The Social Structure of Political Influence

Timo Böhm

Inaugural dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Social Science in the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim

University of Mannheim
2015
Dekan der Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften

Erstbetreuer: Prof. Henning Hillmann, Ph.D.

Zweitbetreuer und Erstgutachter: Prof. Thomas Gschwend, Ph.D.

Zweitgutachter: Prof. Daniel A. McFarland, Ph.D.

Datum der Disputation: 26. Mai 2015
Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my advisors Henning Hillmann and Thomas Gschwend, and to Daniel McFarland for their invaluable feedback. I am also thankful for suggestions from Love Börjeson, Charles Gomez, Michel Meier-Bode, Anna Kaiser, Malte Reichelt, the seminar participants at the University of Mannheim, the University of Utrecht and the University of Nijmegen, the conference participants at the ASA Annual Meetings 2013 and 2014, at the 30th EGOS Colloquium 2014, at the ECPR General Conference 2013 and at the XXIII Subelt 2013. Furthermore, I am grateful for the Center of Education Research at Stanford (CERAS) for hosting me one semester and for the financial support to go there by the Graduate School of Economic and the Social Sciences (GESS).
# Table of Contents

The Social Structure of Political Influence – 5

Framing Chapter

A Closed Elite? – Bristol’s Society of 30
Merchant Venturers and the Abolition of Slave Trading

Activists in Politics – The Influence of 68
Embedded Activists on the Success of Social Movements

Party Careers and Electoral Success – The 114
Structural Effect of Political Parties on Candidates’ Success

Anhang 144
The Social Structure of Political Influence

Framing Chapter

Timo Böhm
Striving for Political Influence

Modern societies’ heterogeneity of preferences seems to increase over time. Many of these preferences are affected by political decisions in a more or less direct way. Strictly speaking, every law has an impact on some actors’ preferences. If actors want to actively pursue their preferences, they need to find ways to affect political decisions. The broad term for all these ways is political influence. The research question of this dissertation therefore is: how do actors get access to political influence?

Political influence is the general ability to change political outcome. Speaking counterfactually, political outcomes would have been different if some actor had not used his or her political influence. Since political influence is a rather abstract concept, it is very useful to understand it as a limited resource that some actors have access to and others have not. If there is one group of actors that is able to restrict access to political influence or to even monopolize this resource, this group is called a political elite. Following a recent summary of elite studies in sociology (Khan 2012), political elites can be understood as a group of actors with a disproportionate control over political capital. An existing political elite also implies a strong inequality concerning access to political influence within a society.

There are two important ways for political elites to protect their privileged access to political influence. First, political elites can be organized. Interest groups and political parties are well-known examples. Second, political elites can be institutionalized. Here, parliaments and other kinds of political offices serve as prototypical instances. Regardless of the specific configuration of the elite’s structure, political elites are a very frequent phenomenon in societies. Political elites may be smaller or larger and more or less permeable, but it seems to be a general rule that political hierarchies emerge wherever larger groups of people meet. By
definition, most actors will stay outside the elite. Nevertheless, excluded actors also have an interest in realizing their preferences as well as elite actors. The more precise research question of this dissertation therefore is: how are actors able to pursue their political interests if there is a political elite that controls the access to political influence?

I approached this research question by applying an analytical frame that is based upon a social network perspective. By doing so, I propose a distinction between three possible social structures that have the potential to enable actors to get access to the elite. In the next step, I outline my research strategy and describe the three papers that constitute this dissertation. I conclude this framing chapter with a summary of the results and suggestions for further research in this direction.

**Analytical Framework**

I approached my research question from a social network perspective. More precisely, I developed theoretical arguments that are based on the assumption that the social structure – the sum of individual actors and the connections between them – plays a significant role in understanding the access to political influence. Starting with this perspective, figure 1 illustrates the analytical frame of my research question. The left half of figure 1 shows the basic setting. There is a (latent) group of actors with shared preferences. However, there is a political elite that these actors cannot circumvent. The elite serves as a gatekeeper. The right half of Figure 1 pictures the three theoretical possibilities for actors to get access to the political elite: ties, intersection and careers. Each of these avenues has its own logic and the underlying mechanisms deserve a close examination. Yet, the specific effect of each mechanism depends on the empirical question at hand. Therefore, I restrict the description to the basic ideas and refer to the single papers for the extensive arguments and further details.
Figure 1: Illustration of the analytical frame of my research question. There is a (latent) group of actors with shared preferences that needs access to the elite in order to get access to political influence. The three possible ways to get this access are ties, intersection and careers.

In this framework, **ties** between the elite and other actors constitute bridges. As the term suggests, bridges cross cleavages but the groups stay separated. A well-known advantage of ties between groups is the additional access to information, which can then be used to adapt strategies or to identify new courses of action. Probably the most famous works based on this idea, applied it to economic advantages that actors can get out of ties (Burt 1995; Granovetter 1973). More recent contributions attempt to transfer these ideas to social movements by generalizing individual advantages to the group level (Diani 1997, 2003). Despite different research questions, it is widely accepted that ties between two groups lead to measurable advantages for at least one and very often both sides.
In contrast, if it is possible for actors to become a member of the elite without losing their membership in the non-elite group, *intersection* can appear. Intersection emerges if groups start to overlap because some actors are brokers between them. There are many examples in the literature of how brokers make profit, especially if they are able to maintain their position (Padgett and Ansell 1993). There are also conceptualizations about different types of brokers (Gould and Fernandez 1989). The literature on brokerage is extensive, therefore I have to refer to a recent review article for further details (Stovel and Shaw 2012).

The last possible social structure to get access to political influence is constituted by *careers*. Here, the focus lies on transitions from an outsider to a full member of the elite. The memberships do not remain the same and they do not add up. They change completely. In the context of political influence, the most important kind of career is a political career. Considerable parts of the literature on this issue are concerned with individuals’ ambitions and decisions (e.g., Fox and Lawless 2005; Recchi 1999). In contrast, I want to emphasize that careers create the potential for non-elites’ preferences to get access to political influence.

**Research Strategy**

The aim of this dissertation’s research strategy is the identification of the three possible social structures of actors’ access to political influence and the related mechanisms. Therefore, the focus lies on internal validity and less on a direct generalizability of the results. In order to achieve this goal, two requirements are essential. First, there has to be enough variation between observations both on the dependent and on all independent variables. I accomplished this requirement by analyzing long periods of time and by considering a large number of observations in each case. By analyzing long periods of time, I was able to separate the general mechanisms from more specific, and probably fast-paced, dynamics. The large
number of observations enabled me to apply quantitative methods of analysis, which are better suited to detect general patterns than qualitative approaches. Qualitative examples are provided in some cases to illustrate theoretical arguments or key findings but they are not meant as additional evidence in a strict sense. Second, the context needs to be stable enough to exclude potential bias by differences on the macro level. In order to fulfill this requirement, I chose two cases within one political environment and one case with very similar and therefore comparable political systems.

This research strategy requires a specific kind of cases. That is, the cases are chosen in order to evaluate whether the analytical frame has explanatory potential. If this proves to be true, these cases can be used as starting points for further research. Subsequent investigations can then clarify under which circumstances given mechanisms have more or less impact on political outcomes. I return to more specific suggestions on this issue at the end of this chapter as well as in the conclusions of each paper.

More specifically, each paper of this dissertation focuses on one of the social structures and the underlying mechanisms. Separating these mechanisms is an analytical approach to make the empirical tests as straightforward as possible. It is important to keep in mind that social structures are highly complex and fluid. For instance, cases with intersection can also include careers or bridges or both. However, each case in this dissertation was chosen in a way that allowed clear conclusions on the effect of one specific mechanism without neglecting other possible influences.

Before I turn to a more detailed discussion of the single papers, some words on the basic idea of each paper. The first empirical case focuses on ties between the slave traders and the political elite in 18th century Bristol, England. By applying network simulation techniques, Henning Hillmann and I looked at variations in network connectivity to estimate how
important these ties were for the slave traders’ attempt to protect their business from an abolitionists campaign. The second paper is about the German anti-nuclear movement and its intersection with members of the Green party that were also members of the parliamentarian elite. The amounts of intersection vary between regions, which enabled me to estimate the effect of more or less intersection on the movement’s success. The third empirical analysis focuses on the political careers of Norwegian candidates for the national parliament between 1945 and 2010. Here, variation stems from the difference between successful and unsuccessful candidates. I used these differences to estimate the influencing factors for the probability of a successful career. The following description of the three papers is limited to the general argument, the basic analysis and the key findings. Refer to the original papers for more details.
I. A Closed Elite? – Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers and the Abolition of Slave Trading

This paper focuses on the first kind of social structure that might enable actors to get access to the political elite: ties. In this scenario, a clear distinction between members of the elite and non-elite actors remains, so there is no room for parallel memberships in both groups. To ensure that this setting is empirically valid, we focused on a case with an organized elite. Organizations have clear boundaries. Thus, the identification of membership is straightforward. The specific elite organization also classifies as the political elite due to its strong connection to the political system. The actors outside the elite share a common economic interest, which strongly depends on political decisions: slave trade.

Slave trade was one of the most established and profitable trades in England during the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. Although it was a risky endeavor, it was also an opportunity for less established merchants to make enough profit to launch a long-term career. There are some discussions in the literature about the precise profit rates of the slave trade but the overall profitability is rarely contested. Therefore, slave trade was an important part of the English trade system for a very long period of time. Consequently, the slave traders had a common interest in protecting this trade. The need for protection became significant when, in 1787, the founding of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade marked the beginning of the final attack on slave trade. In 1807, the House of Commons officially banned slave trade and the slave traders had lost their struggle. In this paper, we analyzed the connections between the slave traders and the political elite to understand how these ties influenced the slave traders’ lack of success. A focus on ties implies knowledge of the actual connections between actors on the micro level. Therefore, we chose to use Bristol as an example. Not only
was Bristol one of the three most important slave trading ports, there is also high-quality data available for the analysis.

In the paper, we argue that local elite organizations can serve two purposes. On the one hand, they can provide an organizational platform for different forms of mobilization. For instance, they can support political struggles by activating their contacts to political decision-makers. Building on their formal and informal connections to other groups, elite organizations can do what is in the center of this dissertation: enable actors to get access to political influence. On the other hand, elite organizations have an interest in keeping the number of benefitting actors low. That is, elite closure is very likely. Given that elites were able to monopolize resources, elite actors have no direct incentive to reduce their individual share. Elite actors’ considerations might differ if political struggles can affect an elite’s interest in the long run, such as a general interest in protecting trade privileges from state interventions. In sum, we expected that there should be a potential for support but whether this support was provided or not turned out to be an empirical question since there are good arguments for both sides.

The local elite of Bristol was organized in the Society of Merchant Venturers of the City of Bristol. Since political offices had a high relevance for political influence during this period (Rogers 1989), we evaluated data on local and national offices of members (Beaven 1899) to understand how important the Society actually was. We also considered honorary memberships (Minchinton 1963). The results provided clear evidence that the Society was strongly embedded into the political system, both on the local and the national level. In other words, the Society qualified as the most important elite organization in our empirical analysis. Therefore, we used the official membership roster of the Society (Minchinton 1963) to identify elite members. In sum, we could use information on 393 members of the Society between 1700 and 1807.
We collected ties between slave traders by referring to the well-established *Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (Eltis, Berent, and Richardson 2008). This database includes the names of merchants who financed slave-trading ventures. We also included information on ventures in privateering and other trades, such as sugar or tobacco, to analyze trading sequences of merchants over time (Hillmann and Gathmann 2011; Morgan 1993; Powell 1930; Richardson 1996). Here, we could use information on 287 merchants who collaborated in 448 partnerships. These merchants and their overlap with the Society are in the center of our empirical analysis.

The data clearly showed that most slave-traders were not able to attain membership in the Society of Merchant Venturers. The rare exceptions were the most successful merchants, that is merchants who dealt in slave trade for a longer time and more often. This selection was due to increased entry barriers over time. In contrast to merchants from other trades, slave traders were significantly more likely to pay a fee to attain membership. Other modes of access such as kinship or apprenticeship were mostly reserved for merchants from other trades (see McGrath (1975) for details about the different modes of admission). In addition, slave traders constituted only a small share of the Society’s members.

Although only a small minority of slave traders became members of the Society, they were central for the overall cohesion of the slave traders’ economic network. After deleting the 182 ties between members of the Society and ordinary slave traders, the percentage of unreachable pairs rose from about 56 percent to about 97 percent (see figure 2 for a graphical representation). The original paper lists additional measurements but all results pointed at the same direction. In order to clarify whether these descriptive results were systematic, we conducted two different network simulation procedures. First, we deleted 182 random ties from the observed network to see whether the decreased amount of the network’s cohesion was a result of the absolute number of deleted ties. Second, we simulated networks with the
same number of nodes and the same degree distribution and used the simulated networks instead of the observed one to delete 182 ties. A more detailed explanation of the procedure and the exact results can be found in the original paper. In sum, the results suggested that the ties between members and ordinary slave traders had a systematic relevance for the overall cohesion of the economic network. We interpreted that as evidence for the organizing capacity that the Society’s members could provide. In other words, the structural basis for a successful mobilization was given.

Figure 2: The left graph shows the observed network of economic ties between the members of the Society (white squares) and ordinary slave traders (black circles). The two initials refer to two exemplary cases that are discussed in the original paper. The center graph uses the same coordinates to illustrate the network’s cohesion after we deleted ties between members and ordinary merchants. The right graph is based on optimized coordinates to show how members of the Society shape the biggest remaining component. Ordinary slave traders had no comparable component structure that could replace the cohesion provided by the members.

However, the incentives for the elite members to use this potential in favor of the slave traders’ interest were small. Empirically, slave traders who attained membership in the Society of Merchant Venturers stopped to trade in slaves shortly after their membership. This general trend became stronger during the course of the 18th century and was strongest when the Abolitionists’ campaign started in 1787. Most likely, these trading patterns were due to
the higher risk of slave trade compared to other trades. Successful merchants were not forced to rely on such a risky endeavor anymore. Instead, they chose to pursue lower profits that were more predictable. The elite closure was therefore a direct consequence of the underlying economic incentives, which is in line with more general analyses of merchant guilds (Ogilvie 2011). From the slave traders’ point of view, this mechanism prevented a successful activation of the economic ties for political purposes and left them in a structural disadvantage when the campaign against slave trade started.
II. Activists in Politics – The Influence of Embedded Activists on the Success of Social Movements

The second paper is about intersection. In contrast to the first paper, the potential of intersection implies that actors can have two memberships at the same time. Therefore, possible cases for this type of social structure need to consider two kinds of memberships that are both theoretically combinable and empirically observable. In other words, the empirical membership to the elite may not exclude memberships outside, as it was the case with 18th century Bristol and the Society of Merchant Venturers. Thus, I chose to focus on an institutionalized elite and a group of actors that are specific enough to identify them but organized loosely enough to allow intersection. More specifically, I focused on members of parliament and the intersection with a social movement.

The concrete empirical case, which I analyzed in the second paper, is the German antinuclear movement and its intersection with the Green party in regional and national parliaments. The term “activists in politics” summarizes the approach to focus on antinuclear activists that were able to make a career in the Green party up to a seat in parliament. Since this case includes a political elite, an identifiable group of actors outside the elite and the possibility for intersection, it is well suited to see how intersection is connected to access to political influence. From a more technical point of view, there are additional advantages. First, the antinuclear movement’s goals are clearly definable and therefore, a measurement of success is straightforward. Second, Germany’s federalist structure allows considering variation in intersection and success while comparing very similar political settings. Third, there is also variation over a long period of time, which can be used to disentangle general relations from time-varying dynamics.
There are more detailed arguments in the original paper, but I basically argued that there are two main mechanisms concerning intersection. On the one hand, intersection has many advantages for social movements. First, intersection is based upon trust. Activists in politics have an intrinsic motivation to fight for their movement’s goals. Because of their history as activists, they are also perceived as “one of us” by the movement. These two aspects together create an access to the political elite that is way stronger than ties, since ties between two groups are vulnerable to rational calculations of either side. Second, intersection enables brokers to recombine resources of both networks (Evans and Kay 2008). In this specific case, the most important resources to combine are information from the inside of the political system and support of members of parliament by the social movement. Third, intersection gives activists access to insider tactics that are not available otherwise (see Banaszak 2005 for details). The combination of insider and outsider tactics is connected to an increased likelihood of social movements’ success (Olzak and Ryo 2007).

On the other hand, intersection has also some disadvantages. First, a large number of activists in politics might endanger the social movement’s identity. Most social movements emerge because of a shared belief that the political system is unable or unwilling to act appropriate (Tilly 1999). If intersection increases, a social movement might react by restoring the distance to the political system, thereby decreasing the potential that intersection creates. Second, individual activists in politics might be confronted by role-conflicts. Since roles are a combination of internal identification and external application (Viterna 2013), tensions between the role of an activist and the role of a politician can lead to less efficient use of the brokerage position. Third, there is also a constant danger of cooptation, which is spelled out in the original paper but not crucial for the main argument. In sum, although there should be an overall positive effect of intersection on a movement’s success, there also should be a tipping-point. I therefore expected to find an effect in form of an inverted U-shape.
I collected data to operationalize the two main concepts: success and intersection. In line with the antinuclear movement’s goals, I defined success as events, namely cases of prevented constructions or shutdowns of nuclear reactors. Information on the timing of these events came from the documents of the *International Atomic Energy Agency* (IAEA) and the official journal of the *Deutsches Atomforum e.V.*, which is the association of German energy suppliers that own nuclear power stations. The operationalization of intersection was more complex. First, I collected the names of all members of parliament of the Green party on the regional and national level between 1972 and 2002. These 352 politicians constituted the subset of the political elite that might also have an activist background. In the next step, I collected biographies, historical records and parliamentarian questions to identify those actors that had an antinuclear background (see original paper for details). The actual value of intersection for each region was calculated as the proportion of politicians with an antinuclear background in the Green parliamentary group for each month. Therefore, the values range from zero to 100 percent. Most importantly, there was a lot of variation over time and between regions to use for a reliable statistical analysis.

I followed an understanding of success as the result of cumulating influence over time (Tilly 1999), which is in line with a view on social movements’ struggle as a gradual process (Yamasaki 2009). To account for this conception, I applied event history analyses and defined the episodes as the time between success events. The tested research question therefore was: is higher intersection related to faster success? I also included a set of control variables, for instance a dummy to account for the period after the incident of Chernobyl and the shifting public opinion afterwards. To increase the results’ robustness, I also controlled for alternative explanations. The PRODAT dataset (see original paper for details) was used to construct a proxy for public pressure. Information of Greenpeace Germany about its budget development during the period in question entered the model as a proxy for the resources spend for
lobbying. More technically, additional models tested whether different specifications of the underlying base hazards would alter the results (again, see original paper for details).

Figure 3 illustrates the main result of the empirical analysis, namely the predicted hazards for each degree of intersection based on the main model. Both the linear and the quadratic effect were significant and pointed in the expected direction. That is, the results confirmed the inverted U-shape. In other words, the analysis provided evidence that intersection is an effective way for a social movement to get access to political influence and is related to the antinuclear movement’s rate of success.

Figure 3: The x-axis shows different degrees of intersection and the y-axis the predicted hazards based on the main model of the original paper. The dashed line is calculated using the linear and quadratic coefficients for intersection (see original paper for details). The difference between the predicted hazards and the simplified function are due to opposing influence of other variables in the model.
III. Party Careers and Electoral Success – The Structural Effect of Political Parties on Candidates’ Success

The third paper is about careers or about the question how actors get access to the political elite. Therefore, the transition itself is most important, implying that I needed information on the time before and after an actor attained elite membership. I decided to conduct this analysis by focusing on the members of parliament as an institutionalized political elite and the careers of political candidates that try to get into parliament. In order to focus on the general pattern, the empirical case needed to be one with an overall stable setting to minimize potential influences by macro developments, e.g., big shifts in the political landscape. Therefore, I carried out the analysis based on data about Norwegian candidates for parliament over a period of several decades.

Perhaps the most prominent effect in the literature concerning parliamentary elections is the incumbency effect. Without going into the details, members of parliament that decide to rerun for office have a strong probability to defend their seats. This effect can be seen as one aspect of elite reproduction, which is an interesting question in itself but out of the scope of this dissertation. However, if this effect is strong, transitions into the elite are mainly possible when incumbents leave seats undefended. In sum, vacancies are a necessary precondition of actors to make a career and they are filled after an election with the most successful candidates. Another complication for candidates is that party lists are strongly correlated with the final result. Even if voters have the right to change the candidates’ order, they usually do not exercise this right. This is true both for random (Chen et al. 2014) and alphabetical lists (Webber et al. 2014). For instance, the correlation between party lists and the order of
candidates in Norway is 0.92. These findings shift the focus from individual candidates to the organizations that select them: political parties.

Political parties decide on party lists according to their organizational goals. In general, the main goal of a political party is to maximize its influence in parliament to pursue their political agenda as strongly as possible. I argue in the paper why there are two qualities of candidates that are most important to achieve this goal: high political performance and loyalty. However, these qualities are not directly observable. Therefore, political parties need signals to reduce their uncertainty about the hidden qualities. The best choice is internal signals that are observable inside the party structure. These signals are more difficult to fake than signals outside the organization. The best signal for the ability to deliver a high political performance is the prominence of a candidate. The best signal for a candidate’s loyalty to fight for the party’s goals is the length of his or her party career. Given that political parties use these signals to recruit candidates, they should be strongly connected to candidates’ probability to make a career, i.e. to get a seat in parliament.

I merged data provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) to test the empirical implications of this argument (see original text for details). It is important to emphasize that the data includes both winning and losing candidates for the period between 1946 and 2010. It also includes a measure for the exact place on the list for each candidate after the election. I especially focused on the information on party careers. Here, the data includes information on the sequence and level of the positions hold by each candidate.

I conducted several generalized linear mixed-effects models that include a random intercept by politicians’ ID to account for unobserved heterogeneity and nested sequences of party careers (see original paper for details). Three models from the paper are most important. First, I calculated a complete model for all candidates. In this model, I used the whole range
of variation in success and party careers. Second, I calculated a separate model with the subset of candidates who had some sort of a party career. I used this for the internal comparison between different lengths of party careers and different levels of party offices. Third, I did another model with the subset of candidates that just missed or won a seat.

The results of these three models are in line with the theoretical expectations. In the complete model, the effects of party offices and the length of a candidate’s party career point in the expected direction. Furthermore, there is a significant difference between offices on the national and lower levels. The effects of prominence and loyalty are also significant in explaining differences between candidates with a party background. Here, an office on the national level has the strongest impact on a candidate’s probability to win a seat in parliament. When it comes to close calls, the effect of a party career’s length disappears. Without going too much into the details, that might be due to a stronger effect of voters’ perception of a candidate. In other words, the structural effect of parties on election outcomes decreases when relatively few votes can make a difference. Refer to the original paper for more details both about the results and the interpretation.

Since coefficients, respectively odds-ratios, can be misleading in this kind of model, I calculated predictions for each observation and compared them to the actual results, pictured in figure 4. The left bar for each model shows the percentage of correct predicted winning candidates, the right bars the percentage of correct predicted losing candidates.
The complete model is very strong in predicting election results. This finding supports the argument stated above, namely that party careers are strongly related to career success. In the case of party politicians, the predictions are especially good for winners but less so for losers. The results for close calls are also asymmetric. All these findings combined indicate that there is a strong structural effect of political parties on politicians’ success. On a more abstract level, the results suggest that making a career, that is attaining membership of the political elite, depends on the existing elite.

Figure 4: Each bar indicates the number of correct predictions for the three models mentioned in the text. The left bars graph the correctly identified winners and the right bars the correctly identified election losers. The complete model is quite strong in the overall prediction pattern whereas the other two models show strength and weaknesses.
Conclusion and Outlook

How do actors get access to political influence? Concerning the three types of underlying social structures, the main results of the three papers of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. First, the lack of utilizable ties to the elite is a serious disadvantage in political struggles. Second, an intersection between a non-elite and the political elite has a measurable impact on the non-elite’s political success. Third, the elite itself controls the access to the elite. In each of these cases, the analytical frame proved to be fruitful for increasing our understanding of each empirical case.

However, all three cases revealed more complicated mechanisms behind the respective social structures. First, political ties are dependent on ties in other areas of social life. In the case of Bristol, these ties were economic ones. Second, the opportunity for intersection depends on the existence of an allied group inside the political elite. That is, the specific social structure between non-elite and elite depends on the overall structure of the political arena. Third, if careers into the elite depend on decisions of elite members, non-elites have to adapt to the internal logic of the elite.

On a more general level, the presence of ties, intersection or careers is a precondition of non-elites’ access to political influence. The presence alone, however, is not enough to infer political success. Actors need to be successful in using established bridges, they need to combine resources and they need to make a career. In other words, the social structure itself needs to be combined with information on the specific empirical case to create reliable insights and to increase our understanding. It is important to emphasize that these mechanisms and structures are not mutually exclusive. For instance, careers might lead to ties or intersections. Therefore, valid conclusions arise out of a careful combination of analytical
distinction and empirical evidence. The three papers of this dissertation showed how it is possible to analytically focus on one dominant mechanism without denying or ignoring the potential relevance of the other two. By doing so, the analytical frame presented above led to further insights.

Based on these results, there are several areas for further research. First, each paper provided insights into the absolute relevance of a specific social structure but no setting was intended to allow a direct comparison between the three mechanisms. Further research needs to clarify under which conditions one mechanism is more successful than the other two or when and how they interact in what ways. Second, an emphasis on elite organizations would add to the picture developed here. How do the internal dynamics of these organizations influence external relations? How do formal and informal connections between actors interact? This possible line of research also hints at the possibility to develop a more fine-grained measurement of elite membership. For instance, there is an internal hierarchy in elite organizations and the elite members’ position in it might strongly impact actors’ opportunities and incentives to connect to outside actors. Third, although I focused on the political elite, the basic mechanisms should be transferable to other kinds of elites, for instance economic or religious ones. The identification of an outside group might be more difficult but the basic arguments presented in this dissertation should hold nevertheless.
References


A Closed Elite?

Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers and the Abolition of Slave Trading

Timo Böhm and Henning Hillmann

Why, despite clear economic incentives, did eighteenth-century slave traders fail to defend their business interests against the abolition campaign? We focus on the outport of Bristol as a case in point. Our main argument is that slave traders lacked an organizational basis to translate their economic interests into political influence. Supporting evidence from merchant networks over the 1698-1807 period shows that the Society of Merchant Venturers offered such an organizational site for collective political action. Members of this chartered company controlled much of Bristol’s seaborne commerce and held chief elective offices in the municipal government. However, the Society evolved into an organization that represented the interests of a closed elite. High barriers to entry prevented the slave traders from using the Society as a vehicle for political mobilization. Social cohesion among slave traders outside the chartered company hinged on centrally positioned brokers. Yet the broker positions were held by the few merchants who became members of the Society, and who eventually ceased their engagement in slave trading. The result was a fragmented network that undermined the slave traders’ concerted efforts to mobilize against the political pressure of the abolitionist movement.
The case of early modern merchant companies offers a valuable opportunity for understanding how organized economic interests translate into political influence. Evidence from various historical settings suggests that traders who played similar roles within the networks of their merchant community also formed shared economic interests. They relied on the same trusted business partners in repeated overseas trading ventures, and they preferred the same creditors to obtain the funding necessary for their enterprises (Hancock 1995; Zahedieh 2010). These are just two examples of salient economic connections. What they illustrate is that reliance on shared positions within well-established webs of elite relationships may indeed have helped merchant traders to stay in business. But, more often than not, their shared economic interests required a political voice for merchants to obtain valuable trade privileges and to defend them against competing merchants in other ports.

Drawing on our historical case and insights from comparable settings, we argue that their political voice was rarely heard unless merchants were able to coordinate their interests and multiple network affiliations into some cohesive organization (Gould 1995; Hillmann 2008a). Our evidence suggests that chartered merchant companies provided such an organizational platform for political mobilization. In their capacity as formal organizations, the companies enabled economic elites to forge the strong bonds necessary for the successful translation of their economic interests into political influence. Still, as with other regulated and guild-like organizations, most merchant companies were created to protect the hard-won privileges of particular merchant elites, and few members were prepared to share their privileges with non-members (Ogilvie 2011). Access to membership was therefore restricted to a select group of traders. In other words, there are two sides to merchant companies: on the one hand, they provide an organizational platform that facilitates collective action; on the other, they hardly looked like generalized institutions and rather served the particular interests of a closed elite.
We consider the historical case of the Society of Merchant Venturers in eighteenth-century Bristol as a case in point. For much of the period, Bristol was one of the leading ports in the wider British Atlantic economy as well as the Baltic and Iberian trades, second only to London and later Liverpool (Little 1967; Morgan 1993; Sacks 1991). Bristol’s merchants traded in colonial crops such as sugar and tobacco, had a vested interest in the shipping of slaves from Africa to the American plantation colonies, and engaged in privateering during times of war (Hillmann and Gathmann 2011). The most established and prominent members of the local merchant community organized themselves in the Society of Merchant Venturers. Initially founded as a merchant guild in the Late Middle Ages, and eventually granted its first royal charter as a trading company in 1552, the Society exerted considerable influence on the local politics in the city of Bristol and beyond (McGrath 1975; Minchinton 1963).

We show how restricted access to the Society prevented up and coming members of Bristol’s merchant community from mobilizing themselves in defense of their economic interests. The particular group we focus on consists of the slave trading merchants within Bristol. Up until the late 1690s, the Royal African Company, based in London, enjoyed the monopoly right granted by its royal charter. The charter guaranteed company members exclusive access to and control of the English slave trade (Davies 1957). Multiple reasons contributed to the eventual demise of the Royal African Company. By 1698, mounting pressure from competing interloping merchants, among other factors, led Parliament to pass the Africa Trade Act, which obliged the Royal African Company to open the slave trade and to license private venturers (Carlos and Kruse 1996; Pettigrew 2007). Just like their competitors in other outports, Bristolian merchants seized the opportunity to enter the former monopoly trade.

Investments in the transatlantic slave trade promised high returns for those willing to take the high risks it implied. Thus one James Jones, a Bristol merchant, noted that the
enterprise was “a precarious trade” where profits were “sometimes … good—sometimes not so” (quoted in Morgan 1993: 137-38; see also Richardson 1996). Still, the volatile nature of the slave trade attracted aspiring merchants in particular because any profits they made helped them to launch long-term careers in other, less uncertain overseas trades. And at least for a few of them, the prospect of riches opened opportunities to rise into the very elite ranks of their community.

Figure 1 illustrates the scale of slave trading among the merchantry in the period from 1698, when the English Parliament permitted independent private slavers to enter the trade, until 1807, when the House of Commons voted to outlaw the trading of slaves. All information on the number of slaves shipped and the merchants involved comes from the comprehensive Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis et al. 2008). The left-hand panel in figure 1 plots the number of slaves shipped by traders from Britain (England), North America, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, which constituted the leading commercial powers in the triangular trade across the Atlantic. The graph shows that the market volume did in fact increase over time. Decreases in the number of slaves traded during times of war were followed by recoveries to pre-war levels. Towards the end of our period of interest, France abolished the slave trade in 1794. Yet, after an initial downturn, the market was once again increasing in its volume. In short, the slave trade was flourishing by the time the British Parliament voted in favor of its abolition in 1807.
Figure 1: Scale of Transatlantic slave trading, 1698-1807. The dashed line connects observed values for each year. The straight line represents the 10-year moving average. The source for the left-hand and center graphs is the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (Eltis et al. 2008). Leading commercial powers refer to Britain (England), its North American colonies (later the United States), Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The sources for the Bristol merchants in the right-hand graph are Eltis et al. (2008), Morgan (1993), Powell (1930), and Richardson (1996).
Obtaining robust estimates of profit from slave trading remains a thorny issue because few sources and samples are of comparable quality over time and across different contexts (Morgan 2000; Thomas and Bean 1974; Richardson 1987, 1989; Darity 1985, 1989). Darity (1985) arrives at an estimated profit rate between 10.3 and 24 percent for British slave traders. Anstey (1975) calculates profits of about 10 percent. More recently, Daudin (2004) estimates that eighteenth-century French slave traders could expect a profit rate of about 15.5 percent. Hence, scholars find some variation in the range of profit rates, but few would deny that the slave trade was a lucrative enterprise indeed. Likewise, there is little indication that profitability declined over time.

Given that trading in slaves promised substantial returns, how large was the slice of the pie that British merchants could claim? The center panel in figure 1 shows that British merchants controlled a considerable share of the slave trading market throughout the eighteenth century. Even when advocates of the abolition movement gained political momentum in the 1790s, British slavers still benefitted from an international market share of at least 12 percent in 1798 and up to 67 percent in 1793. The average share in the 1787-1807 period was equal to 41 percent (SD = 11.86). Still, one may suspect that other trades became just as attractive for promoters of overseas ventures, leading to increasing opportunity costs of investing in the slave trade. The right-hand panel in figure 1 depicts the pattern of replenishment among the ranks of slave traders in Bristol, our local setting. Clearly, younger cohorts of Bristolian merchants kept entering the slave trade throughout the eighteenth century. Fluctuations certainly occurred between subsequent years. Yet on average, 42 percent of active slave traders in a given year between 1698 and 1807 were first-time partners in a venture (SD = 22.9). In sum, over the entire 1698-1807 period, and despite competing investment opportunities elsewhere, the slave trade remained a lucrative business, offered a
considerable market share for British merchants, and continued to attract new entrants among the local mercantile.

These observations prompt our substantive historical question: why, despite such strong economic incentives, did the slave trading merchants fail to defend their enterprise and to resist the challenge of the abolitionists by the end of the eighteenth century? Political debates about its abolishment have always surrounded the slave trade (Pettigrew 2007). In 1787, the founding of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade invigorated the campaign, using educational programs, petitions and pamphlets to gain the support of the broader public and members of Parliament. In January 1788, the Bristol branch of the committee held its first public meeting and prepared petitions against the slave trade (Marshall 1968). Eventually, in 1807, the movement led a large majority in the House of Commons to vote for the abolition, although it would take at least another 25 years to enforce the end of slavery within the British Empire (Walvin 1981). We are certainly not denying that multifaceted reasons existed why the abolition movement gained the upper hand in their struggle against the slave trade, and against Bristolian traders in particular (for a recent comprehensive history of the abolition movement, see Pétré-Grenouilleau 2004, pp. 209-311).¹ We rather emphasize the importance of cohesive political organization, or more precisely, the lack thereof among the slave traders in Bristol.

Briefly summarized, our main argument is that the Bristolian slave traders lacked an adequate organizational basis to align their economic interests into a collective political force that would have enabled them to garner support and to counter the abolitionists’ efforts. Supporting evidence for our argument comes from a list of all known slave trading

¹ Cultural influences such as the diffusion of an anti-slavery moral sentiment across Enlightenment Europe come to mind as an alternative reason. By its very nature, cultural diffusion is a long-run development and should not have an instantaneous effect on the behavior of all European merchants. Instead, if a growing anti-slavery sentiment did indeed influence these merchants, then we should observe a gradual decline in their engagement in the slave trade over time. Neither of the trends in figure 1 suggest empirical support for this cultural influence argument.
partnerships that involved Bristolian merchants over the 1698-1807 period, the roster of all members of the Society of Merchant Venturers, and the list of leading public officeholders in the City Council, Bristol’s municipal government. Drawing on these sources, we show that a local organization for political mobilization did in fact exist in the form of the Society of Merchant Venturers. As a chartered company that controlled much of Bristol’s seaborne commerce it was ideally suited to translate economic interests into political influence. Our findings indicate that a sizeable share of Society members occupied influential offices within the municipal government, including positions as mayors, aldermen, and sheriffs. However, over time, the Society evolved into an organization that represented the interests of a closed elite. It primarily granted membership to established merchant families, erected high barriers to entry, and denied its privileges to traders of lower social standing in the community (see McGrath 1975). As mentioned earlier, the high risk, high return nature of the slave trade often attracted novice merchants who were hopeful to use it as a starting point to launch a successful career in less uncertain trades. Due to their standing in the community, few among the slave traders were granted access to the company. The most common way to enter the Society was through apprenticeship and kinship ties that connected the candidates to existing members. Social closeness through elite family relationships between existing and aspiring members clearly was salient for the Society. The alternative option for those who lacked such family connections and appropriate social networks was to pay an entry fee. That it was still possible to pay for admission meant that entry barriers were not insurmountable. But paying the fee was an unmistakable signal of the social distance that separated an applicant from the elite families in the Society. We show that slave traders who applied for membership were increasingly much more likely required to pay an entry fee than members of the established merchant elite. Further, our findings suggest that those few merchants who did gain access to this elite organization tended to turn their backs to slave trading.
Finally, we turn to the network among the slave traders themselves. Whereas the Society of Merchant Venturers did not support their interests, we may suspect that their own network of partnership ties may have served as a foundation for collective political action. But as we shall demonstrate, whatever social cohesion existed in this network hinged on the presence of centrally positioned brokers who connected the various partnership clusters. As previous research on similar historical settings has shown, strategically placed brokers are essential for building political coalitions across the multiple networks that the protagonists are embedded in (Gould 1996; Hillmann 2008a, 2008b; Padgett and Ansell 1993). Unfortunately for the slave traders, the broker positions were primarily held by precisely those traders who became members of the Society and eventually ceased their engagement in slave trading partnerships. The consequence of these developments was a deeply fragmented network that undermined the slave traders’ concerted efforts to mobilize themselves against the mounting political pressure of the abolitionist movement.

**Data Sources**

Supporting evidence for our argument comes from a combination of three distinct data sets. The first set includes all 536 merchants in Bristol who are known to have traded in slaves at some time during the period from 1698 through 1807. We begin in 1698 when the former monopoly of the Royal African Company was effectively opened to private slave traders. We end our observation window in 1807, the year in which the British Parliament passed the act to abolish slave trading. Our main source of information on slave trading ventures that originated in the port of Bristol is the well-established *Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (Eltis et al. 2008). We supplement these data with information on ventures in privateering and additional trades (e.g. tobacco and sugar) that the Brtitolian slave traders were involved in
(Hillmann and Gathmann 2011; Morgan 1993; Powell 1930; Richardson 1996). On average, ventures consisted of about three merchants (mean = 3.18; SD = 1.63) who formed a business partnership to sponsor a trading voyage from Bristol. Many merchants were serial investors: on average, they financed about four ventures (mean = 3.86; SD = 6.73), and their careers as active sponsors of overseas trading voyages lasted for about eight years (mean = 7.8; SD = 10.5; min—max = 1—66 years). We have complete information on 287 merchants who collaborated in 448 trading partnerships, and on 249 merchants who organized ventures on their own as single investors.

Our second data set compiles the complete list of the 393 known members of the Society of Merchant Venturers during in the 1700-1807 period, as they are provided by Minchinton (1963). Four different avenues of admission to the chartered company existed for aspiring merchants (McGrath 1975). First, they could apply for membership after an apprenticeship period of at least seven years. Second, sons of existing members could be granted admission by patrimony. Third, admission by redemption was available to sons of existing members who had entered the Society by paying an admission fee. Finally, the fourth possibility was to pay an admission fee. During the eighteenth century, the admission fee increased from £50 up to £250. The main substantive distinction between the four procedures was that admission through apprenticeship, patrimony and redemption relied on existing social network ties to established members of the Society, whereas admission through payment of a fee signaled the social distance between Society elites and outsider merchants. Table 1 documents the distribution of admissions over time (1700-1807) according to the four different procedures.

---

2 We are missing information on membership in the Society for the first two years of our observation window, 1698 and 1699. However, the two missing years are not as salient for our substantive argument as the years towards the end of our observation window when the slave traders had to face the strengthened abolition campaign.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Apprenticeship</th>
<th>Patrimony</th>
<th>Redemption</th>
<th>Entry fee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700-1710</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711-1720</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721-1730</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1731-1740</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741-1750</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751-1760</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761-1770</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771-1780</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781-1790</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791-1800</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801-1807</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Admissions to Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers, 1700-1807. Sources: Minchinton (1963) and McGrath (1975). Our observations begin in 1700 because we are missing information on membership for the two years 1698 and 1699.
Our third data set consists of all documented political officeholders in the municipal government of eighteenth-century Bristol, the city council. We draw all our information on officeholding merchants from Beaven (1899). Membership in the city council fluctuated around 40 councillors in any one year over our entire period. Our focus, however, is on the three chief elective offices that belonged to the executive branch of the local government (Seyer 1812): the position of the mayor, the members of the aldermen’s bench, and the positions as sheriffs. We have information on a total of 203 different officeholders in the years from 1698 through 1807. In what follows, we examine the officeholding careers of Society merchants and slave traders in detail.

Local Politics and Elite Closure

We first consider the role of the Society of Merchant Venturers within Bristol’s local politics. Holding offices within the municipal government was one of the most direct means of exercising political power in the city (Rogers 1989). The executive offices of the mayor, the members of the aldermen’s bench and the sheriff were among the most influential political positions and reflected the social standing of the incumbents in their community. Table 2 documents the distribution of these three political offices among members of the chartered Society of Merchant Venturers.

Over the entire 1700-1807 period, members of the Society of Merchant Venturers were able to fill close to a quarter of the available positions. Society merchants represented 23 percent of the mayors, and claimed 25 percent of openings on the aldermen’s bench as well as 18 percent of the sheriff positions. This pattern of officeholding shifted little over time. Naturally, the number of vacancies to be filled in each election cycle was limited. It is therefore not surprising that only a small group of 31 out of all 393 known members of the
Society of Merchant Venturers were elected into the three offices. Yet, beyond these chief elective offices, the historical record reveals that the 43-member strong City Council was dominated by “an elite corps of Merchant Venturers comprising 30-40 per cent of total membership in any one year” (Rogers 1989, p. 264). Likewise, the same elite of Merchant Venturers was equally successful in recruiting the political support of national grandees by granting up to 59 honorary memberships in our period of interest (Minchinton 1963). Such honorary members included the Lord of Trade (in 1763), two Prime Ministers (in 1764 and 1789), and several Members of Parliament (in 1727, 1755, 1759, 1768, 1775, 1790, and 1796). Both the enlistment of prestigious national elites and officeholding within the municipal government reflected the predominance of commercial interests in Bristol politics during the eighteenth century. As historian Nicholas Rogers (1989, p. 263) aptly put it, “organized through the Society of Merchant Venturers, merchants were effectively able to determine the town's economic priorities and to marginalize competing interests.”

Certainly, a few slave traders outside of the Society were able to win public offices as well, but their political cachet was rather limited. In particular, in the years from the 1780s onwards when the abolition movement gained political momentum, merely five slave traders were elected, and they filled only 15 office vacancies. Further, slave traders who held offices were hardly typical representatives of the Bristolian slave traders at large. On average, they could boast much longer careers in commerce (mean = 20.1 years; SD = 15.2) compared to slave traders who never held any office (mean = 8.8 years; SD = 12.3). Likewise, they were involved as partners in more than twice as many trade ventures (mean = 4.9 partnerships; SD = 7.0) than their peers without offices (mean = 2.0 partnerships; SD = 2.0).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th></th>
<th>Aldermen</th>
<th></th>
<th>Sheriff</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All officers</td>
<td>Officers in Society</td>
<td>All officers</td>
<td>Officers in Society</td>
<td>All officers</td>
<td>Officers in Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700-1710</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711-1720</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721-1730</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1731-1740</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741-1750</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751-1760</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761-1770</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771-1780</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781-1790</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791-1800</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801-1807</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Political Officeholding Among Members of Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers, 1700-1807. The table reports the number of persons elected to the offices of the mayor, aldermen, and sheriff in Bristol's municipal government. Our observations begin in 1700 because we are missing information on membership in the Society of Merchant Venturers for the two years 1698 and 1699. Sources: Beaven (1899); Minchinton (1963) and McGrath (1975).
What our findings suggest, then, is that access to company membership facilitated access to influential political positions. That is, the political weight and the company organization of the Society of Merchant Venturers would have been ideally suited for the slave traders to mobilize themselves and to defend their economic interests. But they could only rely on this organizational vehicle if the Society welcomed the slave traders in their midst. Table 3 compares the means whereby slave traders and merchants who invested in other trades were granted membership in the Society. We distinguish between two principal means of gaining access. Applicants could either invoke social ties to existing members of the Society, through apprenticeship, patrimony, or redemption. Or, alternatively, they could request admittance by paying an entry fee. The main idea here is that admittance through family and social ties implies deeper embedding in the networks of the elite corps of the Society to begin with, whereas admittance through payment suggests greater social distance of the applicants from the elite (see McGrath 1975).

Three important results emerge from table 3. First, considering the total number of new members from both groups of merchants shows that reliance on family and social ties to existing members was the preferred means of admission to the company. Second, the Society granted membership to only 99 out of all 536 documented slave traders over the entire period. Put differently, the vast majority of slave traders (82 percent) were never admitted, and those who were admitted accounted for only one quarter of all 393 new members. Third, we observe a clear shift in the admission pattern among the slave traders over time. Up until

---

3 One may wonder if a change in the proportion of slave traders among the population of Bristol merchants explains our observation. To the best of our knowledge, a census of all merchants in Bristol for our entire period is not available. But a comparison of all known slave traders across the quartiles of our historical period shows that their number remained substantial over time: there were 240 slave traders in the first quartile (1700-1726), 335 in the second quartile (1727-1753), 225 in the third quartile (1754-1780), and still 137 in the fourth quartile (1781-1807), when the abolition movement gained in political influence. Despite the still substantial pool of slave traders, the number of slavers admitted to the Society declined steadily: 41 admissions in the first quartile, 28 in the second quartile, 17 in the third quartile, and merely 13 in the fourth quartile. Unfortunately, we do not have any information about the number of slavers who attempted but failed to gain entry. It seems safe to assume that the number of attempts was greater than zero. If anything, then, our findings are lower-bound estimates of elite closure in the Society.
about mid-century, slave traders predominantly relied on their social networks of family and apprenticeship relations with existing members to gain access. From the 1780s onwards, however, the Society required the majority (67 to 75 percent) of slave traders to pay an admission fee, presumably because these new cohorts were not or only weakly related to the elite families who dominated the Society. In contrast, as table 3 shows, new members coming from other trades were still primarily admitted on the basis of their kinship and social relations. Our findings thus indicate an increasing closure of the merchant elite corps in the Society, whereby it also became increasingly more difficult for aspiring slave traders who lacked the necessary family connections to gain entry. Welcomed they were no longer, it seems.

But perhaps the few slave traders who did gain admission were sufficient to use the Society as an organizational site for creating an alliance among their own supporters and merchant members of the Society to collectively counter the abolitionists. Such a successful political mobilization would have required mediation between two separate merchant networks: it would have implied that they were able to forge new ties within the Society and at the same time to maintain bonds with their slave trading peers (see Hillmann 2008a). Recall that political opposition to the slave trade began in earnest with the founding of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787. We therefore consider the 90 slave traders who had been admitted as new members to the Society by 1787. Figure 2 contrasts their involvements in slave trading ventures before and after they became members of the Society of Merchant Venturers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Slave traders</th>
<th>Merchants from other trades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Admission through networks</td>
<td>Entry fee paid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700-1710</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711-1720</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721-1730</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1731-1740</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741-1750</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751-1760</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761-1770</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771-1780</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781-1790</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791-1800</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801-1807</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Admissions of slave traders to Bristol's Society of Merchant Venturers, 1700-1807. Admission through networks includes apprenticeship, patrimony and redemption. Our observations begin in 1700 because we are missing information on membership in the Society of Merchant Venturers for the two years 1698 and 1699. Sources: Minchinton (1963) and McGrath (1975) for membership in the Society of Merchant Venturers; Eltis et al. (2008), Morgan (1993), Powell (1930), and Richardson (1996) for trading activities of Bristol's merchants. Significant difference in admission patterns between slave traders and merchants from other trades: \( \chi^2 = 20.342, df = 10, p = 0.026 \).
The two graphs reveal a crisp pattern in the relationship between slave traders and membership in the Society over time. The left-hand panel shows that slave traders who joined the Society closer to the end of the eighteenth century had spent significantly longer careers in the slave trade than their peers who became Society members around the beginning of the century. For instance, the average career length of slave traders who entered the Society in 1775 was about 20 years compared to just 8 years for those who became members in 1725. In other words, the Society increasingly attracted those merchants who tended to be fairly long and well established in the slave trade. However, the complementary panel to the right shows a clear trend of decreasing involvement in the slave trade over time among those who were admitted as new members to the Society. Again, those who entered the Society in 1775 continued their sponsorship of slave trading ventures for about 8 years, on average, whereas those who became new members in 1700 continued to trade for another 22 years, on average. Combining the findings from both graphs thus suggests that it was precisely the set of venturers with long-standing careers and probably prominent positions in the slave trade who ceased their commitment once they became members of the Society.

---

4 The shift in career trajectories indicates that the average age of new entrants increased over time, but we do not have systematic information on age at the time of entry into the Society to confirm this. It is certainly conceivable that the Society increased its selection on experience primarily to assert its status as an association of elite merchants rather than to explicitly exclude slave traders. But whatever the Society’s motives behind the selection policy were, its negative structural consequences for the slave traders’ political mobilization remain the same, namely network fragmentation and decreasing brokerage.
Figure 2: Slave traders who gained admission to the Society of Merchant Venturers by 1787. The figure shows the observed number of years that Society members spent in the slave trade before they became members of the Society (left-hand graph) and after they became members (right-hand graph). The straight lines represent linear regression estimates, including the 95 percent confidence interval. N = 90 slave trading members of the Society.

The patterns of investment sequences of the 90 traders lend further support to this interpretation of increasing disengagement from the slave trade. Eighteen amongst them stopped their involvement in slave trade partnerships immediately once they had become members of the Society. Eleven new members ended trading altogether within five years of their admission. Fourteen former slave traders switched their investments into entirely different trades after they had become Society members. Another 19 venturers continued trading in slaves, but they only gained admission by paying a fee, which indicates their lower
standing and social distance from the elite members of the Society. Out of the remaining 28 new members who continued their involvement in the slave trade merely two cases were active in the second half of the eighteenth century, and thus could have contributed to any political efforts.

Why, then, was there no basis for successful mediation and alliance building? In sum, our findings indicate first that the Society of Merchant Venturers increasingly became an organization of a closed elite with barriers to entry for most slave traders. Merchants in other trades continued to use their social networks to existing members to enter the Society. In contrast, the few slave traders who obtained membership typically were required to pay a fee. Of course, even an entry fee of up to £250 may be considered nominal by some (McGrath 1975, p. 103). More significant was the mark of social distance to the elite merchants of the Society that it left. Second, however, our case is not just a story of denial of access to a chartered company that served as an important economic and political organization. Unfortunately for the slave traders, precisely the most established amongst them, and thus presumably the ones best positioned to forge alliances, were also the ones who ceased their active commitment to the slave trade once they became members of the Society.\(^5\) Both developments—elite closure and prominent traders pulling out of their former networks—undermined whatever concerted efforts existed among the slave traders to defend their business interests against the mounting pressure from the abolitionists.

\(^5\) A means comparison of the number of trade partnerships attests to the prominent role of Society members within the network of slave traders. Society members maintained about as twice as many partnerships (mean = 5.2; SD = 6.4) than the slave traders who did not become members of the Society (mean = 2.4; SD = 3.5; \(p = 0.000\)).
The Fragmented Network of the Slave Traders

Another alternative for the slave traders was to mobilize themselves even without the organizational support of the Society of Merchant Venturers. To do so, they required sufficiently cohesive networks to enable the communication and coordination necessary for successful collective action. Table 4 documents the extent of cohesion in Bristol’s slave trader network, using various indicators. Recall that we have information on a total of 536 merchants who traded in slaves at some point during the entire 1698-1807 period. Only those merchants who formed partnerships for their ventures could have potentially contributed to social cohesion among the slave traders. We therefore exclude the 249 merchants who organized trade ventures single-handed (that 46 percent of the slave traders are isolates in their primary business area already hints at the limited cohesion in the trader’s network). This leaves us with 287 merchants who partnered in a total of 448 ventures. In addition, we can identify 72 among these merchant partners as members of the Society of Merchant Venturers. We combine this information into a symmetric network matrix (287x287), where pairs of merchants are linked if they partnered in a trading venture. Cell entries are equal to zero in the absence of a joint partnership.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Network scope</th>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th>Society members (percent)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Among members</th>
<th>Bridges</th>
<th>Among non-members</th>
<th>Isolates</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Size main component (percent)</th>
<th>Mean size</th>
<th>SD size</th>
<th>Perc. un-reachable pairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1698-1807</td>
<td>all partnership ties</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>72 (25.1)</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>190 (66.2)</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>28.31</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>without bridges</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>72 (25.1)</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41 (14.3)</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>97.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1698 - 1787</td>
<td>all partnership ties</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>69 (27.5)</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>171 (68.1)</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>28.13</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>without bridges</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>69 (27.5)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34 (13.5)</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1787 - 1807</td>
<td>all partnership ties</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7 (14.9)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14 (34.1)</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>without bridges</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7 (14.9)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5 (10.6)</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Indicators of social cohesion in the slave traders' partnership network in Bristol, 1689-1807. Sources: Eltis et al. (2008), Morgan (1993), Powell (1930), and Richardson (1996). Component sizes refer to the number of merchants within components. All component sizes are greater than 1, and components equal to 1 are listed as isolates.
One indicator of cohesion in the partnership network is the distribution of components. Technically, components refer to discrete groups within a network graph such that all members of a given component are linked by at least one pathway, using both direct and indirect ties between them. In addition, components are mutually exclusive with no bridging ties between them. Consequently, a small number of components indicate cohesion within the merchant partnership network, whereas a large number of components imply structural fragmentation into numerous separate subgroups. If we consider first the entire network throughout the 1698-1807 period, we observe a separation into 44 different components, each consisting of 6 to 7 members, on average. This observation suggests fragmentation, rather than cohesion. However, a majority of 190 traders (or 66 percent of the total) are connected within the main component. And given its extent of internal connectivity, the main component appears to have been an ideal site for collective political mobilization among the slave traders. What undermined this potential for collective action was the dependence of the slave trader’s network on bridging ties that linked members and non-members of the Society of Merchant Venturers. The 182 observed bridges account for 41 percent of all partnerships in the network during the 1698-1807 period. Hence, social cohesion within the trader network hinged on brokers who bridged between members of the Society on the one hand, and slave traders outside of the Society on the other. Further, as we have seen in the previous section, the Society members who contributed to the maintenance of such bridges were the ones who tended to retreat from their slave trading partnerships, and they increasingly did so by the time the abolition campaign gained in political strength. In table 4 we replicate the potential consequences for cohesion when these critical bridging ties are removed from the network. The consequences are rather dramatic because the removal of bridges reduces the size of the main component to just 14 percent of all traders in the network. In other words, the one area within the network that is most cohesive and thus best suited for collective action is also the
one most vulnerable to the breakdown of bridges. And it was precisely the retreat of Society members from the slave trade that facilitated the breakdown of bridges. Our interpretation is further supported by the observation that the proportion of trader pairs that cannot reach other within the network increases just as dramatically from 56 up to 97 percent once we remove the bridging ties.

The network graphs in figure 3 visualize our systematic results in table 4. The left-hand graph shows the complete partnership network among all 287 traders over the entire 1698-1807 period. We employ a spring-embedding algorithm where the distance between traders is proportional to the shortest path linking them and the overlap among nodes and ties is minimized. Clearly visible is the large cohesive main component at the center of the network. The two initials, JJ and HB, refer to two exemplary cases that represent the kinds of brokers who maintained the bridges between Society members and non-members (the biographical information comes from Beaven 1899 and Richardson 1996). Joseph Jefferis exemplifies prominent slave traders at the beginning of the eighteenth century who typically entered the Society through an apprenticeship relation. As a member of an established merchant family in Bristol, he was elected into the offices of Sheriff (1715), Mayor (1724), and Alderman (1725). In contrast, Henry Bright illustrates the slave trading brokers in later years who had to pay an admission fee to become a member of the Society (he did so in 1775). Bright also held the offices of the Sheriff (1753) and Mayor (1771).

The center graph in figure 3 uses exactly the same coordinates as the left-hand graph to visualize how much the removal of the 182 bridging ties reshapes the pattern of ties into a fragmented network. Finally, the right-hand graph depicts the same fragmented network as the center graph, but optimizes its layout to avoid the overlap of ties and traders in the drawing.
Figure 3: Cohesion and fragmentation in the trader’s partnership network, 1698-1807. The left-hand graph shows the complete network among the 287 Bristolian merchants who formed 448 trade partnerships. Network ties link merchants if they were business partners in the same venture. White squares represent members of the Society, black circles represent traders who were not members of the Society. The center graph shows the same network after the removal of the 182 bridging ties between Society members and non-members. The right-hand graph optimizes the layout of the center-graph to avoid overlapping nodes and ties in the display. The red squares and initials refer to two exemplary brokers between Society members and non-members (see main text for details). The sources for the partnership ties among the Bristol merchants are Eltis et al. (2008), Morgan (1993), Powell (1930), and Richardson (1996).
The evidence we have presented thus far is based on the complete trading partnership network over the entire 1698-1807 period. Using this complete network offers a conservative, lower-bound estimate of the extent of fragmentation because it presumes that ties never decay and traders never die. It thus privileges cohesion over fragmentation. One may suspect, however, that the selection of trade partners and formation of partnership ties after 1787 was strongly influenced by the political activities of the abolitionists. For this reason, we calculated the same indicators of cohesion and fragmentation for the 1698-1787 and the 1787-1807 networks. The results are reported in table 4 and confirm the direction of our findings for the entire 1698-1807 period network: once again, the networks depend on bridging ties for their cohesion; likewise, removing the bridging ties substantially decreases the percentage of traders in the main component and increases the proportion of trader pairs that cannot reach other using their direct or indirect network ties.

Further robustness checks demonstrate that the extent of fragmentation in the observed network is unlikely to have emerged by chance alone. For the 1698-1807 period, we started with the observed network of 287 traders and their 448 partnerships. But instead of the 182 known bridges, we selected a random set of 182 ties and removed them from the network. We then calculated the cohesion and fragmentation indicators. We repeated these steps for a total of 1,000 iterations. In table 5, we compare the simulation results with the observed network. The p-value reports the proportion of the 1,000 simulated networks that exhibit a similar or even higher degree of fragmentation compared to our observed network. For example, in only 2.1 percent of the 1,000 simulated networks do we find as many or more isolates as in the observed network once we have removed 182 randomly chosen ties. As an alternative solution, we followed the same steps, but used 1,000 randomly generated networks with the same number of nodes (traders) and degree distribution as we find in the observed network. As table 5 shows, nearly all p-values for both versions of the simulated tie removal are very
low, which suggests that the extent of fragmentation in the observed network was not a chance outcome. It rather suggests a social process whereby the bridges between members and non-members of the Society created cohesion, and their absence gave rise to fragmentation in the slave trader network.

**Alternative Sources of Cohesion**

The main inference to be drawn from our results is that the slave traders’ network was vulnerable to fragmentation caused by the withdrawal of brokers, and thus lacked an adequate social relational basis for collective action. But perhaps we missed some unobserved social bonds that created sufficient cohesion among the slave trading merchants of Bristol. For instance, as obvious candidates, kinship ties among the traders may have facilitated cooperation and filled the structural holes in the fragmented network we observe. We have such kinship information for some of the merchants in our data, but not for a large enough number of cases to explore this scenario systematically. Of course, one could simulate the consequences of adding alternative network ties, but it would do little more than express in numbers the substantive truism that additional ties will increase cohesion. Likewise, if such alternative relationships were indeed as salient for these Bristolian traders, then whatever influence they had on the formation of business ties should in fact be expressed in the very pattern of the partnership network we observe (see Richardson 1996).

---

6 The one exception is the $p = .90$ result for the number of isolates in the randomly generated graphs. One explanation is that the degree distribution in the observed network is driven by dense local clustering in the main component, as shown in figure 3 (note that this property of the network is preserved in our first simulation version). In contrast, randomly generated networks tend to exhibit far less local clustering, and therefore fewer redundant connections. Consequently, the removal of ties is also likely to create more isolates than in a locally clustered network.

7 We obtained similar simulation results for the 1698-1787 and 1787-1807 period networks that confirm our interpretation.
Table 5: Robustness checks of fragmentation in partnership networks, 1698-1807: simulation of removal of bridging ties. The observed fragmentation shows the decrease in network cohesion after the removal of the 182 bridging ties between members and non-members of the Society of Merchant Venturers (see table 4). Simulation 1 reports the decrease in cohesion after the removal of 182 randomly selected ties in the observed network (1,000 iterations). Simulation 2 reports the decrease in cohesion after the removal of 182 randomly selected ties in randomly generated graphs with the same number of nodes and degree distribution as we find in the observed network (1,000 iterations). The $P$-values report the proportion of the 1,000 simulated networks that have at least as many isolates, at least as many number of components, the same or smaller percent of merchants in the main component, and a percent of unreachable pairs that is as high as in the observed network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed fragmentation</th>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th>Extent of network fragmentation after removal of bridges</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
<td>Isolates</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41 (14.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of components (size &gt; 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Merchants in main component (percent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent unreachable pairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P$ (Simulation 1)</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P$ (Simulation 2)</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One set of ties that were salient for eighteenth-century Bristol concerned the political alignments with either the Whig or the Tory party. As in other British towns of the time, the cleavage between the two opposing political factions ran deep through the merchant community of Bristol and influenced the choice of business partnerships (Rogers 1989; Trapido 2013). Because the struggle between abolitionists and slave traders was a political one as well, it is conceivable that the slave traders sought to align their interests with either the Whig or the Tory party. Even though neither entailed a formal party structure in the modern sense, such alignment of interests could have provided the slave traders with a useful organizational platform that they lacked otherwise. We have information on the political party preferences for a total of 417 voters in several elections during our period: 35.7 percent voted for the Tories and 64.3 percent for the Whigs. In addition, we also know the political leanings of 134 among the slave traders in our data. Their political preferences are virtually indistinguishable from the 417 voters at large: 35.8 percent of the slave traders voted for the Tories and 64.2 percent for the Whigs. Hence, we find no evidence to support the argument that the slave traders achieved cohesion by aligning themselves with one of the two opposing political parties. Considering struggles surrounding the slave trade monopoly and abolition earlier in the eighteenth century, Pettigrew (2007, p.17) likewise finds that the “individuals involved doubtless maintained opinions that would categorize them as either Whig or Tory. (...) Party labels perhaps stimulated early momentum for both side’s cause. Yet they did not decide the issue. (...) Party networks did not supply a decisive means for either faction to mobilize sympathetic constituents. (...) The expansion of Britain’s slave trade, like its abolition, had cross-party appeal.”
Success of the Abolitionist Campaign

Here we have identified some of the critical organizational obstacles that undermined the mobilization of the slave trading merchants in the face of growing political pressure from the abolitionists. What, then, were the local events on the ground that eventually triggered the success of the abolitionist movement in Bristol? If we consider the role of the Society of Merchant Venturers, the available historical information evokes an ambivalent strategy. On the one hand, the company merchants of the Society displayed rather lukewarm sympathy for the advocates of abolition. The plausible reason was that ending the slave trade would have had a negative impact on the supply of forced labor in the West Indian plantations, and hence ruinous consequences for Bristol’s position in the colonial trade with Africa and the Caribbean (Marshall 1968). Therefore, the company merchants had few economic incentives to lend their support to the abolitionist movement. On the other hand, their business interests and lack of enthusiasm for anti-slavery agitation did not mean that the company merchants took the lead in organizing the local opposition to the abolition activists. Instead of playing a prominent role, the Society merchants preferred to keep a low profile in this particular political contest. If necessary, they offered meeting rooms and other resources. Yet, as our findings show, they were hesitant to admit slave traders as members and to maintain trading partnerships with them. The ambivalent position of the Society elite toward the slave trade was also reflected in the report of one Thomas Clarkson, a member of London’s abolition committee who was sent to Bristol in 1787. Clarkson observed that “every body seemed to execrate it, though no one thought of its abolition” (quoted in Marshall 1968, p. 2).

In 1792, a pivotal moment came that tipped public sentiment in favor of the local protest against slavery. Abolition activists had already unearthed a long legacy of fraud, violence and even murder on board of British slave ships. The high death toll also included
seamen serving on the vessels, and several captains were apparently involved in the brutality. In April 1792, John Kimber, captain of the *Recovery*, a slaver owned by Bristol merchants, was put on trial before the High Court of Admiralty for maltreatment that led to the violent death of a 15 year old girl on board of his ship. The trial and ensuing public outrage endangered the reputation of those who continued to oppose the cause of the abolition movement. Finally, an economic crisis in the wake of war with revolutionary France hit Bristol’s merchant community. The resulting shortage of mercantile credit led to the bankruptcy of many Bristol traders, including a number of prominent slave ship owners. What brought the interest of Bristol’s merchantry in the slave trade to an end was the sudden loss of financial support, combined with the moral outrage following the Kimber case (Marshall 1968).

**Conclusion**

We began with the substantive historical question why, despite clear economic incentives, the Bristolian slave traders failed to defend their business interests in the face of the abolitionists’ campaign. We acknowledge that a variety of causes led to the eventual success of the abolition movement in Britain (see Pétré-Grenouilleau 2004, pp. 223-28, 234-53). Among these causes, we emphasized the important role of merchant companies as political organizations. In particular, we argued that the lack of a cohesive organizational platform undermined whatever efforts of collective political mobilization the slave traders undertook. We presented supporting evidence that the chartered company of the Society of Merchant Venturers offered such an organizational site for collective political action. Members of the Society held chief elective offices in the municipal government and exercised considerable political influence. However, increasingly high barriers to entry—such as
admission through fees rather than social networks—prevented most slave traders from accessing and using the Society as a vehicle for their own political mobilization. The few who did gain access to the Society typically were the most established among the slave traders, and thus were ideally positioned as brokers to mediate between the otherwise separate networks of the Society members and the slave traders. Most unfortunate for the slave traders’ ambitions, these well-positioned merchants tended to cease their engagements in the slave trade once they had been admitted to the Society. Finally, their retreat from slave trading exposed how vulnerable the traders’ network was to structural fragmentation. In sum, these pieces of evidence document how much the lack of cohesive organization contributed to the failure of collective political action among the slave traders.

Two broader lessons for understanding the role of merchant companies emerge from our case. The first emphasizes their importance as economic organizations that facilitated collective political mobilization. As we have stated repeatedly, merchant companies offered an organizational vehicle that helped its members to forge the cohesive bonds necessary for translating their economic interests into political influence. The historical evidence suggests that many slave traders in Bristol did recognize that they shared similar economic interests and positions in the local and national merchant networks. Yet their case also illustrates that structural equivalence and shared interests alone are rarely sufficient for successful political mobilization. One is reminded of Karl Marx’ *Eighteenth Brumaire*, in particular his portrait of the small peasants who “form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another (…), much as potatoes in a sack form a sackful of potatoes.” Consequently, “the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union, and no political organisation” (Marx [1852] 1978, p.608). Returning to the Bristolian traders, the implication is that they had to coordinate their interests within some cohesive organization if they wanted their political voice to be heard. In our historical setting,
the Society of Merchant Venturers provided precisely such a cohesive organization for collective political action.

The second lesson, however, is that merchant companies like the Bristolian Society of Merchant Venturers more often than not served the particular interests of a closed elite. We are of course not the first to note the consequences of open versus closed elite systems in early modern European history (Stone and Stone 1984; Padgett 2010; McLean 2004). What seems important to us is rather the inherently ambivalent, double-edged nature of such merchant elite companies. On the one hand, they provided an institutional framework that facilitated trade relationships, the protection of hard-won monopoly rights, and the coordination of collective political action. On the other hand, early modern merchant companies, much like medieval guilds, were particularized institutions that limited access to these organizational benefits to their members (Ogilvie 2011). In our historical case, both the increasingly high entry-barriers and the limited number of bridges to networks beyond the boundaries of the company document its exclusive nature. Similar to other merchant companies, Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers constituted an enabling and a restricting organization in equal measure. To conclude, if we wish to understand the role of economic merchant companies as political organizations, it should be just as important to understand the closeness and openness of their underlying membership networks.
References


Activists in Politics

The Influence of Embedded Activists on the Success of Social Movements

Timo Böhm

Social movements strive for policy changes that will realize their conception of the ‘perfect world’. To achieve their aims as rapidly as possible, movements attempt to identify the most effective ways to influence decision-makers. In parliamentary democracies, the central decision-makers are political parties. Much of the existing literature emphasizes the use of public pressure and lobbying. In contrast, I argue that the intersection between political parties and social movements is the strongest and most stable means for activists to influence policy. Using novel microdata on the German antinuclear movement, particularly its success in influencing the shutdown of nuclear power plants, I demonstrate that movements realize their goals significantly more rapidly when their intersection with political parties increases. My results also suggest that there is a tipping point beyond which the effect of this intersection declines.
What factors determine the success of social movements, and how do these factors operate? In this paper, I consider success in relation to the ideals that social movements follow and in connection with observable policy outcomes (see Giugni (1998) for a broader perspective on the outcomes of social movements). Because the outcomes of social movements occur as a result of accumulated influence (Tilly 1999), I assess the conditions under which movements achieve progress and the factors that accelerate or decelerate developments.

It is widely accepted in the literature that an analysis of the political system is crucial to understand the policy outcomes of social movements. The institutional setting determines which actors in the political system constitute the political elite. In parliamentary democracies, the political elite is composed of the representatives of political parties – the central political organizations – in parliament. This elite passes laws and defines policy goals. Social movements attempt to influence this elite to achieve policy changes.

I argue that activists in the political system are an effective means for social movements to achieve their goals in parliamentary democracies. Such activists are integrated into both networks and are therefore insiders of both the social movement and the parliament. Unlike other means of influence, such as public pressure or lobbying, this intersection is based upon trust. Activists in politics fight for the goals of their social movement even without extrinsic incentives, such as votes or nominations. Their advantageous position of being embedded within the network of the movement organization and that of their political party allows them to combine the resources of both networks. Furthermore, activists in politics can employ insider tactics that are unavailable to activists outside the political system.

Nevertheless, the positioning of activists in politics has disadvantages. If there are too many such activists, the identity of the social movement can be endangered and mutual trust
undermined. Social movements emerge because the political system as a whole is regarded as unwilling or unable to properly address specific issues (Tilly 1999). Thus, the distance from political decision-makers constitutes the identity of a movement.\(^1\) If activists perceive the distance between the social movement and the political system as insufficient, they may induce conflict or separation to restore their identity. However, even if a social movement’s members accept embedded activists as a legitimate instrument with which to pursue goals, the members will always regard this arrangement with caution. Thus, activists in politics need to use some of their resources to balance the demands of the movement and those of the party (i.e., to maintain this role conflict at a controllable level).

Given the broad range of possible examples, the German antinuclear movement is an excellent case study for a substantive empirical analysis. Its policy goal is clearly definable: nuclear phase-out. Therefore, every new nuclear reactor or delayed shutdown represents a setback, whereas every shutdown or prevented construction represents a success. In addition, the German political system is federalist and thus allows for the comparison of regions with varying degrees of success. Because of the similarities among regions, the same mechanisms are expected to be operative. Finally, the antinuclear movement in Germany has a long history that began in the 1970s; thus, information from several decades is available for analysis.

To conduct the analysis, I collected information on Green Party members of parliament and their connections with the antinuclear movement from biographical material, archived party documents and parliamentary documents. The result is a set of novel microdata on the German antinuclear movement. Using this information, I calculated intersection based on the number of Green members of parliament with activist backgrounds in the antinuclear movement. Furthermore, I evaluated information from the *International Atomic Energy*

Agency (IAEA) and the official journal of the interest group Deutsches Atomforum e.V. to define 15 episodes in seven of the federal states of Germany. These episodes represent the timespans until another nuclear power station went offline or plans to build a new station were abandoned. Important alternative explanations are also considered in my data and analysis. An event history analysis of these unique longitudinal data reveals that the effect of activists in politics operates in the expected direction. Controlling for public pressure and lobbying does not weaken this result.

**Political Influence of Social Movements**

There is an ongoing debate on how collective action influences policies (Burstein and Sausner 2005). Many researchers consider political parties, interest groups, social movements and public opinion to be the most important factors in policy-making (Burstein and Linton 2002). Numerous aspects of how social movements influence policy outcomes remain unclear (Amenta et al. 2010). Although there are several contributions toward a better understanding of the specific mechanisms (e.g., Andrews (2001); Kolb (2007)), researchers agree that there is still work to be done (e.g., Viterna (2013)). In the current paper, I will contribute to this area of the literature.

In the literature on policy outcomes, two prominent lines of reasoning emphasize the importance of the political system in understanding the success of social movements in influencing policy: political opportunity theory (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) and political mediation models (Amenta, Caren and Olasky 2005; Cress and Snow 2000). However, many different actors are involved in the political system, and a more precise understanding is necessary. Therefore, a focus on the most important decision-makers – the political elite – is helpful. Such a focus implies an understanding of the elite as a group of actors with dominant
or powerful positions (Khan 2012). The institutional setting largely defines which positions are powerful. For example, in parliamentary democracies, political parties’ representatives in parliament are the most powerful. These representatives vote on every important political decision and have access to classified government information. To achieve their goals, social movements must influence these representatives.

One means of influencing these elites is public pressure. Public pressure encompasses all attempts to influence the political elite through the mass media. Recent studies have identified the conditions under which social movements are successful in media appearances (Amenta et al. 2009; Andrews and Caren 2010). In addition, analyses have been conducted to determine how protest and public opinion interact to influence policy-making (Agnone 2007; Olzak and Soule 2009). Although public pressure can be a powerful tool, social movements depend on the media for this indirect means of influence.

A common approach to directly influence political elites is through lobbying. The aim of lobbying is to increase agreement between a social movement and elite actors (Burstein and Linton 2002). Lobbying can be an effective tool for connecting with indecisive actors and persuading them to support the movement’s goals. Lobbying is especially common among social movements with organizational structures that are managed by professionals (Andrews and Edwards 2005). However, the efficiency of lobbying depends on a constant and reliable flow of resources. Successful lobbying pursues mutual exchange in an instrumental manner. If a movement cannot provide public legitimation or support, then politicians have no reason to continue providing assistance. As a result, political elites will tend to sever connections or limit their support. From the perspective of social movements, the lack of control over such

---

2 Another way to consider public pressure is to focus on social movements’ pressure on companies. For instance, Bartley and Child (2011) describe the effects of anti-sweatshop campaigns on U.S. companies.

3 Following the classification of Hall and Deardorff (2006), I concentrated on exchange theories and lobbying as persuasion.
relationships represents a vulnerable influence and, therefore, instability. Similar to public pressure, lobbying may be the only available tool in certain instances and may be a useful supplement in others, but a social movement that is able to ensure support under poor circumstances will enjoy a better initial position than a movement that cannot.

A discussion of connections beyond instrumental exchanges must include the consideration of alliances. Elite allies in politics are known to significantly improve a social movement’s chances of success (Soule and Olzak 2004) and are widely discussed in the literature (e.g., Giugni (2007)). For instance, Dixon and Martin (2012) describe how non-union allies supported labor unions with both material and symbolic actions during strike events. There appears to be a consensus that political elite allies can significantly promote the goals of social movements. However, explanations of the underlying mechanisms are scarce.

In this paper, I contribute to this neglected aspect of the discussion by developing a theoretical argument concerning how social movements create and maintain alliances with political elites on an individual level. Related to the concepts of ‘institutional activists’ developed by Santoro and McGuire (1997) and ‘insider tactics’, developed by Banaszak (2005), I demonstrate how the structural qualities of the interaction between the political system and a social movement and its micro-foundation can be combined in a social network framework. In the following section, I provide detailed arguments for why activists in politics are a strong and stable means of influencing policy decisions.
Activists in Politics

Social network analysis and its concepts constitute an established approach to research on social movements. The ideas described in the previous section can be translated into a social network framework to emphasize both the positions of individual actors and their structural relationships. In this framework, the interactions among the news media, a social movement and a political party are conceptualized as connections between three different networks (see figure 1). Public pressure is an indirect connection between a social movement and a political party via the news media (1). A direct connection from a social movement to a political party indicates lobbying (2). Finally, intersection occurs if at least one actor is integrated into both networks as a full member (3).

In contrast to ‘institutional activists’ (Santoro and McGuire 1997), the term ‘intersection’ emphasizes structural quality rather than the attitudes of the actors. Although the basic notion is similar, a more structural perspective highlights the connections between a social movement and political parties. In other words, intersection emphasizes merging networks rather than individual decisions. This perspective corresponds to the notion that an important share of a social movement’s social capital is created by its ties to political elites (Diani 1997). In the terms of Evans and Kay (2008), the intersection I describe here is a specific case of field overlap. Following these authors, there are four mechanisms that result from such network intersection, of which two are most important for my argument: ‘alliance brokerage’ and ‘resource brokerage’. I will return to these notions when I describe the specific mechanisms of influence.

It is important to note that intersection is generally not an available option. Only political actors who are already sympathizers can be included in a social movement’s
network. The ideological threshold for intersection is substantially higher than it is for successful lobbying, which can also target political actors from more distant parties. Actors must commit to a movement’s goal and adjust their identity. Thus, the existence of an allied political party is a necessary condition for the existence of intersection. Here, allies of social movements are political parties that share attitudes toward specific issues. For instance, only parties in favor of nuclear phase-out are (potential) allies of the antinuclear movement. Lacking such an ally, intersection is impossible.

Figure 1: There are three ways in which social movements may influence policy: (1) creating public pressure on political parties via the media, (2) lobbying in favor of the movement’s goals and (3) intersection. The advantage of intersection is that the connection is more stable and stronger than public pressure and lobbying.

As Minkoff (1997) indicates, political allies are also necessary to extend protest under certain conditions.
Where does an intersection with an allied political party originate? There are two possibilities: activists can join an existing party or participate in the creation of a new party. However, established parties have a history of negotiating their programs, at least in parliamentary democracies. New political trends are difficult to embed because they can disturb the unstable balance between existing political wings. A different situation occurs during the emergence of a new party, at which point no influential group of members exists and no program has been adopted. In other words, it is easier to introduce new ideas and propose emphases within an emerging party than within an existing one. Social movements in Germany exploited such opportunities when the Green Party was founded. From a social movement perspective, an ideal scenario occurs when a party emerges as a direct result of the social movement. Perhaps the most famous examples are the labor parties that emerged as a result of preexisting unions.

Activists in politics can create and sustain trust, combine various resources and apply tactics that are unavailable to activists outside of the political system. Trust is the factor that most strongly differentiates an intersection from lobbying. Activists in politics are insiders of both networks and thus are closely connected to these networks. Other network members do not question the loyalty of these activists because they are perceived as ‘one of us’. This trust is justified because members of political parties with an activist background are firmly convinced of the movement’s goals. They do not ignore the interests of their social movement, even at the risk of losing votes. These members have intrinsic motivation to pursue their goals, notwithstanding absent or weak extrinsic incentives.

If these central actors succeed in maintaining trust, then they enjoy a very strong brokerage position (see Stovel and Shaw (2012) for a review on brokers). Their advantageous position enables them to combine diverse resources (compare Evans and Kay (2008) and their notions of ‘alliance brokerage’ and ‘resource brokerage’). For example, parties can provide
valuable information on political processes while the social movement supplies support. Both resources affect policy on personal relationships at the micro level. Therefore, embedded activists have more opportunities to influence decisions and increase the likelihood and speed of their movement’s success.

Opportunities to influence decisions are closely linked to what Banaszak (2005) calls ‘insider tactics’. Activists in politics have insight into parliamentarian work that helps them to identify important procedures to use and actors to address inside the political system. Therefore, such activists expand the tactical repertoire of a social movement (Evans and Kay 2008), which increases the probability of success (Olzak and Ryo 2007). Taking the antinuclear movement as an example, activists in parliament are aware of plans to construct new nuclear power plants earlier than activists outside of politics are. They can provide this information to antinuclear movements, allowing the movements to react more promptly than they could without this direct access.

However, activists in politics – similar to other brokers – encounter serious difficulties. At least two role expectations accompany being embedded in two networks. It is difficult to simultaneously fulfill the roles of an activist and a politician, especially if role expectations are connected with identity. Consider, for instance, a person who begins to participate in a social movement. She already shares the movement’s goals, and she develops an identity as an activist by participating in meetings, demonstrations and other activities. As discussed by Zuckerman et al. (2003) in a study of the film labor market, the focused identity of the activist is both a result of and a prerequisite for becoming an accepted member of the movement. If she chooses to expand her activities to a political party, then an adjustment to another identity is necessary. As Viterna (2013) emphasizes in her theory on micro-level processes of mobilization, the identities of activists are both internally held and externally applied by others. That is, it is not enough if an activist maintains her identity while joining
politics; it is also necessary for her original movement to continue applying it to her. Otherwise, the additional role as a politician replaces her status as an activist. If tensions between both identities increase, then resources may be needed to ensure loyalty in both directions; otherwise, alienation between the movement and the party may be renewed. In both cases, fewer resources are available to pursue the movement’s goals.

An example from my case of such a development is Petra Kelly, one of the most important Green politicians in Germany until her death in 1992. Petra Kelly became a member of the German antinuclear movement during the 1970s. Prior to this, she participated in initiatives supporting children with cancer, which led to a natural sympathy for the antinuclear cause. However, soon after she became a member of parliament, local activists accused her of neglecting the movement’s cause in favor of more prestigious, i.e., international activities (Richter 2010). On a more abstract level, activists doubted whether a politician could remain one of their own.

Alliances with political parties also involve risks at the macro level. The main risk arises through the institutionalization of protest. A driving force of social movements is their distance from the political establishment and their identity as a legitimate representative (Tilly 1999). Activists may interpret substantial intersection with political parties as a reprehensible development and may react by inducing separation or open conflict to restore the distance between the movement and the political system. Furthermore, public perception may change. Whereas excessive lobbying casts doubt on the independence of political decision-making, excessive intersection subverts the legitimation of the social movement.

A less important risk for my analysis is that political parties can exploit social movements. One example is the case study of Ho (2003) regarding the antinuclear movement in Taiwan. Here, the antinuclear activists were forced into the role of campaigners for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Only a strong DPP could urge antinuclear policies, and the antinuclear movement had no alternative available.
Meyer (1993) provides an example of how institutionalization carries the risk of losing credibility and reduces opportunities for powerful alliances. His study reveals how certain activists in the Nuclear Freeze Movement in the United States introduced moderate goals and targeted their efforts at Congress rather than the broader public. The movement’s majority perceived this shift in politics as a retreat and thus distanced itself from the movement. The remaining resources were not sufficient to achieve the moderate goals or any other substantive goals of the movement.

Given the advantages and disadvantages of activists in politics, a subsequent question arises: what degree of intersection between a social movement and the political system creates the most influence? As the structural intersection increases, actors are better able to use their specific connections within the party to reinforce their position with mutual support. In addition, as the number of connections increases, both the diversity of tactics and the amount of resources increase. However, institutionalization and closeness to the political system operate in the opposite direction. The effects are stronger in the presence of greater intersection because other activists’ tolerance of alliances decreases.

The primary hypothesis derived from the theoretical argument is that intersection and policy outcomes should interact in the form of an inverted U-shaped relationship. This conclusion relates to the question previously asked in the literature, namely, whether there might be a threshold for the positive impact of network intersection (Evans and Kay 2008). I test this hypothesis using the example of the German antinuclear movement and its intersection with the Greens over a period of three decades. Before I describe the data collection, operationalization and statistical model, I provide background information on both the movement and the Green Party.
Case Selection and Historical Background

There are several reasons to choose the German antinuclear movement as an example for the empirical analysis. First, the antinuclear movement is a worldwide phenomenon. However, its national branches differ largely in their political impact. The German antinuclear movement is the most successful movement of this type and provides a good case to explain variations in success over time. Second, the political goals of antinuclear movements are closely linked to the economic structure. This is especially true for Germany, where the official end of nuclear energy production has led to many adjustments by the energy sector and connected industries. Third, the grassroots structure of the German antinuclear movement makes it comparable to many other social movements in various policy arenas and contexts, which increases the generalizability of the results.

In addition, there are three more technical reasons for this case selection. First, the antinuclear movement’s issue is clearly definable, which facilitates the empirical analysis. The second reason for this choice lies in the federalist structure of Germany. Germany’s regions are similar in terms of the regional political structure and their position within the nationwide context. Consequently, unobserved heterogeneity across German regions is less likely than it is between different countries. A comparison of similar regions that vary in the number of antinuclear successes facilitates causal inferences. Third, the antinuclear movement in Germany has existed for three decades, which provides sufficient data to conduct a reliable analysis.
The German Antinuclear Movement

The antinuclear movement was only one aspect of broader development that occurred in Germany during the 1970s. United in their opposition to the political system, various movements and political groups shaped public debates regarding such issues as women's rights, peace and environmental protection. Similar to other movements during this period, the antinuclear movement was not hesitant in its choice of methods. Between 1970 and 1997, 11.3 percent of antinuclear demonstrations in Germany included violence, and 26.2 percent were considered confrontational. For instance, a demonstration of 28,000 participants in Whyl led to the occupation of a construction site (Rucht 2008). Another characteristic of antinuclear protests in Germany is the substantial variation in the number of participants. The incidents at Harrisburg (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and Tomsk (1993) amplified mobilization, but between these incidents, protests diminished sharply (see figure 2). The Greens joined the federal government in 1998. According to Poloni-Staudinger (2009), concentration on political alliances explains the subsequent lack of mobilization.

In 2000, the antinuclear movement celebrated a major success when the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens announced the nuclear phase-out. A temporary change of course was introduced by the conservative-liberal coalition in 2010 but was then canceled only one year later in 2011 immediately following the earthquake in Japan that led to serious damage to a nuclear reactor in Fukushima. Although not yet definitive, the antinuclear movement in Germany appears to have finally succeeded in its struggle after approximately 40 years of existence.
Local action groups and informal networks characterize the internal structure of the antinuclear movement (Rucht 2008). Initially, the Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (BBU) (Federal Alliance of Citizens' Initiatives for Environmental Protection) played an important role in the movement (see Markham (2005) for details). The goal of the alliance was to unite disparate branches of environmental movement organizations, such as initiatives against water pollution, highway construction and nuclear energy. However, this alliance was unstable because the direction and scope of the aims within the BBU fundamentally differed from those of the movements. New and more successful competitors entered the scene, such as Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) (German League for Environment and Nature Protection) in 1975, Greenpeace Germany in 1980 and Robin Wood in 1982. Most important, however, was the foundation of the Greens. The formation of this party had a lasting effect on the German political system.
The Green Party

The foundation of the Green Party of Germany in 1980 was a reorganization of existing political lists. These lists emerged from 1977 onward and emphasized either ecological or leftist political agendas. One ecological list successfully participated in regional elections in Bremen in 1979, marking the beginning of a series of electoral successes at the regional level. In 1983, the Greens entered the Bundestag (German Parliament). Throughout the 1980s, the Greens were involved in heated discussions concerning their future political orientation. Two wings, the ‘fundamentalists’ and the ‘realists’, bitterly contested how leftist the Greens should be, including issues such as whether a coalition with the Christian Democrats should be a (theoretical) option. In the midst of internal struggles, the Greens lost the first national elections after reunification in 1990 and failed to reach the necessary 5 percent voter threshold in West Germany. The party slowly recovered, and in 1998, it formed a coalition with the Social Democrats to form the federal government until 2005. As previously noted, the coalition finalized negotiations with energy producers and announced the nuclear phase-out in 2000.

Connections between the Greens and social movements played an important role from the party’s formation. The Greens wished to be a party of movements while cherishing their independence. One means of support was financial contributions, but only the women's rights, peace and third world movements actively participated in negotiations. The antinuclear movement opted to maintain its distance from the political system and emphasized its independence. Nevertheless, antinuclear objectives were a vital component of the Green Party's political agenda, particularly during the periods in which the antinuclear movement was unable to mobilize a large number of demonstrators. The movement and the party

---

My brief summary is based on the book of Raschke and Heinrich (1993).
maintained their connections but did not institutionalize an intersection. Rather, activists throughout Germany joined the Greens and fought for antinuclear issues as party members. Some of these activists joined regional parliaments and the Bundestag. These actors represent intersection in the following analysis.

Although there have always been connections between the Greens and the antinuclear movement, the relationship has been a complicated one. A good example of the general dynamics is Johnsen’s (1988) description of the 1982-1985 period in Hesse. During this period, the balance of power within the Greens changed, and with it changed the party’s distance to the antinuclear movement. Whereas the ‘fundamentalists’ were in favor of an absolute opposition, the ‘realists’ started to work toward a possible coalition with the Social Democrats. In 1983, the Greens agreed to tolerate a minority government in exchange for preserving the status quo concerning nuclear energy production. When the Greens withdrew their support in 1984, they returned to absolute demands, namely an early shut down of the existing power plants. In 1985, the Greens became part of the regional government and Joschka Fischer, later foreign minister of Germany, became the first Green minister. During these years, the distance between the antinuclear movement and the party increased every time the Greens came closer to the government and decreased when they emphasized their oppositional role. This pattern is in line with the argument that social movements attempt to keep their distance from the political system.

The Role of Regional Parliaments

The construction and operation of a nuclear power plant in Germany constituted a complex business endeavor. The following summary of the formal process is based on Ronellenfitsch (1983). First, a prospective operator began informal discussions with the responsible administration at the regional level concerning a possible new power plant. Most
importantly, he described what type of reactor he wished to construct and where. These talks continued until an agreement was reached or the potential operator halted the talks. Second, the company submitted a formal application. The regional and national authorities considered this application and made it public. Over several months, the parties concerned could examine the files and submit concerns or protests. Third, the regional administration decided whether to dismiss or accept the application. In addition, these applications had to be renewed at regular intervals.

Most important for the research question of this paper, the main decisions were made at the regional level. Although the national authorities were involved, the regional government had the final word, for instance, concerning the exact location (e.g., Kretschmer and Rucht (1991)). The political discussion, however, occurred in the parliaments (Ronellenfitsch 1983). Here, the opposition had several instruments to influence the process. First, members of parliament could use a so-called ‘Kleine Anfrage’ (brief enquiry) to ask the government whether there were informal discussions on new power plants. If the answer was yes, the antinuclear movement could begin to mobilize one stage earlier in the process than would have been the case had they needed to wait for the official application. Second, members of parliament, especially those in relevant committees, could contact officials in the respective administrations to obtain information on the ongoing process and optimal ways to delay or end it.
Data Collection and Operationalization

Success

The external success of social movements has been widely discussed in the literature, and very different approaches have been proposed to measure and understand this success. Related concepts range from a focus on enacted laws to broad understandings that include indirect and unintended consequences (Giugni 1998). Because the theoretical argument concerns political actors, I focus on policy outcomes. In addition, I adopt an understanding of success as a gradual process rather than an all-or-nothing approach (e.g., Yamasaki (2009)). By tracing single steps, it is possible to disaggregate long-term developments into shorter time periods that are comparable and thus yield more precise information.

The antinuclear movement strives for a world without nuclear energy production. Therefore, the movement considers every prevented construction or shutdown of a nuclear reactor to be a policy decision in the right direction. In other words, every project to construct a new nuclear power station and every online reactor are obstacles on the antinuclear movement’s path to success.

From a contemporary perspective, we know that the German antinuclear movement was highly successful. Therefore, it is not interesting to consider whether a higher intersection increased the likelihood of success itself. Instead, the intersection should have affected the rate of progress. The more important an individual factor was for the success of the antinuclear movement, the more rapid subsequent steps toward success should have been. Another important aspect is the level of analysis. As described above, the most important decision-makers concerning nuclear power stations were the regional governments and parliaments.
To avoid bias, it is important to define the risk population of the analysis. The risk population denotes the segment of the general population that might experience an event. In this case, the antinuclear movement could only go one step further if there were a nuclear power station or a plan to construct one. Including a region in the analysis that lacked such an opportunity would confuse the lack of potential success with a missed goal. Of course, all regions might have been constantly at risk of constructing a new plant. However, in these cases, it is not possible to distinguish success from a lack of success without access to substantially more information on internal decision processes.

Regions were entered into the analysis when the first antinuclear demonstration occurred. Clearly, some type of formal or informal structure had evolved before this. However, it is difficult to quantitatively justify how and, above all, when unobservable structures influence political decisions. In contrast, the first demonstrations clearly signal a social movement's willingness to begin participating in public debates. Only subsequent successes can be linked to the movement's efforts. Regions were removed from the dataset in 2002 or in instances in which no (planned) nuclear reactors remained. Time steps were measured in months. Different times of entry and exit resulted in 115 to 364 months or approximately 10 to 30 years of observation between 1972 and 2002. The following analysis refers to 2,023 clustered data points.

For practical reasons, only facilities with a clear commercial background were included in the dataset. Nuclear reactors for scientific purposes and related infrastructure, especially waste deposal sites, were excluded (see Sherman (2011) for details regarding the complex interactions in these cases). After the application of these restrictions, seven out of 16 German regions remained in the risk population.
I collected data from two different sources to operationalize success. The IAEA provides online information on all 30 nuclear power stations that were in operation in Germany. Eleven of these stations went offline before 2002 and were therefore considered successes. I used the official journal of the interest group *Deutsches Atomforum e.V.* as the second data source. This journal includes an annual report on the state of nuclear energy in Germany. I found information on eight projects that were planned but never fully realized. These projects were considered successes. Including the 11 shutdowns, 19 successes occurred between 1972 and 2002. However, the number of episodes was lower. One event in Rhineland-Palatinate and two events in Bavaria occurred before the antinuclear movement’s demonstrations began. Two projects in Hesse were canceled in the same month, resulting in only one event. Thus, 15 episodes were entered into the analysis.

**Intersection of Social Movement and Political Parties**

Intersection measures the number of activists in politics. In the current case, intersection implies the number of antinuclear activists in regional and national parliaments. This operationalization does not include activists and politicians in general. Although this approach prevents a more general view of the specific mechanism, it is a direct measurement of the theoretical argument. Only the political elite has direct access to the influence the antinuclear movement is seeking. I argue that the existence of intersection relies on an allied political party. In the empirical case investigated here, only the Greens are applicable. Other parties, especially the Social Democrats (SPD), changed their views concerning nuclear energy production; thus, only the Greens were a reliable ally for the entire period.

To construct intersection, I collected the names of all 352 Green members of parliament and the periods during which they served in office at the regional and national levels from official lists and reports of the electoral authorities. The number of actors
multiplied by their individual periods in office created 21,738 observations. In the next step, I accounted for the following three types of sources to identify antinuclear activists: biographical material, party documents and parliamentary documents (see table 1).

Table 1: Data sources for intersection. The regions are Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW), Bavaria (BY), Hesse (HE), Lower Saxony (NI), North Rhine-Westphalia (NW), Rheinland-Palatinate (RP) and Schleswig-Holstein (SH). A total of 328 out of 352 actors are identified as either antinuclear activists or non-activists, corresponding to 93.2 percent of the statistical population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment based on</th>
<th>Biography</th>
<th>Party Documents</th>
<th>Parliament Documents</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Activists (%)</th>
<th>Missing (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7 (11.5)</td>
<td>10 (14.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BY</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10 (18.5)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9 (18.0)</td>
<td>5 (9.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>18 (30.5)</td>
<td>1 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4 (6.0)</td>
<td>8 (10.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5 (23.8)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4 (25.0)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N 237</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>57 (17.4)</td>
<td>24 (6.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 72.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Biographies are the most reliable source; thus, I evaluated them first. I referred to the books of Lengemann (1986) (nine actors), Simon (1996) (25 actors) and Vierhaus (2002) (120 actors) and information provided by parliaments (52 actors). In 31 additional cases, I evaluated the homepages of the representatives or their associates. Only actors with clearly observable membership or active participation in the antinuclear movement were considered activists. For instance, actors who explicitly joined the Greens because of Chernobyl were regarded as activists. Overall, I identified biographical material on 237 out of 352 actors, which corresponds to 67.3 percent of all actors.
Regarding the second type of source, I used historical documents from the Green regional associations obtained from the archive Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis in Berlin. The party-linked Hans-Böckler Foundation maintains the archive. This foundation collects documents created by the party and social movements in Germany to make them accessible to the general public. I used the register to identify documents that were clearly linked to individual parliamentarian actors and evaluated them with respect to their thematic emphasis. Sixty additional actors (another 17 percent) were identified. Table 1 provides an overview of the actors’ regional distribution.

Finally, I used information regarding parliamentary questions. In the German political system, such questions serve as an instrument for individual members of parliament to obtain access to government information. According to the theoretical question of the current paper, antinuclear activists should exhibit noticeable engagement in the antinuclear topic. Thirty-one actors (8.8 percent) were positively classified (again, see table 1 for details).

In summary, 328 of 352 relevant actors were captured by the data, corresponding to 93.2 percent. Given the number of observations, the coverage is even higher. A total of 21,292 of 21,738 data points (97.7 percent) were available for analysis. I classified 17.4 percent of them as activists. The Greens integrated a broad range of movements; therefore, this number appears reasonable. It is important to emphasize that I only considered politicians activists if they were activists before they became members of parliament. Otherwise, the measurement would not capture activists in politics but politicians in social movements. The latter is outside the scope of this paper.

To eliminate the possibility of bias caused by the underlying sources, I compared the sources with respect to the proportion of activists. Among the 237 actors identified via biographical material, 44 (18.6 percent) were classified as antinuclear activists. I evaluated
party documents for another 60 actors, and 11 of them (18.3 percent) were considered activists. The proportion in the third group (parliamentary documents) differed significantly: only two of 31 actors (6.5 percent) were considered antinuclear activists. This deviation results from the hierarchy of sources rather than bias. Only actors who did not appear in biographies or party documents remained in the third step. Therefore, the probability of identifying missing activists in this step was relatively low. For the same reason, it is unlikely that unidentified actors were activists, although this assertion cannot be verified.  

Given the information regarding the actors, intersection with the Greens was calculated as the proportion of antinuclear activists for each month and region and is plotted in figure 3. Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein reached values of up to 100 percent because of the low number of Green members of parliament in these regions relative to the other five regions. There are few values above 50 percent, which I will address below in the interpretation section. Apart from this pattern, the variance within regions was high; thus, intersection was not regionally stable. Furthermore, the values indicated unequal patterns between regions, indicating that general developments at a higher level have no systematic influence on regional levels of intersection. In addition to the graphical overview, table 2 includes descriptive information on the intersection and all other variables examined in this paper. All of these independent variables have substantive variation.

---

7 My procedure might overestimate the overlap. Therefore, I recalculated all following models under the assumption that missing data indicated non-activists. However, there were only slight differences between the two models. If the amount of overlap were overestimated, then its effect would be underestimated. Thus, all conclusions in the main text are based on the more conservative estimations.
Figure 3: The degree of intersection for each region from January 1970 to December 2002.

Table 2: Distribution of variables. The data sources for all variables are described in the text. Media coverage is measured as the number of articles concerning one demonstration. The proportion of articles on the front page excludes observations without articles.
Combining all variables, the data structure used for the analysis is schematically presented in table 3. Each row includes the information for one region in one month during the observation window. The first episode concludes when the variable of success changes to one. The same is true for subsequent episodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Perc. Intersection</th>
<th>…</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>23.08%</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>23.08%</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Data Structure. A schematic data structure was used for the analysis. Each time success changes from zero to one, an episode is over and another one begins.

**Statistical Analysis**

**Model**

As mentioned above, the aspect of timing is crucial for understanding success. For instance, social movements initiate demonstrations that do not instantaneously induce change. Only a longitudinal perspective allows for an estimation of their true influence. If demonstrations (or other actions) accelerate the process, then the results should follow rapidly. In other words, a more effective tool of influence should lead to more rapid policy change than a less effective tool. I modeled this acceleration of events using event history
analysis with a parametric approach. Event history analysis models estimate the time until an event occurs based on covariates $x_j$ and a base hazard $h_0(t)$:

$$h(t|x_j) = h_0(t)exp(x_j\beta_j).$$

Parametric specifications, in contrast to semi-parametric models, explicitly define the base hazard $h_0(t)$. I use a Gompertz distribution as the base hazard:

$$h_0(t) = \exp(\gamma t) \exp(\beta_0)$$

In its initial applications, this distribution modeled mortality data and is therefore a useful approximation for technical devices such as nuclear reactors. Its use implies the assumption that the closure of a nuclear power station becomes increasingly likely as time advances, for instance because the costs to maintain a technical device’s operation increase with age.

I argue that intersection and the success of a movement should exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship. Consistently, the model includes a linear term and a quadratic term. The linear term should take a positive sign and the quadratic term a negative sign. In addition, a time-varying coefficient for intersection captures a possible long-term effect. If a hidden process alters the effect of intersection over the period of interest, then the estimated coefficient should be significant.

---

8 See Jung (2010) for an extended discussion of why event history analysis is the preferable approach when analyzing data on social movements.

9 I repeated the analysis with different base hazards, resulting in three main findings. First, although the amount of influence varied, the effect of overlap was robust against other specifications. Second, the effect of Chernobyl was also largely robust. Third, the Gompertz model was the most efficient parametric model as measured by the BIC.
The theoretical argument partly relies on resource allocation within and between the social movement and the political party. Mutual support can reinforce each actor's position within parliamentary groups. Therefore, absolute numbers of activists in parliament may be more important than the proportion of activists within the parliamentary group. Another possible source of bias is the relative strength of the Greens in parliament. However, electoral results do not equally translate into seats in parliament across regions and are therefore not a valid measure. Instead, I calculated the proportions of seats to capture the effect.

As previously described, regions exited the dataset when no active reactor or ongoing project remained. However, with more than one target available, the time that elapsed before a policy change could differ. Each reactor might create an additional opportunity for protest because an increasing number of individuals are directly affected. Additional reactors might also complicate concentrated action because of the different priorities of local action groups. Either possibility could bias the estimated effect of intersection. Therefore, I included a count of targets in the model. The number of active reactors and ongoing projects also indicates how strongly a region is oriented toward the production of nuclear energy.\(^{10}\)

The potential danger of nuclear energy production is a pivotal argument of antinuclear movements. Core meltdowns lead to radioactive contamination, resulting in uninhabitable areas and a sharp increase in the risk of cancer and other diseases. The Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 was interpreted as evidence that meltdowns are possible and that their consequences are terrifying (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995).\(^{11}\) Although different countries have drawn starkly different conclusions from this incident (Kolb 2007), Chernobyl subsequently served as an important reference point in public discussions regarding nuclear energy production. If

\(^{10}\) To the best of my knowledge, there is no available information on the different sources of energy production at the regional level for the relevant period.

\(^{11}\) Antinuclear movements in Europe and the United States differ in this aspect. For the latter, Harrisburg in 1979 was more important because of its local reference (Jasper and Poulsen 1995).
Chernobyl raised public awareness concerning the dangers of nuclear energy, then the amount of time that elapses before a policy change should be significantly shortened after the incident.

The complete specification of the model is

\[ h(t|x_j) = \exp(yt) \exp(\beta_0 + x_j \beta_j), \]

with

\[ x_j \beta_j = \text{intersection} \cdot \beta_1 + \text{intersection}^2 \cdot \beta_2 + \text{intersection} \cdot t \cdot \beta_3 \]

\[ + \text{activists} \cdot \beta_4 + \text{seats} \cdot \beta_5 + \text{chernobyl} \cdot \beta_6 + \text{plants} \cdot \beta_7. \]

**The Effect of Intersection**

Table 4 reports the estimated hazard ratios (HRs) of two models. HRs greater than one are positive effects, and HRs less than one are negative effects. The first model in table 4 is the model described above. The second model provides a benchmark to assess the relevance and efficiency of intersection. Because there is no statistical measure of explained variance in event history analysis, I calculated the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).\(^{12}\) A lower BIC indicates a more efficient model and greater explanatory power.

Both the significance and direction of the linear and quadratic terms support the expected inverted U-shaped relationship between intersection and influence. Although the linear effect is clearly positive (HR: 1.230), the quadratic term indicates the existence of a threshold (HR: 0.997). The estimates of the time-varying coefficient reveal that the effect of

\(^{12}\) Following the suggestion of Raftery (1995) regarding the use of BIC in event history analysis, I defined \( n \) as the number of events.
intersection decreased slightly over the period analyzed (HR: 0.999). Although the effect is significant, it is too close to one to be interpreted as substantial.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intersection (%)</th>
<th>Controls only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.230***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.113-1.360)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intersection Squared (%)</td>
<td>0.997*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.995-0.999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying Coefficient Intersection</td>
<td>0.999*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.998-1.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Activists in Parliament</td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td>0.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.423-1.389)</td>
<td>(0.398-1.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Seats (%)</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>1.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.858-1.197)</td>
<td>(0.865-1.369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Chernobyl Period</td>
<td>25.548**</td>
<td>30.103**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.389-192.580)</td>
<td>(1.790-506.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Nuclear Projects/Power Plants</td>
<td>1.239</td>
<td>1.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.870-1.766)</td>
<td>(0.911-1.805)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>42.615</td>
<td>48.539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.001  ** p<0.01  *p<0.05

Table 4: Time to shutdown – main models. Both models assume a Gompertz distribution; the results are reported as hazard ratios (HRs) with their 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses below. The second model is calculated as a benchmark for estimating the importance of intersection. The lower BIC of the first model indicates that the inclusion of intersection in the model is efficient. The two most important findings are that there is a significant influence of intersection on success and that Chernobyl changed the subsequent rules.

To provide empirical conclusions, I calculated the predicted hazards for all combinations of values in the dataset and sorted them according to the degree of intersection. In addition, I calculated a simplified function with only the linear and quadratic terms. Figure 4 illustrates the results. The interpretation (and the graph) was limited to values of up to 50 percent because there were few observations with higher values. Nevertheless, there was

\[ f(x) = 0.207123x - 0.0025305x^2 \]
a predicted threshold at an intersection of 28.57 percent, and the threshold of the simplified function was approximately 40.93 percent. However, the exact values must be interpreted with caution. Missing observations with higher values of intersection could bias the estimation. Although the precise threshold cannot be estimated, there is clear evidence of its existence, and 30-40 percent is a reasonable approximation.

How important is the degree of intersection in explaining policy outcomes? If intersection is irrelevant, then the second model should be more efficient because it includes fewer predictors. However, the BIC value of the first model was clearly lower (42.615 and 48.539), indicating that intersection is an important aspect of the success of the antinuclear movement.

Figure 4: Predicted hazards are based on the estimations of the first model (see table 4) and are subsequently ordered by the degree of intersection. Only observations with an intersection of 50 percent or less are shown because there are few observations with higher values. The dashed curve is calculated using the linear and quadratic coefficients for intersection (see the text for details). Predicted hazards have a visible threshold at 28.57 percent, and the threshold of the simplified function is approximately 40.93 percent. Although the exact locations are not interpretable, they describe a reasonable range. Predicted hazards and the simplified function differ because of the opposing influences of other variables in the model.
Furthermore, the analysis provides evidence that the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe marked a shift in nuclear policies (HR: 25.548 and 30.103). Kolb (2007) argues that Chernobyl led to complex interactions among the social movement, public opinion and political actors. Following his line of reasoning, Chernobyl triggered a fundamental shift in political opportunities. Depending on the movement's strength and the institutional setting, nuclear policies changed. My analysis confirms the overall connection between Chernobyl and subsequent decisions related to nuclear energy production; however, the confidence interval is wide, and the actual degree of this effect is thus unreliable.

**Controlling for other Mechanisms of Influence**

The estimations clearly revealed that intersection affected the success of the social movement. However, the other two means of influence mentioned above might also have influenced policy outcomes. Therefore, I estimated models for lobbying and public pressure and compared their results with those of the previous model. Table 5 contains all models and estimations.

**Lobbying**

The first alternative mechanism of influence of the social movement is lobbying. The literature includes two propositions regarding how to include lobbying in statistical models. Studies on political decisions in the United States refer to published amounts of money that were spent during elections and other campaigns (e.g., Baldwin and Magee (2000); Wawro (2001); Wright (1990)). Interest groups control so-called political action committees that are allowed to contribute. Conducting a survey is an alternative means of collecting necessary data (e.g., Andrews and Edwards (2005)). Because there are no comparable data for Germany, I contacted the three most important environmental organizations and requested their budgets.
Robin Wood and BUND were unable to provide financial reports, but Greenpeace Germany provided the requested information. Thus, I used the figures (in millions) from Greenpeace Germany to include a proxy variable for lobbying effects.

In contrast to intersection, lobbying had no significant effect on the shutdown or prevention of the construction of nuclear power stations in Germany. However, the absence of an effect should not be interpreted as a general disproof of the influence of lobbying on politics. The absence of an effect in this model is likely due to the rough proxy. Although Greenpeace’s budget measures the overall development of organizations’ resources in this field, there is no information on what share of these resources was actually used for lobbying. Nevertheless, the results contribute evidence that the effect of intersection survives robustness checks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intersection (%)</th>
<th>1.246***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intersection Squared (%)</td>
<td>0.997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Varying Coefficient Intersection</td>
<td>0.999**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Greenpeace Germany (/million €)</td>
<td>0.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrators (/1,000)</td>
<td>1.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Coverage</td>
<td>0.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article on Front Page</td>
<td>2.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Activists in Parliament</td>
<td>0.691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Seats (%)</td>
<td>1.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Chernobyl Period</td>
<td>32.402*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Nuclear Projects/Power Plants</td>
<td>1.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>48.503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 5: Time to shutdown – alternative explanations. Again, all four models assume a Gompertz distribution. The results are reported as hazard ratios (HRs). The effects of public pressure and lobbying are not significant in any model configuration. All three models without intersection are also less efficient. Their BIC values (47.274-48.503) are higher than the values for both the complete model (41.010) and the model that included intersection only (42.615).
Public Pressure

Public pressure via the mass media is the second alternative means by which social movements influence policy outcomes. Demonstrations have the characteristics of newsworthy events, known as *news factors* in the literature (Kepplinger and Ehmi 2006). Media coverage creates pressure because decision-makers in general and politicians in particular pay attention to their publicity. In the case of politicians, bad publicity endangers their probability of winning elections. Higher rates of mobilization should lead to a greater amount of media coverage, which, in turn, should increase pressure on public figures and the likelihood of rapid achievements. I controlled for both mobilization and media coverage by referring to PRODAT, a dataset collected by the *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung* (WZB) concerning protest events in Germany between 1950 and 2002. PRODAT relies on two newspapers: the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Although both newspapers are distributed nationwide, their head offices are located in Munich (Bavaria) and Frankfurt (Hesse). Therefore, demonstration events in these two regions might be overreported. Nevertheless, PRODAT is the best dataset available to include public pressure in the model. Mobilization was operationalized as the number of demonstrators per month and region, divided by 1,000.14

Media coverage was calculated as the number of articles pertaining to each demonstration at the regional level. A greater number of articles indicates both a longer period of media coverage and more extensive reporting. I also included a dummy in the model to account for front-page coverage. Prominently placed reports on antinuclear demonstrations could have a greater effect than less noticeable reports.

---

14 Counting the number of events instead of the number of demonstrators is an alternative measurement of public pressure. However, estimations do not change substantively and variation in protest size is much higher in the PRODAT dataset than the number of events.
The results indicated that public pressure did not have a significant influence on the success of the antinuclear movement in Germany. Neither the number of demonstrators nor the amount of media coverage or front-page coverage was a decisive factor. One possible explanation is that political actors only react to new information on the opinions of their electorate and that demonstrations lose their influence over time (see Burstein and Linton (2002) for a summary and Lohmann (1993) for details). However, a meta-analysis by Uba (2009) suggests that public opinion has no significant effect on policies. An investigation of how mobilization affected the German antinuclear movement’s presence in the media is beyond the scope of this paper but certainly warrants a detailed analysis. A recent study by Malinick, Tindall and Diani (2013) demonstrates that such an analysis should be based on a decomposition of the movement into its activists’ respective positions. The most important point is that the effects of intersection remain robust regardless of the model specification.

**Comparison and Summary**

Table 4 provides evidence on the influence of intersection. Table 5 complements these results with a comparison of other possible mechanisms, namely lobbying and public pressure. There was no model configuration in which lobbying or public pressure had a significant effect on the time until a success occurred for the antinuclear movement. Again, I calculated the BIC to compare efficiency. Although the estimators of both alternative mechanisms were non-significant, their inclusion in the model increased efficiency.

In summary, the results suggest that intersection is an important mechanism with respect to a social movement's influence on policy outcomes. Alternative mechanisms did not contradict this result; in fact, they strengthened the argument regarding activists in politics because the significance remained stable when additional variables were considered. Furthermore, the findings reveal that the Chernobyl catastrophe was a watershed event; the
estimations clearly indicate that policy change was more likely following the catastrophe than before the event.

**Conclusion**

The initial question asked in this paper was how social movements effectively influence policy outcomes. I argued that an intersection of a social movement and a political party is a stable and strong instrument of influence because these activists in politics use trust to combine resources and apply additional tactics. Furthermore, I described how this intersection loses some of its influence if it becomes excessively large because role conflicts occur and trust becomes mistrust. Therefore, policy outcomes and intersection should exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship.

Despite certain data limitations, the event history analysis provided clear evidence that intersection affects policy outcomes. Alternative mechanisms and varying model specifications did not weaken this effect. Caution is required in the interpretation of the threshold. However, I wish to emphasize that although the results indicate its existence, only application to other empirical settings can yield more precise information on the influence of intersection. For instance, Uba (2009) demonstrates that the legitimacy, stability and types of regimes are important factors in evaluating the influence of social movements on policy outcomes. For instance, a presidential democracy and a parliamentary democracy may follow different rules because of differing levels of access to political decisions (e.g., Burstein and Hirsh (2007)).

This application to another political system is one way to further investigate the influence of intersection with respect to external validity. For example, Germany differs from the United States in that Germany has a parliamentary and multi-party system. Both the
parliamentary system and the presence of more than two parties in parliament make intersection more likely to occur. A recommendation for further research in this context is to study whether intersection loses some of its relevance in other political systems or whether it assumes a different shape. A useful starting point is the concept of veto points or veto players and how they come to a decision (e.g., Tsebelis (2002)). For instance, a similar analysis in the U.S. context would need to ensure that the regional or national parliamentary bodies are the correct group of actors to examine. The identification of the political elite should be driven by the question of which actors control access to the political influence that a specific social movement needs most.

Another promising approach is to understand policy changes as occurring within fields in which social movements are one possible type of actor (Duffy, Binder and Skrentny 2010; Evans and Kay 2008). However, even in similar political settings, it is important to emphasize that the existence of an ally is a necessary condition. The Greens in Germany were a perfect match for the antinuclear movement in many ways, particularly because they partly emerged from this movement. If internal cadres characterize the organizational structure of a political party with no or few opportunities for outsiders to achieve high positions, it is very difficult for social movements to establish intersection. More generally, a political system with more fluctuation in parties and politicians offers more opportunities for social movements’ activists to obtain influential political offices. Notwithstanding these opportunities, it is important to emphasize that intersection might backfire both on an individual level (see the example of Petra Kelly) and on the organizational level (see the example of the Nuclear Freeze Movement). Nevertheless, the presence of an ally and the resulting potential of intersection are generalizable factors in explaining the success of social movements.

Another natural question is whether the results are transferable to other social movements. Disregarding the important discussion of how to measure the success of other
movements for the sake of clarity, there is no analytical reason that intersection should be limited to the antinuclear movement. Intersection measures one aspect of how social movements connect with the political system. If we consider social movements rather than professional lobbying groups, then the main arguments should be transferable to other movements, such as the Tea Party in the United States.

Another valuable line of research is a fine-grained analysis of intersection. More specific data about activists’ positions inside both networks would allow more sophisticated analyses. For instance, social network analyses could be used to evaluate activists’ sequence of formal and informal positions. This would lead to a closer look at how the micro-processes based on identity translate to the structural connections between networks. Such data would also enable researchers to observe the elite’s relations to non-elite actors in a way that makes it possible to disentangle the specific dynamics between actors of both groups. The data requirements for such procedures are high but certainly justifiable by the potential insight.

In summary, the theoretical concept of intersection can be empirically tested and was provisionally confirmed in the current paper. The findings emphasize the importance of examining actors’ heterogeneity and their interaction to disclose micro-level mechanisms. Whereas ‘pure’ activists and politicians exist, activists in politics bridge these two separate networks. Analyses of social movements should account for the potential for such blurred boundaries to avoid oversimplified concepts. Further research must clarify the conditions under which intersection operates and the size of its influence in each case. However, the results of this analysis imply that intersection is important to consider. Even if it is not directly measureable or is difficult to quantify, intersection should be included in future empirical analyses.
References


Party Careers and Electoral Success

The Structural Effect of Political Parties on Candidates’ Success

Timo Böhm

In parliamentary elections, political parties decide candidate ranking. Because this ranking is highly correlated with candidates’ electoral success, political parties are central to understanding why some candidates have more electoral success than others. I argue that political parties choose candidates with party careers that signal both the ability to win elections and loyalty to the party’s political goals. Therefore, variations in party careers are connected with variations in candidates’ electoral success. I test this hypothesis by applying generalized linear models to an extensive dataset of candidates for the Norwegian parliament between 1946 and 2010, and the results support my theoretical argument. However, there is also evidence that party careers are less important for candidates who barely win – or barely lose – a seat in parliament.
What types of candidates win seats in parliament? In many countries, party lists have a strong influence on the probability that a candidate wins a seat in parliament. The higher the candidate’s place on the party list, the more likely he is to win the election. This correlation emphasizes the importance of political parties in the composition of a given parliament. How do political parties decide which candidates to choose from a pool of ambitious politicians? I argue that political parties are similar to other organizations in this respect. Seats in parliament can be interpreted as vacancies that a political party attempts to fill with politicians that support the party’s organizational goals to maximize its political influence in parliament.

In choosing how to fill these seats, a political party looks for candidates who are both loyal to the party’s goals and able to deliver a strong political performance during election campaigns. However, both qualities are difficult to observe directly. Therefore, I argue that political parties use a candidate’s party career as a signal. A candidate with a long history of holding party offices signals loyalty. Similarly, a candidate who has held high-level positions inside the party structure signals the ability to deliver strong political performances. In combination with the strong correlation between party lists and election results, candidates with longer party careers and higher positions in the political party should have an increased probability of winning a seat in parliament. I contribute to the literature by providing a general argument regarding political parties’ structural influences on the success of individual candidates in parliamentary elections. In addition, this argument adds to the literature on the incumbency advantage in elections. More specifically, the argument provided in this paper implies a categorical difference between three different groups of candidates: incumbents, party officials without a previous position in parliament (who are the focus of this paper), and newcomers who have neither a seat in parliament to defend nor a party career that makes them attractive to political parties.
I focus on Norway to conduct a robust empirical test of my theoretical arguments. The available data include both candidates who won and candidates who failed to win a seat in the national parliament. Furthermore, the data include information on 17 elections between 1945 and 2010, which allows me to control for time-specific effects. Because there were seven important political parties during this period, I can also rule out differences between organizational recruitment procedures. For each candidate, there is information on the status and time period of his different party offices. Therefore, I am able to differentiate party officials from candidates with no party careers and derive measures for loyalty and performance for the first group. There is also information on candidates’ positions outside of political parties, such as in public administration or volunteer organizations. I use these data to test the main results against alternative explanations.

**Party careers and electoral success**

What types of candidates successfully win seats in parliament? In the literature, an acknowledged and widely tested finding suggests that an incumbent has a higher likelihood of keeping his seat than losing it. In other words, it is more difficult to win a seat in parliament than to defend it. Vacancies for new members of parliament occur when incumbents decide to surrender their seats. Given this general tendency, the research question should be reformulated: Which candidates successfully fill the vacancies that occur when incumbents choose not to run for office?

In many parliamentarian elections, voters decide on ranked lists of candidates – so-called party lists – for each party competing in the election. Even if voters have the right to change the order of the candidates on the list, there is evidence in the literature that voters do not alter the ranking significantly. This finding is true both for random (Chen et al., 2014) and
alphabetical lists (Webber et al., 2014), indicating that the correlation between the rank on a party list and electoral success is very high. Hence, a political party’s decisions regarding the order of politicians on its list is pivotal for a candidate’s electoral success. The higher a candidate appears on the party list, the higher his probability to win a seat in parliament. Nonetheless, the question remains: Which candidates are selected by parties and why?

For the sake of brevity, I will not discuss the literature on why individual politicians decide to run for office in the first place. Some contributions in this field focus on questions regarding the emergence of political ambitions and the strategic choices of individual politicians (Black, 1972; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2014; Maestas et al., 2006; Recchi, 1999). Given an existing pool of ambitious politicians, another perspective focuses on the organizational quality of political parties and posits that candidacies are the result of a recruitment process. Following a concept suggested by Hazan and Rahat (2010; Rahat and Hazan, 2001), recent contributions to the literature discuss political parties’ selection procedures in terms of whether their decision processes are centralized or decentralized and whether they are inclusive or exclusive (Shomer, 2014; Spies and Kaiser, 2014). This strand of the literature aims to determine the reasons that parties adopt certain procedures to select candidates. These different selection procedures can be analyzed in the next step with respect to the results they produce in terms of representativeness, such as results involving gender (Evans, 2011; Fox and Lawless, 2010). Here, researchers focus on overall outcomes. The contribution of this paper is to establish two main criteria for political parties’ choice of candidates. These criteria operate independently of different recruitment procedures and other more complex explanations, including the role of internal power struggles between central strategists and local activists (Evans, 2012).

In choosing its candidates, a political party determines its criteria based on its organizational goals and therefore on an organizational perspective. As organizations
pursuing political agendas, political parties strive to create political influence, which largely depends, in turn, on electoral success. Consequently, a political party looks for candidates with two qualities: the ability to deliver a strong political performance during election campaigns and the loyalty to push to achieve the party’s goals once they are elected. A candidate who fulfills both characteristics can count on his party’s support. The better match a candidate is, the more support he should receive, and the higher his party will place him on its party list.

However, both qualities are difficult to evaluate. The best option for political parties is to look for signals that are observable indicators of a candidate’s hidden qualities. The more difficult it is to fake these signals, the more reliable they are. Thus, it is natural for political parties to base their selection on candidates’ party careers. Party careers develop over extended periods of time and are easy to evaluate. More specifically, party careers are directly observable by party members, which means that party careers are more reliable than signals emerging from outside the organization’s boundaries.

Party careers are sequences of offices inside a party’s organizational structure. Party officials can hold offices on different levels and for different periods of time. These two dimensions allow for a wide variety of combinations. Combining the two dimensions into sequences hints at the number of ways that party careers can vary over time. Therefore, the question to ask is the following: Which characteristics of party careers signal the qualities that a political party is looking for? The most important feature to signal a candidate’s ability to deliver a strong political performance is his prominence within the party. A party official with a national-level office has proven that he can achieve political success. Although such party elections are intraorganizational, they demonstrate that a politician was able to successfully mobilize support and convince the party electorate that he was a better choice than other candidates. Furthermore, higher-level offices are more difficult to win. Beginning at some
positional level, party officials also gain experience in handling the media, which is another signal for strong political performance; the most prominent examples of this feature are party leaders (Midtbo, 2011). Therefore, higher offices are a reliable signal of a candidate’s abilities. Moreover, the most important feature signaling loyalty is career length. The more stable a party member’s commitment is, the stronger the signal that he will stay loyal if he wins a seat in parliament.

In summary, a candidate’s party career signals to his political party whether he is a good or bad match to pursue the organization’s goals. The stronger the signal of his ability to deliver a high level of performance and loyalty, the more support his political party will provide. The logic of the recruitment process should therefore translate into structural advantages that will, in turn, lead to a higher likelihood of winning a seat in parliament. The longer a candidate’s party career is and the higher the level of office he holds, the more likely it is that he will win a seat in parliament.

With respect to the overall picture of candidates’ success in parliamentary elections, the argument developed here suggests three empirical expectations. First, an incumbent should be able to successfully defend his seat if he decides to run for office. It is important to re-emphasize that – although there is a connection between both processes – the mechanism of incumbents’ success is different from the process of candidate selection, which is the subject of this paper. Second, there should be a clear difference between different groups of candidates. Incumbents should win more often than party officials, but party officials should have a higher probability of winning a seat than newcomers, i.e., those candidates without a party career. Given the theoretical argument, political parties should always prefer candidates who can signal the desired qualities, even if the signal is weak. Third, the longer a candidate’s career and the more prominent his position in the party, the more likely it is that he should win a seat in parliament.
Data sources and preparation

I use data provided by Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) to test the empirical implications of the theoretical argument. The NSD covers the 1946–2010 period and contains information regarding candidates for the national parliament, the Storting, including information about candidates’ party careers and electoral records. The Storting is characterized by a multi-party system with shifting coalitions. Following World War II, five parties were the most important: the Arbeiderpartiet (Social Democrats), the Høyre (Conservatives), the Venstre (Social Liberals), the Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian Democrats) and the Senterpartiet (Center). The Social Democrats enjoyed an absolute majority between 1945 and 1961. In 1973, two additional parties joined the Storting and became established participants, namely the Fremskrittspartiet (Populists) and the Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialists). The empirical analysis in this study is based on these seven political parties. Only one other party won seats in the Storting during the studied time period; however, this party, the Norges Kommunistiske Parti (Communists), have since completely disappeared. Therefore, I excluded Communist Party candidates from the data. Recent developments in Scandinavian party systems are discussed by Arter (2012). As a result, there are 5,151 observations of 3,044 different candidates available for analysis.

Elections for the Storting occur every four years. The number of seats are calculated (and allocated) according to a combination of the number of inhabitants and size of each of 19 districts. This formula has been criticized, but it continues to be used to prevent urban areas from dominating parliament. Over time, the number of seats has changed incrementally: after World War II, there were 150 seats, which number had increased to 169 by 2010. Citizens vote for party lists from their districts and can change the order on these lists if desired. However, an analysis of the available party lists of the three Norwegian elections between
2001 and 2009 shows that voters rarely exercise this latter right. Positions on the party lists and election results are highly correlated (.92). After the elections, candidates are ranked based on the absolute number of votes in each district. Candidates that failed to win a seat are designated as successors, and these candidates are also ranked based on their respective number of votes.

**Party careers**

The dataset includes annual information regarding each candidate’s political party positions. Consequently, I combined the information on party offices into sequences. Table 1 shows an example of the procedure I applied. All the sequences began at zero to capture the first transition into a party office. If there is a gap between the last party office and the election, the gap is filled with zeros. When there is an overlap between two offices, the sequence contains only the highest level. In summary, the 1,456 observations of party officials lead to 1,115 different patterns. If a candidate appears more than once in the dataset, i.e., if he runs for office in more than one election, the sequences will differ. Because they are nested with one another, a shorter sequence is necessarily a part of a longer sequence. Therefore, all the statistical models include a term to control for nesting. Although candidates who switch parties between elections might bias this procedure, only three candidates switched parties during the time period studied. Two of these three never won a seat, and the third candidate was not able to win again after changing parties.
Table 1: Example of how the sequences for each subsystem were combined. Years without an office, e.g., 1988, are indicated with a 0. In years with two or more offices, e.g., 1990, only the highest level is part of the sequence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (1)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (2)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National (3)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The length of party careers is calculated as the number of years since a candidate’s first party office, which is the length of a sequence. The candidates’ careers range from two to 46 years, with a standard deviation of 8.5 years; 75 percent of party careers are twenty years or shorter. The levels include local (1), regional (2), national (3) and international (4). The third measure captures a possible gap between the highest party office and election. Such a gap could bias the results. However, approximately 76 percent of all candidates have a gap of four years or less, indicating that long gaps are unusual. Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics for the measurement of party careers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Career in Years</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Level</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years between Highest Level and Election</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Descriptions of the measurements of party careers. There are 1,465 observations of 1,096 candidates.
Table 3 shows the transition matrix between the different levels of offices, which is another means of obtaining a first impression of the sequences. Only candidates that were party officials with at least one party office at some point are considered in the calculation. As a result, each row shows the percentage of transitions to other levels between years. For instance, 8 percent of candidates who held a regional office continued to a national office within the next year, whereas 7 percent dropped out. The triangle below the main diagonal shows the percentage of transitions to higher levels, whereas the upper triangle shows the transitions to lower levels. The last column shows the transitions from each level of party offices to parliament. The data in this column are thus based on the year preceding the election. In other words, 65 percent of the candidates without an office held a party office at some point before the election and are therefore considered party officials, which is an additional reason to control for the time period between holding the party office and election.

It is important to emphasize that there is no information available regarding the actual opportunities for party officials to obtain a higher level office. There is also no information regarding each office’s term. For instance, the probability of remaining at the regional level from one year to the next might be partly due to the term of that office. The main consequence of this lack of information is that it is difficult to justify operationalizations for more complex concepts of career patterns. Although there are ways to perform such calculations as a technical matter, there is no way to validate the results. Therefore, I restrict the analysis to the unambiguous measurements of a party career’s length and the highest level of a candidate’s party position.
Table 3: Transition matrix of party offices. The numbers indicate the percentage of transitions that occurred from a row to a column. The last column indicates how many party officials managed to win a seat in parliament based on the position they held immediately before the election. For instance, 47 percent of candidates that held a party office at the local level in the year before the election won a seat. Absolute numbers are provided in brackets. It is important to emphasize that only party officials – candidates who held at least one party office at some point – are included here. Therefore, the 65 percent of candidates without a current office but who won a seat in parliament had held a party office before the election and are not newcomers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(0)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>Seat in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International (4)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.38 (3/8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National (3)</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.64 (290/452)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (2)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.52 (157/303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (1)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.47 (79/169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Office (0)</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.65 (351/524)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vacancies

If there is an incumbency effect, it is important to account for undefended vacancies. In other words, the best opportunities for both party officials and newcomers to win a seat in parliament should arise when an incumbent chooses not to run again. It is therefore pivotal to control for the number of vacancies that were open to new candidates. I calculated the number of vacancies as the difference between the absolute number of seats and the number of incumbents running for office in the respective electoral district. As a result, I assigned absolute numbers of opportunities that were available for candidates in a given election period in their respective electoral district. On average, 43 percent, or 4 seats, were not defended by
incumbents, with a standard deviation of 23 percentage points, or 2 seats. Both the absolute numbers and the percentages were not systematically connected to regional or temporal developments. Although there were variations among regions and elections over time, the data showed no general trend. Therefore, there is no need to consider additional model specifications, such as interaction terms, to capture such an effect.

Empirical analysis

Groups of candidates

First, I determine whether there is an overall incumbency effect. Between 1946 and 2010, incumbents defended their seats 1,425 times. Of these 1,425 defenses, 1,366 (approximately 96 percent) were successful. In other words, knowing that a candidate was an incumbent is a strong indicator of his success. Because incumbents won approximately 58 percent of the seats during the entire period, this finding also implies that a majority of the Norwegian parliament’s composition is shaped by structural inertia. The argument presented here does not depend on why incumbents decide to leave parliament before an election. In addition to age, career decisions that favor positions in the private sector might be the next most common reason for leaving parliament (Diermeier et al., 2005; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008).

Second, party officials should generally be more successful than candidates without a party career background. Party officials are candidates who hold at least one party office at some point before a respective election. Out of 3,726 observations of non-incumbents, 1,465 (approximately 39 percent) were party officials. Approximately 60 percent of these candidates won a seat. Thus, party officials accounted for another 38 percent of the seats in parliament.
The remaining 2,270 observations represented candidates who were neither incumbents nor party officials when they ran for office. Out of these 2,270 observations, only 4 percent won a seat. These seats accounted for 4 percent of all seats in parliament during the entire period.

Table 4 summarizes the results, and the differences are striking. Incumbents were by far the most successful candidates, which is consistent with recent research on the overall effect of incumbency on electoral success (Fridkin and Kenney, 2011; Milita et al., 2014; Liang, 2013). Furthermore, incumbents represented the largest group of members of parliament. Party officials were more likely to win a seat than to lose an election, and they were the second-largest group. Newcomers’ success was negligible. They lost most of the time, and the few candidates who won constituted a very small minority in parliament. This result is not surprising because political newcomers rarely enjoy political success except in very specific elections or when celebrities are candidates (Canon, 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success Rate</th>
<th>Share of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>96% (1366/1425)</td>
<td>58% (1366/2342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Officials</td>
<td>60% (880/1465)</td>
<td>38% (880/2342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcomers</td>
<td>4% (96/2270)</td>
<td>4% (96/2342)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Descriptive results of the success rates and share of seats won by groups of candidates. The success rates are the proportion of candidates from each group who won a seat in parliament. The share of seats is the proportion of seats won by the group in relation to all seats.
These results show that the electoral success of incumbents and newcomers is easy to predict without any additional information. However, some variation must still be explained with respect to party officials. Sixty percent of party officials won – and 40 percent failed to win – a seat in parliament. According to the theoretical argument, this difference should be related to variations in the length of party careers and the level of candidates’ party offices.

**Statistical models**

All the models presented here are generalized linear mixed-effects models, which means that they include a random intercept by politicians’ ID to mitigate the possible effect of unobserved heterogeneity and to account for nested sequences. The models also include the absolute number of undefended vacancies in each electoral district. Furthermore, the models include electoral district, party and period dummies as control variables to account for possible underlying heterogeneity in these dimensions. For instance, organizational cultures vary among parties, which might affect their recruitment processes (Barling, 2013), although estimations for these control variables are not discussed. All the results are provided as odds-ratios (ORs). An estimated OR higher than one indicates an increased probability for the dependent variable. For example, an OR of two indicates that the probability of a candidate with that attribute to win a seat in parliament was twice as high as a candidate without the attribute. I calculated all the models in R (v3.1.0) using the lmer-package (v1.1-7). In summary, I ran three different main models, and all the models had a dummy for a successful election as the dependent variable. First, I tested whether there was an overall effect of incumbency on electoral success. Second, I tested whether differences in party careers helped explain party officials’ electoral success. Third, I combined both models to test whether observations of incumbents with party careers changed the results. All three of the models are summarized in Table 5.
**Effect of incumbency.** The first model is restricted to a dummy for incumbency and the controls discussed above. The model is a simple test of whether the descriptive pattern found above stays the same after controlling for the various influences of party, period, and electoral district. The results show that incumbents had clear advantages with respect to winning a seat. Both the significance and the size of the effect underscore the importance of incumbency. In addition, in the 59 cases of incumbents who failed to win a seat, 56 (approximately 90 percent) missed by only one place. This finding indicates that such electoral results were due to idiosyncratic dynamics during election campaigns that are beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, the significant effect of vacancies on a candidate’s probability of winning a seat suggests that it was substantially easier to win a seat that was not defended by an incumbent.

**Variation in party careers.** The second model focuses on party officials to directly compare candidates’ career patterns. Therefore, only party officials are included in this dataset. The model includes the highest office level of a candidate’s party career as well as the years since he obtained his first office and the years between the highest office level and election. The comparison for political offices is at the local level. Therefore, the model tests whether an office at a level higher than local increases the likelihood of winning a seat. According to the theoretical argument, I expect that a higher position and a longer party career positively affect a candidate’s probability of winning a seat in parliament. However, there are possible interactions between these effects. For instance, the length of a party career might only be relevant for candidates who did not hold a high-level office in the party hierarchy. I tested this proposition and other possible interactions between both signals by estimating models for subgroups of candidates according to the level of their party offices and by including an interaction term in the main model. The lack of significant effects and
significant differences among the effects justifies a focus on the interpretation of the main model.

First, only offices at the national level have a positive and significant effect on a candidate’s probability of winning a seat in parliament. The probability of winning for candidates with such an office is about two times higher than those with an office at the local level. Furthermore, the results suggest that there is no significant difference between offices at the local and regional levels. The estimation for offices at the international level is less reliable because there are only 40 instances in the dataset, which corresponds to 3 percent of the observations. Second, the length of a candidate’s party career has a significant and positive effect on electoral success. Each additional year makes a candidate 4 percent more likely to win a seat in parliament. This result indicates that loyalty and commitment to political parties pays off for politicians. To put these findings into perspective, I calculated predictions for all the possible combinations of the number of vacancies, political parties, electoral districts and year of election while varying the length of a candidate’s political career and the highest level of his party position. On average, a candidate with an office at the national level has approximately a 68 percent likelihood of winning a seat, compared with only a 53 percent likelihood for a candidate with an office at the local level. A candidate with a five-year long career has an average probability of 50 percent of winning a seat, and each additional decade increases this probability by approximately 7 percent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbency Effect only</th>
<th>Party Careers</th>
<th>Complete Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>85.18***</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(63.93 – 113.50)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(15.38 – 29.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Party Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office at the Local Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9.27 – 21.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office at the Regional Level</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.90 – 1.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(14.61 – 30.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office at the National Level</td>
<td>2.05***</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.43 – 2.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(24.66 – 50.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office at the International Level</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.51 – 2.93)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(13.78 – 74.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap between Party Office and Election</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.97 – 1.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.96 – 1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Career in Years</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02 – 1.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02 – 1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefended Vacancies</td>
<td>1.22***</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.16 – 1.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.15 – 1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>4829</td>
<td>2176</td>
<td>3316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>5151</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>5151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates</td>
<td>3044</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>3044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: All results are reported as odds-ratios with the 95 percent confidence interval in brackets. The dependent variable is a dummy for winning (1) or failing to win (0) a seat in the Storting. The second model only includes observations of candidates with party careers who did not win a seat in the previous election. See text for details and interpretation of each model.
In addition, a gap between the highest position and election does not make a difference, although this finding is potentially due to the limited variation in this variable. Finally, even without incumbents in this dataset, the effect of vacancies remains significant. This finding provides further evidence that the availability of undefended vacancies defines the general opportunity for a candidate to win a seat.

**Complete model.** The third model combines the independent variables from the first two models and tests them using the complete dataset. All the effects from the previous models remain significant, which confirms the results described above. In addition, holding a party office at any level has a positive effect on the probability of winning a seat compared with candidates who have not held a party office. The ranking of the magnitudes of the effects is consistent with the theoretical argument. Offices at the national level have a stronger effect than offices at the regional and local levels. Again, offices at the international level are difficult to interpret because there are few cases in the data. The results suggest that the separation between incumbents and party officials is justified; in other words, the effect of party offices is not an artifact of the effect of incumbents and vice versa. The effect of vacancies remains stable.

**Alternative explanations**

**Anticipation of voters’ preferences.** The main argument assumed the dominance of a political party’s internal logic, i.e., an organization’s recruitment process. However, it is possible that party careers and electoral success are caused by the same factors. If that is true, the relation between a candidate’s party career and his electoral success is a spurious correlation, and the estimated effects would disappear. If the effects hold but decrease in size, the interpretation is that political parties mediate some of the effects of alternative factors. That finding would put the results into perspective but would not contradict them. If the
results do not change at all, the alternative explanations add something independent of the main effect.

One argument in favor of a common cause is that parties choose candidates in anticipation of voters’ preferences and expectations. Many studies have examined how different attributes of candidates impact electoral success. However, a consensus seems to have emerged that a candidate’s quality influences election results (Buttice and Stone, 2012; Milita et al., 2014; Mondak, 1995). “Quality” is a term that allows for many different interpretations, and studies use the term quite differently. However, most specific qualities that are discussed in the literature can be summarized under the labels of competence and integrity, which were popularized by Mondak (1995). Competence can be understood as the sum of a candidate’s skills and abilities. Examples of competence from the recent literature include leadership, experience or intelligence (Fridkin and Kenney, 2011). Integrity represents the likelihood that a candidate will use his competence in accordance with his pre-election promises. Examples of integrity from the recent literature include honesty or whether a candidate is perceived as caring (Fridkin and Kenney, 2011). This understanding can also be identified in formal models of valence attributes (Adams and Merrill, 2013) and models of more general questions regarding agency between politicians and voters (Frenkel, 2014).

Consequently, a candidate’s quality is not only based on his party career but also on his record in other areas of social life. Because there is no specific information on the perceived quality of the candidates in the data, I use observable positions outside of political parties as proxies for quality. An additional advantage of this procedure is that observable positions are not prone to voters’ rationalization mechanisms that play an important role in surveys (Rahn et al., 1994). First, voters might prefer candidates with a political commitment outside the party system. If that is true, candidates with a position in a volunteer organization should be more likely to win than those without such a position. Second, voters might look
for a candidate’s experience in political and administrative processes. Therefore, candidates with public administration positions might benefit from this preference. Third, voters might prefer candidates with proven political abilities. This hypothesis might be connected to the incumbency advantage of incumbents, but it is generalized to all elected positions, such as political offices at the local or regional level. Although evidence from other countries has shown that many politicians prefer to remain at a regional level (Stolz, 2003), such a preference would help more ambitious politicians win a seat in the national parliament. Given that parties know about these preferences, they should recruit their candidates accordingly, creating a spurious correlation between party career and electoral success. A model using all these factors as independent variables is summarized in Table 6.

The lower BIC value (3,316 vs. 3,486) indicates that the more complex model is more efficient than the original model; in other words, the inclusion of additional coefficients is justified by the increase in explained variation. The model also estimates weaker effect sizes for all the independent variables. However, its significance remains high, and the original order of effects remains the same, i.e., higher positions still have a stronger impact. A longer party career still increases the likelihood of winning a seat in the Storting. Although the alternative explanations tested do not undermine the main findings, it is notable that all three additional independent variables have a significant effect on electoral success. This result suggests that part of the effect of the alternative variables is mediated by party structure. In other words, parties do not exclusively recruit based on internal considerations. However, the results still suggest that recruitment itself significantly increases a candidate’s probability of winning a seat.

**Different effects for close calls.** Another alternative explanation is that the significant effects are due to the operationalization of the dependent variable. Because there are several seats per electoral district, candidates can win or lose more or less clearly. In other words, it is
possible that the structural effect of political parties is strong for the top places on the lists but is less important for close calls. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that parties prefer experts as candidates when a seat is contested (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). Because comparatively few votes can decide which candidate wins the last seat, parties’ calculations change. If that is true, the effect of loyalty, i.e., the effect of longer party careers, should disappear. I therefore recalculated the complete model, including the variables regarding positions outside of political parties, using a reduced dataset. Only candidates that won the last seat or were only one place behind are included. Table 6 summarizes these estimations.

The most important finding is that the effect of the length of a party career disappears. This result supports the argument that parties compromise on close calls. Although party loyalty is an important quality for recruitment, it is not relevant from a voter’s point of view. In addition, the effect of local and regional party offices disappears. This result suggests that party officials under a certain threshold are not prominent enough to translate their party positions into electoral success.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>Close Calls only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>16.13*** (11.68 – 22.27)</td>
<td>7.85*** (4.66 – 13.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office at the Local Level</td>
<td>2.69*** (1.65 – 4.39)</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office at the Regional Level</td>
<td>3.71*** (2.36 – 5.82)</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office at the National Level</td>
<td>6.60*** (4.26 – 10.23)</td>
<td>3.71** (1.69 – 8.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office at the International Level</td>
<td>7.34*** (2.88 – 18.69)</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years between Maximum Level and Election</td>
<td>0.99 (0.96 – 1.01)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Career in Years</td>
<td>1.03*** (1.02 – 1.05)</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefended Vacancies</td>
<td>1.24*** (1.16 – 1.33)</td>
<td>1.16* (1.03 – 1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position in a Volunteer Organization</td>
<td>1.55*** (1.20 – 2.01)</td>
<td>1.85** (1.17 – 2.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position in Public Administration</td>
<td>3.04*** (2.08 – 4.44)</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Office at Local or Regional Level</td>
<td>3.58*** (2.48 – 5.17)</td>
<td>4.68*** (2.15 – 10.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3316</td>
<td>1333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>5151</td>
<td>1251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates</td>
<td>3044</td>
<td>1028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Table 6: All results are reported as odds-ratios with 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. Both models include variables for the alternative explanations described in the main text. Because there are only nine observations of candidates with an office at the international level in the second model, the standard errors were too high to report any meaningful estimation. See text for details and interpretation.
Model comparison by predictions

The effect sizes of odds-ratios can be misleading and are particularly difficult to interpret in models with a variety of control variables, such as those presented in this paper. Therefore, I provide a comparison of the five models based on their predictive power. In other words, I calculated an expected result for each observation based on each model’s estimations. Table 7 summarizes these results. Each cell shows the percentage of correct predictions of winning and losing candidates. For instance, the complete model without alternative explanations correctly identified 89 percent of the winners and 88 percent of the losers, equaling a total of 89 percent of all observations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbency Effect Only</th>
<th>Party Careers</th>
<th>Complete Model</th>
<th>Alternative Explanations</th>
<th>Close Calls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Won a Seat</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to Win a Seat</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5151</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>5151</td>
<td>5151</td>
<td>1251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>3044</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>3044</td>
<td>3044</td>
<td>1028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: A summary of the correct predictions of each model and the number of observations used. See text for details and interpretation.

The first model correctly predicts most candidates who failed to win a seat. However, only 63 percent of the winning candidates are identified correctly. The second model, which was restricted to party officials who had not previously held a seat in parliament, is much better at predicting winners. Considering party careers, 85 percent of all winners are predicted, whereas only 46 percent of the candidates who failed to win a seat are correctly identified. The complete model, which included independent variables from the previous two models, predicts both winning and losing candidates very well. Overall, 89 percent of all observations are correctly identified, with no real difference between the groups. This model
is slightly outperformed by the more complex model that includes the alternative explanations, which indicates that the additional factors also account for some part of the variation in electoral success. The last model, which focuses only on close calls, is similar to the first model with respect to its predictive power. It works well for identifying candidates who failed to win a seat, but it predicts only 53 percent of the winning candidates. In summary, the most complex model performs best insofar as predicting the correct outcome is concerned, but there is little difference in predictive power between that model and the model with no alternative explanations.

An additional lesson can be learned from the predictions of close calls. This model is clearly better at identifying candidates who failed to win a seat than it is at predicting winning candidates. In other words, in the case of close calls, the results suggest that candidates who are neither incumbents nor party officials with prominent party careers will most likely fail to win a seat. There is more variation left with respect to explaining why some candidates are more likely to win. In this sense, the evidence is asymmetric, indicating that the reasons why some candidates win are different from the reasons why they do not lose. Therefore, structural factors are more likely necessary than sufficient to explain a candidate’s electoral success in this subgroup. A closer look at this asymmetric relation is beyond the scope of this article, but part of the asymmetry might be created by differences in the parties’ success rates over time, i.e., factors that are not influenced by differences among specific candidates or, by contrast, by individual campaign dynamics between candidates.
**Conclusion**

The findings suggest that empirical variation in party officials’ electoral success can be traced back to political parties’ recruitment processes. Observable commitment and holding high-level party offices have a robust effect on a candidate’s probability of winning a seat in the Storting. In a comparison of all candidates, less prominent offices also impact electoral results. Alternative model configurations that included measures for outside experience and connections did not substantially change the results. However, there are different mechanisms at work regarding close calls. In these cases, candidates with experience at the local or regional level of elected offices have an advantage. Incumbency and national-level party offices continue to have an effect, but the effect of party commitment disappears. This result suggests that although parties have a strong structural influence on most aspects of an election, voters’ preferences make a difference under specific circumstances. In summary, the statistical results confirm the analytical differentiation between incumbents, party officials, and newcomers. The evidence also shows that a candidate’s success depends on the number of undefended vacancies, i.e., opportunities for winning a seat without an incumbent.

However, there are limitations to the study. First, Norway as an empirical case is excellent for analyzing general patterns but is less suitable for examining candidates’ electoral success during times of change. Although two new parties emerged during the period analyzed, there was no major shift in the political landscape. Second, this type of analysis does not allow insight into the actual process of voters’ decision-making. Whatever occurs inside that black box cannot be disentangled here. The same is true for feedback processes between incumbents and party lists (Crisp et al., 2013) and possible endogeneity between candidates’ ambitions, the realistic possibilities in a given electoral district and political parties’ recruitment processes. Nevertheless, the strong and robust relation between
recruitment and success across different model configurations is powerful enough for it to be used as a conceptual framework for further research.

More generally, the empirical analysis presented above emphasizes the need for in-depth information on campaign dynamics to predict electoral success on close calls. However, an analysis of the success of candidates is incomplete without reference to the parties’ recruitment logic. Although voters have the last say in elections, they face a choice that is strongly predetermined by the parties’ structural influence. Because elections are based on party lists, holding a party office and being committed to the party is at least as important to winning a seat as being a good choice from the voters’ perspective.
References


Anhang

Erklärung zur Gemeinschaftsarbeit “A Closed Elite? – Bristol’s Society of Merchant Venturers and the Abolition of Slave Trading” nach §9 Abs. (1) b) der Promotionsordnung:

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich folgende Beiträge in eigener Verantwortung selbst geleistet habe:

• Entwicklung der Gesamtkonzeption des Artikels
• Schreiben des ersten Entwurfs
• Aufbereitung der Daten
• Zusammenführen der Daten
• Durchführung der statistischen Analysen
• Erstellung der Datengrundlage für die im Artikel enthaltenen Tabellen
• Erstellung der im Artikel verwendeten Grafiken und Schaubilder
• Korrekturlesen mehrerer Entwürfe


Timo Böhm (Erstautor)  Henning Hillmann (Ko-Autor)