Estimating strategic models of international treaty formation

Wagner, Ulrich J.

DOI:	https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv054
URL:	http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/83/4/1741
Weitere URL:	http://wagner.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/fileadmin/user_u...
Dokumenttyp:	Zeitschriftenartikel
Erscheinungsjahr:	2016
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	The Review of Economic Studies
Band/Volume:	83
Heft/Issue:	4
Seitenbereich:	1741-1778
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Oxford
Verlag:	Oxford Univ. Press
ISSN:	0034-6527 , 1467-937X
Verwandte URLs:	http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content...
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > Umweltökonomik, Industrieökonomik, Finanzwissenschaft (Wagner 2015-)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft 333.7 Natürliche Ressourcen, Energie und Umwelt
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	Dynamic game , strategic interaction , structural estimation , International environmental agreement , preferential trade agreement , bilateral investment treaty , international relations
Abstract:	This article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties. A treaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period. The net benefit of treaty membership increases over time. Spillovers among members and non-members accelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute, respectively. The predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters, based on a cross section of treaty ratification dates. With this approach, I estimate the sign and magnitude of strategic interaction in the ratification of the Montreal Protocol, in the formation of Europe's preferential trade agreements, and in the growth of Germany's network of bilateral investment treaties. Through a series of counterfactual experiments, I explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in the formation of these treaties.