some concern about Germany’s status and reputation with the other EU Member States. Interestingly, interviews reveal that unlike I hypothesised given the literature discussed above (Checkel 2005; Slaughter 2004), this is not about being seen as a ‘good European citizen’. Instead, it is about being “an active player”, making sure that Germany shows an opinion, and about showing a profile, as one interviewee put it, “to live up to our significance as the largest country in the EU”. This is one explanation for Germany’s aforementioned tendency to have an opinion on everything and “making it heard” as one interviewee said. German policy-makers want to show their country’s relevance in all areas, even those where its interests are not that important, as is the case of policy towards Latin America.

Domestic Socialisation In Germany, evidence for domestic socialisation affecting the interaction between national policy towards Latin America and the EU level is relatively weak, but it does influence policy-makers. As previous studies (Wagner 2002; Rittberger 2001a) led me to predict, there is reason to believe that national foreign policy-makers are socialised into a pro-European domestic policy culture. As one interviewee phrased it, “in principle, we Germans are generally just a bit more Europe-friendly than some of the others.” Interestingly, however, some evidence to the contrary is also beginning to appear. A ‘new Euroscepticism’ that has characterised recent German action at the EU level, particularly during the Euro crisis, seems to have pervaded all areas of policy-making in the European context. Asked about the further Europeanisation of policy towards Latin America, one interviewee explained that “today we are at a level where [...] one says, this is all going in the direction [of further Europeanisation], perhaps we even have to look where there are particular
national interests that have to be guarded or taken into account.”

**European Socialisation** German officials also seem to have soaked up some European-level norms, although evidence is relatively weak. The relevant norm concerns what behaviour is appropriate at the EU level. One interviewee justified the participation of less interested Member States in EU-Latin American affairs as follows: “It just belongs to the EU [...] that there are of course Member States who are more interested in Latin America, that’s completely clear. And the others then participate... because they also participate.” There thus seems to be a shared norm of participation in European-level policy-making even if interests are low. However, the same interviewee also connected participation in areas of lower interest to the possibility to establish issue linkages ($H_1$), so that there may be a double motivation at play. Additionally, German policy-makers appear to have internalised a norm of information sharing at the EU level: “And that’s a thought one sometimes has, whether that’s a thing that one should Europeanise. Not Europeanise, but at least inform the partners? [...] So that’s at least the first step, that you inform partners about the things you are doing”, as one interviewee put it.

**Britain**

**Domestic Interests** Interestingly, and contrary to what Hypothesis 1 postulated, the ‘domestic interest’ variable is not the strongest in Spain, as one might have expected given the distribution of material interests in Latin America, but in the UK, whose interests are relatively low. This does, however, chime with the very pragmatic or even sceptical view the UK is said to have towards the EU (Forster 2000: 45). Indeed, Aktipis and Oliver (2011: 87) point out, UK policy-makers have been rather influential in driving some aspects of the EU’s external dimension, such as the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), but have been reluctant to admit to this within its domestic setting characterised by a deep suspicion of all things European. My finding, therefore, that the UK tries very hard to influence the EU level in areas of interest is in line with this discussion of UK behaviour in Europe rather than, as expected by Hypothesis 1, interests in Latin America.

**Institutional Constraints** While in Germany, the hypothesised connection between lower interests and relatively stronger evidence for the impact of institutional constraints was not found, the relationship does hold up for the UK. British policy-makers do seem to try harder to upload their stance in issue areas that are of Union competence than in others because of this distribution of
competences. The UK indeed concentrates most of its uploading efforts in the commercial realm. Relatively to other issue areas, the UK is thus very active in commercial policy towards Latin America, which is also recognised by interviewees from the other two countries and the triangulation interviews. One British interviewee stated that “we hold the Commission to account, particularly in the negotiations which are Commission competence [...] like the trade negotiations [...] to ensure that issues which are important to us, like for example spirits [...], we get the right deal on them, otherwise we won’t agree to the agreement anyway.”

Rational Adaptation to European Rules  I did not find evidence for rational adaptation to European rules in the interviews with British policy-makers. In Hypothesis 3, I postulated that I expected the impact of this independent variable to be the weakest in Britain, because there is little evidence in the study of the UK’s role within the EU for a British concern with being seen as a ‘good European’, but rather a tradition as an “awkward partner” (George 1994) in Europe. Therefore, the fact that I do not find evidence for such behaviour driving Britain’s policy activity towards Latin America in the EU context is not surprising and chimes with previous findings of the UK’s rather pragmatic and even critical approach to the EU and its external action (e.g. Wagner 2002; Forster 2000): it can be useful, but when it is not, there is no need to make a particular effort just in order to garner a good reputation.

Of course, there is a fairly obvious caveat which has also been discussed in Chapter 4: a lack of evidence does not necessarily mean that the postulated variable is not influential at all. However, it is possible to say with relative confidence that rational adaptation to European-level rules in order to be seen as a good European partner is not one of the key motivating factors of British policy activity towards Latin America in the European context.

Domestic Socialisation  As with rational adaptation to European rules, I do not find evidence for domestic socialisation into pro-European norms that might account for British policy activity towards Latin America within the EU context. This is in line with Hypothesis 4, although it must be noted that the above-mentioned caveat regarding the absence of evidence also applies here. However, it must also be noted that I do not find evidence for socialisation into domestic Eurosceptic norms either. Unlike their German counterparts, who despite the large impact of interest-based factors do hold domestic norms about how they should interact with EU foreign policy, British foreign policy-makers seem to see their interaction with the European level in a very pragmatic fashion.
6.6. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK

**European Socialisation** Finally, there is no evidence in the interviews for European-level socialisation of British policy-makers. Indeed, I had hypothesised that it would not be an important variable for the UK, as I also did not expect there to be a strong pro-European domestic norm with which European socialisation could resonate. Therefore, the finding seems to confirm the mechanism theorised in Hypothesis 5.

**Spain**

**Domestic Interests** As in the previous chapter, I find that in Spain, the drivers behind policy activity are more varied than a purely utilitarian-liberal framework would lead one to expect. Although domestic interests constitute the independent variable for which I find most support, their relative importance is lower in Spain than in the other two countries and the relationship between the strength of interests and their impact hypothesised in $H_1$ could not directly be confirmed. Despite its important economic and political interests in Latin America, other factors also, by and large, have a stronger influence than they do in the other two countries.

Not surprisingly however, evidence for downloading in areas of lesser interest is the lowest in Spain, which takes a very strong interest in all aspects of EU policy towards Latin America, as both national officials and those interviewed for triangulation were keen to point out. Indeed, those statements indicating that Spain is willing to download aspects of EU policy where its interests are weaker concern issues not related to Latin America policy, such as relations with other regions. One interviewee pointed out that “obviously, we cannot cover the whole world with the volume and intensity we would like. In that sense, [...] we have to establish a balance between our bilateral designation of presence [...] and the construction of a European external action policy that covers us.” In the same vein, statements affirming Spain’s drive to upload policy to the European agenda often concerned the EU’s relations with Latin America as a whole. Spanish diplomats see it as their job to make sure that Latin America is not forgotten. Part of this is motivated by economic and political interest, but part of it is also motivated by other factors. This finding constitutes an interesting difference between Spain on the one hand and Germany and Britain on the other. While in Spain, the concern is with policy towards Latin America in general and interest-driven up- and downloading is weighted against policy towards other regions, in Germany and Spain the weighting concerns issue areas within policy towards Latin America.
Institutional Constraints  Evidence for uploading due to institutional constraints is the second strongest in Spain. Spain has important commercial interests in Latin America, but it is also a very major donor in the region, and with the EU operating a very active own development policy, Spain tries to ensure that Latin America receives its share, in line with its general pro-Latin American lobbying at the European level. However, as I hypothesised, institutional constraints can occasionally force Spain to take the EU’s autonomous action into account, which may even lead to downloading. Especially in development policy, interviewees insisted that Spain very much takes the EU’s development policy activities in the region under consideration when drawing up its own programmes in order to ensure complementarity. This is in line with Hypothesis 2 and explains the co-occurrence in the interviews of issues of EU competence with downloading in the Spanish case.

Rational Adaptation to European Rules  There is some evidence for $H_3$ in the case of Spain, but it is rather weak. It appears that Spanish policy-makers are to some extent concerned about Spain’s reputation as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Latin America. However, the reason why evidence for $H_3$ in the sense of this leading to weak uploading is fairly thin is that in the Spanish case, wanting to keep a good reputation and status with the other Member States actually leads to strong uploading. Rather than simply sharing national initiative to facilitate information flows and be seen as a cooperative partner, Spain often tries to take an active influence on the EU’s Latin America policy to show other Member States that it matters. As one interviewee said, “our links with the region also give us importance within the EU.” In a sense, thus, Spain uses Latin America to punch above its own weight within the EU and to improve its standing as an important EU Member State. In none of the three countries did I find evidence for rational adaptation leading to a greater willingness to download.

Domestic Socialisation  In Spain, domestic socialisation does matter, but not strictly in the way I theorised in Hypothesis 4. Rather than merely being socialised into a pro-EU norm, foreign policy-makers are nationally socialised into a pro-Latin American norm, in the sense that they have a special cultural and historical connection with Latin America that makes them particularly responsible, which leads them to share their initiatives at the EU level and push Latin American affairs there. However, it goes beyond weak uploading to strong uploading. In fact, there exists a national norm in Spain of being both part of Europe and what Spanish policy-makers call ‘Iberoamerica’. Spanish policy-makers thus tend to see themselves as a part of Iberoamerica within Europe.
Therefore, while evidence for \( H_4 \) as it was initially postulated is weak, evidence for domestic socialisation as such is stronger than the results in Table 6.5 indicate. Yet it leads to a different interaction mechanism, because it is a different type of socialisation than was initially considered.

**European Socialisation**  In Spain, evidence for European socialisation is equally weak as for rational adaptation. In contrast to their German counterparts who have been socialised into a norm of cooperative behaviour at the EU level, Spanish foreign policy-makers appear to have adopted a norm of shared responsibilities at the EU level for different external regions on behalf of different member states: “Every European country understands that it bears responsibility in the external deployment of the European Union. [...] Our role in Europe [...] is to contribute this relationship, our *acquis* with Latin America, to the European environment.” In that sense, like with strong uploading, Spanish policy-makers want to facilitate their entire relationship with Latin America to contribute their share to the success of the EU’s external relations. As I discuss below, this is intimately linked to processes of domestic socialisation in the Spanish policy-making community.

**Further Considerations**

While there is evidence that the mechanisms postulated in the theoretical part of this study are indeed at work and intertwined in interesting ways in the three countries under study, there are reasons to contemplate a re-conceptualisation or the introduction of additional mechanisms that arise from the evidence presented above. Regarding evidence for the link between national and European-level norms, reconsiderations akin to those contemplated in Chapter 5 are useful. The idea that EU-level norms resonate more easily in countries with similar domestic norms seems to ring true, but the picture is more complex. German policy-makers appear to be nationally socialised into pro-European attitudes. They are also receptive to EU-level behavioural norms. Spanish policy-makers, on the other hand, are socialised into a national norm of carrying a special responsibility for Latin America, and they perceive a European norm of shared responsibilities among Member States for different regions. This could mean two things. Firstly, different EU-level norms may resonate differently with policy-makers depending on their domestic socialisation. Alternatively, policy-makers may project their domestic socialisation to the EU-level and, so to speak, ‘invent’ an EU norm for themselves that resonates with their domestic socialisation.

Moreover, an interesting feature of German interaction with the EU level
in Latin America policy that has not been theorised previously, is what I term ‘re-uploading’: policy-makers first download issues from the EU-LAC agenda, but then try to influence them actively. This mechanism shows very nicely in the area of migration, where Germany does not have strong interests vis-à-vis Latin America, thus downloading it onto the national Latin America policy agenda, but nevertheless plays a very active role in shaping the EU’s policy.22

Another example is the creation of a EU-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation, of which Germany was initially sceptical, but then proposed its own candidature to accommodate its headquarters once it could no longer impede its creation.23 ‘Re-uploading’ may occur for two reasons. On the one hand, it can result from Latin America not being much of a policy priority for Germany, but policy-makers wanting to play an active role in EU-LAC policy both for reasons of appropriateness and wanting to maintain one’s status as a vital player in the EU. On the other hand, there is overall evidence that countries cannot always attain their preferences in the face of another Member State’s strong position. Not even Spain can always upload its policy if other Member States have strong feelings about an issue that runs counter to the Spanish position. Policy-makers may thus have to download policy if another country has successfully imposed its position or blocked a decision. In that case, it would make sense for a country to then try and influence future aspects of this policy area to at least get the best deal possible out of a less-than-ideal situation.

Similarly, interviewees emphasise the importance of compromise. In particular, if a Member State has a particularly strong interest in achieving something vis-à-vis Latin America, it may have to accept an imperfect result rather than no deal at all. Germany, for instance, has a very strong interest in concluding association agreements with the countries and regions of Latin America and the Caribbean because of its trade dependence. However, other countries such as France have strong reservations about such agreements because of their strong agricultural basis. Therefore, in order to reach a negotiation mandate and come closer to an agreement, Germany may have to make some concessions. One interviewee, regarding the association agreements, stated that “we want that, we [...] can handle making some compromises that might not be super great for us.” Thus, strong domestic interests may in some cases even lead to downloading if this leads to a compromise.

22Note, however, that migration is important in Germany’s interaction with other areas of the world and that Germany thus has a strong interest in influencing migration policy overall. This is one potential explanation for ‘re-uploading’ in the case of migration policy towards Latin America.

23The EU-LAC Foundation has the remit of improving relations between the two regions and making them more visible and continuous. The question of where it should be located was the issue of heated debate among the Member States, as Paris, Milan and Hamburg presented candidatures backed by their own government. In January 2011, it was decided to set up the headquarters in Hamburg, with the other two candidates receiving the status of privileged partners (AA 2011b).
In general, policy-makers from all three countries very much see policy towards Latin America at the European level as a way to add value to their own relationships with the region. There are issues, such as human rights and democracy promotion, where Member State officials see a common European interest that can better be reached through the EU than bilaterally, thus punching above one’s individual weight. Whenever Member States see eye to eye on an issue vis-à-vis Latin America, essentially, EU-level action is considered adequate, even if compromises have to be made along the way.

For Britain and Spain – interestingly not for the German case – there is also some evidence for willingness to ‘outsource’ aspects of policy to the EU level. In the British case, interviewees contemplated the idea of representation in parts of Latin America where the UK has been scaling down or closing embassies, although this downsizing is now being reconsidered (FCO 2011: 2). In Spain, as I have discussed regarding $H_1$, policy-makers feel that while they are very strong in Latin America, Spain does not have the capacity to cover all areas of the world in the same fashion. Therefore, in other regions, it may be willing to delegate some of this representation the the EU. Even within policy towards Latin America, however, some Spanish officials see potential for the EU to cover at least some areas like consular representation, freeing up capacities to do more bilaterally in areas of interest, such as cultural policy. This amounts to a desire to not just up- or download policy, but to actually outsource some less vital obligations or aspects where policy-makers feel their capacities are being stretched. However, it must be noted that this was motivated by expected benefits (more bilateral capacity), not norms. Furthermore, interviewees made clear that this was interesting mainly for more administrative areas and had to respond to Spanish as well as other Member States’ interests.

6.6.2 Triangulation Interviews

In order to strengthen the validity of the national-level interview data, I conducted interviews with officials responsible for Latin America at the EU level, as well as with Latin American diplomats based in Brussels who are involved with EU-Latin American relations. The main value of these interviews lies in the fact that they should be able to compensate some of the potential ‘strategicness’ inherent in the national-level interviews, as discussed in Chapter 4. For example, while national officials may be wont to obscure the impact of EU-level norms and rules – be it through rational adaptation or because of considerations of appropriateness – this should not be the case with EU officials.
and Latin American diplomats. If anything, there is a danger that EU officials may overstate their impact, either because they genuinely overestimate it, or because they deliberately set out to do so in order to justify their work or confirm its importance. However, they may find it difficult to assess the impact of EU-level factors in the Member States because they cannot observe it directly. Finally, the interviews with Latin American diplomats present, to some extent, the most ‘neutral’ view on the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America, because they are not directly involved in this interaction process. However, their statements are limited by other factors. Firstly, they are diplomats and, as such, must not burn any bridges with either the EU institutions or the Member States, because they rely on good relations with both. They can thus be expected to be, in the true sense of the word, diplomatic about the issue and are unlikely to be overly critical. Secondly, precisely because they are not directly involved in the interaction between national and European policy-making towards their home region, they are also likely to be the least informative, because they are watching the process from the sidelines and know less about its intricacies than national or European officials.

Therefore, the results presented in Table 6.6 must be taken with the appropriate caution and with a view to the limitations discussed above and in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the combination of three different interview sources – national, European, and Latin American – should provide a suitably complete picture that allows conclusions about the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America to be drawn. Note also that the evidence presented for the countries in Table 6.6 only includes instances where the impact of one of the independent variables conceptualised in this study was explicitly tied to the respective country in question by the interviewees. There was further, not country-specific evidence for the above hypotheses, however. I thus report the overall evidence for the hypotheses in a separate column.

**Domestic Interests**

Evidence for *Hypothesis 1* from the triangulation interviews is rather similar to evidence from the national-level interviews, although Spain is perceived as more in line with *Hypothesis 1* than its policy-makers are perhaps willing to admit. Domestic interests are by far the most important motivating factor in interaction between national and EU-level policy towards Latin America, even more so than it appeared in the national-level interviews. It is equally strong in the UK and Spain. It seems that what is seen – or at least portrayed – by Spanish officials as a promotion of Latin American affairs not necessarily driven by interests is perceived that way by others, in particular by European officials.
6.6. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK

Table 6.6: Results of triangulation interview analysis (% of total evidence for hypotheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Interests</td>
<td>85.71</td>
<td>92.00</td>
<td>92.00</td>
<td>76.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Constraints</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>EU Rules: Rational Adaptation</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9.52</td>
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Several interviewees mentioned Spain’s use of the EU level as highly tactical, with Spain occasionally being reluctant to subscribe to European declarations that could harm its interests in the region. Interestingly, Latin American officials take a different view on this, as they see Germany and the UK as more interest-driven than Spain. However, Spain’s vital role in the EU’s Latin American policy is not always perceived positively by Latin American diplomats either. Several of them mentioned that having only Spain as an interlocutor on the European side is problematic and that Latin Americans are interested in dialogue with the other Member States as well. There is thus an overall feeling that Spain’s influence on the EU’s Latin America policy, while vital for keeping it active, is a two-sided affair.

Overall, all three Member States try to influence the EU level in areas that are of particularly high importance to them. However, Spanish Latin America policy is perceived as built on the broadest basis out of the three. “With Spain”, one Latin American diplomat stated, “you notice [...] that it does not just look for the defence of its economic interests in Latin America, of which there are a lot, but that there is also a clear cultural and political call.” Germany and the UK, in turn, are seen as mostly motivated by their economic interests. The UK, indeed, is mentioned as being particular selective in its engagement, only becoming active when it has an interest in a certain issue – mostly trade, but also security issues such as drugs and terrorism, as already indicated by interviewees at the national level. This is almost certainly what is behind the above-mentioned phenomenon of Latin Americans perceiving Spain as less interest-oriented. Spain constantly pushes for increased attention to Latin America, which Latin American diplomats value highly. Spain tries
to upload its national policy on all fronts – indeed, I did not find evidence for ‘downloading in areas of lesser interest’ for Spain at all. The other two countries, however, are happy to download some issues when their level of interest is lower. This is more so in the UK, where 28% of the evidence for $H_1$ is due to downloading, than in Germany, where only 19% of evidence for $H_1$ is the result of downloading in areas of lesser interest. This explains some of the UK’s low activity on the overall EU dimension: its overall interest in Latin America is low, so it does see the need to be as active and is happy to go along with the rest of the EU as long as its economic interests are not harmed.

**Institutional Constraints**

As in the national-level interviews, I also find evidence for the impact of institutional constraints in the triangulation interviews, except for the case of Spain. Given Spain’s attempts to upload its policy in all issue areas, this is perhaps not that surprising: I theorised in Hypothesis 2 that Spain’s attempts at uploading should be more balanced than those of Germany and Britain, as its interests in all policy issues vis-à-vis Latin America were stronger. Indeed, from the perspective of EU officials, for Spain’s attempts at strong uploading it does not matter whether an area is of EU competence or not. Germany and the UK, on the other hand, are indeed perceived to be stronger ‘uploaders’ in areas of EU competence than in others, and interviewees do link this to the distribution of competences. British policy-makers are perceived to be particularly aware of the EU’s distribution of competences, in line with the comparatively strong evidence for Hypothesis 2 in the British national-level interviews. As one triangulation interviewee remarked, “I think the British receive exact instructions during their training on what is EU competence and what is not. And they play the game.” In other words, British policy-makers try to influence the EU level when there is no other way to proceed, while they stay out of it where they do not have to go through the EU level. As seen above, as long as their interests are not touched, however, they are also happy to let EU policy run its course and go along with it. However, it is important to note that for both Britain and Germany, the distribution of competences coincides with their main area of interest; economic affairs. For both EU and Latin American officials, it may thus be difficult to disentangle the reasons for their attempts at strong uploading. Yet Latin American triangulation interviewees were very much conscious that even in areas of EU competence, the Member States play a vital role: one diplomat, for instance, explained that even though competence in commercial affairs was with the EU, the Member States were the important working partners because they are the ones who approve the negotiation mandate for the
6.6. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK

Commission.

Rational Adaptation to EU Rules

In the triangulation interviews, I find no evidence for rational adaptation as a motivating factor for weak uploading or downloading for either Britain or Germany. In the case of Britain, this is in line with the national-level interviews that did not display evidence of rational adaptation either, and in line with the expectations of Hypothesis 3. For the case of Germany, where there was indeed evidence for rational adaptation as a result of keeping up its reputation as a highly active Member State in all policy areas, this finding is a bit more surprising. Nonetheless, note that there was overall evidence for Hypothesis 3 in the triangulation interviews (see column “Total” in Table 6.6), although it was not very strong – this more general evidence may very well apply to Germany, although it was not explicitly mentioned. Indeed, evidence for rational adaptation at the national level is likely to be fairly unproblematic. Interviewees do not have a strategic incentive to misrepresent their rational adaptation to EU rules, unless it is in the context of downloading, where they might not admit to it (and indeed no evidence for it was found). Spain, on the other hand, is mentioned by interviewees in the context of rational adaptation to EU rules. As one EU official put it:

“Imagine a big country, like Spain, which has a special relationship with Latin America. [...] In principle one could imagine that such a country doesn’t need, really, to rely entirely on the European institutions. That’s a wrong perception. [...] Spain is seen in Latin America as the natural door to the European Union, and seen by the Europeans as the natural bridge to Latin America. And its kind of intermedior [sic] role is [...] very important both for the Latin Americans and for the Europeans, and of course for the Spanish themselves as well.”

This supports what was said by the Spanish interviewees at national level: that Spain’s expertise in Latin America gives it importance within the EU, which it is eager to maintain. It also harks back to the findings from Chapter 5, which showed Spain to be rather preoccupied with its standing in the international donor community. Thus, it seems that Spain is still in the process of finding its role both in Europe and on the wider international scene and actively works to achieve its reputational goals. Within the EU, it aims to take on a special responsibility for Latin America and to make it known that it has expertise with

25Emphasis added.
the region that other EU partners and the EU institutions can rely on. Conveniently for Spain, this helps it achieve its interests vis-à-vis Latin America at the same time, as it offers the country a further level to pursue them.

**Domestic Socialisation**

In line with the findings of the national-level interviews, the triangulation interviews show evidence that domestic socialisation does matter in the interaction between national and EU policy-making towards Latin America. Triangulation interviewees are also able to assign some of the evidence directly to the countries under study, in particular to Germany and the UK. Interestingly, Spain, where evidence for domestic socialisation was the strongest in the national-level interviews, does not display such evidence in the triangulation interviews. However, the finding becomes more reasonable if one recalls that the norm into which Spanish policy-makers are socialised is not exclusively a norm about the desirability of a European dimension of policy towards Latin America but rather a norm of Spanish responsibility for Latin America at the EU level. This leads to strong rather than weak uploading and can be perceived, especially by EU officials, as Spain trying to push its national interest at the EU level – hence the strong evidence for Hypothesis 1 in the case of Spain. Latin American interviewees do perceive the domestic socialisation of Spanish policy-makers into a very active role in EU policy towards Latin America, however. This explains the difference between EU interviewees and Latin American diplomats regarding the impact of domestic interests on Spanish interaction with the EU’s Latin America policy. But as in the national-level interviews, domestic socialisation does not lead to the uploading and downloading mechanisms predicted by the hypotheses – instead, it leads to strong uploading on behalf of Spanish policy-makers.

With regard to Germany, triangulation interviewees’ remarks about the domestic socialisation of its policy-makers refer to two aspects. The first concerns the idea that German policy-makers see Germany as an important power that has an opinion on everything, including Latin America. The second is closely related and concerns the ways in which German policy-makers bring forward their national position in all circumstances. One interviewee stated that “It is very important that [...] time and time again national representatives say, ‘I don’t even want to read out to you what my instructions are’ [...] This is a positive element of EU coordination [...] that one says, we want to achieve the whole, common, best thing and not just push our position until the end. But there is a different German culture” – German representatives seem to display a tendency to stick to their instructions in most situations and inform their
counterparts about the German point of view (weak uploading), or even try to push it (strong uploading). The same interviewee pointed out that this is also related to the fact that Latin America is not an important issue for Germany, so that the participants in meetings often do not have enough standing to single-handedly derogate instructions from the capital. In this sense, their domestic socialisation into the norm that Germany has to speak combines with low interests in Latin America to produce attempts at uploading that may be suboptimal from the point of view of trying to reach a consensus.

British policy-makers, in turn, are also seen as socialised into a national norm of ‘great power status’ that leads them to engage in weak uploading, although this occurs with much less frequency and with a greater focus on certain issues than in the German case. Additionally, triangulation interviewees do indeed see Britain as sceptical of Europe, as predicted by Hypothesis 4. I expected weak uploading and downloading at work if policy-makers have been socialised into ‘Europeanist’ norms. What we see in the case of Britain is the reverse: policy-makers are socialised into a norm that sees the EU as a more distant entity, which is viewed sceptically. As a result of this socialisation and low British interests in Latin America, British engagement with the EU’s policy towards the region is overall low.

However, as with the previous hypotheses, triangulation interviewees also pointed to some factors that were not specifically tied to a particular country. Especially European officials noted a recent decline in European commitment. One interview partner said that

“There used to be certain Member States that were more Community-minded [...] and these of course were the Member States that were more open towards the institutions, towards [...] sharing information, acting jointly, and [...] putting the EU dimension, the Community dimension first. [...] Nowadays unfortunately, [...] this has [...] greatly diminished, I would say. My perception is that the Community spirit has almost disappeared.”

Although the official did not attach this notion to any Member State in particular, it strikes a chord with the evidence from the German national interviews, where there is evidence that the norm of Europeanism that had so long governed German actions within the EU is waning.

**European Socialisation**

Evidence for European socialisation is overall stronger in the triangulation interviews than in the national-level interviews, taking about 9% of total evidence. However, as expected, it was difficult for triangulation interviewees to
assign the impact of European norms on uploading and downloading in the
countries under study. Indeed, evidence for the impact of the EU level in terms
of socialisation tends to remain general, covering all Member States. One EU
official, for example, stated that the “effort Member States put in trying to find
compromises” is “quite astonishing to watch. [...] [I]t is an amazing process,
if you would think years back, it was not possible.” The official saw this as a
result of the constant interaction and the trust that had been built up among
the Member States and the EU officials. There is evidence for both download-
ing and weak uploading in terms of information sharing as a result of constant
EU-level interaction, and it appears that there is now a general willingness to
achieve consensus even in the face of widely disparate opinions on sensitive
issues such as Cuba, because consensus is generally seen as the appropriate
goal. The limitation of this evidence, obviously, is that it remains at the general
level. This, however, supports the theoretical conceptualisation of this study
and the findings of previous studies that it is national-level differences that ex-
plain the varying receptiveness of national policy-makers for EU-level norms.
What the triangulation interviews can contribute to this study is that EU-level
socialisation processes are indeed at work.

Triangulation interviewees were, unfortunately, not able to pinpoint exactly
the above-mentioned interaction between European and domestic socialisa-
tion. This may be due to several reasons. Firstly, triangulation interviewees
were not able to assess the impact of European Socialisation on the individual
Member States, as discussed in the previous section. Additionally, the num-
ber of cases under study here is indeed too small for conclusions to be drawn.
What would be needed in this context is a large-N study including a well-
designed survey of policy-makers for as many EU Member States as possible
in order to ascertain whether there is a mediating impact of national norms on
the way in which EU-level socialisation processes – which, as evidence from
both national-level and triangulation interviews shows, at work – are medi-
atied by distinct national contexts. As I have shown based on the national-level
interviews, there are differences depending on the national context, but further
investigation that branches out beyond Latin America policy may be needed
to better conceptualise this interaction.

Further Considerations

Overall, the triangulation interviews corroborate the evidence from national-
level interviews. Interaction between national and EU level policy towards
Latin America on behalf of the three Member States under study is mainly
driven by interest-based considerations. However, some nuances from the tri-
angulation interviews complement the national-level evidence in novel ways. The UK is seen as mainly interest-driven and active on a fairly small number of thematic issues, especially commercial affairs, but also counter-narcotics and the environment. While Britain is not very visible in the EU’s policy towards Latin America, it is influential whenever it does get involved and can then successfully upload its preferences. While part of this low level of visibility is due to the fact that Latin America is not a British foreign policy priority, there is also some evidence of a domestic norm in the UK that distances policy-makers from the EU.

Germany, meanwhile, is seen as one of the more active countries, and a very influential one. In addition to the evidence brought forth above, it is interesting to note that some interviewees see it as balancing Spanish influence, an evaluation concurrent with how German policy-makers see their role. Alongside France, Portugal and Italy, it was universally mentioned as an important actor in the EU’s Latin America policy, although there is evidence for this activity being driven mainly by commercial interests, confirming evidence from the national-level interviews. Overall, Germany’s role in EU-LAC relations is evaluated as a highly influential, and, in the case of Latin American diplomats, also very positive. Spain, finally, is seen across the board as the most active and influential EU Member State.

In the Spanish case it is important to recognise the difference between EU officials, who tend to characterise Spain as highly tactical and interest-driven in its interaction with the EU’s Latin American policy, and Latin American diplomats, who interpret Spain’s role more concurrently with Spanish policymakers themselves: driven by a domestic norm of a special responsibility towards Latin America. Nonetheless, Latin American interviewees do not deny that interests play a major role in Spain’s tendency to attempt to upload its national policy to the European level, as they indicate a preference for other EU Member States to become more involved and welcome, for instance, German initiatives to balance Spain in some aspects. Another peculiar factor of the Spanish case is that Latin America policy in Spain is to some degree internally politicised, especially with regards to Cuba. While the conservative Spanish government under Aznar pushed for a strict Common Position on Cuba, the subsequent socialist government tried to change the Common Position towards a more flexible framework. However, Spanish intents to upload in this respect met with the fierce resistance from other countries, such as the Czech Republic, who wish to keep the current Common Position. While Cuba is very much a controversial issue between the different EU Member States, Spain seems to be the only one where the position on Cuba is nationally strongly contested depending on the government in power. Triangulation
interviewees observe that in other countries, nuances might change, but the position remains essentially similar, while at the time of the interviews, they were preparing for the Spanish position to change as a result of a potential government change in the November 2012 general elections. Cuba, however, is a very special case in the context of the EU’s policy towards Latin America that merits additional attention that is beyond the scope of this study.

An interesting feature of the triangulation interviews with EU officials is the support they yield for European socialisation, although they did not attach it to specific countries. Interaction between the representatives of the EU institutions and those of Member States, as well as among Member State officials was often described as characterised by an atmosphere of community and trust. Daily, intense communication, both using official and unofficial channels, between members of the European policy-making network appears to be the norm. Consensus-finding appears to be an EU-level norm Member State representatives readily adhere to. A communication reflex is also seemingly evident – if something is happening, policy-makers pick up the phone, write an e-mail or send a COREU to inform partners. This is surprising, given that European socialisation was definitely among the very weak to non-existent (in the case of the UK) independent variables as they emerged from the national interviews. A potential explanation for this is that EU officials tend to overestimate the importance of EU-level interaction and communication. On the one hand, they often cannot observe directly the impact of EU-level socialisation on Member State policy, that is, they are unable to observe whether it actually leads to downloading. What they are not aware of are all the other networks that Member State officials are involved in that might have an even greater impact, in particular the domestic policy-making network emphasised by Liberal Intergovernmentalism, but also other international arenas such as the Iberoamerican Summit process in the case of Spain. Additionally, it is not unreasonable to suspect that at least some of the activity Member States do not voluntarily communicate to the EU network is not picked up by EU officials, so that they are missing a chunk of the information. Similarly, national-level officials may be less keen to reveal downloading to the interviewee in order to portray their own national actions as particularly successful.

6.6.3 Policy Documents

In this section, I turn back to the recent policy documents from each individual country and discuss them briefly. While policy documents represent only the official line, they can nevertheless reveal some aspects of the factors motivating the interaction between national policy towards Latin America and the EU’s
strategy towards the region. In the following, I analyse the documents that were coded above to ascertain the mechanisms at work in more depth in order to corroborate the evidence from interviews, as discussed in Chapter 4. In the case of Spain, were no specific such document exists, I limit myself to the speech by then Foreign Minister Trinidad Jiménez before the Senate Committee on Iberoamerican Affairs as the most recent expression of policy towards Latin America. I begin with the German strategy paper for Latin America and the Caribbean (AA 2010).

“Germany, Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategy Paper by the German Government” (2010) Compared to the historical evidence provided in Section 6.5.1, the 2010 strategy paper takes a somewhat different approach to the interaction of Germany’s Latin America policy with the European level. In fact, in a comparison between the 1995 and the 2010 strategy papers, Günther Maihold finds rather little difference between the documents, apart from a different emphasis in the section on the European Union, where there is a shift away from further Europeanisation towards bringing in a stronger national voice (Maihold 2010: 15). Indeed, while the document recognises that a “substantial part of Germany’s relations with Latin America is realised today within the context of the European Union” (AA 2010: 54), the desire for further Europeanisation that permeated earlier documents, such as the “Guidelines” for policy towards Latin America published in 2004 and updated in 2007 (AA 2007) is no longer there. Instead, the government postulates that in order “to fully represent our values and interests in Latin America, we have to use our influence in a targeted manner to help shape European policy on Latin America and the Caribbean” (AA 2010: 9). Germany wants to use its influence in EU-Latin American relations to achieve a more coherent policy and to strengthen the Strategic Partnership (ibid.). The paper immediately turns to this task by explicitly stating where some of these German interests lie: in maintaining the Common Position on Cuba, in rethinking the way the EU deals with regional integration projects in Latin America, and in concluding as well as putting into practice association and trade agreements with Latin America – preferably with regions, but also with individual countries if bi-regionalism turns out to be too cumbersome (ibid.: 54f). This is a rather strong expression of German interests that is new to the interaction with the EU level. It is consistent with the evidence from both national and triangulation interviews, which have pointed to a change in the way German policy-makers consider interaction with the EU level. It seems Germany now feels the need to steer these relations in a direction congruent with its own preferences, confirming the evidence from interviews. The European level also carries importance in the section on trade
with Latin America (ibid.: 33ff), although the division between trade – subject to the Community method – and external economic promotion – quite strictly bilateral – remains. However, the EU’s growing competences in external economic policy are making themselves felt in Germany’s interaction with the EU level in this policy area. While competence for the protection and promotion of investments is migrating to the EU under the Lisbon Treaty, Germany remains determined to ensure that the levels of protection provided by current bilateral arrangements are maintained (AA 2010: 37). With national room for manoeuvre further circumscribed by Europeanisation, Germany is trying to ‘upload’ its own level of investment protection to the EU, consistent with Hypothesis 2: where the distribution of competences lies with the EU, Germany tries to achieve its interests through the European level.

However, there is no fully-blown turn away from Germany’s generally pro-European attitude. “Germany’s Latin America Strategy would be inconceivable without a European dimension”, the paper recognises (ibid.: 54). It argues in favour of EU action vis-à-vis Latin America for instance in the fields of human rights, counter-narcotics, and regional and subregional integration (ibid.: 54f). Thus, while there is a turn towards a clearer articulation of German interests, this is more of a change in nuances than a fundamental redefinition of Germany’s policy towards Latin America in the EU context.

“Britain and Latin America: Historic Friends, Future Partners” (2010) This speech by Foreign Secretary William Hague at Canning House in November 2010 fulfils a very similar purpose to the German strategy paper: to bring the UK’s Latin America policy up to date after a government change and outline the government’s ideas on policy towards the region. In congruence with evidence from the interviews, the EU’s role in the speech is punctual. Like Germany, Britain is seeking “ambitious European Commercial Agreements” with Latin American regions “in our role as undoubtedly the strongest and most persistent advocate of free trade in the European Union” (FCO 2010). This supports evidence from the interviews that commercial interests are key in the UK’s involvement in EU policy towards the region, and that its motivations are to be found in the more general foreign policy context rather than being specific to Latin America – the UK tries to upload its commercial preferences vis-à-vis Latin America not because of big trade interests in the region, which it does not have, but due to a more general pro-liberalisation preference: again, the UK constitutes itself as an “indirect uploader”, as already shown in the historical overview. British policy towards Latin America in the EU context thus does not change much with the new government in terms of content, although the region may potentially receive some more attention from the UK (“Bri-
tain’s retreat from the region is over”; ibid.). There is little change in this respect from an earlier government document on UK relations with Latin America published by the previous Labour government, where the EU’s role was also largely seen in the trade area (FCO 2007: 19). This lends some support to Hypothesis 2, the influence of the distribution of competences between the national level and the EU level, for which there was also substantial evidence in the national interviews and some evidence in the triangulation interviews.

A second area in which the EU level plays a role in British Latin America policy is climate change, where the UK is “keen to help broker a strategic alliance between Latin America and Europe on climate change” (FCO 2010). Interviewees in both national and triangulation interviews confirm that the environment is indeed one of the areas where the UK is active vis-à-vis Latin America in the EU context. Note that regarding climate change, however, the role of the EU level is more indirect, as the alliance to be brokered here is between the Member States and the Latin American countries, rather than in partnership with the EU institutions. Interestingly, another policy area that did play a role in the European context in the interviews and in the previous government’s strategy paper on Latin America (FCO 2007), counter-narcotics, was not mentioned in Hague’s speech. Overall, the speech is more focused on bilateral and global-level aspects of the relationship, supporting the evidence from the triangulation interviews that British engagement with the EU is focused on areas where the EU holds competences and where the UK has particular interests vis-à-vis the region.

“Appearance before the Senate Commission for Iberoamerican Affairs”

(2010) The then Foreign Minister’s speech before the Senate Commission for Iberoamerican Affairs in December 2010 informed the relevant representatives of Spain’s upper house on the lines of action for the department in Latin American affairs and recent events in connection with the region. Because Spain had held the Council Presidency during the first half of 2010, during which the biannual EU-LAC Summit took place, there is an extensive section on the government’s actions within the EU framework. Overall, the evidence from the interviews that Spain attempts to ‘upload’ its policy in a wide range of areas is confirmed. Spain, “with its immense interest in the region will follow very closely” the further consolidation of the relationship, the speech promises (Jiménez García-Herrera/MAEC 2010: 102).

However, while the speech is eager to point to Spain’s achievements within...

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26 Full translated title: “Appearance before the Senate Commission for Iberoamerican Affairs to inform about the lines of action planned for the relations with the Iberoamerican Community of Nations and Priorities of the Department in the realm of Iberoamerica and the Iberoamerican Summit in Mar del Plata” (Jiménez García-Herrera/MAEC 2010).
the EU-LAC context, EU action vis-à-vis Latin America is presented as a value per se throughout, pointing to Spain’s double identity as both European and “Iberoamerican” that characterises its approach to the region. While both Germany and the UK highlight mostly the commercial aspects of the EU’s Association negotiations with Latin American countries and regions, the former Spanish Foreign Minister’s speech takes this further by emphasising the far reach of the agreements into commercial, but also political and development cooperation aspects (ibid.: 103), supporting evidence for Spain’s broader motivations that go beyond economic interests, although these are fundamental. In general, the speech shows the strength with which Spain tries to push the overall relationship with Latin America onto the EU agenda, confirming the evidence for uploading in all aspects from the interviews.

6.7 Conclusions

In this case study, I have analysed the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America in three EU-Member States: Britain, Germany, and Spain. Evidence shows that interaction is motivated by several factors, responding to utilitarian and constructivist liberal as well as to more systemic factors. However, as expected by the theoretical framework, domestic interest-based calculations based on a logic of consequences are by far the most important motivating factor that causes national representatives in all three countries to try and upload their national stance to the EU level. The more interests are at stake in a certain issue area, the more strongly the ‘strong uploading’ mechanism plays out. In areas of lesser interests when this does not entail costs, they may be willing to accept issues from the EU level onto their own agenda and go along with what is decided at EU level. As a result of this domestic interest constellation, Spain, whose interests in Latin America are the strongest, attempts to upload its stance essentially in all policy areas. The interviews show that the EU level is one further channel for Spain through which it carries out its Latin America policy – it will chose other channels if it does not achieve its preferences in the EU framework. However, what does not hold true is the hypothesised connection between the strength of interests and the strength of the interest variable: although Spain clearly has the strongest interests in the region, this does not mean that its interests preclude the impact of other independent variables. Quite to the contrary, the factors that motivate its policy towards Latin America in the EU context are more balanced and varied than those of the other two countries under study, especially of the UK.  

27 However, triangulation interviews show that Spanish attempts to upload are often perceived as interest-driven. Moreover, national-level interviewees may have an interest in misrepresenting
Britain, conversely, uploads very selectively with a focus on economic issues and counter-narcotics. It is also quite willing to let EU policy run its course and accept European decisions, as long as its interests are not touched – and since these interests are far and few between regarding Latin America, Britain’s activity is rather low-key at the EU level. Germany is more broadly active but still focuses on some issues more than others, especially on commercial policy. The interest-based explanations arising from Liberal Intergovernmentalism thus account for a lot of the variation in policy activity on the European dimension shown in Chapter 3.

However, it is also important to note that there are other influencing factors at play, which interact in different ways with domestic interest constellations in the three countries under study. Firstly, the institutional distribution of consequences between the EU and the national level is a noteworthy factor that plays a role in all three countries. It limits Member States’ ability to take a bilateral route if the EU level does not satisfy their requirements. As a result, attempts at strong uploading are particularly intense in areas of EU competence, notably commercial relations. This, of course, interacts with the fact that economic policy is the area where both the UK’s and Germany’s main interests vis-à-vis Latin America lie. But since interviewees explicitly link strong uploading to the distribution of competences, the evidence is relatively clear. Indeed, especially British diplomats are said to be very well aware of the distribution of competences, in congruence with the conclusion of previous research that the UK favours cooperation in foreign affairs, but strictly within an intergovernmental setting (Aktipis and Oliver 2011: 90). Additionally, the distribution of competences also matters in the Spanish case, where it translates into having to take into account the EU’s autonomous actions. This holds both for commercial policy, where the EU negotiates on behalf of the Member States and Spain has to accept the negotiation outcomes, and for development policy where the EU has not just a considerable amount of competences, but also wields major financial power. This links the present case study with the previous chapter discussing the motivations for development policy-making. While Spanish policy-makers are always pushing for Latin America to receive more funds, they must also take the EU level into account when considering their own actions. The fact that the EU holds supranational competences therefore places some limits on Spain’s strategy of choosing the channel through which it can best achieve its preferences in Latin America policy, as in some instances it cannot bypass the EU level.

Rational adaptation to EU-level rules plays a role both in Germany and in their motivations. Even so, the difference between Spain and especially the UK in terms of the variables influencing interaction between national policy and the EU level is striking.
Spain, but does not seem to influence the UK’s up- and downloading activities, thus chiming with evidence from the previous chapter on rational adaptation to international rules about development, as well as with theoretical expectations. Indeed, for Spain the motivations behind rational adaptation are similar to those found in development policy: Spain is concerned about being taken seriously by its EU partners as an influential Member State, just as it is concerned about being taken seriously by the international community. However, the mechanism through which this plays out is slightly different in the EU case. While in development policy, Spain is essentially a rule-taker, in EU policy towards Latin America, it tries to use its special relationship with the region in order to demonstrate its importance through uploading. This is why in the case of Spain, strong uploading in connection with maintaining a status and reputation is actually more important than the postulated information-sharing through weak uploading mechanism. Through its special relationship with Latin America, Spain tries to punch above its weight in the EU. Similarly, in Germany weak uploading in the context of rational adaptation is motivated with maintaining a reputation as an influential and active Member State. It therefore shares its initiatives and stances on all policy areas, even those that are not of vital interest for it, such as Latin America policy. This diverges somewhat from previous evidence for Germany wanting to maintain a reputation as a ‘good European citizen’ (e.g. Aggestam 2000; see also Checkel 2005; Slaughter 2004) – in line with the evidence brought forward based on the historical overview and the most recent German strategy paper on Latin America that provides a great deal of evidence for uploading and indicates a stronger willingness of Germany to use its influence within the EU to shape the policy. This is indicative of a general tendency in Germany’s behaviour within the EU that appears to have trickled down to all policy areas, including policy towards Latin America. On the other hand, the UK as predicted did not yield evidence for rational adaptation to EU rules to maintain a reputation with regards to policy towards the region.

With regards to the impact of socialisation, this study largely confirms previous evidence that domestic socialisation is more relevant than European-level socialisation (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005), although in Germany and Spain both are present with Germany displaying the strongest evidence for European socialisation making an impact on up- and downloading on policy towards Latin America. From the triangulation interviews, it becomes evident that European socialisation processes are indeed at work, although triangulation interviewees could not trace their impact on individual Member States. However, national-level interviews showed that they do have a different impact on the behaviour of different Member States, which is mediated by domestic
factors. Such mediation was indeed contemplated by this study in hypothesising that domestic socialisation into EU norms would make states more receptive to European socialisation. This hypothesis could not be confirmed in the face of a lack of clear evidence. But it became clear that domestic socialisation impacts upon the kind of European norms that are adopted by national policy-makers. In Germany, policy-makers are receptive to an EU-level norm about participation at the EU level even if interests are low, which is reinforced by domestic perceptions that Germany is a pivotal EU Member State that should make its voice heard, which also influences rational adaptation regarding participation. Additionally, although there is evidence that this norm is currently changing, there still exists a domestic norm in Germany stipulating that European action as such is the appropriate way of carrying out foreign policy for Germany. Interestingly, therefore, weak uploading in the form of participation at the EU level can arise from both rational and appropriateness-based considerations. Both logics of action can thus exist in parallel and complement each other when determining foreign policy-making.

In Spain, on the other hand, policy-makers seem to be more receptive to an EU-level norm stipulating different areas of responsibility for different Member States at EU level. Again, this is intimately connected with domestic socialisation, for which there is quite strong evidence in the case of Spain. However, in the case of Latin America policy, it is a different kind of socialisation than expected: rather than being domestically socialised into a particular stance on Europe, policy-makers are socialised into a stance on Latin America policymaking that impacts their interaction with the EU level. Evidence shows the existence of a Spanish foreign policy culture that sees Spain as having a particular responsibility for the EU-LAC relationship. This motivates them to actively try to influence all areas of EU policy-making towards Latin America, even if this is sometimes viewed with a dose of scepticism on the part of both their European and Latin American partners. If anything, Spanish uploading is limited by capacity, which leads some policy-makers to toy with the idea of ‘outsourcing’ some more administrative aspects of policy to the EU-level to be able to focus more on bilateral relations. ‘Outsourcing’ is also contemplated by British officials who see the EU’s presence in Latin American countries where Britain has scaled down its presence as a possibility of, so to speak, ‘keeping a foot in the door’.

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28Esther Barbé (2011: 131) includes identity reconstruction in the European context as ons of the dimensions of the Europeanisation of Spanish foreign policy. Indeed, Spain has been extremely pro-European in its foreign policy outlook (see also e.g. Torreblanca 2001). Yet, in the case of Latin America, Barbé’s assessment concurs with my findings in stating that “Once it joined the EC, Spanish governments began to conceive of Spain as the spokesman for Latin American interests” (Barbé 2011: 145).
While I did not find that interests overall trump the impact of ideational factors, there is evidence for a ‘division of labour’ between a logic of expected consequences and appropriateness. This applies in particular to the case of Germany, which is active in a broad range of policy areas but does not display the peculiarities of the Spanish case. Depending on the importance of the policy area in question, the logic of action may change: the more important the area, the more likely German representatives are to respond to rationalist logic. Moreover, they are quite willing to download some policy initiatives from the EU-level, but they then ‘re-upload’ their own stance on these initiatives. When policy-makers are unsuccessful in ‘uploading’ their national stance, they may first download policy, but then try to influence its further shape actively. In the case of Germany, this may also be the result of a relatively low level of interest in Latin America combined with a desire to influence the EU level on the basis of both domestic interest and the rationally motivated desire to match up to Germany’s status as a pivotal EU Member State. By uncovering this mechanism, this study has made an interesting discovery in the field of interaction between national and EU policy in the field of external relations.

The crucial difference that sets Spain apart from both Germany and Britain is that Spanish policy-makers see interaction with the EU-level in Latin America policy more as a feature of Latin America policy than EU external relations, thus seeing the EU only as one branch of conducting policy towards the region. This explains the low score on the European dimension of policy activity towards Latin America found for Spain in Chapter 3. British and German representatives see it not just as that, but more strongly within a context of EU external relations. This changes the norms that matter when actors are domestically socialised. While in Britain, domestic socialisation has little or no effect, in Germany, what matters is socialisation into norms regarding behaviour at the EU level. In Spain, what matters is socialisation into what Esther Barbé calls “kinship-based duty” (Barbé 2009: 126), the domestic norm that Latin America matters, and that it should not only matter to Spain, but to Europe as a whole. What represents an interesting starting point for future research is the mechanisms of interaction between domestic and European norms. A greater number of cases and a more specific research design are required to reach conclusive evidence, but this study has pointed to at least one way in which the two interact.

Finally, there are some implications for the biregional relationship that can be drawn from the evidence discussed in this chapter, and they are connected with the strong evidence for country-specific interests driving the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America. Firstly, it would appear that Latin American diplomats are correct when they consider Member...
States to be the crucial working partners in Europe, even in areas of EU competence. It is the Member States who are pushing to see their interests represented by the negotiation mandates for Association or Free Trade Agreements, for instance. Latin American countries who want to see their own interests taken into consideration by the EU are therefore well-advised to lobby the Member States as well as the EU level, even under the new post-Lisbon institutional structure. Secondly, and the practical implications of this can already be witnessed, the Member States’ economic interests are likely to trump EU attempts at promoting regional integration in Latin America. If powerful countries like, for instance, Germany want a commercial agreement with Latin American countries, they are unlikely to forego it if a biregional agreement is not possible. This has been the case, for example, with what was initially conceived as a biregional agreement between the EU and the Andean Community and has now turned into Multiparty Agreements with Peru and Colombia. Even more importantly, bilateral agreements between the EU and individual countries, especially Brazil, are likely to be negotiated if the bloc-to-bloc negotiations with Mercosur fail. Especially in the current climate of rising scepticism about the economic and political capacity of the EU, normative considerations are likely to be quickly forgotten when economic and political interests are at stake in external relations.

Overall, the second case study has reinforced the usefulness of a theoretical framework combining liberalism-based with systemic factors. It allows for a much more complex picture of interaction and multi-causal explanations. Indeed, I have shown that interaction between national and the EU’s Latin America policy is more complex than the mechanisms postulated in the hypotheses due to the country-specific combinations of influencing factors that work together in unique ways to produce the interaction patterns uncovered by this investigation. Further research will now have to show to what extent these findings can be extended to other areas of foreign policy-making in the European context, such as policy towards other regions, or the Latin America policy of other Member States.
Chapter 7

Summary and Conclusions
7.1 Summary

This study set out to theorise, conceptualise, and analyse the factors that influence Latin America policy-making in Germany, Spain, and the UK. Through this investigation, I hoped to shed more light on policy-making towards a region that receives very different levels of policy activity from various EU Member States. Likewise, by assessing the factors that motivate policy towards the same region on behalf of several European states, the study contributes to the larger endeavour within Foreign Policy Analysis of disentangling the factors that impact upon foreign policy (Hudson 2007).

By studying policy towards Latin America, I focused on an area that consists largely of day-to-day policy-making towards a region whose relations with European countries span essentially all aspects of foreign policy: commercial relations, investment, and development aspects, as well as political, cultural, and civil society relations. In addition, all states under study interact with Latin America within the EU framework in crucial aspects of the relationship, so that an EU dimension of policy was also included. In this sense, the present investigation differs from many other studies located within an FPA approach, which tend to focus on special cases, crises, or particular events. The investigation therefore broadens our understanding of the motivating factors behind the main body of most Western democracies’ foreign relations: everyday external policies. In keeping the ‘recipient region’ of policy constant across all three cases, the study could keep factors pertaining to the ‘policy target’ constant and hence isolate those factors operating in the countries where policy originates.

By choosing Germany, Spain, and the UK as cases for study, I investigated the foreign policies towards Latin America of three states that share a number of attributes, thus further honing in on those explanatory factors emanating from the domestic level. Firstly, all three countries under investigation come with their own national policies towards Latin America, hence making an investigation of its motivating factors meaningful in the first place. Secondly, all are relatively long-standing Member States of the European Union, so that the interaction between the national and the EU level is fairly consolidated in all cases. Moreover, they are relatively large Member States of the Union, thus granting them a certain level of influence within the EU. Finally, they are middle powers at the wider international level. It must be noted here, and has been discussed in Chapter 2, that this point is where international-level differences between the three countries are the greatest, as the UK is a per-

1Nevertheless, I took into account Spain’s status as a later joiner of the European Community and the international community at large. See also fn 12, p. 30.
manent member of the UN Security Council, Germany aspires to become one, and Spain is certainly the least internationally influential country out of the three. Nonetheless, I argued that for the purposes of this investigation, their European middle-power status was sufficiently similar for fruitful comparisons to be made. However, as I have shown, for Spain its status as a relative ‘newcomer’ to the international scene matters especially in development policy.

Theoretically, I embedded the study within an extended liberal framework, fundamentally based on the work of researchers such as Moravcsik (1993; 1997; 1998), Goldstein and Keohane (1993); Katzenstein (1996), and the more recent investigations of Wagner (2002) and Koenig-Archibugi (2004). Liberalism conceptualises the domestic origins of foreign policy, but while Moravcsik’s work is firmly embedded within a rationalist logic of action, conceptualising policymakers as utility maximisers, the other authors open up the framework to the impact of ideational factors. The study thus conceptualises a framework that can incorporate factors based on a logic of expected consequences as well as a logic of appropriateness and that allows them to be at work side-by-side, complementing and interacting with each other rather than being mutually exclusive, based on the work of researchers such as for example Jupille et al. (2003), Fearon and Wendt (2003), and Zürn and Checkel (2005). I thus conceptualised independent variables based on liberal foreign policy theory, including political and economic domestic interests, as well as domestic norms about how foreign policy should be conducted. The use of a liberal framework with its focus on domestic-level factors impacting upon foreign policy is appropriate in the context of this study, having taken care to isolate these domestic factors as much as possible. Nevertheless, it is important not to ignore the fact that states and their policy-makers are embedded in the international arena, including the EU, and that this context may also affect policy-making. Therefore, I conceptualised independent variables emanating from the systemic level, thus including rational adaptation to international rules, international socialisation and, in the case of interaction between national foreign policy towards Latin America and the EU level, also the institutional context. However, I argue that these factors are by and large constant across the three countries under study so that their varying influence ought to be due to domestic-level factors (Risse et al. 1999). I therefore conceptualised the impact of the international level as mediated by the national arena. Additionally, I considered whether states come to the international community as rule- or norm-makers (“norm leaders”, as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901) call them) or norm-takers.

Since the analysis of policy towards Latin America in Europe has been carried out mostly within the context of either national-level studies or edited
volumes based on studies of individual countries, and literature is scarce in particular for the UK, I first had to establish a common ground upon which the policies towards the region of Germany, Britain, and Spain could be meaningfully and systematically compared. In order to do so, I conceptualised three dimensions of policy activity towards Latin America. The first dimension was an economic dimension comprising trade and investment as well as development policy towards the region. The second was a governance dimension including political dialogue, cultural policy, and civil society involvement in policy. The third and final dimension captured the European context within which EU Member States carry out policy, as I found, to varying degrees.

In order to compare the three countries’ activity levels on all three dimensions, I established an index based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a rather novel approach to indexing. This technique allows for the systematic comparison of data from a wide variety of sources: qualitative data from government documents and secondary literature could be incorporated alongside numerical data on development assistance from the OECD statistical database, for instance. Additionally, country-specific indicators could be employed where no comparable data were available. Based on set-theory, fsQCA scores varying continuously between 0 and 1 are attached to each case depending on whether it is closer to full non-membership (0) or full membership (1) in a set, with the point of maximum ambiguity (crossover point) at 0.5. By placing all data on the same scale through fsQCA’s calibration procedure, I could make the wide variety of indicators conceptualised during Chapter 3 comparable across countries and dimensions, and reduce the data’s complexity through set intersection and union. At the same time, the step-by-step indexing procedure allows the researcher to record all the variation in the data in a systematic, tractable fashion. I found policy activity towards Latin America to vary in interesting ways across both countries and dimensions. While the UK achieved the lowest overall score, Spain scored very highly on all dimensions except the European one, for example.

Based on the variation uncovered in Chapter 3 and theoretical relevance, I then proceeded to identify two policy areas for further study in Part II of this investigation. In Table 7.1, I once more summarise the variation relevant to the case studies found on the basis of the fsQCA index. This empirical variation presents several questions. Regarding development, a subcomponent of the economic dimension of policy towards Latin America, the question arising from the wide variation on the different countries’ index values was why the same region receives such different levels of policy activity from three European OECD Donor Assistance Committee member states. If aid were mainly oriented towards alleviating poverty efficiently, one might expect more
similar levels of policy activity. As regards the European dimension, the variance uncovered by the fsQCA indexing procedure is similarly puzzling. Why do three relatively ‘veteran’ Member States vary so widely in the levels of policy activity towards Latin America within the EU framework? Why does Spain, a traditionally Europeanist country, achieve such a low score, especially given its high scores on all other dimensions? Why does even Germany with its long-standing reputation of Europeanism not even reach a 0.5 membership score?

Aside from the empirical variation, however, the two cases for further study were chosen for their theoretical relevance. In the context of ‘marrying’ rationalism- and constructivism-based explanatory factors, development assistance should be a particularly interesting field of study given the unresolved disagreements of researchers regarding the factors that influence development policy (e.g. Lumsdaine 1993; 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). Is development policy fundamentally oriented towards alleviating poverty in developing countries, or is it primarily influenced by geopolitical or economic interests? If norms about poverty alleviation are indeed driving development policy activity, do they emanate from the international or from the domestic level? Or do policy-makers rationally adapt their behaviour to international standards in order to maintain a certain reputation with the international donor community?

The European level, on the other hand, is theoretically interesting in terms of the interaction mechanisms involved in foreign policy-making at the domestic level and the EU level. Interaction between the national and the European level is now a constant feature of foreign policy-making in EU Member States, yet the index showed that it plays out differently in different countries. How can this interaction be conceptualised and explained? Why do countries sometimes accept issues coming from the EU level onto their national agenda, while in other cases they push to see their own policy stance implemented at the EU? In both case studies, I conceptualised rationalist and constructivist liberal influencing factors, as well as rationalist and appropriateness-based adaptation to the international level. By including equifinal hypothesis, the investigation contributes to a deeper understanding of the driving factors behind

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Table 7.1: Variation in Policy Activity towards Latin America

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Dimension:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Dimension</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS

foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe, but also behind for-

eign policy-making more generally by uncovering potential influencing factors
that can then be applied to other cases.

Methodologically, given the small-N research design and the data availabil-

ity of this study, I opted for process tracing in the sense of tracing the impact of
	en often equifinal influencing factors through in-depth semi-structured elite inter-

views with foreign policy-makers. The main data source was interviews car-

ried out at the national Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Minis-

tries or Agencies. In order to mitigate the problems of strategicness associated

with elite interviews, I triangulated the data with interviews conducted both

at the EU institutions and with Latin American diplomats based in Brussels.

Furthermore, OECD data were used in the case of development policy, and

government documents in the case of national-EU level interaction. Although

these data sources all have their limitations – discussed in depth in Chapter

4 and in the individual case studies – they allowed me to trace and analyse

in depth the various postulated influencing factors on policy-making towards

Latin America in the three countries under study.

7.2 Findings and Implications

Overall, I find that foreign policy-making towards Latin America is mostly

driven by domestic economic and political interests, as expected by the exten-

ded liberal theoretical framework. However, other factors including domestic

and international norms, as well as rational adaptation to international rules,

also have an impact. Because of its qualitative design, the study was also able

to analyse the interaction among the independent variables in depth, showing

how they combine differently across various national backgrounds to produce

country-specific outcomes. Although the findings are not readily generalisable

to other countries or policy towards other regions, they indicate that the ways

in which different variables interact in the policy-making process are specific to

each country and often complex. I now briefly discuss the findings from each

case study in turn.

7.2.1 Development Policy towards Latin America

In development policy, as predicted by the theoretical framework, the concen-

tration of aid in Latin America as a whole region and among Latin American

countries is driven to a large extent by domestic political and economic in-

terests, but I also found considerable evidence for the impact of domestic as

well as international norms.
However, in the context of international norms, it is important to recognise their interaction with rational adaptation to international standards, as policy-makers seek to maintain or achieve a status of fully-fledged membership in the international donor community. This is particularly important in the case of the concentration of Spanish aid to Latin America, which is very poverty-oriented within the region. Spain is still a relatively recent donor and its policy-makers remain rather preoccupied with Spain being accepted as a ‘good’ donor internationally. They are therefore receptive to international rules mostly for rationalist reasons. But at the same time, Spain’s historical ties with Latin America have created a domestic normative environment which makes it difficult for Spain to withdraw aid from the region, even on the basis of the argument that Latin American countries are ‘too rich’ to receive substantial development funding. This finding illustrates how the impact of international-level factors is indeed mediated by the domestic context of each individual donor country.

In Germany and the UK, there is evidence that poverty orientation matters more in poorer countries, while interest-based considerations dominate when allocating aid to the richer countries of Latin America. This explains why both countries give some substantial shares of their aid to some very poor, but also to some of the regions rich countries. Indeed, in the UK a strong national norm about the poverty orientation of aid has caused the bilateral aid programme with Latin America to be dismantled. Interest-based considerations, however, motivate the UK to continue running a programme with Brazil as an emerging global power. Germany, on the other hand, due to its somewhat greater interests in the region, maintains a broader profile, but the essential pattern is similar to the British one.

Interestingly, the lower policy activity towards Latin America in the field of development, the less relevant Latin America-specific considerations are in making development policy towards the region. The driving factors in Germany and particularly in the UK are thus more reflective of general development policy considerations than in Spain, where the focus is very much on Latin American specificities when making development policy. As a result, different motivating factors matter in all three countries under study, but the ways in which they matter and, in particular, interact among each other are conditioned by domestic preference constellations – both ideational and rational – that are unique to each country.

Overall, the case study on development policy-making towards Latin America showed that the aid giving process is highly complex. The idea that all donors behave the same in general or that different donor countries behave the same towards the same recipient region or country is flawed. Different donors
behave differently towards different countries and regions, and independent variables combine in singular ways that are difficult to capture in a large-N design. Large-N studies are excellent at uncovering that different factors matter in development policy-making, but this study has contributed to a deeper understanding of how the different factors that impact upon development policy can matter in different national contexts.²

### 7.2.2 The European Dimension of Policy towards Latin America

As for the case study on the interaction between the national and the EU level in foreign policy towards Latin America, evidence likewise shows that interaction in the sense of uploading and downloading policy is motivated by several interdependent factors. Overall, calculations based on domestic interests were found to be by far the most important motivating factor. As expected by the Liberal Intergovernmentalism-based hypothesis, the stronger the interests at stake in a certain issue area, the more strongly policy-makers attempt to upload the national stance to the EU level. In areas of lesser interests and when this does not entail costs, they may be willing to accept issues from the EU level onto their domestic agenda. As a result Spain, whose interests in Latin America are the strongest, attempts to upload its stance essentially in all policy areas. The UK, conversely, uploads very selectively with a focus on economic issues and counter-narcotics. It is also quite willing to let EU policy run its course and accept European decisions, as long as its interests are not touched. Germany is more broadly active but still focuses on some issues more than others, especially on commercial policy.

However, as with development policy, other independent variables are also at play and interact in interesting and different ways with domestic interest constellations. Firstly, I showed that the institutional distribution of competences between the EU and the national level plays a role in all three countries by limiting their ability to take the bilateral route if working through the EU framework does not satisfy their interests. As a result, attempts at strong uploading are particularly intense in areas of EU competence, notably commercial relations, but also development policy, where the EU wields power over substantial funds. There is also evidence for a ‘division of labour’ between expected consequences and appropriateness to be at play. This was found to apply especially to the German case: the more important the area, the more

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²This is not to say that there are no general patterns in development policy activity that could be uncovered by large-N studies. But because of the complexity of aid, it is difficult to disentangle the intricate connections between different variables in different donor-recipient scenarios quantitatively.
likely German representatives are to respond to a rationalist logic. Rational adaptation to EU-level rules plays a role both in Germany and in Spain, but does not seem to influence the UK’s up- and downloading activities, thus also chiming with evidence from the previous chapter on rational adaptation to international rules about development.

With regards to the impact of socialisation, the EU case study largely confirmed previous evidence that domestic socialisation is more relevant than European-level socialisation (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005), despite the presence of both in Germany and Spain. European socialisation processes are indeed at work, although their impact on individual Member States will require additional research. There is evidence for variation depending on the domestic context of different Member States, however. While the mediation of EU-level socialisation by domestic socialisation was indeed hypothesised by this study, I was not able to conclusively confirm this hypothesis due a lack of clear evidence. Nonetheless, I did find evidence for the impact of domestic socialisation upon the kind of European norms that are adopted by national policymakers. Evidence from the Spanish case, for instance, showed that Spanish policy-makers seem to be particularly receptive to an EU-level norm stipulating different areas of responsibility for different Member States at EU level. This is intimately connected to the existence of a domestic foreign policy culture that sees Spain as having a particular responsibility for the EU-LAC relationship, motivating policy-makers to actively try to influence all areas of EU policy-making towards Latin America.

I did uncover a mechanism that was not contemplated by the initial hypotheses and represents a valuable contribution to the research on interaction between national and EU policy, which I termed ‘re-uploading’. In some cases, I found policy-makers to be quite willing to download some policy initiatives from the EU-level, but they then ‘re-upload’ their own stance on these initiatives. ‘Re-uploading’ may arise in two contexts. Firstly, when national representatives are unsuccessful in ‘uploading’ their national stance, they may initially download policy, but then try to influence its further shape actively. Secondly, it may also be the result of a relatively low level of interest in a policy combined with a desire to influence the EU level despite this, for example in order to maintain a reputation as an influential Member State. The exact conditions under which this mechanism operates may be subject to further research.

In sum, the crucial difference that sets Spain apart from both Germany and Britain is that Spanish policy-makers see interaction with the EU-level in Latin America policy more as a feature of Latin America policy than EU external relations. British and German representatives see it not just as that, but more strongly within a context of EU external relations. Overall, the second case study
reinforced the usefulness of the study’s theoretical framework, allowing for a complex picture of interaction and multi-causal explanations to emerge. Indeed, I have shown that interaction between national and the EU’s Latin America policy is more intricate than the mechanisms postulated in the hypotheses due to the country-specific combinations of influencing factors that work together in unique ways to produce the interaction patterns uncovered by this investigation.

7.2.3 Contextualising the Findings

From the two case studies, some general conclusions can be drawn to anchor the case studies in the wider context of this investigation. The first is that foreign policy-making towards Latin America in the three countries under study responds to independent variables both from the realm of liberal theorising and variables emanating from the international level, as conceptualised by the study’s theoretical framework. In addition, I was able to confirm the study’s premise that utilitarian-liberal variables in the shape of domestic political and economic interests constitute the fundamental driver behind foreign policy towards Latin America in Europe. The stronger a country’s interests, the more likely it is to respond to them. On the other hand, as the case of the UK shows, where stakes are minor, policy activity can be overall extremely weak and oriented towards merely protecting these vestiges of interests. And as we have seen in the case of Spain, interests and norms can coexist in their influence on foreign policy. The tension between such coexistence can then lead to unique policy outcomes, such as the strong poverty orientation of Spanish aid within Latin America in the face of an overwhelming amount of total Spanish aid given to this relatively rich region – although, as I have shown, other additional factors impact upon such patterns, thus making the picture even more complex.

Similarly, the impact of international or European-level factors has been shown to be mediated by the domestic context, as previous literature from similar contexts has indeed suggested (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005). However, the exact processes by which such mediation occurs have to be further investigated to put to a test my evidence that domestic factors do impact upon the kinds of international norms domestic policymakers may be socialised into. Additionally, states want to be recognised in a certain way by other members of the international community and seek to

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3 Acharya (2004: 239) does suggest that what kinds of norms matter depends to some extent on the “differential ability of local agents to reconstruct the norms to ensure a better fit with prior local norms”, although his research focuses on a context where a transnational norm is integrated into a regional group’s normative code.
promote different kinds of self-images in order to gain or maintain importance at the international level. They may thus promote themselves as experts in a certain region or policy area, or as a pivotal state in the community. I have found evidence, especially in the development case study, that such rational adaptation is especially important in areas where countries feel the need to ‘prove’ their belonging to a certain ‘club’ such as the international donor community in the case of Spain. In a different arena – the EU – on the other hand, Spain seeks to promote an image as the ‘expert on Latin America’. Patterns of rational adaptation can thus vary across issue areas. Despite this impact of the international level, foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK is fundamentally driven by domestic interests.

Finally, the comparison between the three countries has shown that the stronger the relationship with Latin America, the more policy is based on Latin America-specific considerations than on more general foreign policy lines such as a general stance on development policy or general considerations regarding the EU. Spain, therefore, operates the most Latin American policy towards the region. Even its low score on the EU dimension testifies to that – the EU is just one channel of conducting policy towards Latin America that can be substituted for others. What matters is Latin America. Likewise, most of the UK’s policy towards the region reaches Latin America through indirect channels, such as a reorientation of general development policy towards the poorest countries. The important factors here are foreign policy considerations that also happen to affect Latin America, sometimes even negatively, as the withdrawal of British bilateral development assistance to the region shows. In Germany, finally, considerations are mixed. This shows that foreign policy-making does not just depend on purely domestic factors, but also on the country-specific relationship with the target region or country, a factor that needs to be taken into account when analysing foreign policy in any context.

7.3 Directions for Future Research

While the present study of foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe has made some substantial findings, it is just these findings that also prompt possibilities for further research.

As I have discussed at several points, this study gives valuable indications that go beyond foreign policy-making towards Latin America. Yet due to its focus on three relatively long-standing, large EU Member States with pre-existing national policies towards Latin America, the applicability of its results to smaller countries, new EU members, non-EU countries, and more generally,
states with little pre-existing national relations with Latin America is somewhat circumscribed. Thus, it is worth looking at other countries to determine to what extent the constellations of independent variables considered by this study are specific to cases with the above characteristics. France or Italy would be good test cases, for instance, of countries that are similar enough to the three cases under study to apply the same theoretical framework. Moreover, a comparison between old and new EU Member States, or large and small ones could yield further insights into Latin America policy-making in Europe. In addition, incorporating non-EU countries could help isolate factors specific to EU Member States’ policy towards the region.4

Similarly, it is worth considering those dimensions of foreign policy and their subcomponents that have not been covered by the present investigation’s case studies in order to determine the extent to which the impact of the different independent variables varies depending on the policy area under study. Finally, varying the ‘target region’ of foreign policy may yield additional opportunities to test my findings in a different context. Policy towards Africa or policy towards Asia could be subjected to a similar framework to test the validity of the results in other geographical areas.

One issue that could not be conclusively resolved by either of the two case studies is the interaction between international (including European) and national norms. Although I have shown that international socialisation processes are at work and are mediated by domestic factors, in order to test the expectation that international norms fall on more fertile ground in countries where a similar domestic norm also exists, or that pro-EU domestic norms make policy-makers more susceptible to European socialisation, additional research involving a greater sample of cases is required. What is more, the interaction between national and international-level norms has to be further disentangled. The idea that a particular national norm or domestic foreign policy culture may make national foreign policy-makers particularly receptive to certain types of international-level norms constitutes an excellent point of departure for additional inquiry.

Because of its liberal focus on domestic-level explanations with an extension into higher-level factors mediated by the national level, this study has exogenised other factors that may play a role in the making of foreign policy. As discussed above, by focusing on foreign policy-making towards a particular region on behalf of EU Member States, it exogenised systemic factors by holding them constant to a large degree. Additionally, it has exogenised

4For a discussion of determining the ‘impact of Europe’, see e.g. Haverland (2006). Such a decision would, however, eliminate the possibility to assess in detail how national and EU-level foreign policy interact in each country under study, as this interaction is limited to EU Member States.
more micro-level explanatory variables such as the bureaucratic constellations or small-group dynamics in each of the three countries under study by focusing on meso-level factors. Follow-up research may therefore expand beyond the extended liberal model conceptualised in this study to reach an even more complete picture of the motivations of foreign policy-making.

In the following, I also briefly discuss those specific aspects of each case study demanding further investigation.

7.3.1 Development Policy-Making in Europe and Beyond

The case study on development policy towards Latin America has found evidence that the ‘colour’ of the government may have an impact on development policy-making, in particular with respect to the factors that determine the allocation of development assistance. This is in line with the findings of some previous authors (Tingley 2010; Fleck and Kilby 2006) and suggests that rather than nationally shared norms about aid, what might be at play are ideology-based concerns over what aid should be employed for: poverty reduction or furthering national economic and political interests. Therefore, future research should consider the impact of government ideology (conservative or liberal, left-wing or right-wing) on the motivating factors for aid and, in particular, might fruitfully conceptualise norms as politically rather than nationally shared.

In addition, there is evidence from my interviews that the channel of aid – whether states give multilaterally or bilaterally – could also give an indication of the motivations of development assistance. There are studies demonstrating that multilateral aid is more efficient (e.g. Easterly and Pfutze 2008), thus suggesting that states who deliver more aid multilaterally might be motivated by ideational considerations about aid efficiency. Although the motivations for different channels of aid have not been as widely studied as one might expect, research investigating the issue has shown the usefulness of applying a principal-agent framework, hence making the decision about a cost-benefit calculation of maintaining control over aid versus sharing the costs of aid delivery by ‘going multilateral’. I have found some evidence that other factors, such as the idea that a level of bilateral visibility should be maintained in the recipient country, also matter in the decision. However, since the bilateral-multilateral aid decision is not specific to Latin America but rather a more fundamental choice, it should be investigated within a wider framework.

7.3.2 Foreign Policy-Making in the EU Context

With regard to the EU case study, it is of course particularly appealing to extend the study to other EU Member States. While a forthcoming edited volume
on the Europeanisation of national foreign policies towards Latin America (Ruano forthcoming 2012) provides a starting point, it lacks the direct comparison between the different Member States advanced by this study. How does EU membership, for example, affect the relations with Latin America of the new Member States, or those of smaller ones? Further research might also be conducted in other areas of policy. Abstracting from the geographical context, it might be worth looking at thematic policy fields such as development policy towards different regions. It could also be fruitful to move away from external relations altogether in order to test how the mechanisms of interaction play out in various policy areas that are not related to external affairs.

In particular, the ‘re-uploading’ mechanism found by this study merits further conceptualisation and investigation. Under what circumstances does it occur in other contexts than policy towards Latin America or even foreign policy more generally? Does it play out differently in different EU Member States? By uncovering this mechanism, the study makes a theoretical contribution that may provide the basis for further refinement.

### 7.3.3 Theoretical Implications

This investigation is embedded within a Foreign Policy Analysis framework with a focus on meso-level factors impacting upon foreign policy. In this vein, I considered explanatory factors from utilitarian-liberal and liberal constructivist foreign policy theory: domestic economic and political interests and national norms. However, I have also taken into account factors emanating from the European and wider international level, thus moving further towards the macro-level and systemic theories of foreign policy and international relations. Due to its focus, the study conceptualised such higher level factors as mediated by the domestic context. The meso-level is thus where my research’s main findings lie and contribute to FPA’s endeavour to achieve a closer grasp of the variables that impact upon foreign policy-making. The study then employed middle-range theories from the two cases selected for in-depth study, thus contributing to their further refinement. In particular, through the method of process-tracing employed by the study, I have contributed to the fine-tuning of the mechanisms connecting the independent variables to policy-making in development policy and the interaction between national foreign policy and the EU’s external policy. By doing so, the investigation leads to a better understanding not just of what factors impact upon policy-makers’ decisions, but how they do so.

I have, for example, been able to confirm the theoretical expectation that domestic economic and political interests are the main drivers behind foreign
policy towards Latin America in all three countries under study, and that such interests tend to matter over other - both normative and rationalist - factors at the limit. However, through in-depth analysis of the interviews conducted for this study, I have also shown that the independent variables interact in complex ways that monocausal theories focusing on a narrow set or even just one independent variable - such as a strictly utilitarian-liberal framework - would be unable to capture. Interests, domestic and international norms, and concerns over a state’s status and reputation with its partners all matter.

By concentrating on policy towards a region that is not generally affected by major crises or particular events, this study has moved away from FPA’s traditional focus on explaining the occurrence of particular events. In that sense, it broadens the applicability of FPA by using its framework to explain foreign policy-making as it occurs on a daily basis, which represents a major part of many countries’ foreign relations.

Due to its focus on domestic variables, the theoretical basis of the present investigation’s explanatory framework was a liberal approach incorporating factors derived from both rationalist and constructivist liberal theorising. Yet the subject under study was foreign policy-making, and it would have been unwise to ignore the potential impact of international or European dynamics. However, as laid out in Chapter 2, given that the three countries under study have similar systemic contexts, their varying effect should be due to domestic-level differences, thus justifying the liberal approach. I thus conceptualised the systemic-level factors as mediated by domestic factors, and the study was able to theorise and assess these interaction mechanisms, such as different national foreign-policy norms leading to the receptiveness of different international or EU-level norms. Indeed, as discussed in the previous section, such interaction could benefit greatly from further research is required to fine-tune such a mechanism. The evidence from this study, however, suggests that we may be confronted with something like a normative ‘goodness of fit’ issue here. While the original concept of ‘goodness of fit’ arose from research on the Europeanisation of policy and stipulates that countries more easily incorporate new policies if they closely match their pre-existing domestic set-up (see e.g. Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001), one could easily imagine a similar mechanism at work when it comes to international vis-à-vis domestic norms.\footnote{See Acharya (2004) for previous research on how different transnational norms become incorporated at the regional level; see also fn 3, p. 298.}

I now briefly discuss the contributions of both case studies in turn.

In the development case study, the theoretical contribution of this investigation lies in further elucidating how the various different factors that have been found to impact upon development policy-making interact with each other to
produce different outcomes. As discussed above, I have shown that different donors behave differently towards the same countries or regions due to the ways in which domestic political and economic interests interact with other factors, including domestic and international norms and calculations about standing and influence in the international donor community. While previous studies have been able to indicate that different factors matter, this study has contributed to finding out how they matter.

Concerning the interaction of national foreign policy with the European level, the theoretical implications of this study also lie in the fine-tuning of the interaction mechanisms conceptualised. As with development, the way in which different explanatory factors work together depends on the domestic constellations of these factors in the countries under study. A mechanism not previously conceptualised has been uncovered and provides a fruitful starting point for further investigation: ‘re-uploading’ in the sense that EU Member States may first ‘download’ a policy stance or a decision from the EU level and then actively try to shape its further development. The conditions under which this occurs seem to be two-fold: either a previous attempt at uploading failed, or domestic interest in the issue at hand is relatively low, but there are other incentives to motivate attempts at influencing the EU level despite this.

Having discussed the theoretical implications of the study, some further observations regarding its wider context can be made.

7.4 Further Considerations

In this study, I have discussed in depth the varying motivations of three important EU Member States’ policies towards Latin America. I have also addressed the importance of the EU level in Latin America policy nowadays. In this context, it is worth taking a brief look at the implications of my findings for the EU’s policy towards the region. The biregional strategic partnership celebrated its ten-year anniversary in 2009 and the last EU-LAC biregional summit took place in 2010 in Madrid; both fall within the timeframe of this investigation’s focus. In the decade since its creation, the EU-LAC partnership has come to cover an impressive array of issues ranging from economic to cultural cooperation, although they have not always been tackled in a very organised fashion. The Lisbon Treaty has reformed the EU’s institutions and the way the Union makes foreign policy through the creation of a permanent post of High Representative and the European External Action Service. However, the EU’s Member States remain vital to the success of its external relations. As I have shown, the motivations and intensities with which EU members involve
themselves with Latin America vary widely across countries, but most of them tend more towards the UK’s end of the activity spectrum than Spain’s or even Germany’s, with the noticeable exceptions of Portugal, Italy, and France. As long as the Member States are driven by different motivating factors and are unwilling to leave the EU’s policy stance towards Latin America in the hands of the most interested and active Member States – and as long as such states are willing to exploit the EU to further their own interests, even when at odds with the general European good – there is little reason to believe that the relationship will take off as a truly bi-regional one. Bilateral paths are likely to remain strong. Spain does not get ‘enough Latin America’ out of the EU, while others are unable or unwilling to dedicate more attention to it, but are similarly unwilling to leave the relationship to others. Different Member States have different interests in Latin America, as one can easily observe in the current Association negotiations with Mercosur. France is sceptical of an agreement because of its vast agricultural sector, Germany and the UK want ambitious free trade agreements to conquer growing markets, and Spain is schizophrenically torn between the interests of its domestic agricultural sector and its external relations drive towards a closer relationship with Latin America. The importance of domestic factors discovered by this investigation thus does not bode well for a common, concerted, and active EU relationship with the region.

An analysis of current foreign policy is necessarily an attempt to hit a moving target. The conclusions drawn from this study apply to the making of Latin America policy in Germany, Spain, and the UK as it stands roughly since the mid-2000s. However, the world is rapidly evolving and it is quite likely that policy towards Latin America will be affected substantially. The most radical change is the fact that the balance of the European-Latin American relationship appears to be tipping rapidly in favour of Latin America. Europe must prepare for the ‘partnership’ rhetoric that has characterised relations with the region at least since the beginning of the EU’s strategic partnership with Latin America to become a reality. As Latin America’s economic and political situation improves, its most prosperous countries are increasingly both willing and able to make demands upon others and impose them. Due to the growing involvement of other actors, specifically China, the region needs Europe’s partnership less and less, while Europe might just be starting to need Latin America more. Whereas Europe struggles economically and politically through the current financial and economic crisis, Latin America seems, at least for the moment, to weather the crisis rather well. If they want to preserve or even improve rela-

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6 At the same time, as the saying goes, ‘it takes two to tango’. As long as Latin America (and the Caribbean) continues to be as fragmented as it currently is, it will be difficult to make the relationship a bi-regional one.
tions with the region, European countries thus ought to make sure they do not miss their chance.

But the developments in Latin America point to a growing division between the major economies of the region and ‘the rest’. While Colombia and Peru with their impressive economic growth rates may retain some significance, many of the smaller and poorer Latin American countries may lose touch with their faster-moving neighbours. With Argentina and Mexico two of the region’s major powers may be too engulfed in internal problems to focus on their role on the international scene. This principally leaves Brazil as the emerging power in the region, and may lead to a further ‘Brazilianisation’ of Latin America policy on behalf of those European countries that do not possess ties of the kind that link Spain with the region. In the UK, such a tendency is evident even in development policy, as this study has discussed. In Germany, Brazil is the only country that is discussed in depth in the government’s 2010 strategy paper (see also Maihold 2010 for a critique of this issue), although substantial ties with other countries of the region remain and have experienced a minor revival under the liberal-conservative government since 2009. The question is therefore to what extent we will soon be able to still speak of a Latin America policy on behalf of these countries at all, meaning a policy towards the entire region rather than just the most important countries or indeed just Brazil. For Spain, the question is whether it will remain on its track of ever further internationalisation and Europeanisation that has been relativising its relationship with Latin America to some degree in recent years. Yet at the same time, Spain’s current crisis situation has seen domestic concerns tie the Socialist government’s attention, especially during its last year, leading to stagnation in the development of Spain’s external affairs. Since the general elections in November 2011, the new Conservative government under the leadership of Mariano Rajoy and Foreign Minister José Manuel García Margallo has merged the offices of Secretary of State for Iberoamerica (previously merged with the Secretariat of State for External Affairs) and Secretary of State for International Cooperation (i.e. development policy) to create a single post for International Cooperation and Iberoamerica. This is surprising, since International Cooperation was initially supposed to be merged with External Affairs (El País, 6 January 2012). This seemed to indicate development policy would be put on the back burner as a result of the crisis, with Latin America – a fundamental support pillar of Spain’s multinationals, which are struggling domestically – taking on renewed importance. What exactly the merger of International Cooperation and Iberoamerica means for Spanish policy towards Latin America in the medium to long term can only be speculated on at the time of writing. Overall, Latin America policy-making in Europe thus remains a topic to be further observed.
7.5 Final Remarks

Policy-making towards Latin America in Europe, as this study has shown, is complex. Different explanatory factors from different theoretical backgrounds combine in unique, country-specific ways in order to produce varying levels of policy activity towards one and the same region on behalf of three important EU Member States. While policy is mainly based on domestic interests, both national and international norms also play a role, as does the rational adaptation to international standards for a range of reasons, including the desire to maintain or obtain a certain reputation on the international scene.

In sum, by exposing the complex interaction and influence of independent variables on foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK, I have shown that ‘bridge-building’ between different theoretical approaches is highly important in order for studies to be able to capture the full picture of what determines foreign policy-making. The challenge for future research is to broaden such insights by incorporating foreign policy towards other regions, the foreign policies of other countries, or policy-making in areas other than foreign affairs. Moreover, the mechanisms uncovered by this investigation can be fruitfully subjected to further research and systematisation both in small and large-N contexts.
Appendix A

Countries of Latin America and three-letter Country Codes
Table A.1: Countries classified as Latin America and three-letter country abbreviations (ISO ALPHA-3 code)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>ARG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>BLZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>BOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>BRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>CHL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>COL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>CRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>CUB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>DOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>ECU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>SLV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>GTM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>GUY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>HND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>HTI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>MEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>NIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>PRY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>PER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>SUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>URY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>VEN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B

fsQCA Index Raw Data
Appendix B.1 – Development Policy Activity Data

Table B.1: Percentage of DAC ODA going to Latin America, 2007-9 average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>% of DAC ODA to Latin America, 2007-9 average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>22.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>25.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B.2: Percentage of national ODA going to Latin America, 2007-9 average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>% of national ODA to Latin America, 2007-9 average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>37.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC total</td>
<td>7.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B.3: Number of Latin American countries among top-25 ODA recipients, 2007-9 average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>No. of LA countries among top-25 ODA recipients, 2007-9 average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DAC average</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B.2 – Civil Society Involvement

Government funds* channelled through CSOs – Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NGOs total</th>
<th>Churches</th>
<th>Political Foundations</th>
<th>CSOs total gross total</th>
<th>BMZ to Latin America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21,594**</td>
<td>42,657</td>
<td>32,165</td>
<td>96,416</td>
<td>569,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>16,378</td>
<td>43,329</td>
<td>32,092</td>
<td>91,799</td>
<td>493,296</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>16,141</td>
<td>38,510</td>
<td>31,144</td>
<td>85,795</td>
<td>354,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average</th>
<th>19,91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

* ODA

** figures are in 1,000 Euros

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subsaharan Africa</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>CSOs total</td>
<td>gross total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td></td>
<td>BMZ to Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16,777</td>
<td>57,887</td>
<td>32,250</td>
<td>106,914</td>
<td>914,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>15,260</td>
<td>53,988</td>
<td>29,581</td>
<td>98,829</td>
<td>890,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>14,184</td>
<td>52,461</td>
<td>20,873</td>
<td>87,518</td>
<td>777,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>11.26</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 2007-9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>Political Foundations</td>
<td>CSOs total</td>
<td>gross total BMZ to Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16,764</td>
<td>53,306</td>
<td>10,961</td>
<td>81,031</td>
<td>1,070,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>16,223</td>
<td>48,171</td>
<td>8,856</td>
<td>73,250</td>
<td>1,056,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18,757</td>
<td>47,937</td>
<td>11,538</td>
<td>78,232</td>
<td>1,039,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 2007-9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>DFID bilateral aid through NGOs North &amp; Central America</td>
<td>South America</td>
<td>Total Latin America</td>
<td>Total DFID bilateral aid to Latin America North &amp; Central America</td>
<td>South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/5</td>
<td>2,115**</td>
<td>5,991</td>
<td>8,106</td>
<td>8,406</td>
<td>17,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/6</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>3,297</td>
<td>4,365</td>
<td>7,708</td>
<td>12,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/7</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>4,201</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td>11,372</td>
<td>15,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/8</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>3,041</td>
<td>4,480</td>
<td>9,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/9</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2,399</td>
<td>2,699</td>
<td>5,123</td>
<td>8,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* UK Gross Public Expenditure on Development (GPEX). GPEX is reported in gross figures per calendar year.

** figures are in 1,000 British Pounds

Source: DFID Department for International Development (DFID) and National Statistics (2009).
### Subsaharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DFID bilateral aid through NGOs</th>
<th>Total DFID bilateral to Africa</th>
<th>% of total DFID bilateral aid through CSOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004/5</td>
<td>85,113</td>
<td>827,566</td>
<td>10.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/6</td>
<td>93,297</td>
<td>1,099,875</td>
<td>8.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/7</td>
<td>95,652</td>
<td>1,186,467</td>
<td>8.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/8</td>
<td>92,807</td>
<td>1,103,764</td>
<td>8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/9</td>
<td>158,231</td>
<td>1,465,890</td>
<td>10.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 2006-9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Asia***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DFID bilateral aid channelled through CSOs</th>
<th>Total DFID bilateral to Asia</th>
<th>% of total DFID bilateral aid channelled through CSOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004/5</td>
<td>82.121</td>
<td>725,782</td>
<td>11.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/6</td>
<td>89.185</td>
<td>824,959</td>
<td>10.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/7</td>
<td>90.498</td>
<td>795,959</td>
<td>11.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/8</td>
<td>75.500</td>
<td>830,673</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/9</td>
<td>87.512</td>
<td>993,499</td>
<td>8.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>9.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***excluding Middle East
Government funds* channelled through CSOs – Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of total gross ODA channelled through NGODs**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>33.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>29.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>27.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ODA
* Non-Governmental Organisations for Development
Appendix B.3 – Coding Scheme Text Analysis European Dimension

The texts were coded according to a coding scheme adapted from Larsen (Larsen (2009)), who developed a coding scheme to determine the way in which EU Member States carry out foreign policy within the EU framework. In the context of mapping policy activity, what is interesting are the different channels through which foreign policy is carried out. Policy documents were thus coded along the codebook in Table B.4. Note that if sentences belonged to more than one category, multiple coding was allowed.
### Table B.4: Codebook Policy Activity European Dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Policy Channel</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Country only</td>
<td>&quot;The Federal Government is focusing more strongly than it has until now on Latin America...” (AA Auswärtiges Amt (AA) (2010): 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>&quot;Not only will we continue to promote initiatives within the EU-Latin American Summit framework...” (MAEC Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (MAEC) (2010))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Country and other multilateral actor</td>
<td>“We have worked closely with Mexico and Brazil on the [UN Security] Council this year and look forward to doing the same with Colombia when it takes up its seat next year.” (FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (2010))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Country and US</td>
<td>“Our principal objective is constructing a positive agenda, [...] also using the dialogue and cooperation [...] with the United States (MAEC Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (MAEC) (2010))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

Calculating the Suits Index
The Suits Index $S$ is calculated as follows.

$S$ is defined in terms of the triangle $K$ between the lead diagonal, $x=100$ and the top right-hand corner of the concentration curve box ($x=100$, $y=100$), and $L$, the area under the aid concentration curve, so that:

$$S = (K - L)/K = 1 - (L/K) \quad (C.1)$$

On the $x$-axis of the concentration curve, we have the cumulative percentage of the $1.25$-day poor. This is a variable $y$ that varies between 0 and 100. The cumulative share of aid flow $x$ received by each country then becomes $A_x(y)$. The area under the concentration curve is therefore

$$L_x = \int_0^{100} A_x(y) \, dy \quad (C.2)$$

Recalling equation C.1, $S$ is therefore given by

$$S_x = 1 - (L_x/K) = 1 - (1/K) \int_0^{100} A_x(y) \, dy \quad (C.3)$$

However, the values of $A_x(y)$ are only known for the values shown in C.1. Therefore, the Suits Index relies on an approximation of the integral for $L_x$:

$$L_x \approx \sum_{i=1}^{j} \frac{1}{2} \left[ A_x(y_i) + A_x(y_{i-1}) \right] (y_i - y_{i-1}) \quad (C.4)$$

Using the data in Table C.1, the approximation can easily be calculated and the resulting value plugged into equation C.1. The value for $K$ is easily calculated, since it is a triangle with a base $b$ and height $h$ of 100, whose area is therefore:

$$K = \frac{b \times h}{2} = 5000$$

Doing so, we receive a Suits Index $S_x$ of 0.19 for the data in Table C.1 (p. 327), meaning that aid to Latin America from the DAC member countries is mildly regressive.
Table C.1: Cumulative Percentages of DAC Countries’ Aid to Latin America and $1.25/Day Poor*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage: Aid</th>
<th>$1.25/Day Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>26.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>18.03</td>
<td>33.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>29.01</td>
<td>41.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>38.15</td>
<td>50.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>40.23</td>
<td>54.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>47.19</td>
<td>60.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>50.93</td>
<td>64.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>55.31</td>
<td>67.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>66.44</td>
<td>71.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Rep.</td>
<td>68.70</td>
<td>73.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>82.05</td>
<td>81.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>83.40</td>
<td>82.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>84.15</td>
<td>87.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>85.91</td>
<td>89.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>92.87</td>
<td>93.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>93.32</td>
<td>94.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>94.02</td>
<td>97.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>98.21</td>
<td>99.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure is based on the share of poor in each country. The shares were summed across all countries to reach the figure based on which the cumulative percentages were calculated.
Appendix D

Coding Scheme Development

Case Study
**Hypothesis** | **Evidence in the interviews** | **Support for hypothesis if**
--- | --- | ---
$H_{1a}$: Development policy towards Latin America is driven by economic interests. | $1a$: Interviewee motivates aid to Latin America (or Latin American countries) with economic factors, such as trade and investment | There is an explicit connection between development aid and economic interest. |

$H_{1b}$: Development policy towards Latin America is driven by political interests. | $1b$: Interviewee motivates aid to Latin America (or Latin American countries) with political factors, such as a country’s/Latin America’s global weight or security considerations. | There is an explicit connection between development aid and political factors, including geopolitical issues, bilateral political relations, and security concerns (incl. new security, such as drugs). |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Evidence in the Interviews</th>
<th>Support for Hypothesis if</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_{2a}$: Development policy towards Latin America is driven by a national norm of poverty alleviation</td>
<td>2a: Interviewee motivates aid to Latin America (or Latin American countries) with a norm of poverty alleviation based on national considerations, such as a national duty, or ‘the right thing to do as Country’</td>
<td>There is an explicit connection between aid and a domestic-level norm of the goal of aid being poverty alleviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{2b}$: Development policy towards Latin America is driven by an international norm of poverty alleviation</td>
<td>2b: Interviewee motivates aid to Latin America (or Latin American countries) with a norm of poverty alleviation based on international considerations, such as ‘the right thing to do as member of the developed countries’, or reference to global development goals (e.g. MDGs) as ‘the right thing to do’.</td>
<td>There is an explicit connection between aid and an international-level norm of the goal of aid being poverty alleviation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hypothesis Evidence in the Interviews Support for Hypothesis if

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Evidence in the Interviews</th>
<th>Support for Hypothesis if</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_2$: Development policy towards Latin America is driven by rational adaptation to international rules of poverty alleviation</td>
<td>2c: Interviewee motivates aid to Latin America (or Latin American countries) with conforming to global development goals (e.g. MDGs) for reasons such as maintaining a status or a reputation as a good donor.</td>
<td>There is an explicit connection between aid for poverty alleviation and a desire to maintain a status or reputation as a good member of the international donor community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E

Coding Scheme EU Case Study
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uploading (Strong)</td>
<td>Taking national policy to the EU level with intention of influencing EU policy</td>
<td>$U_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uploading (Weak)</td>
<td>Taking national policy to the EU level with intention of sharing information/ initiative</td>
<td>$U_w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downloading</td>
<td>Incorporating issues from EU level into national policy agenda</td>
<td>$D$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>Evidence in the interviews</td>
<td>Support for hypothesis if:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_1$: Greater domestic interests lead to attempts to upload. Downloading only in issues of lesser interest if it brings other benefits or has no costs.</td>
<td><em>Code 1a</em>: Issues identified by interviewee as being of particular interest to her country</td>
<td>Evidence for $1aUs$ must be present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Code 1aUs</em>: Interviewee connects strong uploading with issues of particular interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Code 1b</em>: Issues identified by interviewee as being of lesser interest to her country</td>
<td>Evidence for $1bD$ and $1ben$ is present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Code 1bD</em>: Interviewee connects downloading with issues of lesser interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Code 1ben</em>: Interviewee connects downloading in areas of lesser interests with additional benefits or no cost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hypothesis Evidence in the interviews Support for hypothesis if:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Evidence in the interviews</th>
<th>Support for hypothesis if:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| $H_2$: State representatives try harder to upload if issues fall under EU competence. | Code 2a: Issue of EU competence is mentioned.  
*Code 2aUs*: The interviewee establishes a special, explicit connection between EU competence and strong uploading. | Instances of 2aUs are present. |
| $H_3$: State representatives adapt to EU rules to keep a good reputation and status, leading to a willingness to download and to weak uploading | Code 3a: Reputation and Status are mentioned as motivation for action.  
*Code 3aD*: Interviewee connects good reputation and status with downloading.  
*Code 3aUw*: Interviewee connects good reputation and status with weak uploading. | Instances of 3aD and/or 3aUw are present. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Evidence in the interviews</th>
<th>Support for hypothesis if:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_4$: Pro-European domestic socialisation leads to downloading and weak uploading motivated by national norms.</td>
<td><em>Code 4a</em>: Pro-European national norms are mentioned as motivation for action</td>
<td>Instances of $4aD$ and/or $4aUw$ are present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | | *Code 4aD*: Interviewee connects pro-European national norms and downloading  
*Code 4aUw*: Interviewee connects pro-European national norms and weak uploading | |
| $H_5$: European socialisation leads to downloading and to weak uploading motivated by EU norms and a feeling of community. | *Code 5a*: EU norms and a feeling of community are mentioned as motivation for action | Instances of $5aD$ and/or $5aUw$ are present. |
| | | *Code 5aD*: Interviewee connects EU norms and feeling of community to downloading  
*Code 5aUw*: Interviewee connects EU norms and feeling of community to weak uploading | |
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