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Inequality and Political Consensus
Grüner, Hans Peter
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Dokumenttyp:
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Zeitschriftenartikel
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Erscheinungsjahr:
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2009
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Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:
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Theory and Decision
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Band/Volume:
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67
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Heft/Issue:
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3
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Seitenbereich:
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239-265
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Ort der Veröffentlichung:
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Dordrecht [u.a.]
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Verlag:
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Springer
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ISSN:
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0040-5833 , 1573-7187
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Sprache der Veröffentlichung:
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Englisch
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Einrichtung:
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Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > VWL, Wirtschaftspolitik (Grüner 1999-)
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Fachgebiet:
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330 Wirtschaft
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Fachklassifikation:
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JEL:
C72,
D31,
D70,
D72,
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Abstract:
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This paper develops a model of political consensus in order to explain the missing link between inequality and political redistribution. Political consensus is an implicit agreement not to vote for extreme policy proposals. We show that such an agreement may play an efficiency-enhancing role. Voters anticipate that voting for extremist parties increases policy uncertainty in the future. A political consensus among voters reduces policy uncertainty because self-interested politicians propose non-discriminatory policies. We study how much inequality can be sustained in a democracy and how the limits to redistribution vary with initial inequality. The bounds of the set of political equilibria may react in a fundamentally different manner to changes in exogenous variables than do the policy variables in the one-dimensional, one-shot game. More initial inequality need not lead to more redistribution from the rich to the poor. The maximum amount of redistribution decreases with inequality if (and only if) agents are sufficiently patient. In this case inequality is politically self-sustaining.
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 | Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie. |
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