Voters, Parties and Representation in European Multicultural Democracies

Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca

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in
European Multicultural Democracies

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Acknowledgments

“Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood. Now is the time to understand more, so that we may fear less”. Marie Sklodowska Curie

“We never think entirely alone: we think in company, in a vast collaboration; we work with the workers of the past and of the present”. Antornin-Gilbert Sertillanges

Multiculturalism is not a totally new phenomenon (my Italian ancestors who settled in Argentina in the 20th century are evidence of it). Yet the increasing mobility we have experienced in the last decades combined with the globalization of the economy and the latest technological developments are unprecedented. This thesis tries to put onto words and graphics thoughts and empirical findings deriving from the exploration of the relationship between multiculturalism and democracy. This intellectual adventure would have barely existed in this form without the support and guidance of the professors and colleagues I worked with, the institutions I had the privilege to belong to, and the support and love of my family and friends.

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To all of you,
Gracias.
Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca
# Table of Contents

List of Figures viii  
List of Tables ix  
List of Abbreviations xi  

1. Introduction 1  
1.1 Why Immigrants’ Participation and Representation? 1  
1.2 Research Design 5  
  1.2.1 Immigrants 5  
  1.2.2 Case Selection 7  
  1.2.3 Time Frame Overview 19  
  1.2.4 Data 21  
  1.2.5 Measurements 22  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 24  

2. Setting the Context: Multicultural Democracies 27  
2.1 Immigration in Western Europe 29  
2.2 Geographic Concentration 33  
2.3 From Immigrants to Citizens 35  
2.4 France, Germany and the United Kingdom 40  
  2.4.1 Socio-Demographics 44  
  2.4.2 Naturalization 55  
  2.4.3 The Immigrant Electorate 62  
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion 76  

3. Immigrant Voters 79  
3.1 Analytical Framework 83  
3.2 Research Design and Measurement 89  
  3.2.1 Case Selection 89  
  3.2.2 Data 90  
  3.2.3 Dependent Variables 92  
  3.2.4 Independent Variables 94  
  3.2.5 Control Variables 95  
  3.2.6 Methods 96  
3.3 Results 96  
  3.3.1 Turnout 96  
  3.3.2 Party Choice 101  
  3.3.3 Migratory Background and Control Variables 104  
  3.3.4 Region of Origin 107  
3.4 Conclusion and Discussion 111  

4. Issue Evolution and Political Parties 115  
4.1 Analytical Framework 119  
4.2 Research Design and Measurement 123
4.2.1 Case Selection 124
4.2.2 Data 124
4.2.3 Dependent Variables 126
4.2.4 Units of Analysis 127
4.2.5 Methods 129
4.3 Results 129
4.3.1 The Issue of Multiculturalism (1960 – 2010) 129
4.3.4 Party Families 145
4.3.5 Multiculturalism across Countries 152
4.4 Conclusion and Discussion 157

5. **Descriptive Representation** 159
5.1 Analytical Framework 160
  5.1.1 Electoral Systems 161
  5.1.2 Political Parties 163
  5.1.3 Immigrant Constituencies 165
5.2 Research Design and Measurement 167
  5.2.1 Case Selection 167
  5.2.2 Data 169
  5.2.3 Dependent Variable 171
  5.2.4 Independent Variables 172
  5.2.5 Methods 173
5.3 Results 174
  5.3.1 Electoral Systems 174
  5.3.2 Political Parties 179
  5.3.3 Immigrant Constituencies 181
  5.3.4 Parties or Immigrant Constituencies? 188
  5.4 Who are the Immigrant Deputies? 190
5.5 Conclusion and Discussion 199

6. **Substantive Representation** 203
6.1 Analytical Framework 204
6.2 Research Design and Measurement 210
  6.2.1 Case Selection 211
  6.2.2 Data 212
  6.2.3 Immigration Issues 212
  6.2.4 Written Parliamentary Questions 213
  6.2.5 Independent Variables 217
  6.2.6 Control Variables 218
  6.2.7 Methods 219
  6.2.8 Reliability 220
  6.2.9 Validity 221
6.3 Results 221
  6.3.1 Immigrant Voters: Different Opinions? 221
  6.3.2 National Legislatures 224
  6.3.3 Constituencies 226
  6.3.4 Political Parties 229
  6.3.5 Immigrant Deputies 239
  6.3.6 Constituencies, Parties or Immigrant Deputies 241
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Conclusion and Discussion</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Conclusion and Discussion</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Main Findings</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Limitations</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Future Research</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. References</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Appendix</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

Figure 1. System of Political Actions 4
Figure 2. Venn Diagram of Citizens and Immigrants 7
Figure 3. Scope of the Cross-country Comparison and the Case Studies Analysis 9
Figure 4. Empirical Chapters Time Frame Overview 20
Figure 5. Total Population Change, Natural Change and Net Migration in Europe (per 1000, 1960-2012) 30
Figure 6. Scatter Plot Matrix of Expected Shares of Immigrants in Europe (average, 2011-2051) 32
Figure 7. Net Migration in the EU 15, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (per 1000, 1960–2012) 42
Figure 8. Line Plot Matrix of Unemployment and Migration Rates (1990–2012) 46
Figure 9. Unemployment by Birthplace (2008-2012) 51
Figure 10. Percentage of Immigrant Workers whose Jobs Matches their Skills and Training 54
Figure 11. Naturalization Rates per Country and in the EU15 (average, 2000–2011) 61
Figure 12. Immigrant Population in France 66
Figure 13. Immigrant Population in Germany 67
Figure 14. Immigrant Population in the United Kingdom 68
Figure 15. Opinions of Immigrant and Native Voters on whether there should be more Immigrant-origin Deputies 72
Figure 16. Party Preference of Immigrants and Natives 103
Figure 17. Share of Positive and Negative Sentences Related to Multiculturalism in Party Manifetos (5 year periods) 130
Figure 18. Scatter plot of Net Migration (per 1000) and the Average Saliency of Multiculturalism (1960-2010) in Western Europe 134
Figure 19. Timeline of Major Events related to Multiculturalism (2000-2010) 136
Figure 20. Line plot of Position on Multiculturalism across Party Families (1960-2010) 149
Figure 21. Line plots of Average Saliency (black) and Position (grey) per Country 154
Figure 22. Immigrants’ Distribution across Electoral Constituencies 185
Figure 23. Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Country? (Distribution Difference in Percentage of Immigrant and Native Voters) 224
Figure 24. Multiculturalism Policy Position of Elected Parties per Country 232
Figure 25. Average Number of Questions Asked by Immigrant and Native Deputies 240
## List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Rank of Countries by Human Development in 2010</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Share of Immigrants per Country</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Summary of the Empirical Data</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Summary of Measurements</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Voting Rights Granted to Immigrants and Citizens in Local, National and European Elections</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Immigrants by Nationality and Age Group (2010)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Conditions for Citizenship</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>Percentage of Foreign Born</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9</td>
<td>Identification and Coding of Immigrant Voters</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 10</td>
<td>Electoral Participation of Native and Immigrant Voters</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 11</td>
<td>Voters’ Personal Characteristics and Party Preferences (Multiple Regressions)</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 12</td>
<td>Region of Origin and Socio-Demographic Variables (Multiple Regressions)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 13</td>
<td>Mean Saliency and Position by Party Family (1960–2010)</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 14</td>
<td>Number of Deputies and Immigrant Deputies</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 15</td>
<td>Summary Statistics of Descriptive Representation</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 16</td>
<td>Immigrant Deputies by Party Family</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 17</td>
<td>Immigrant Deputies Elected and Shares of Immigrants in the Constituencies</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 18</td>
<td>Logistic Regressions with Deputies’ Background as Dependent Variable</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 19</td>
<td>Region of Origin of Immigrant Deputies</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 20</td>
<td>Age, Gender and Education</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 21</td>
<td>Ties to Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 22</td>
<td>Number and Percentage of Questions per Legislature</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 23</td>
<td>Mean Number of Immigration Questions asked and Share of Immigrants in the Constituencies (quartiles)</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 24</td>
<td>Number and Share of Immigration Questions by Party</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 25</td>
<td>Number and Share of Immigration Questions by Majority and Opposition Deputies</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 26</td>
<td>Negative Binomial Regression for the Number of Immigration Questions</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 27</td>
<td>Glossary: Parliamentary Questions Coding</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Electoral Knowledge Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Commonwealth citizens</td>
</tr>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHES</td>
<td>Chapel Hill Expert Survey</td>
</tr>
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<td>CONS</td>
<td>Conservative Party (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union (Germany)</td>
</tr>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
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<td>Destatis</td>
<td>Federal Statistical Office of Germany</td>
</tr>
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<td>DOM</td>
<td>Overseas Departments and Territories (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Social Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
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<td>EU 15</td>
<td>European Union 15</td>
</tr>
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<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>Greens</td>
<td>Green Party (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>Grünen</td>
<td>Green Party (Germany)</td>
</tr>
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<td>H</td>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Irish citizens</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Immigrant Citizen Survey</td>
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<td>IHDI</td>
<td>Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSEE</td>
<td>National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (France)</td>
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<td>LA</td>
<td>Latin American citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Labour Party (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>LibDem</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Linke</td>
<td>Left Party (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARPOR</td>
<td>Manifesto Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mneg</td>
<td>Multiculturalism Negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>Modem</td>
<td>Democratic Party (France)</td>
</tr>
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<td>MPF</td>
<td>Movement for France Party (France)</td>
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<td>Mneg</td>
<td>Multiculturalism Negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>Mpos</td>
<td>Multiculturalism Positive</td>
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<td>MSSD</td>
<td>Most Similar System Design</td>
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<td>NC</td>
<td>New Centre Party (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
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<td>PCF</td>
<td>French Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid</td>
<td>Plaid Cymru Party (Wales, United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRG</td>
<td>Radical Left Party (France)</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Socialist Party (France)</td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Single Member Constituency System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>Scottish National Party (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Germany)</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>French Union for Democracy Party (France)</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>Independence Party (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
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<td>UMP</td>
<td>Union for a Popular Movement (France)</td>
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<td>UNPD</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verts</td>
<td>Green Party (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WQs</td>
<td>Written Questions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

This doctoral dissertation investigates immigrants’ political participation and representation in European democracies. It grounds on the observation that immigration to Europe has increased in the last years changing the ethnic and cultural landscape of the hosting democracies. These social phenomena raise several questions: How does immigration affect electoral democracies? Are immigrant and native voters alike? Or, does immigration emerge as a new social cleavage? Are parties concerned about immigration and open to include immigrant candidates? And, how are immigrants represented in national legislatures?

This dissertation is an attempt to provide deep and systematized empirically founded insights on the transformations that national electorates, parties, and political institutions are experiencing in the so-called “age of migration” (Castles & Miller 2009). The studies examine and compare Western European democracies and shed light into some of the substantive changes and their underlying mechanisms.

1.1 Why Immigrants’ Participation and Representation?

Ideally all research projects should aim at satisfying two criteria: first, they should examine questions that are “important” in the real world and second, they should make a “contribution” to the existent scholarly literature by scientifically explaining some aspects of our world (King et al. 1994).
Although international migration is far from being a new phenomenon, in the last decades it has expanded to all regions of the world. International mobility has become easier as a result of political changes and the technological advancements in transport and communication, turning into the central dynamic of globalization (Castles & Miller 2009). A crucial characteristic of today’s international migration is the challenge that it poses to the sovereignty of states and the very notion of the nation, which are key features of modern polities. First, confronting the idea of a sovereign state constituting the authority which rules over a society, international migration defies the ability of states to regulate movements of people across borders and their integration (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). Second, challenging the idea of a nation sharing a common ethnic and cultural heritage immigrants change the socio-demographic configuration of countries’ nation. This results in major challenges to the conception of national identities grounding on ethnic terms (Howard 2009). Furthermore, immigration contributes to the emergence of a structural conflict between the so-called “winners” and “losers” of globalization. While the winners of globalization benefit from globalization as the opening up of national boundaries enhances their life chances, for the losers of globalization the opening up of national boundaries represent a threat to their social status and security (Kriesi et al. 2008: 4-5). Thus, contemporary migration touches the vertebral bones of Western electoral democracies.

A growing corpus of political literature has started investigating immigrants as voters, and immigrants’ interactions with political institutions and parties. Chronologically speaking this research first emanated from countries historically considered as immigration countries like the United States and Canada. Yet in recent years it has reached the old continent, where the field is under development. Recently, a team of researchers formed by Karen Bird and colleagues published one of the most comprehensive comparative studies about
immigrants’ political participation and representation in the context of European democracies (Bird et al. 2011). In this book the authors examine the electoral behavior of immigrants, immigrants’ candidacy and their representation in national legislatures, setting a fertile ground on which subsequent studies (including this one) build on.

In the essay “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems”, David Easton states “the study of politics is concerned with understanding how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a society” (1957: 383). Therefore, in the historical time that is ours, characterized by mass migration, this doctoral dissertation seeks to shed further light on the phenomenon of immigration and its effects on electoral democracies based on a series of comparative studies that encompass the process of immigrants’ political incorporation into the receiving counties, namely: (1) immigrants’ arrival to the host country; (2) their entry into the political arena and the recognition of their specific needs; (3) their political participation as voters, advocates and candidates and (4) the responsiveness of the political system to the needs and preferences of immigrant groups.

Examining key aspects of the political life of immigrants emerged to me as a viable strategy to foster our understanding of the changes that European democracies are undergoing at the age of migration. As Easton observed “each part of the larger political canvas does not stand alone but is related to each other part” (1957: 383).
In fact, a political system receives inputs of several kinds, which are converted into outputs, and have consequences for the system and the context in which the system exist (Easton 1957). As Figure 1 illustrates, in the context of multicultural democracies, political systems receive the input in the form of demands from immigrants, citizens of immigrant origin and national voters, which may have the support of specific political parties. Much of what happens within political systems is related to the inputs and forces that shape the process of decision-making. And following that process, authoritative decisions result, which shape the political system and its context (see Easton 1957).

Following this framework of analysis I expect that by examining immigrant groups and their demands, immigrant voters’ mobilization, where do political parties stand on immigration and multiculturalism (inputs and support) and immigrants’ representation (outputs) I will make a contribution to our understanding of the politics of immigration, integration and citizenship in European democracies.
1.2 Research Design

In order to provide with an overview of the research design of this investigation, in this section I explain the cross-national comparative strategy designed for this study, present a detailed account of the data that is used, and provide explanations for the multi-methodological approach implemented.

1.2.1 Immigrants

This dissertation focuses on the study of international migrants in Western European democracies. International migrants (or immigrants) are defined as individuals that enter a country with the aim of establishing residence. The most usual criteria to identify immigrants are place of birth and citizenship (Bilsborrow 1997). On the one hand, individuals’ place of birth is an important indicator because it sheds light on the dynamics of international mobility. On the other hand, nationality is one of the crucial identifying factors for international migrants because citizenship determines a person’s social, economic, and cultural rights in a country.

Cross-national studies related to immigration embody several challenges. The definition of migrants has been a key source of inconsistency in national population statistics. Countries gather migration data in accordance to their own definitions and measurement traditions, which is not always consistent across countries. To reduce complexity and guarantee comparability in this dissertation I focus on first and second-generation migrants using place of birth as the main identifier. First-generation migrants are those individuals that are born in a different country than where they live, and to foreign parents. Second-generation migrants, in contrast, are those individuals born in the country where they live but

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to at least one foreign parent. These definitions are applied to all country, and district-level analyses.

Following the main objective of this thesis some of the empirical analyses focus on immigrant voters and representatives, using citizenship as the main identifying criteria. Therefore having identified international migrants by their country of origin, I then focus on the subset of national citizens of immigrant origin. This is particularly the case in Chapter 1 when I examine the immigrant electorate, Chapter 2 when I analyze the voting behavior of immigrant voters, in Chapter 5 when I investigate immigrants’ descriptive representation and in Chapter 6 when I examine whether immigrant-origin deputies represent immigrants in national parliaments.

The Venn diagram presented in Figure 2 illustrates the definitions above established. The circle of the left colored in dark grey represents the population of a country having the citizenship of that country. The circle of the right colored in light grey stands for the immigrant population living in that same country. At the intersection of both groups is the subset of individuals that have both, the citizenship of the country where they live, and a past of migration. Overall, the empirical analysis of this dissertation focuses mainly on immigrant voters and representatives, that is on the population located in the intersection of the diagram.
To conclude, the main subjects of interest of this dissertation are the immigrant populations residing in Western European countries. And, the main objective is to shed light on the effects that immigrants and immigration has in electoral democracies. As every empirical chapter deals with a different aspect of this phenomenon, depending on the focus I may refer either to the entire immigrant population of a country, or to the subset of immigrants holding the nationality of that given country. This is clearly indicated in every study.

1.2.2 Case Selection

In this dissertation I adopt a two-step approach to examine the transformations of Western European electoral democracies in relation to mass immigration (see Figure 3). First, I apply a cross-country comparative perspective to analyze the effects of mass immigration on the composition of the electorate, voting behavior and party policy positions in 15 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Second, following the case-study approach I go more in depth and examine immigrants’ political representation in three Western European countries: France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom, which are in Europe among the countries with the largest immigrant populations.

The combination of the comparative method with the right selection of cases can provide the means to test propositions that are deduced from given theory which derives in a very promising strategy (Mahoney 2003). At first, I examine some of the most important assumptions about immigrants’ political participation and representation across Western European countries. The comparative method used in this research can be traced back to the Millean canons. Comparative research is one of the basic scientific methods of establishing general empirical propositions (Lijphart 1971:682). It consists on the systematic search for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of political phenomena (Mill 1843 in Clark et al. 2009). And, it is useful for testing propositions that have been validated in other contexts (Rokkan 1966: 19-20). In this way, the large N approach serves the purpose of revealing similarities and differences across cases, and to draw generalizations (King et al. 1994, Miller 2007).

Second, the case-study approach follows the small N strategy and aims at providing a deep understanding of the factors that influence political representation and its causal mechanisms. In this sense, the small N strategy can help overcoming some of the weakness of large N comparisons, namely poor data quality, inadequate indicators, and reductionism (Geddes 2003, Brady & Collier 2004).
Figure 3. Scope of the Cross-country Comparison and the Case Studies Analysis

Cross-country Comparison

Case Studies
Therefore, it is expected that by combining the large N and the small N strategies this dissertation can draw some generalizations and provide with a better understanding of the mechanisms of immigrants’ participation and representation.

1.2.2.1 Cross-country Comparison

In order to obtain scientific findings it is important to define clear criteria delimitating the scope of this inquire (Horowitz 1986). Accordingly, the selection of cases has followed the logic of a most-similar systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Therefore to examine immigrants’ participation and representation the countries included in the analyses have been selected on the basis of their social, economic, demographic, and political similarities, which are discussed below.

a) Socio-economic Development

The “push-pull” economic theory of migration shows that difficult conditions in the country of origin, and attractive economic prospects in the receiving country are among the major forces behind migration (Castles and Miller 2009:22). Following this assumption the countries included in the comparative analyses outperform the majority of the countries in the region and in the world in terms of their socio-economic development. Prosperous economic and living conditions are strongly related to the topic studied here because they attract migrant workers from countries with less developed economies.

The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) is a composite statistics that combines life expectancy, education, and income indices accounting for inequality designed to rank countries in terms of their human development (United Nations Development Program). In short, the IHDI can be defined as
“the level of human development when inequality is accounted for”\textsuperscript{2}, which is considered as the actual level of human development.

As it is shown in Table 1 Western European countries, which are the cases, analyzed in this dissertation are considered to belong to the “very high human development” group, which means that they are located in the top quintile. Among the top 10 countries worldwide in terms of their Human Development we find four European countries including Ireland in the 5\textsuperscript{th} position, Netherlands in the 7\textsuperscript{th} position, Sweden in the 8\textsuperscript{th} position, and Germany in the 10\textsuperscript{th} position. In the second ten of the rank appear France in the 14\textsuperscript{th} place, Finland in the 16\textsuperscript{th} position, Belgium in the 18\textsuperscript{th} place, and Denmark and Spain in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} places respectively. Down in the list appear Greece in the 22\textsuperscript{nd} place, Italy in the 23\textsuperscript{rd} position, followed by Luxembourg, Austria and United Kingdom, which are in the 24\textsuperscript{th}, 25\textsuperscript{th} and 26\textsuperscript{th} positions respectively. Finally, Portugal is located in the 40\textsuperscript{th} place worldwide.

\textsuperscript{2} http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf (page 157)
In other words, countries’ socio-economic conditions in terms of life quality, opportunities, and economic conditions are among the most important determinants of international migration. From this perspective the fact that European countries outperform other countries and regions in the world explains why they had become the recipient of mass immigration. And, mass immigration as I will show below is transforming the demographic landscape of these societies, making them the ideal cases to analyze to examine the effects of immigration on electoral democracies.
b) Immigration Countries

In line to what I have argued above, socio-economic development comes almost always hand in hand with mass immigration. The pursuit of better economic opportunities is among the most important determinants of international migration. The relationship between socio-economic conditions and immigration is well established. As it is shown in Table 2 Western European countries are among the main destination of international migration. These countries have a considerable percentage of their population being born abroad.

On the upper extreme is Luxemburg, which has one third of its population of immigrant origin. Ireland, Austria, Spain, and Sweden follow with more than 15 percent of their population of immigrant origin. Then, Belgium, Germany, Greece, United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands have between 10 and 15 percent of their population of immigrant origin. Finally, in Denmark, Portugal, and Italy around 10 percent of the population is non-national. And on the extreme lower side is Finland scoring the lowest percentages of immigrants among their population with 4.6 percent of their residents being of immigrant origin.
Western European countries have followed a transformation phase in which they have step-by-step turned from emigration countries into immigration countries (Fassmann et al. 20143). Transformations in countries’ migration cycles are often times accompanied by periods of stagnation, which then stabilize when immigration becomes one of the central components of demographic growth. In this latest stadium of the migration cycle, policy evolutions related to migration regulations are re-examined and integration policies are put forward.

Under those circumstances, Western European democracies are interesting cases to examine for two main reasons. On the one hand, the aim of this dissertation is to provide new insights on the interplay of immigration and democracy in “new” immigration countries. Much of what we know today about these phenomena originates from “old” immigrant countries, mainly the United States and Canada. For this reason, centering our focus on the European contexts allows for testing

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3 http://epc2014.princeton.edu/papers/140803
whether the same factors that explain immigrants’ political participation and representation in “old” immigration countries are useful to explain this in the “new” immigration countries. On the other hand, due to the fact that the phenomenon of immigration is relatively new in Western Europe, many transformations are taking place at the present time in these democracies. Therefore, we are in a privileged position when examining this phenomenon in Europe because these evolutions are on the go, making the European democracies the ideal cases to investigate how immigration affects electoral democracies.

c) Consolidated Democracies

The democratic history of a polity is an important factor to take into account in comparative analyses. In the first place the length of the democratic trajectory of a given country is crucial factor explaining the characteristics of institutions, party systems and the electorate. Established democratic systems guarantees that “the democracies studied are not ephemeral entities but reasonably stable and consolidated democratic systems” (Lijphart 1999: 53). In contrast, countries that have democratized more recently have a re-structuring party system and volatile electorates.

From this perspective, drawing the line for the case selection along the iron curtain has been a vital decision in this dissertation. Western European countries have followed a differentiated political trajectory in comparison to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were part of the Soviet Union. While the former, have more solid and stable democratic institutions, the latter are still experiencing considerable institutional, partisan, and demographic re-structuring. And this is quite consequential in defining the stadium of democracy. From this perspective, in stable democracies classic cleavages are more or less solved and new issues can emerge in the public agenda, among which immigration (Kriesi et al. 2008),
therefore older and stable democracies of the West of Europe are the ideal framework for examining the interplay of immigration and democracy.

d) European Union Membership

In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics that make Western European countries suitable for comparison in terms of their socio-economic conditions, migration dynamics and democratic history, another key point that is crucial in this study is countries’ early membership to the European Union. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands constitute the “Inner Six”, the founding members who set the basis for the economic and political regional cooperation. In 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the community. In 1981 Greece was included and later Portugal and Spain in 1986, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.

In 2004 the European Union made the steps towards the big enlargement, including Eastern European countries and symbolizing the unification of Eastern and Western Europe. Even so, including countries that have been EU members for a long time responds to a major concern. These countries play an important regional role as agenda-setters and policy-makers in the EU. It must be remembered that as part of the European Union, member states adhere to collaborative immigration policies applied on the borders of the Union to control for non-European immigration. As a result older members of the EU have been deciding on immigration matters, shaping EU immigration policies. And, a point often overlooked is that these countries have set the conditions for accession of the new EU members states, including the conditions related to intra-European and third-country migration. Given these points it is reasonable to center the empirical analyses of this dissertation on the older members of the European Union.
Finally, EU membership (which explains also the exclusion of non-EU members like Norway and Switzerland from this study) is an important determinant of immigration policies within the regional territory. First, it must be remarked that an increasing convergence on border control, citizenship and integration policies is observed across these countries (Koopmans 2005). Notably, since the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 European citizens have the right to live and work everywhere within the EU. These institutional changes contributed immensely to intra-European migration. And, with the adoption of the Maastricht agreement in 1992 the European citizenship was created which setting higher standards in terms of the integration of European migrants. In particular, social and political rights have been granted to EU nationals living in other European countries.

1.2.2.2 Case Studies

The second part of the analysis focuses on immigrants’ political representation in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and examines in particular their national parliaments. This design is conceived to reducing “the number of “disturbing” variables to be kept under control” (Della Porta & Keating 2008: 214) and therefore we can better explain similarities and variations in terms of immigrants’ political representation.

In the vast majority of the lower houses across bicameralist democracies, representatives are elected directly by citizens in which equal weight is given to each and single eligible voter (Tsebelis and Money 1997:46). Independently of the electoral system (single-member constituency, first-past-the post, two-round system, proportional representation) the lower house normally serves the purpose of legitimating because is elected by the citizens of the country where one citizen equals one vote (Tsebelis and Money 1997:46). The focus of the last empirical
analyses on the lower houses responds to the fact that these are elected directly in the aim of representing the citizens.

The three countries selected for the analysis of political representation have key characteristics in common. They have adopted single-member constituency systems (albeit some differences), which have as a constitutive characteristic to emphasize the relationship between members of parliament and their territorial constituencies. From this perspective, single-member constituency systems are particularly interesting for the research topic I investigate in this dissertation because international migrants tend to concentrate geographically within the borders of legislative constituencies. This characteristic facilitates testing the explanatory power of different variables such as the effect of the size of the immigrant community in a given constituency on immigrants’ representation, against party or individual-based explanations. In addition, France has a two-round system whereas the United Kingdom has a first-past-the-post system, and Germany combines single-member constituency system with open list proportional systems\(^4\). These institutional differences are taken into account by the researcher and linked to the empirical outcomes of the analyses to explain how and to what extent institutions shape immigrants’ representation.

In summary, I have presented in this section the case selection procedures adopted in the selection of countries for the cross-country comparison, and the three cases for the in-depth analyses, that structure the two-step approach I follow in this dissertation. Next, I will show the time-span covered in the empirical analyses that conform this doctoral thesis.

\(^4\) The implications of these differences for immigrants’ political representation are further discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
1.2.3 Time Frame Overview

The interest of this doctoral dissertation is to understand how the phenomenon of immigration affects our contemporary democracies. In order to do so, I examine some of the most important pillars of our democracies: the electorate, political parties, and political representation in national legislatures. The vast majority of the empirical research focuses in the present years. This is in particular the case to explain immigrants’ voting behavior, and immigrants’ political representation. In contrast, to explain the emergence and evolution of multicultural democracies, and parties’ policy position, I adopt a broader historical perspective that covers the period from the 1960s until 2010.

Figure 4 summarizes the time covered in every empirical analysis. To start with, Chapter 2, which examines the emergence and evolution of European Multicultural Democracies, examines their evolution since the 1960s till today. Chapter 3, explains the participation and voting behavior of immigrant voters in contemporary democracies, and uses a survey conducted in several Western European democracies in 2010. Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the issue of Multiculturalism across party systems in the last five decades. Finally Chapters 5 and 6 study descriptive and substantive representation in France (2007-2012), Germany (2005 – 2009) and the United Kingdom (2005 – 2010).

Therefore for the most part, this research is centered in examining contemporary democracies. Nonetheless, when it is appropriate I take a retrospective approach that help us revealing the long-term development of contemporary European democracies in the context of immigration.
Figure 4. Empirical Chapters Time Frame Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 2 Multicultural Democracies</th>
<th>1960 - 2010</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 The Immigrant Voter</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Parties and Multiculturalism</td>
<td>1960 - 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 Descriptive Representation</td>
<td>2005-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 6 Substantive Representation</td>
<td>2005-2012</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1.2.4 Data

Given its empirical nature this dissertation makes use of a wide variety of primary and secondary data. Table 3 presents a summary of the data by category, type, and source.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Population registers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Population registers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Development</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Several</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Several</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>Several</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preferences</td>
<td>Electoral behaviour</td>
<td>European Social Survey</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Opinion</td>
<td>Several</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Policy position</td>
<td>Manifesto Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs' demographics</td>
<td>Several</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPs' questions</td>
<td>National parliaments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The empirical analyses that conform this dissertation are based on five categories of data: (1) demographic, (2) economic, (3) legal, (4) preferences, and (5) representation data. These categories are sub-divided into different types, which have been extracted from different sources. Demographic data includes population and migration information, extracted from population registers. Economic data comprises economic growth and development data obtained from the databanks from the World Bank and the United Nations Statistics. Legal evidence includes migration, citizenship, and political rights, which have been extracted from legal documents and institutional databases. Preference data refer

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5 Data specifications are provided in the single chapters
to individuals’ vote choice and opinion, which are captured via opinion surveys. Finally, representation data comprises parties policy positions extracted from the Manifesto Project database and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, MPs’ demographics obtained from representatives’ biographies in combination with secondary data, and MPs’ written parliamentary questions obtained from the websites of National Parliaments. All in all, the question of immigrants’ political participation and representation in European democracies is explained using different kinds of data.

1.2.5 Measurements

The aim of this dissertation is to measure immigrants’ political participation and representation in European democracies. In order to achieve such objectives, and following Easton’s system of political actions, I have identified crucial elements of our contemporary democracies and examined them in the light of the phenomenon of immigration. These include national electorates’ demographics, voting behavior, and descriptive and substantive representation. Table 4 presents a summary of the main variables examined in this doctoral dissertation.

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6 Specifications related to the definition of these variables can be found on the empirical chapters.
To start with, in Chapter 2 I analyze the characteristics of the diversifying electorate across Western European democracies. From this perspective I examine the evolution of national electorates in terms of their ethnic and cultural diversity. In Chapter 3 I study the electoral behavior of immigrant voters. Therefore, the main variables of interests are immigrants’ turnout and vote choice. Chapters 4 to 6 focus on political representation, and in every chapter a different component of representation is tackled. Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism across parties and party systems. In this chapter, political parties are the main units of interest, and I look in particular at their position on the issue of multiculturalism. Chapter 5 examines the representation of immigrants in national legislatures. It studies the nomination and election of immigrant deputies.
Finally, Chapter 6 investigates immigrants’ substantive representation in parliament by looking at the content of the questions they tabled by individual MPs.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 2 “Setting the Context: Multicultural Democracies” addresses the state-of-the-art on the impact of immigration on Western European electoral democracies. Relying on demographic and economic data it sets the reasons and contexts of immigration. It argues that these countries have now multicultural democracies, and discusses how immigration alters the composition of the electorate, voting behavior, and political representation. On the whole, the first chapter sets the ground for the empirical analyses that precede this dissertation.

Chapter 3 “The Immigrant Voter” examines the voting behavior of citizens of immigrant origin in European democracies. So far, only few studies conduct comparative analyses of this type due to lack of survey data on voters’ backgrounds. This is why in this chapter a method is proposed that allows extracting this information from a combination of different items from the European social survey in a comparative manner. Through this novel approach, the thesis renders more visible the inherent specificities of the immigrant electorate. Furthermore, an additional contribution of this chapter to the literature resides on the way I have measured party preferences. The results show that immigrant voters participate less in elections and are more prone to support left parties than native voters. Thereby, this chapter provides cross-country evidence sustaining the findings reached in single case studies, showing that these patterns are observed across countries and immigrant groups.
Chapter 4 “Issue Evolution and Political Parties” complements the research immigrant voters by analyzing the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism and parties’ positions on this issue over the last five decades in ten democracies. All in all, it makes two main contributions. First, and contrary to what is generally assumed in the literature, the study shows that the issue of multiculturalism was present in the political arena before the emergence and success of anti-immigration parties. Second, it provides evidence which signal that all party families in the 1960s and 1970s (including nationalist parties) had positive views on multiculturalism. It is shown that by the end of the 1970s a radical shift in party systems occurred towards more conservative views. And, it is at this point that anti-immigration parties adopted more radical positions against multiculturalism. That process was accentuated in the 2000s parallel to the occurrence of major immigration-related events (terrorism, social unrest, and controversial statements by the media and political actors). In this way, Chapter 4 sheds light on the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism across party families and party systems, and provides with some keys to unlock the underlying dynamics of these developments.

Chapter 5 “Descriptive Representation” deals with how immigrants are represented in parliament. It is an attempt to move beyond the “counting-faces” approach focused on the number of minority representatives in office by incorporating additional elements in the study of descriptive representation. Coping with the challenges of the limited data available, the study makes two essential contributions. It proposes a framework of analysis by which descriptive representation is examined in relation to the characteristics of the immigrant electorate. Through this novel framework, this thesis sheds light on the role that immigrant voters play in the election of immigrant representatives, together with the strategies that parties follow in the nomination of candidates in the immigrant constituencies. Besides, it focuses on immigrant deputies socio-demographics in
order to explain how much these “mirror” immigrant voters. The results of the study reveal that this analytical framework is very useful to understand immigrants’ representation. Additionally, the study shows that institutional characteristics are among the most important determinants of immigrants’ descriptive representation. Furthermore, there is evidence confirming that party ideology is highly associated with immigrants’ nominations and that immigrant deputies are more likely to get elected in “immigrant constituencies”. Finally, biographical data sheds light on the fact that immigrant deputies resemble more national elites than the members of the immigrant community.

Chapter 6 “Substantive Representation” examines how immigrant and native deputies deal with immigration issues, especially when they represent “immigrant constituencies”. The sixth chapter makes three substantial contributions to the existing literature on political representation. By examining a massive amount of parliamentary questions from an original dataset it sheds light on how members of parliament respond to their constituencies, whether differences between immigrant and native deputies exist, and the extent to which parties influence immigrants’ representation. The study shows that overall members of parliament respond to their immigrant constituents when these constitute a large group.

Chapter 7 “Conclusion and Discussion” summarizes the findings of this dissertation, discusses the main limitations of the study and path the way for future research.
2. Setting the Context: Multicultural Democracies

Mass migration refers to “large net streams crossing cultural and national borders resulting in significant population redistribution” (Fielding 1993:7). After a long history of emigration European countries have become the destination for many migrants. In contrast to other affluent democracies such as the United States, Canada or Australia, which have been since their very foundation immigration countries, modern European states are the result of a political history rooted on ideas of a nation based on shared ethnicity and cultural heritage. As a consequence, ethnic and cultural diversity resulting from mass migration challenges European societies and their political regimes in many ways.

In the late 19th century and to the first half of the 20th century following the devastating effects of World Wars I and II most European countries experienced mass emigration. Considerable numbers of European citizens who were in their vast majority urban belonging to the poor working class and rural workers emigrated searching for better opportunities. Also, the armed and ideological conflicts that took place in European states forced partisans as well as members of the intelligentsia to flee their home country. The United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina ranked among the most popular destinations for European migrants. This period was also characterized by an important intra-European south-north migration, but that remained less important than the inter-continental flow.
Migration patterns reversed quite drastically after World War II. Western European countries\textsuperscript{7} (particularly those from the North-West) started to receive large number of migrants\textsuperscript{8}. This change in the migration cycle resulted from two situations. On the one hand, migration to Europe is explained by the North-South variability of the economies. Notably, Germany, France, the Benelux, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in comparison to other European states and other regions in the world enjoyed from economic prosperity, which attracted numerous foreign workers from less developed economies in the region. Macroeconomic theories explain that in periods of economic expansion, employers turn to foreign labor (Fielding 1993:8) and nation-states implement migration policies designed to cope with labor shortage. For instance, the Guest Workers programs implemented in Germany facilitated labor migration to the country.

On the other hand, the independence of former colonies, which occurred mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, had also a great impact on mass migration, particularly to the former colonial masters. The cultural and linguistic ties that former colonial subjects had with France, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, facilitated migration from the former colonial territories to these countries. Thus, economic development and the colonial history of many European countries increased migration to the old continent, contributing to the ethnic and cultural diversification of European societies.

In this Chapter I examine some of the main traits of these demographic changes, and its consequences for the working of contemporary democracies. The Chapter

\textsuperscript{7} In this research the terms Western Europe and EU 15) are used interchangeably. EU 15 was the number of member countries of the European Union prior to the accession of ten candidate countries on May 2004. The EU 15 comprises the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (source: OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms).

\textsuperscript{8} The terms migrants, immigrants, ethnic minorities and foreigners refer to intra and extra-European migrants and are used interchangeably.
is structured as follows. It first gives an introduction to the demographic dynamics in Europe that result from mass immigration, and it examines citizenship access and immigrants voting rights across European countries. In a second part it focuses on the specificities of immigration and the immigrant electorate in France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

2.1 Immigration in Western Europe

Since the end of World War II the impact of immigration on the European population didn’t cease to increase. As it is showed in Figure 1, net migration (shares of foreign-born\(^9\)) to Western Europe (EU15\(^10\)) augmented, particularly after 1985. At the same time, across European societies natural change (difference between births and deaths in country) decreased drastically. The combination of these two demographic trends had two major consequences. First, since the 1980s net migration surpassed natural change in terms of its contribution to the overall population growth. Therefore in European societies - characterized by an ageing population - generational replacement is to a great extent dependent on migration. Second, the relative size of the immigrant population has grown. As a result, the immigrant population started to be very visible in certain geographic areas and specific sectors of the economy.

\(^9\) Net migration rates are calculated as the difference between immigrants and emigrants in a given country in a specific period of time.
Figure 5. Total Population Change, Natural Change and Net Migration in Europe (per 1000, 1960-2012)

Source: Eurostat^11

^11 Eurostat Migration Statistics (demo_pop) include the flows of immigrants and emigrants, and population stocks broken down by country of citizenship or birth, data that is supplied on an annual basis by national statistical institutes.
This evidence provides the empirical foundations for the premise that immigration is changing the ethnic and cultural composition of Western European democracies. And, it is expected that in the future diversity will continue to increase. Even the most conservative population predictions forecast that the percentages of foreign population (including first and second generation, excluding third generation) will continue to increase in the next decades. As it is showed in Figure 2 in the next decades it is expected that increasingly larger shares of the population will be of immigrant origin. Overall, in the EU15 we expect that by the year 2021 twenty percent of the population will be first or second generation migrant, and that by 2051 almost one out of three European residents will be of foreign origin.

Broken down by country, by 2051 great ethnic and cultural diversity is expected across most Western European democracies. The countries that are expected to have lower shares of immigrants are Finland and France scoring 12,9 and 15,5 respectively. The majority of Western European countries are forecasted to have an immigrant population of around 30 percent. In the Netherlands were the foreign population is expected to reach 21 percent. Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom will have approximately between 26 and 34 percent of their population of immigrant origin. Finally, among the countries for which the population expectations forecast the largest shares of immigrants are Ireland, Spain and Luxemburg scoring 34 percent, 36 percent, and 62 percent respectively.

In this dissertation ethnic and cultural diversity or heterogeneity are considered as similar concepts. Kymlicka (1995:11-12) distinguish two patterns of cultural diversity. The first one resulting from the incorporation of self-governing territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state, which are otherwise referred as "national minorities". The second case refers to cultural diversity resulting from individual and familial migration. Such immigrants often times form "ethnic groups". They typically seek integration into the larger society and to be accepted as full members of it. They seek recognition of their ethnic identity by demanding modifications of the institutions and laws of the majority group "to make them more accommodating of cultural differences". 

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Institutional theorists have made the observation that once that international migration has started it tends to sustain itself. This is the byproduct of the growth of networks and the development of migrant-supporting institutions, which together make additional movement more likely over time. This process is called cumulative causation (Massey 1990) and sheds light on the fact that every migration act alters both the sending and receiving social contexts, increasing the likelihood of future migration. As can be seen, mass migration has transformed, is

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transforming, and will continue to transform the ethnic and cultural landscape of European societies. Given these points, Western European democracies are becoming multicultural democracies. As Kymlicka (1995: 18-19) puts it, there is a sort of multiculturalism that arises from ethnic differences resulting from immigration. Different groups sharing distinct languages and history, which are important aspects of personal identities and political lives, co-exist in a given country arising several challenges related to the accommodation of these minorities and the performance of its democracy.

2.2 Geographic Concentration

“Migrants arriving in a particular country do not spread out randomly throughout all possible destinations” (White 1993:52). As a consequence, the largest European cities have experienced in the last years a dramatic change in their composition (White 1993b: 66-67). This results on the “labeling” of certain districts as immigrant neighborhoods, as La Goutte D’Or and Saint Denis in Paris, Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin, and Brixton in London.

The emergence of ethnic minority communities is basically the consequence of residence distribution, which results from residential segregation. In a word, housing reflects immigrants’ economic status, family composition and demography, cultural identity and the hegemonic forces of the host society. It evidences the emergence of housing submarkets within individual classes that are related to the existence of different minority groups. Generally speaking, socioeconomic status and class explain ethnic minority housing segregation. Immigrant groups are to a great extent in a weak financial position, and as a consequence unable to afford high rents or buy expensive properties. Many migrants also pool their resources, as through a systems of communal sharing of financial resources.
practiced by the community they can afford access to properties, such is the case with the Chinese community in Paris (White 1993b: 71).

Along with the effect that financial constraints have on immigrant groups’ geographic concentration, cultural factors or in-group orientation, also play a role. For instance many minority groups use very limited housing search methods. Among many migrants information is only gathered via personal contacts, which relates to a very limited sector of the housing market and that usually limited to specific geographic locations. Besides, in the competitive housing market in which housing competition is a possible factor nourishing anti-immigration sentiments, the concentration of minorities in certain areas could also be seen as a defense mechanism enabling a retention of cultural norms in the face of external threats (Phillips and Karn 1991). In short, housing and geographic segregation can be explained to a great extent by the behavior of immigrant communities themselves.

Yet, the housing market also restricts immigrants’ dispersion and impedes greater contact between migrants and natives. In many cities, the so-called “housing managers” hold the power to restrict the access to housing from many groups. First, the control over social housing has played a crucial role. Segregation patterns have been observed across many cities, especially via the introduction of quotas and maximum percentages in social housing. In turn, the restrictive access of immigrants to social housing has perpetuated the segregation of immigrants from native groups of similar socio-economic status. Second, private landlords are far more discriminatory although their identification is more difficult (White 1993b: 71-72).

To conclude, the geographic concentration of immigrants is an important element of their integration. It allows immigrant groups to maintain some cultural ties to their culture and socialization with groups of similar socio-cultural status while
residing in another country (Funkhouser 2000:489). Self-segregation is observed in two phenomena. First, international migration has also created communities of expats with high-status and very prosperous economic conditions. Examples of such types of immigrants are the employers of international organizations in Brussels and Geneva or the Japanese neighborhood in Düsseldorf. Second, the self-segregation of immigrant groups, especially for those with more distinctive cultural demands, implies other advantages. Indeed, residential concentration favors to creation of religious facilities, educational provisions or specialist retailing (White 1993b: 72).

2.3 From Immigrants to Citizens

For many migrants there is no initial intention of permanent settlement. However, migration dynamics are intertwined with individual’s life cycles. Some migrants may want to prolong their stay because either they have succeeded in integrating into the host society, or because they have failed to meet their expectations and confront several difficulties to return. Also, having their descendants born and/or socialized in the host country may act as an additional incentive to settle in the host country because of the difficulties that it may represent for them to live in a different country. As a consequence when governments interfere to try to control immigration, most likely as a reaction of economic cycles, they confront different challenges than economic ones. Temporary migration has more likely transformed into permanent settlement or family reunion (Castles and Miller 2009:33).

Beyond economic integration, migrants are also confronted with their integration in the social and political communities of their host countries. Yet, as Bauböck argues “[a] democratic polity is never entirely identical with a society (...)).[A] democratic procedure of decision-making creates its own kind of membership,
which identifies individuals as potential voters and not just as participants in social interactions” (Bauböck 1993:174). In this way, liberal democracies usually constrain the access to the polity, via the selection of its members.

The concept of citizenship refers to a particular type of legal bond between an individual and a state. T.H. Marshall (1950) argues that there are three types of rights that are granted to citizens: civic-legal, social and political. Civic rights include the right to fair trial, right of association and freedom of speech. Social rights refer to the social benefits provided to citizens including health protection, unemployment benefit and pension. Political rights include the right to cast a vote and to run for elections. In the postwar era with the expansion of human rights on the one hand, and the increasing inter-state mobility which has forced nation-states to look after the conditions of immigrants, on the other, individual rights have been increasingly conceived as human rights, and recognized at the transnational level. These transformations have led to the emergence of a “post-national citizenship” (Soysal 1994), which involves the extension of many rights that were previously granted exclusively to national citizens to non-citizen immigrants. These developments however, have mainly occurred on the recognition of rights of the first two spheres, namely civic-legal and social rights. In contrast, political rights have remained to a great extent rights that are exclusively granted to national citizens. Generally speaking immigrants can not hold public office, they don’t have the same rights in terms of their eligibility for representative bodies and can’t cast a voter. As Castles and Kosack put it “[t]he most serious form of discrimination against immigrant workers is their deprivation of political rights” (1972: 33).

In general, the political inclusion of immigrants is dependent on two factors: (1) the recognition of political rights to foreign residents, and (2) the attribution of national citizenship. First, the attribution of political rights to foreigners is not
systematic nor it is applied in a similar way across all democracies and groups. Basically, it goes along with two distinctions made by national states: the type of election and immigrants’ country of origin (Table 5). On the one side, there is a distinction between local, regional, national and European elections. Whereas countries tend to be more liberal concerning political rights granted to immigrants on local, regional and even European elections, the right to participate in national elections remain almost an exclusive right of national citizens. This distinction results from the fact that national elections, and local or regional elections are perceived to have different hierarchies. National elections are first-order elections while local, regional and European elections are perceived to be second order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). First-order elections (parliamentary elections in parliamentary systems and presidential elections in presidential ones) have a great direct impact on national governments as in these elections voters decide who should govern the country. In contrast, second-order elections determine electoral outcomes to a lesser extent as these define fewer offices and have no direct impact on national government. Although, second-order elections serve voters and political parties as an arena to influence first-order elections, these are less relevant (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 8-9).

National elections are more influential in terms of defining a government, and because of that they are strongly linked to the core principle of modern electoral democracies of popular sovereignty. “Historically, the principle of nationalism has linked internal democracy with national self-determination, thus with territorially bounded and culturally integrated communities” (Soysal 2001: 164). In short, national elections are (more) related to the ideas of collective decisions making, representation of the interests of national citizens, and control of the rulers by the ruled (Balibar 2004:134).
Table 5. Voting Rights Granted to Immigrants and Citizens in Local, National and European Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Third Country</th>
<th>EU Citizens</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loc.</td>
<td>Nat.</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>■</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>■</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>■</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>■</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>■</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>LA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>■</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>C+I</td>
<td>C+I</td>
<td>C+I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own as of 2012. ● Political rights granted. ■ In 2002 the Social Democratic party in Vienna issued a law extending voting rights to all foreign residents that have lived in the country for more than five years. The regulation has never been applied in practice (Jenny 2011:51). C+I in the United Kingdom Commonwealth and Irish citizens are granted political rights. LA* Voting rights are granted to some Latin-American migrants in Spain based on reciprocity. In Portugal these rights are granted to some migrants.
In this way, national citizenship that grants full access to political rights is an object enacting material and symbolic closure (Brubaker 1992:23), which like other institutions serve the purpose of delimiting the terms of associational and participatory life in modern nation-states (Soysal 2001:164).

Moreover, there is a distinction related to immigrants’ country of birth, which subdivides immigrants into different groups. The differentiation of immigrants based on country of origin is basically the result of the colonial history, inter-state agreements and integration policies implemented by individual states. Basically there are three major groups of immigrants: third country migrants, EU citizens and naturalized migrants.

Third country migrants are granted political rights only in few countries. Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom constitute some exceptions within the European Union. Third country migrants living in Belgium are allowed to vote in local elections since 2000 after 5 years of residence, yet they can’t stand as a candidate (Jakobs 2011:36). The Netherlands granted voting rights to immigrants in 1985, making it one of the first countries to recognized voting rights to immigrants in Europe. Third country nationals having resided in the country for more than 5 years automatically receive their voting card. Participation in local elections is not very difficult as it is not necessary to register to vote (Michon and Tillie 2011:33). Sweden remains one of the most liberal countries in Europe in terms of the recognition of political rights to immigrants. First, it granted voting rights to migrants in 1975, much earlier than many other countries. Second, foreign residents only need a residence period of three years to participate in municipal and county-elections. These features of Swedish democracy are related to the explicit goal of Swedish integration based on ideas of pluralism. These ideas also characterize other Nordic democracies like Norway (Bergh 2011:43) and
Denmark (Togeby 2011:45) and have been intended to foster the political incorporation of immigrants (Tahvilzadeh 2011:39).

Also, following its colonial history most of third country migrants to the United Kingdom came from Commonwealth countries, primarily from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean. Their political incorporation has been expansive and inclusive. The British Nationality Act of 1948 purposes that Commonwealth, Irish, and British nationals are treated similarly. As a result Commonwealth and Irish nationals enjoy voting rights for local, national and regional elections. Which also makes them a very privileged group in comparison to other immigrant groups in the United Kingdom and abroad.

Finally, in the context of the European Union integration, liberal democratic citizenship has been enriched with some transnational elements. A number of provisions introduced in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty including voting rights for EU residents in other European countries for local and European parliament elections (Article 8b) expanded some rights to EU citizens. Based on the reciprocity principle, EU citizens can vote and be candidates for local and European parliament elections. Yet, EU migrants are excluded from participating in national elections. To conclude, migrants having acquired the citizenship of the country where they reside become nationals in all terms, which grant them the same political rights enjoyed by the autochthonous population.

2.4 France, Germany and the United Kingdom

In order to provide with more detailed explanations of the main characteristics of multicultural democracies, from this point on I will examine some crucial aspects focusing on the three case studies: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In Western Europe, these three countries have a net migration surplus and rank
among the first European countries in terms of the number of immigrants they have received in the last decade (Figure 7). France counts around 11 percent of foreigners among its population, while Germany and the United Kingdom have 13 percent and 12 percent of their population of immigrant origin respectively.

Looking in detail at the individual countries we observe that migration inflows to these countries followed different patterns. First, in France there was a peak of immigration in the 1960s and then in the 1970s. During that period many migrants from Southern Europe arrived to work in France in sectors such as the mines or the automotive industry. Also, following the wars of independence of West African and Maghreb colonies, and also Asia new waves of migration were registered. Ever since immigration flows were relative stable over the years and until the 2000s where they increased again. Finally, by the end of the 2000s following Euro-crisis immigration to France decreased.
Figure 7. Net Migration in the EU 15, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (per 1000, 1960–2012)

Source: Eurostat
Germany has experienced peaks of migration inflows in different decades. Following the adoption of Guest Workers programs designed by the German government in the 1960s and 1970s, different peaks of immigration have been observed. Following the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 that gave the rights to citizens of the members of the European Union to live and work everywhere within the EU, and the dissolution of the Eastern block which attracted many migrant workers from the South and East of Europe arrived to the country. Germany experienced in the 1990s the most significant migration inflows in Western European countries. Then, the migration inflows that followed in the 2000s had been relatively low, and even lower in comparison to France and the United Kingdom. Finally, the statistics show that given the fact that German economy has proven to be one of the most stable following the financial and Euro-crisis, new immigration flows have been observed to occur after 2008.

Immigration flows to the United Kingdom have constantly increased since the 1980s, and since the mid-1990s is one the country that has received the largest shares of immigrants in the European Union. The number of migrants arrived in the last years to the British territory greatly exceeds the newcomers in France and Germany, which evidences the fact that the United Kingdom is one of the most attractive destinations for migrants. This phenomena, is partially explained by the relative openness of the British job market, the migration from many citizens from the British territorial powers and the fact that given that English is the official language many migrants find it easier to be able to work in the United Kingdom compared to France or Germany.

In an increasingly globalizing world, neoclassic economics points out at the tendency of people to move from low-income areas towards high-income areas, establishing the linkage between migration and economic cycles. Transnational mobility is captured by the so-called “push-pull” approach, which adopts a
symmetric analysis on the economic factors that influence migration: difficult conditions in the country of origin, and attractive economic prospects in the receiving country. On the first end of migration flow there are the “push factors” which make people considering leaving their country of origin. Demographic growth, low living standards, small economic opportunities and political repression rank among the most important factors influencing people’s decisions to migrate. On the other end of migration flows there are the “pull factors” which act as incentives for people to move to a new country. Among these we count the demand for labor, better economic opportunities and political freedom (Castles and Miller 2009: 22).

2.4.1 Socio-Demographics

Neoclassic economics argues that cross-national economic disparities are one of the main forces behind transnational migration (Borjas 1989). These theories emphasize the individual calculations activated when confronted with the decision to emigrate, which are based on a comparison between the costs and benefits of remaining in the country of origin or going to a different destination. As Borjas puts it:

“Neo-classical theory assumes that individuals maximize utility: individuals “search” for the country of residence that maximizes their well-being (…) The search is constrained by the individual’s financial resources, by the immigration regulations imposed by competing host countries and by the emigration regulations of the source country. In the immigration market the various pieces of information are exchanged and the various options are compared. In a sense, competing host countries make “migration offers” from which individual compare and choose. The information gathered in this marketplace leads many individuals to conclude that it is “profitable” to remain in their birthplace (…) Conversely, other individuals conclude that they are better off in some other country. The immigration market nonrandomly sorts
these individuals across host countries” (Borjas 1989: 460-1, quotation marks in original).

Given these points, migration is considered “human capital” (Castles and Miller 2009:23). As much as people would carefully consider to invest in education because it raises their human capitals which can translate into future earnings, people decide to invest in migration if they expect that the potential returns of working in a different country are higher than those that would have had in the country of origin minus the costs of immigrating.

From the perspective of neo-classic economics there is a relation between migration and the economy of the potential host countries. A study conducted across 22 OECD countries for the period 1987 to 2009 reveals that GDP per capita and net migration has a positive relationship while unemployment and net migration have a negative one. Empirical evidence suggests, “immigrants are mainly concerned by aggregate unemployment which represents a better indicator of host country employment opportunities” (Boubtane et al. 2012:19). The economic cycles experienced by European economies in the last decades provides some support for this argument. Figure 9 presents the relationship between unemployment rates and net migration rates. In France, Germany, and the United Kingdom one observes that the relationship between unemployment rate and net migration is negative, this means that when unemployment increases net migration tends to decrease. Unemployment and net migration have a negative relationship across the three economies, yet in France this relationship is weaker ($R^2= 0.268$), than it is in Germany ($R^2= 0.447$), and in the United Kingdom ($R^2= 0.411$).

Figure 8. Line Plot Matrix of Unemployment and Migration Rates (1990–2012)

France

Germany

United Kingdom

Unemployment rates UNECE Statistical Database compiled from national and international data sources (Eurostat, OECD, CIS). Data on France doesn’t include overseas departments and territories. Net Migration: Eurostat - Migrants in Europe.
The above presented figures evidence that economic cycles and net migration are strongly related, implying that economic motivations are among the most important factors that influence migrants’ decisions to move to another country. The economic rationale of migration dynamics has great effects on the composition of immigrant groups. The migrant population is in its vast majority composed by Third country migrants, and is composed to a great extent by individuals in the working age. As it is showed in Table 6, the group of legal foreign residents of a third country in France, Germany and the United Kingdom is larger than the population of EU migrants. In France, non-European migrants double the population of intra-European migrants (66 and 33 percent respectively). In Germany the number of third country migrants (62 percent of the population with foreign citizenship) is greater than the EU population. Finally, in the United Kingdom foreigners from third countries represent 57 percent of the immigrant population. The fact that third country migrants are more numerous than EU migrants is in line with the argument that inter-state economic inequalities foster migration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU citizens (%)</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third country (%)</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working-age Group (15-65 years old)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National citizens (%)</strong></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU citizens (%)</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third country (%)</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat16

16 Eurostat (migr_pop1ctz): data on population by citizenship and by country of birth are based on administrative sources of national surveys. For some datasets statistical estimation methods are applied, mostly based on census, migration and vital statistics data. Certain differences in definitions and practices of producing statistics exist between countries.
Second, although there is some evidence of the transformations of the migration population structure, the engine of migration is still the mobility of workers across countries. Following WWII, the European labor market became increasingly internationalized and labor migration was characterized mainly by male-dominated groups of workers. In the following decades, migration developed into family migration. Across all migrant groups in Western European countries, the proportion of the total population made up of workers felt between the 1970s and the 1980s (King 1993:33). On the views of the author these transformations are evident when observing the increasing proportions of women among the population of foreigners: “[a] low proportion of females indicates a migrant population still in an early stage of settlement; as the ethnic presence matures with more family migration, so the female ratio will raise” (King 1993:33). Today this approach is contested by the argument of the feminization of the labor market. Female migration has increased in the past two decades. And at the same time it has gained in complexity. While many of the female migrants are confined to the household, many others enter the lesser-skilled sectors of the job market (like domestic labor). In spite of these trends though, increasingly more and more women enter skilled sectors of the labor market, especially in health (Kofman and Raghuram 2006). So as consequence of the increasing gender balance in the job market, today gender is not a distinctive feature of the immigrant population.

Third, the immigrant population belongs in its vast majority to the working-age group, and proportionally more than the native population does. Across countries the native population aged between 15 and 65 years old ranges between 64 and 65 percent. However, when looking at the immigrant population, these proportions are larger. Immigrants in the working-age group in France represent 71 per cent, whereas in Germany and the United Kingdom these percentages are even greater scoring 80 percent and 79 percent of the total immigrant population respectively. Looking at the group differences it is observed that individuals in the
working age are more numerous among the third-country migrants than among EU migrants in France (72 percent and 69 percent) and in the United Kingdom (82 percent and 76 percent). In Germany in contrast third country migrants are in comparison to EU citizens to a lesser extent represented in the working-age group (79 percent and 82 percent). To conclude, the distribution of the immigrant population across age groups in comparison to the native population evidences the fact that among immigrants there is a greater proportion of young working adults than among natives.

The data presented above showing that a majority of extra-communitarian migrants belong to the working-age group is further evidence of the relationship between economy cycles and mass migration. This raises questions related to the situation of immigrants in the receiving economies. Following the Malthusian assumptions that an increase of labor supply shifts the job equilibrium curve, some empirical research has pointed out that immigration lowers the average wages of native workers (see for example Borjas 2003). These arguments have been widely contested, mainly by the argument that natives and immigrants are not perfect substitutes in the job market (Card 2012). Immigrants experience discrimination in the job market in several ways: employment, recruitment, and occupation.

First, there is a higher risk of unemployment among immigrant workers than among native workers. To a great extent this is explained by the fact that migrant workers suffer from unfavorable market allocations, and thus are confined to sectors of the economy that are particularly vulnerable to economic crisis and restructuring (Kogan 2004). But also, economic recession finds some political echoes that translate into tougher regulations that affect the employment of immigrant workers. As it happened with the Lindsey Oil Refinery dispute occurred in 2009 in the United Kingdom where local hiring clauses were adopted to respond to the popular demand of ‘British Jobs for British Workers’ that
resulted in an agreement to hire at least 100 British workers at the site (Barnard 2009). Following the economic crisis of 2008 and till 2012 differences on the unemployment rates between native and migrant workers are observed across economies (Figure 5) suggesting that migrants in the job market retain their outsider status. During this period migrant workers were more likely to be unemployed than native workers in France were the average unemployment rate difference across groups was six percent (sd= 0.7), and in Germany five percent (sd=1). In the United Kingdom the group differences are lower and immigrants where only 1.4 percent (sd=0.2) more likely to be unemployed than British workers. The greater equality between migrant workers and native workers in the United Kingdom may respond to the highly skill nature of the non-EU Labor migration in Britain of foreign workers of the Insurance, Banking, Finance and Professional services in combination with the fact that in the United Kingdom work permits are issued selectively, generally to highly skilled workers from sectors for whom no British nor EU workers can be found (Salt and Ford 1993: 304-6).
Figure 9. Unemployment by Birthplace (2008-2012)

France

Germany

United Kingdom

Source: OECD
Second, institutional explanations for the employment differences between natives and migrants workers shed light on the fact the regulations over economic migration are not very effective. Across OECD countries only a minority (approximately one fourth) of migrants have gone through selective migration mechanisms aimed at meeting the demands of the job market (Keeley 2009:49-50). Thus it is argued that as a result of non-selective migration (and also irregular migration) the composition of the migrant workforce does not match necessarily the needs of national labor markets.

Third, the reality of migrant employment results also from group discrimination. Theories of discrimination in labor markets suggest that in the context of hiring and placement decisions employers face the uncertainty of the productivity of some (ethnic) groups of workers (see for example Arrow 1972a, 1972b). Experimental research has shown that migratory background is a strong factor of discrimination among employers in the private sector. Much of this discrimination occurs when private employers are evaluating whether to invite job applicants for an interview.

A study conducted in France including a variety of methodologies shows that second-generation Muslim households have lower incomes compared to Christian households (Adida et al. 2010). The study shows there is a religious effect in the French labor market. Indeed, anti-Muslim attitudes translate into the discrimination of Muslim workers. Similarly, an experiment conducted by Kaas and Manger (2012) in Germany where applications using a Turkish-sounding and German-sounding name where sent to different employers shows that a German name raises the chance of a callback by 14 percent. Finally, in the United Kingdom in despite of the adoption of the Race Relations Act of 1968, and the implementation of additional policies to measure and punish ethnic discrimination, there is evidence of racial discrimination in the labor market (Firth
More recent accounts show that Indian migrants “suffered particularly from the racial bias operating in entry into non-manual work” (Modood 1998:63). This evidence of unemployment discrimination sheds light on the existence of an ethnic disadvantage. Even when complaints about racial or ethnic discrimination raise every year and when anti-discrimination laws are enforced.

Employment and recruitment discrimination are highly related to occupational segregation, that is, the distribution of workers across and within occupations and jobs based on their demographic characteristics (like ethnicity). Basically, immigrant workers are highly represented in some economic sectors such as construction, accommodation and food, and household goods and services (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). At the same time, ethnic minorities remain largely under-represented in most of the elite jobs, namely as managers and employers (Modood 1998:63). The occupational segregation thus provided empirical evidence of the argument that native workers and immigrant workers are imperfect substitutes (Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 2012; Card 2012) because there is a “glass-ceiling” which affects these minorities (Modood 1998:63).

Finally, many migrants undergo deskilling while moving abroad (King 1993). Evidence suggests that with mobility, migrants experience a downward social mobility. And that people of professional origins often fail to secure professional posts (Modood 1998:63). The Immigrant survey conducted in France and Germany shows that only 28 percent (95% CI [24.2, 31.8]) of the migrant workers in France, and 15 percent (95% CI [12.2, 17.7]) in Germany have a job that match their skills and training (Figure 10). Yet migrants accept this downgrade because they have a relatively weaker bargaining power in the job market (they maintain their outsider status) and these jobs still fulfill one main purpose, they offer them higher earnings that they would have in their country of origin.

53
All things considered, there is a strong relationship between mass migration and the economy. As it is argued by neo-classic economics much of immigration trends are explained by the combination of contextual economic conditions, and individual motivations; and more precisely the reaction of these individuals to contextual conditions. Besides, when considering immigration and employment regimes in parallel one observes that they are moving in opposite directions. “Migration is increasingly onerously regulated and overseen at the same time as employment is de-reregulated (…) Immigration is to be excessively regulated, but

\[ \text{Figure 10. Percentage of Immigrant Workers whose Jobs Matches their Skills and Training}\]^{17}

\[\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{France} & 28 \\
\text{Germany} & 15 \\
\end{array}\]

Source: The Immigrant Citizens Survey\[18].

\footnote{17}{France (N=536, 95% CI [24.2, 31.8]) and Germany (Berlin N= 635, 95% CI [12.2, 17.7])}

\footnote{18}{The Immigrant Citizen Survey (ICS) (http://www.immigrantsurvey.org/) has been conducted in 7 European countries and 15 cities conducted between October 2011 to January 2012: Belgium (Antwerp, Brussels, Liège), France (Lyon and Paris), Germany (Berlin and Stuttgart), Hungary (Budapest), Italy (Milan and Naples), Portugal (Faro, Lisbon, and Setubal) and Spain (Barcelona and Madrid). The target populations were legal residents from third countries and naturalized citizens. The sample was preferably be based on country of birth, or, if this is not possible, on nationality. The sample was drawn from the best available national sources—censuses, local population registers, or other registers—in order to best capture the non-EU-born immigrant population. Interviews (around 40 minutes in length) were conducted face-to-face in all countries, except France (telephone interviews).}
working conditions, not” (Anderson 2013:79). This leads to a situation in which migrant workers are subject to employment discrimination, occupational segregation and deskilling.

**2.4.2 Naturalization**

“A liberal state is nothing more than a collection of individuals who can participate in a dialogue in which all aspects of their power position may be justified in a certain way ” (Ackerman, 1980:72, emphasis in original). In such a context, the political incorporation of immigrants results from a process “of becoming a part of mainstream political debates, practices and decision-making (...) [which are] achieved when patterns of immigrant participation are comparable to those among the native born” (Bloemraad 2006: 6). However, despite great advancements in terms of the rights granted to immigrants full political rights are only granted to national citizens, therefore naturalization plays a key role for the political integration of immigrants.

Naturalization is indeed one of the most common ways to acquire a new citizenship and entails the formal act of granting citizenship to a foreigner upon application. Every national state has the competence to naturalize non-nationals that apply to become national citizens. Naturalization “is achieved in a single point in time by an administrative decision regulated by law” and the decision of the conditions under which citizenship is attributed is “[a] political one that can be object of internal deliberation and consent among members of a democratic polity” (Bauböck 1993:174). So, a crucial issue in the context of political incorporation is the criterion upon which citizenship is granted. Some states grant citizenship without requiring a common ethnicity or cultural assimilation. Others apply more exclusionary policies, which establish a linkage between ethnic and/or cultural belonging, and citizenship.
Generally speaking, as Table 7 illustrates, citizenship regimes can be categorized along two dimensions: the basis upon which citizenship is granted (ethnicity or birth), and the cultural practices related to it (cultural monism or cultural pluralism). The first dimension refers to the population targeted in terms of who is eligible for citizenship. On the one side there is the ethnic definitions of the national community, based on the principle of *ius sanguini*, by which only those that have a shared ethnicity can be granted citizenship. *Ius sanguini* represents a strong barrier to immigrants’ integration as it excluded immigrants and their offspring. This conception has been characteristic of Germany’s citizenship practices, making Germany one of the most restrictive countries in Europe in terms of naturalization (Koopmans 2005). In spite of this, in the last decade the German citizenship was object to increasing liberalization. The 1999 Nationality Act contended that a person born in Germany to a foreign parent who has resided in the country for at least 8 years or has held unlimited residency permit for at least 3 years is automatically granted German citizenship. The law introduced for the first time in Germany a territorial component to the Germany citizenship and nationality (Anil 2005:454).

The territorial definition of citizenship is defined on the basis of birthplace. Countries following the *ius soli* principle grant citizenship to those individuals/subjects born in the national territory. *Ius soli* characterizes the vast majority of the countries, including France and the United Kingdom, and favors the integration of second-generation migrants, as those born in the national territory enjoy the same rights than national citizens born to native parents.

Finally, the basis under which citizenship is granted in a given country is not only relevant in terms of how inclusive these policies are, but have great implications for discrimination. Koopmans (2005) argue that the ethnic conception of citizenship imposes a great differentiation between national and foreigners, which
result on weakly developed sanctions to combat discrimination. In contrast, the second conception of citizenship (territorial) is more color-blind, as it embodies little discrimination in terms of first nationality and ethnicity, imposing greater sanctions to discrimination based on these attributes (Koopmans 2005:34).

Table 7. Conditions for Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Monism</th>
<th>Ius Sanguini (Ethnicity)</th>
<th>Ius Soli (Birth)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Pluralism</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on Koopmans 2005: 73

The second dimension of citizenship is the cultural one and refers to the cultural requirements for naturalization. It distinguishes between cultural monism and cultural pluralism. Cultural monism (or assimilation) is a conception of a unitary national political culture, which demands from immigrants to adapt to a set of values and behaviors that are considered to be at the core of the nation-state (Faist 2000: 201-202). France and Germany are practitioners of cultural monism. The basic indicators of these practices are observed on the requirements for naturalization. In France, language proficiency plays an important role, however foreigners can be naturalized only if they are “well assimilated to the French society”. In this way, prospective applicants are required to be “well assimilated to the French customs and manners”. Lack of assimilation is considered to exist when an individual lives at the margin of society or practices polygamy. Further evaluation of assimilation is conducted by the administrative personnel and also takes into account the conduct of the applicant and her/his loyalty to the country. In Germany before the citizenship regimes modifications introduced in 1999 a strong identification with the German culture was required. Ever since, more demanding language criteria have been included and deep knowledge of the
German political system is required. Additionally, applicants must sign a loyalty statement to the constitution.

Cultural pluralism in contrast, defends a more multicultural definition of citizenship in which the recognition of cultural differences is a distinctive element of the political culture. In this institutional framework, immigrants can maintain their cultural practices and identities in their new country of residence (Faist 2000: 201-202). In countries implementing cultural pluralism, like the United Kingdom, immigrant minorities have greater chances to maintain their cultural distinctiveness, which also contributes to the maintenance of ties to their countries of origin (Goulbourne 1991). In terms of naturalization practices, cultural pluralism translates into less demanding cultural requirements for naturalization. In the United Kingdom the cultural dimension and the cultural naturalization requirements are restricted to the knowledge of the English language (Koopmans 2005:52-53).

Nationality acquisition is measured considering the following indicators (see for example Koopmans 2005; Bauböck 1994): (1) number of years of residence requested, (2) welfare and social security requirements, (3) treatment of the second generation, (4) dual citizenship and (5) actual naturalization rates. Great disparities are found in terms of the number of years requested for naturalization. France and the United Kingdom require a minimum of 5 years of residence. Germany in contrast requires 8, and before the Nationality Law introduced in 1999 it was of 10 years. Regarding the social and economic conditions of the applicant, in some countries like in Germany, dependence on the welfare system may be a barrier to naturalization. This was later revised, and in the 1999 Nationality Law introduced that dependence on the welfare state is not an impediment to naturalization if the individual is not personally responsible for the situation. In France and the United Kingdom such restrictions don’t apply.
Besides, in terms of the treatment of the second generation, in France the children of migrants are automatically granted French citizenship. In the United Kingdom, citizenship is granted on the basis of *ius soli* if at least one of the parents is a legal resident. In Germany after the 1999 Nationality Law, children born in Germany are granted the German citizenship if one of the parents has resided in the country for more than 8 years of has held a permanent residence permit for longer than 3 years. Dual citizenship can be an important factor influencing naturalization. As Koopmans (2005:366) argues the requirement to give up the first nationality can be an important material as well as psychological barrier, as immigrants can loose rights in their country of origin. Also, dual citizenship is allowed in France and in the United Kingdom, yet in Germany dual citizenship is only possible for certain migrants, depending on binational agreements.

Finally, it is important to look the extent to which these factors affect the naturalization rates across countries. Figure 11 shows the naturalization rates in France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the EU 15 (average). Overall, the three countries individually present higher naturalization rates compared to other Western European countries. The large number of naturalizations in these countries is to a great extent explained by the fact that France, Germany and the United Kingdom are the countries in Western Europe having the largest number of immigrants in their territories. Also, migration to these countries is not new, but has some decades thus many migrants are expected to meet the years of residency criteria that are needed for naturalization.

In France the number of naturalizations per year ranges around 150,000 and is more or less stable on time. In Germany we observe that after the liberalization of the German citizenship in the 2000s a peak of naturalization was registered. In that year, almost 200,000 immigrants acquired German citizenship. In the following decade naturalizations rates stabilized between 100,000 to 120,000 per
year. Finally, the United Kingdom registered an increase of naturalization rates in the 2000s from around 75,000 in 2000 to more than 150,000 in 2007. And, following the worldwide financial crisis of 2008, naturalization rates in the country registered a considerable increase up 200,000 citizenships granted to foreigners a year.
Figure 11. Naturalization Rates per Country and in the EU15 (average, 2000–2011)

Source: Eurostat

To summarize, in Europe there is an increasing convergence towards a common conception of citizenship. Although great variations are still observed across countries, since the 1980s France and Germany have moved into the direction of more civic-territorial conceptions of citizenship and from assimilationist cultural conceptions towards the recognition of rights and differences. The United Kingdom instead has moved little as in the country; the civic-territorial conceptions of citizenship and cultural pluralism have been implemented early on (Koopmans 2005: 72-73). These institutional changes, combined with the recent history of migration experienced by these countries are resulting in high naturalization rates, which translates in larger shares of the citizenry being of migrant origin.

2.4.3 The Immigrant Electorate

In this section I examine some of the key characteristics of the immigrant electorate. Students of migrations have observed that the longer the migrant groups stays abroad the less they are interested in their country of origin: “homeland identification is inversely related to the migrants’ length of stay” (Miller 1981:44). On the same talk, the more integrated immigrants communities are, the more they participate in politics in their country of settlement. Thus it is fair to assume, that immigrants, precisely naturalized immigrants whose citizenship statues indicates length of stay as well as a conscious choice to further integrate in the country of settlement, emerge as Miller (1981) argues as a new political force.

In political science, cleavage theories claim that voters are divided into different blocs (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The underlying assumption is that certain cleavages separate voters on specific issues and that these cleavages determine the emergence of group’ shared policy concerns; shaping party systems, political choice, and political representation. “[M]igration is known to have an important
disruptive effect in different fields of social and economic life” (González-Ferrer 2011: 66). “Immigrants enter another country in search of economic betterment and come there to constitute ethnic and racial minorities” (Banton 1988:126).

The creation of group consciousness results then from the systematic classification of individuals between those that enjoy rights (national citizens) and those that have lesser rights (foreigners). This classification is practiced by states, and adds to experiences of group competition (for jobs, housing, social benefits) and individual experiences of discrimination (Banton 1988). In response to these discriminations migrants “organize and articulate their political interests along ethnic, racial, or religious lines” (Ireland 2000:235). Yet the emergence of the immigrant electorate depends to a great extent on their geographic concentration, the existence of social networks that help articulating political concerns and distinctive political preferences.

2.4.3.1 The Geography of the Immigrant Electorate

Electoral systems determine the incentives operating in the process of candidate nomination in a given democracy. Thus, the characteristics of electoral systems lead to different outcomes in terms of the representation of minorities. It has been demonstrated that proportional systems are more favorable than majoritarian systems for the access of women, Aboriginal people, and ethnic minorities to national parliaments (Norris 1997, Reynols 2006, Kostadinova 2007, Forest 2012). In proportional systems (PR) minorities have less the need to join other groups to form larger parties and access the parliament (Shugart 1994). Besides, PR is more favorable to the articulation of the interests of minorities. “What is important to realize regarding the electoral system is that only with proportional representation (…) can we see whether such a set of concerns is politically significant, PR, by not forcing minorities into larger political parties, allows minorities to express themselves through their own parties, if they so desire,
without being penalized in the process of seat allocation” (Shugart 1994:35). In majoritarian systems, party leaders and party members would usually choose to support candidates that they consider able to get the votes required to win the election (Rule 1994:18). Thus, minority candidates and the representation of minority interests tend to suffer from these calculations. As Weaver (1997) puts it, majoritarian systems penalize the access of minorities to office and the representation of the interests of the minorities.

However, contrasting with the widespread assumption that electoral systems alone shape minority representation, recent research is shedding light on the limitations of the electoral rules framework (see for example Bloemraad 2013, Forest 2012, Ruedin 2009). These conclusions are based on evidence that shows that despite differences in the electoral architecture of industrialized democracies (PR or majoritarian systems) ethnic minorities (immigrants) are underrepresented in national parliaments (see Bloemraad 2013, Forest 2012). This evidence leads to the observation of the effects the demographic concentration has on the representation of minorities. The residential concentration of immigrant-origin communities in certain urban areas can translate into minority representation in single-member constituency systems (Bloemraad 2013, Feldblum and Lawson 1994). And, the representation problem of majoritarian systems for minorities can turn to an advantage if there is a minority group that is spatially segregated at the appropriate scale (Forest 2012). For instance, in the United States, variations in the number of black representatives across regions and across levels of government are to a great extent explained as the interaction of the concentration of blacks (row number and percentage) and the size of the constituency unit (Grofman and Handley 1989). Based on this evidence we advance that the geography of the immigrant electorate one of the most important elements explaining their representation. The rationale behind the geographic concentration argument is that the distribution of immigrant voters across constituencies in multicultural
democracies can lead parties and candidates to compete for the immigrant vote if they have reasons to expect that this will lead to advantageous outcomes.

Demographic data on the countries analyzed in this dissertation point in the direction of the unbalanced distribution of foreigners across regions. Figure 12 shows the distribution of the immigrant population (individuals holding a nationality other than French) in Metropolitan France. The statistics shed light on the fact that there is a great concentration of immigrants around the capital city, Paris, where the shares of immigrants reach up to 22 percent of the population. Besides, high concentrations of immigrants are observed in the south, southeast and west of the country.

20 The evidence is based on the official data available for every single country, which explains the fact that demographic data is aggregated at different administrative levels.
Similarly, in Germany immigrants are concentrated in their vast majority in specific regions of the country (see Figure 13). The regions in the north including Hamburg, Berlin and Bremen have the largest immigrant populations with almost 15 percent of their population being a foreigner. Then, in the West, Hessen and

\[\text{Source: INSEE 2011}^{2}\]

\[\text{http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=99\&ref_id=t_0405R}\]
Baden-Württemberg have around 13 percent of their population being of immigrant origin. Other regions of the country present smaller immigrant populations, specially the regions in the East.

Figure 13. Immigrant Population in Germany

Finally, data on the distribution of the foreign population in the United Kingdom sheds light on the fact that there are areas that are dominated by the presence of immigrants. As it can be seen in Figure 14, there is a greater within-country

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22https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/ForeignPopulation/Tables/LaenderTimeSerie.html
population variation. Some areas like Greater London, Manchester, and Leicester are dominated by the presence of foreigners (around 50 percent). Whereas, in other areas, mainly the South-West, West Midlands, North of England, Wales and the South of Scotland have a less mixed population.

Figure 14. Immigrant Population in the United Kingdom

Source: Office of National Statistics 2011²³

²³ 2011 Census: Country of birth, local authorities in England and Wales
As shown above, the inner dynamics fluxes of international migration related to regions’ economic conditions, housing segregation, and the power of ethnic networks result in the unequal distribution of the immigrant population. This phenomenon is quite important in the context of democracies operating with single-member constituency systems\(^{24}\) because migrants find themselves concentrated within the borders of specific electoral districts. Geographic concentration in this way can influence immigrant voters’ mobilization, party strategies, and makes the immigrant population more visible on the eyes of the legislators representing immigrant constituencies. As a result, SMC systems in contexts of immigrants’ geographic concentration are expected to provide with a set of incentives for individual candidates and parties to represent the immigrant voters.

### 2.4.3.2 Immigrants Prefer Immigrant Representatives

The question of whether minority groups should be represented by individuals of the same group has been subject to extended political debates over decades. It is argued that descriptive representatives represent better the citizens that are like them in contexts of inter-group mistrust and when the interest of these groups are not addressed by existent political actors. In these contexts, having representatives that share attributes and experiences with some sub-groups of the electorate facilitates communication and helps bringing particular interests and concerns to the political agenda. Also, in democracies that have a history of political subordination or where there is low legitimacy having minority representatives favors political inclusion and decreases the feelings of political alienation of minorities (Mansbridge 1999, Banducci et al. 2004).

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\(^{24}\) Germany combines single-member constituencies with proportional representation.
The effects of having immigrant candidates and representatives on the attitudes and preferences of the immigrant electorate are manifold. First, it has been showed that in the US the presence of Latino candidates mobilizes the Latino electorate, increasing voter turnout and resulting in strong support for co-ethnic candidates (Barreto 2007). Also the presence of Latino representatives in the congress and senate are associated with lower levels of political alienation among Latino constituents. The presence of immigrant candidates and representatives plays an empowering role among immigrant voters (Pantoja and Segura 2003). So all in all, in contexts of increasing ethnic and cultural diversity party competition and the strategies followed by individual parties when they nominate immigrant candidates also contribute to the formation of an immigrant electorate (Pantoja et al. 2001, Pantoja and Segura 2003.) and ultimately to the quality of multicultural democracies.

These dynamics are not only observed in the American context but they are increasingly more and more spreading across Western European democracies. In Germany, following the liberalization of the citizenship regime in 1999 a rapid enlargement of the immigrant electorate occurred. In this new political landscape the percentage of immigrant candidates (non-ethnic Germans) in the legislative elections rapidly increased (Claro da Fonseca 2011). In the general election of 1998 previous to Law immigrant candidates of non-German origin scored only one fifth of the total number of naturalized candidates. In the 2002 election the percentage of immigrant candidates of non-German origin almost doubled and by 2005 it represented almost half of all the naturalized immigrants. First and second-generation Turks constitute a majority of these immigrant candidates, which corresponds to a great extent to the occurring demographic changes in the immigrant electorate (Claro da Fonseca 2011: 120-121). These electoral dynamics in turn remain susceptible of affecting voting preferences among immigrant voters, yet the relationship between the nomination of immigrant candidates and
the voting behavior remain largely unexplored across Western European democracies.

Empirical evidence suggests that immigrant voters want more immigrant representatives. The Immigrant Citizens Survey\(^\text{25}\) conducted among migrant respondents in France and Germany shows that the majority of immigrants consider that there should be more members of parliament with migratory background (Figure 9). In France 75.7\% (95\% CI [70.3, 81.10]) of the immigrants respondents would like to have more immigrant deputies in the National Assembly. Alike, in Germany, four out of five (95\% CI [78.82, 9]) immigrant voters would prefer having more representatives of immigrant origin in the Bundestag.

\(^{25}\) http://www.immigrantsurvey.org/
Captivatingly, in France native voters are favorable to having more immigrant MPs but not in Germany. A majority of French voters (66 percent) perceives that there should be more immigrant representatives in the parliament, yet they consider so to a lesser extent than immigrant voters do in France (ten percent less). In contrast, the majority of German voters oppose the idea of having more

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26 Sources: Immigrant voters’ opinions extracted from The Immigrant Citizen Survey26. Native Voters: 2006 Eurobarometer on Discrimination in the EU - The Eurobarometer Special 263 QA8.

27 France [Immigrant Voters N=242, 95% CI [70.3, 81.10]/Native Voters N= 1009, 95% CI [63.8, 68.9]) and Germany [Immigrant Voters N=1000, 95% CI [78,82.9]/ Native Voters N=1570, 95% CI [32.6, 37]].
parliamentarians of immigrant origin. In Germany only 35 percent of the native voters, that is less than the half of immigrant voters in Germany, would like to have representatives of the immigrant minority. This cross-national comparison sheds light on two facts: the similarities in terms of political preferences among immigrants across countries, and the differences on attitudes of the native population. Further empirical evidence supports the observation that immigrants have favorable attitudes towards immigrant candidates. An experimental survey conducted in France by Brouard and Tiberj (2011: 171) between immigrant and native French voters shows that both groups would vote for an immigrant candidate of their preferred party. Yet, the authors show that ethnic proximity has a mobilizing effect among immigrant voters as it influences their vote also beyond their partisan preferences (2011: 171).

To the question of why would immigrant voters like to have more immigrant representatives survey data provides some answers\(^\text{28}\). Basically, the vast majority of immigrant voters in France think that having more immigrant parliamentarians is symbolically important, followed by close by the consideration that immigrant representatives would better represent their interests. In Germany, little more than a half of the immigrant voters consider that immigrant MPs would better represent them, and in second place that it is symbolically important to have more immigrant minorities in the Bundestag.

### 2.4.3.3 Immigrants Support Left Parties

The existence of an immigrant electorate in Western European democracies is evidenced by the simultaneous existence of two facts: an established linkage between being an immigrant voter (in contrast of being a native voter) and voting behavior and, group behavioral similarities. Political science research has shown

\(^{28}\) [http://www.immigrantsurvey.org/downloads/Political_v2.pdf](http://www.immigrantsurvey.org/downloads/Political_v2.pdf)
that vote choice is to a great extent determined by an individual’s socio-economic status (SES) (see for example Campbell 1960, Verba and Nie 1972). Education, income, occupation, age and marital status are among the most powerful explanations of electoral participation and vote choice. However in multicultural democracies, ethnicity, cultural distinctiveness and migration experience appear as powerful explanatory factors of the political behavior of immigrant voters and background (native/immigrant) emerges as a new cleavage. Second, the immigrant group is very heterogeneous in terms of its ethnic and cultural composition, the migration experience, the years since migration and the experiences migrants have in the receiving society. In despite of these within-group variations, a great similarity is observed in terms of voting behavior of the immigrant electorate, providing further evidence that the migration experience contributes as well to the formation of political identities.

Numerous national and cross-national analyses shed light on the fact that immigrant voters are great supporters of left parties, and are so to a greater extent than native voters with similar characteristics. 8 out of 10 French Maghrebi and African French voters in the 2007 presidential election gave a strong support to the socialist candidate Segolène Royale (Tiberj 2011:69). This overwhelming support of immigrant voters for the socialist candidate contrasts with the electoral support of the general electorate. Only 46 percent of the French electorate voted for Royale in the second round of the presidential election. Also, among naturalized immigrants in Germany socio-demographic characteristics, which remain the strongest predictors of party choice among the German electorate, have a weaker explanatory power. A vast majority of immigrant voters support the Social Democratic party (Wüst 2011: 91-92). In the United Kingdom the strong support of visible minorities for the Labour party has been observed along several elections (Saalfeld 2011, Messina 2007:203, Saggar 2000: 122).
The electoral support of immigrant voters to left parties suggests the existence of a migratory cleavage (Wüst 2004). In general, electoral research highlights that social class explains alignment with the left. The resulting expectation would be that because a vast majority of immigrants are workers they support working-class parties (Claro da Fonseca 2011:116). However, social class can not be the main explanation of the electoral behavior of immigrant voters basically because there is evidence that shows that even self-employed workers, which in the general electorate tend to support the right party, vote for left parties (Tiberj 2011:71). Consequently, one of the main explanations of the preferences of the immigrant electorate is the saliency of the immigration issue and the fact that left parties (the Socialist party in France, the Social Democrats in Germany, and the Labour party in the United Kingdom) have paid special attention to the integration of foreign workers and advocated for the fair treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. In contrast, conservative parties (UMP in France, CDU/CSU in Germany and the Conservatives in the United Kingdom) have been mostly reluctant to the integration of foreigners. Besides, the social and welfare policies promoted by left parties are of great help for immigrant minorities. Finally, left parties in Western European democracies are the ones that nominate more immigrant candidates, and that have more elected representatives of immigrant origin (Bird et al. 2011). All things considered, the left/right divide in terms of issue position, welfare state policies, and the nomination of immigrant candidates nourishes the political trust of immigrant voters on left parties29 affecting their voting preferences.

29 In France 40 percent of immigrant voters think that left parties defends better their interests, 20 percent that both left and right parties defend their interests, 30 percent that any party defend their interests and only 10 percent that the right defend better their interests (Source: Brouard and Tiberj 2005).
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter I shed light on the development of immigration to Europe after World War II and how it has changed the ethnic and cultural landscape of Western European societies. Furthermore the decline on the natural population growth across European countries increases the relative importance of immigration, which has become the main factor of population growth. Even the most conservative population projections shed light on the fact that the immigrant population will continue to increase across European societies. And it is expected that within the next 40 years one out of three Europeans will be immigrant or immigrant descendant.

Following partially a history of colonialism but mainly due to inter-country economic inequalities France, Germany and the United Kingdom are in Europe the countries receiving the larger numbers of immigrants. The relationship between migration flows and business cycles is clear and explains most of people’s mobility to these countries. At the same time immigration poses several new challenges: immigrants are subject to occupational, residential and political discrimination. Unemployment among migrants is higher than among the native population. Also, when applying for jobs employers are more likely to hire someone with a native-sounding name rather than immigrant, even when these have equal qualifications. Additionally, there is evidence of occupational segregation, which is evidenced by two indicators. On the one hand, entire sectors of the economy are dependent on migrant labor. On the other, migrants often report that they have a job for which they are overqualified. Furthermore, housing segregation has lead to the geographic concentration of immigrants in specific cities and areas changing drastically their ethnic and cultural composition, changing also the composition of legislative constituencies. Third, inequalities between immigrants and natives result in reality to a great extent from state-
driven policies. Despite the fact that great advances have been made in terms of the individual rights recognized to immigrants, they have less social protection and limited political rights. Although in the last years the citizenship regimes have been liberalized in many countries in the aim of fostering immigrants’ integration and diminishing these inequalities, yet immigrants and natives remain in many regards to separated groups.

Finally, related to these observations the question of immigrants’ voting preferences raises. Existing evidence suggests that migrant voters would prefer to have more immigrant representatives and that they are great supporters of left parties. Therefore in the aim of further developing our understanding of these assumptions, in Chapter 3 I examine immigrants’ voting behavior and in chapter 5 their descriptive representation.
3. Immigrant Voters

In this Chapter I examine the electoral behavior of immigrant voters. From the 1960s onwards - but increasingly more since the end of the 1980s - Western European countries have been the destination of large numbers of European and non-European migrants where immigration has largely surpassed emigration. At the same time, nationality and citizenship regimes have converged towards more liberal policies making naturalization more accessible (Koopmans 2005). As a result of these population and policy evolutions the social and demographic basis of the national electorates have changed transforming these democracies into multicultural democracies.

Studies related to the effects that ethnicity and cultural background has on elections are not new. Already some decades ago the sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois (1978) stated, “the problem of the twentieth century is (was) the problem of the color line”. The author explains that the “color line” is by no matters fixed but it changes through time, finding different expressions at different stages of history in varied contexts. But most importantly the concept points out to the existence of privileges and burdens that are experienced by different social groups based on their ethnicity.

In contemporary Western Europe a color line is drown along what Dancygier (2010) has called the “immigrant conflict” which relates to immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict. The first type, the author argues, involve confrontations between immigrant and native groups in specific locations consisting on “violent
and nonviolent native opposition against immigrants, such as the local electoral success of xenophobic parties or physical attacks directed against migrant settlers”. In the last decades an appraisal of such conflicts has been observed across European countries, which has materialized in diverse forms, from spontaneous confrontations, to criminal acts and more organized manifestations expressed the formation and radicalization of anti-immigration forces. The second type of conflict refers to a confrontation between immigrant minorities and state actors, most often the police (Dancygier 2010: 4-5). This conflict elucidates the challenges of integration that many immigrants face. In fact their mistrust vis-à-vis the forces of order emerges to a great extent from the increasing criminalization of immigration, in which the police is an important actor as the institution responsible for identity-checking, managing detentions and deportations and controlling all sorts of demonstrations and social movements.

Yet what is importantly for this research to emphasize is that these confrontations emerge from the opportunities and barriers that native citizens and immigrants face in all spheres of society. Resulting from these symbolic and material differences between groups having a privileged position in a society and those that remain at its margins, enduring inter-racial inequalities are observed (Saggar 1998). These deeply rooted inequalities translate into different economic and educational opportunities and different experiences in the same society. And the question that emerges then is to what extent these different experiences translate into dissimilar political behaviors.

Political research devoted at investigating immigrant voters’ political behavior in Western Europe remains to a great extent sparse and under-developed (Saggar 2007). Basically, these developments can be traced back to the beliefs that immigrants have a small political leverage, and that native and immigrant voters are alike. In this chapter I argue the opposite. Namely, I put forward the
argument that the demographic evolution of the immigrant electorate makes them increasingly more relevant. Also the new strategies developed by key actors, such as political parties, increase their political relevance. And finally, that the immigration-specific social, cultural, and economic experiences they encounter make them susceptible of developing distinctive (political) behaviors.

First, the size (absolute and also relative) of the immigrant electorate has increased across Western European democracies. As I showed in Chapter 2 mass immigration has increased while the nationality laws have followed a process of liberalization. The combination of these two factors has resulted in an increase of the number of immigrant voters (first and second generation). Also, the dynamics of the native populations across European countries is determining the relative relevance of the immigrant electorate. Natural population change has decreased as a consequence of shrinking birth rates and immigration has become the most important factor contributing to population growth \(^{31}\) and enlarging the relative size of the immigrant electorate. Finally, as migrants are not evenly distributed across national territories but tend to concentrate in specific areas as a result of chain migration, and the influence of networks in housing and job market segregation (Castles and Miller 2009). The geographic concentration of the immigrant electorate within the borders of specific constituencies increases their visibility and political leverage (Bloemraad 2013, Forest 2012, Bird 2005).

Second, the new demographic realities of national electorates have had major consequences on the strategies followed by political parties (see also Chapter 4). For example in Germany one of the most prominent figures of the Grüne is Cem Özdemir, a politician of Turkish background and in France the Verts nominated in 2012 the Norwegian lawyer Eva Joly as their presidential candidate. And in the United Kingdom, as Norris and Lovenduski (1995) show, the Labour party has

\(^{31}\) Eurostat
played an important role in the political incorporation of ethnic minority candidates.

Third, although the conditions for immigrants in terms of their social and economic rights, and to a lesser extent their political rights, increasingly resembles the one of the native citizens, there is evidence that suggest the existence of the race ceiling (Saggar 1998). For example in the United Kingdom, immigrant minorities experience discrimination in the labor market (Wood et al. 2009) and have higher unemployment rates than the white population (Li and Heath 2010). Thus the fact that these minorities are subject to differential treatment from the side of institution and the population at large raises questions about how these differentiated experiences affect their political behavior.

Based on the previously exposed observations, Saggar and Heath argue that most of previous studies have failed to account for “the potential of ethnic-based political outlook and voting” (1999: 103). Therefore, in the context of European Multicultural democracies I ask: Are immigrant and native voters alike? Or, does immigrant background over-rides other political cleavages? And, are all immigrant groups comparable?

In order to provide with some empirical evidence to answer these questions this chapter is structured as follows. First, I present the analytical framework to explain turnout and vote choice in the context of multicultural democracies. Second, I present the main working hypotheses. Then I summarize the research design where a detailed account of the case selection criteria, data, and measurement used in the study are presented. In a fourth section I present the main results. Finally, in the conclusion I summarize the main findings and discuss their theoretical and empirical implications.
3.1 Analytical Framework

In the study of political behavior the main objective is to understand the behavior of the electorate and what drives these behaviors. Decisions concerning participation and party choice are influenced by individual as well as contextual factors. Thus, electoral research is concerned with the questions of who participates in elections as well as why they do so. In recent years there has been an increasing debate as to whether ethnicity constitutes an additional social cleavage and whether it over-rides other social cleavages (see for example Heath et al. 2011, Dawson 1994, Hajnal 2007).

One of the most advanced models of electoral behavior emerged at the Columbia School and is widely known as the sociological model. It contends that individuals’ socio-economic status influence to a great extent political behavior (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993; Verba and Nie 1972).

Recent studies in the field of electoral research however have pointed out the limits that the sociological model has in terms of explaining change in electoral politics. On the one hand, it is argued that the sociological model highlighted the stability of party systems because these were related to enduring social cleavages based on the stability of social groups in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Yet, changes in the social structure of contemporary societies have highly influenced class composition, religious practices, educations, and gender among others. These changing social contexts have resulted in the decline on the impact of social structures on voting (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 2001). Precisely, comparative political research has shown that traditional social cleavages have declined in the way they can explain individuals’ choices (Franklin 1992:385). Furthermore, the sociological approach to voting behavior focuses on the effects of characteristics that are long term in nature, as race, religion, or education. Yet, long-term
characteristics are “too stable” to explain variations on national vote from election to election (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 12). The decline of party identification (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) observed in partisan volatility or split ticket voting (Thomassen 2005) are evidence that long term predispositions as explanans have now shifted towards short-term factors as explanations of political behavior.

The rational model in elections was first developed by Downs (1957) and then further extended by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). According to this model a voter has before casting a vote to first estimate the expected benefits of voting and the party choice. In order to perform this task, the voter has to first determine the differences of what she could potentially gain from voting and electing a given party. After calculating the expected benefits of her choice the voter calculates the opportunity costs. These include the costs of registering, voting, and processing the information about the party platforms or candidates in order to determine which candidate the individual prefers (Blais, 2000: 2).

The question of whether voters in electoral democracies are “rational” has been for long debated. A major concern has been whether the “calculus of voting” (Riker and Ordeshook 1998) is empirically sound. In this framework voters are assumed to calculate the costs and benefits of voting and to opt for a party or candidate that brings them the highest utility. In this context, issue opinion and the image of candidates emerged as explanations of behavior in contemporary politics. The issue voting approach highlights that for voters some issues are more important than others (Franklin et al. 1992; Evans and Norris 1999). From this perspective, voters opt for the parties they consider are the most capable of dealing with specific issues. Second, empirical research has also shed light on the fact that political behavior is shifting towards candidate-centered vote choices (Aarts, Blais and Schmitt 2011). Growing evidence points in the direction of the
personalization of politics showing that the image of a candidate influences vote choice.

In this framework, sincere and strategic voting can be distinguished. Sincere voting makes reference to the behavior in which voters simply cast votes for the parties they prefer, without having further considerations. In this context, the electoral prospect of a party in the election does not influence voters’ decision. In contrast, strategic voting refers to the fact that voters evaluate how their partisan preferences will affect electoral outcomes and cast votes strategically to obtain the most favorable outcome possible. This strategic reasoning depends on voters’ first and second choices and voters expectations on parties’ or candidates’ electoral performance and their ability to influence policy-making. In short, the rational choice approach is interested in voters’ decision-making and how they take into account preferences and expectations (Abramson et al. 1992: 65) This approach is based on the assumption that “voters use strategic scrutiny to refer to the assumption that voters consider how their vote choice influence policy outcomes and tactical voting to refer to instances in which voters does not cast a vote for his or her most preferred candidate”…“voters vote tactically when their strategic considerations lead them to abandon their most preferred candidate” (Abramson et al. 2009, p.65)

In the context of multicultural democracies the question as to whether immigrant background constitutes a new social cleavage is very relevant. So far, Europe-based single-country studies suggest that immigrant background is related to two traits of political behavior: low participation rates, and a demarcated support for left parties.

Ethnic minority voters tend to have lower turnout rates than native voters. This fact has been observed in numerous countries including Britain (Heath et al.
Explanations for immigrants’ low turnout have revolved around three main arguments. First, from the perspective of social cleavages it has been argued that migratory background overlaps to a great extent with social class. Migrants are in their majority workers (see Chapter 1) and working class voters tend to participate less in elections than voters from other social classes (Welch and Studlar 1985).

A second set of arguments supports the perspective of rational choice theory. It states that immigrant voters have stronger feelings of disconnect (political alienation in the sense of Reef and Knoke 1999) with the democracies of their hosting countries as they feel that they have little or no influence over the electoral process. “[T]he feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process, i.e. that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties” (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954:187), is a strong predictor of political participation (Pattie and Johnston 1998). Thus among immigrant voters strong feelings of disconnect translate into lower participation rates.

Finally, the so-called “color line” coincides with the existence of a divide in the dynamics of vote choice: immigrant voters give their support to left and centre-left parties more than native voters do. For example, in Britain the Labor party enjoys from overwhelming support from minority voters (Heath et al. 2011, Saggar and Heath 1992). In France empirical research shows that immigrant voters are strong supporters of the Socialist party (Brouard and Tiberj 2005), and in Germany where immigrants are great supporters of the Social Democrat party (Claro da Fonseca 2011).

Understanding vote choice in the context of multicultural democracies needs however to be further explored. From the perspective of the sociological model of political behavior belonging to specific social groups as one of the main
determinants of political predispositions that result in specific participation and voting behavior. Social cleavage theory define these social groups as:

“[a] set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity [which are related to a set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage” (Bartolini and Mair 1990:215).

Traditionally, social cleavage theory identifies four main social cleavages: geographic, socioeconomic, cultural, and religious (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Nevertheless recent research has claimed the existence additional cleavages among which we count generational difference and education (Inglehart 1977), economic sector (Kriesi 1998), and gender (Inglehart and Norris 2000).

In this context, the question of whether ethnicity or immigrant background constitutes a new social cleavage emerges. Saggar and Heath (1999) dispute that “ethnicity counts”; “social identity is linked to, and largely driven by, racial or ethnic categories of political community or political collective interest” (Saggar 2007:504). From this perspective the fact that immigrants are subject to discrimination in the job market (Wood et al. 2009, Adida et al. 2010, Kaas and Manger 2012, Modood 1998, Arrow 1972), have higher levels of unemployment (Kogan 2004), suffer from economic downgrading (Modood 1998), and experience anti-immigration sentiments (Fietkau and Sanhueza 2014, Dancygier and Donnelly 2014, Helbling 2012) can result on groups having common interests in fighting discrimination or achieving greater integration. Therefore, as left parties are defenders of these excluded groups (Kittilson and Tate 2004) it seems plausible that immigrants would show vote for this parties, which supports the social cleavage postulation.

On the other side, these patterns of behavior can be related to the policy positions of left and right parties. The strong preference of immigrant voters for parties in
the left of the political spectrum is explained by the fact that these parties are the ones that have traditionally devoted greater attention to the concerns of immigrant groups (Kittilson and Tate 2004). For instance, in Britain the Labour party concerned by the discrimination suffered by the minority groups and their high unemployment rates has been an important engine for the implementation of programs and initiatives to foster inter-group equality (Heath et al. 2011:257). Or, in France the Socialist party is strong defender of granting voting rights to immigrants. On the contrary, conservative parties particularly on those polities that do not have anti-immigration parties defend immigration control and the reduction of the number of programs devoted to immigrants’ integration (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012). Consequently, these parties appear to hold policy positions that are at odds with the preferences of immigrants becoming unpopular among these voters. From this perspective, immigrants may choose based on the political options that are presented to them.

In order to examine this question I make two logical postulates: (1) if immigrant background is a new social cleavage, immigrant voters and native voters would have different patterns of electoral behavior, and (2) if immigrant background is a new social cleavage there should be behavioral consistence across immigrant groups. Based on these, I formulate the two hypotheses that I will examine in the analysis:

Hypothesis 1: Social Cleavage Hypothesis
While controlling for other socio-economic factors, immigrant voters show a differentiated political behavior (participation and voting) compared to native voters.

Hypothesis 2: Similarity Hypothesis
While controlling for other socio-economic factors, immigrant voters show similar political behavior patterns independently of their region of origin.
In order to investigate these hypotheses I have elaborated a comparative study, which is explained in the next section.

3.2 Research Design and Measurement

Most of what we know about the relationship between immigration and political behavior draw on single-country studies, and in a vast quantity from studies conducted in the United States and Canada. Therefore, this research aims at providing with some first comparative insights focusing on Western European democracies. These objectives represent however some additional challenges, which are mainly related to data availability, and the design of the research. Therefore in this section I give a detailed account of the strategies I have followed in terms of the data, case selection, coding and measurement decisions that constitute this study.

3.2.1 Case Selection

The selection of cases is driven by the two objectives of this research, these are to move beyond single-case studies and to expand the studies of immigration and political to the European context. Accordingly, I examine the political behavior of immigrant voters across Western European democracies. The selection of cases has been determined by considerations of demographic, political and economic factors, which have been considered to maximize the quality of the cross-country comparison and data availability32. Therefore, this study focuses on a subset of ten Western European countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 

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32 In the present study the cases of Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal have been excluded because there is not data available for these countries. Austria, Italy and Luxembourg were not available in European Social Survey database at the time when this dissertation was written. The Portuguese dataset did not include data on one of the crucial variables of analysis (income) therefore had to be dropped out.
Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All these countries are characterized by comparable context conditions.

First, I consider some economic characteristics, which concern the overall social and economic development. These countries outperform the majority of the countries in the world in terms of their development (as shown in Chapter 2). These economic and living conditions tend to attract migrant workers from other less developed European countries and other regions of the world. As the “push-pull” economic theory of migration difficult conditions in the country of origin, and attractive economic prospects in the receiving country are among the major forces behind migration (Castles and Miller 2009:22).

Second, these countries rank among the ones receiving larger immigration inflows and having the largest shares of immigrant populations in Europe (Table 8). In this context, immigration sets new circumstances for the potential emergence of a new social cleavage. On average one out of ten residents of Western European countries is a foreigner (and these figures are just small if one takes into account naturalized and second generation migrants). In Belgium and Denmark around 8 percent of the population holds a different passport than the majority of the population. In France, Greece, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom foreigners represent around 10 percent of the total population. Germany, Spain and Sweden score even higher, where more than 13 percent of the residents in the national territory are non-nationals. Finally, in Ireland almost 20 percent of the population is a foreigner.

3.2.2 Data

The study is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) 2010. The ESS is a representative cross-national survey conducted every two years across Europe. This survey has been designed to measure attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral
patterns across countries. The European Social Survey is a great dataset as it includes a similar battery of questions asked in numerous European countries including questions about the socio-economic status and political behavior of the respondents. Moreover, the ESS is particularly suitable for studies related to the immigrant population because (unlike many other comparative surveys) it includes questions regarding the background of the respondents, and their parents, which allows to identify first and second generation migrant respondents. I have opted for the wave 2010 because it is the most recent wave containing a larger number of Western European countries.

Table 8. Percentage of Foreign Born

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign Population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: World Bank

Additionally, this study makes use of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2010 (Bakker et al. 2012) to measure the general Left-Right position of national parties across Western European party systems. The CHES is based at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and estimates the party positioning on European

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When this study was conducted the data for France (2012 wave), which in this thesis is of great relevance, was not available. Therefore we have opted for using the survey of 2010.
integration, ideology and other policy areas for national parties in various European countries. Finally, contextual information on countries’ demographic composition, and immigration has been gathered from the website of Eurostat, the World Bank, and The United Nations Regions data.

Finally, these countries have in common that they have stable and consolidated democratic systems and are members of the European Union. First, the democratic trajectory of national democracies is important because parties constitute a driving force for the transformation of national political spaces (Lijphart 1999:53). “It is important to consider the function of the cleavages exploited by the parties in their struggle for supremacy. Since the development of cleavages is a prime instrument of power, the party which is able to make its definition of the issue prevail is likely to take over the government” (Schattschneider 1960: 72f). In this way, a party “shapes the pattern of political contest and transforms the dimensions of the political space” (Kriesi 2008:24). Or as Sartori puts it, “it is not the “objective” class that creates the party, but the party that creates the “subjective” class” (1969:84). Furthermore, as old members of the European Union these countries are subject to many common economic and migration policies and have adopted the European citizenship, which grants voting rights for European foreign residents in municipal and European elections.

### 3.2.3 Dependent Variables

This study is interested in explaining two key variables: (1) electoral participation, and (2) vote choice. First, in every election “citizens must decide not only which party or candidate they wish to support but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, whether the wish to support anyone, that is, whether they will vote or not” (Blais 2007:621). So, voting is one of the most frequent and basic forms of political activity (Blais 2000). Participation in elections can be analyzed from two different perspectives: (1) at the aggregated level one can compare electoral participation across democracies, or over time; and (2) and at the individual level
one can examine the individual decisions to vote or not vote, and the crucial question of who votes and why. This study is interested in the voting behavior of ethnic minorities in comparison to native voters; therefore it adopts the second approach. Accordingly, I examine whether natives and immigrants have different levels of participation, and what can explain these differences. The ESS includes the following question: *Did you vote in the last national election in [month/year]?* Based on the response I create a dummy variable where respondents that voted = 1, and respondents that didn’t vote = 0.

Second, for understanding the candidates and parties that immigrants want to support and what affects their decision I focus party choice. The measurement of this second variable the analysis is restricted to those respondents that have chose to vote. Party choice is a nominal variable as voters choose to support either party A, B, C ... There is one ESS item measuring party choice, and asks respondents: *Which party did you vote for in that election?*

One of the two main objectives of this chapter is to provide with some cross-national evidence on the voting behavior of immigrant voters in Europe. A suitable to make the analysis of party choice comparable across democracies is by transforming nominal variable “party” into an ordinal variable. The use of the Left-Right scale is useful because it constitutes a “super-issue, which summarizes the programs of opposing groups” (Klingemann and Inglehart 1976:244). This measurement of ideological preference is a powerful tool to examine political behavior at the mass and elite levels in national and cross-national studies (Mair 2007:219). The definitions of these two ideologies in this study follow Lipset et al. (1954: 1135), in which the left relates to advocacy for social change in the direction of equality (political, economic and social) and the right grounds on the support for traditional, more or less hierarchical social order, which opposes change of it.
For that reason, I have replaced the party name by the position of the party on the Left-Right scale in that period proceeding as follows: I replaced the party name provided by the ESS respondents by the Left-Right position of the party as it is measured by Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2010, which includes an item asking experts to tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

3.2.4 Independent Variables

In order to examine the political behavior of immigrant voters I have identified all the ESS respondents that have immigrant background and their region of origin. I have followed two steps: (1) identifying immigrant voters, and (2) coding their region of origin.

First, from the more than 11,800 of the respondents of the surveys conducted in the ten countries here analyzed I have identified all the respondents that have immigrant background. The variable includes first and second-generation migrants together.

The variable immigrant background results from the combination of three ESS items:

(1) Were you born in [country]?
(2) Was your father born in [country]?
(3) Was your mother born in [country]?

Table 9 shows the coding scheme used. Immigrant voters are those respondents born abroad with at least one parent born abroad, or respondents who have one parent or the two parents born abroad.

34 To see a detailed list of the countries, and number of respondents per background check the Table 10.
Second, since migrants from different world regions have had different socialization and subject to differential treatment (for instance EU migrants enjoy more rights than third country migrants across Western European countries) I have classified respondents according to their region of origin. The Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretariat has developed a Standard Area Codes for Statistical Use\textsuperscript{35}.

Using the ESS questions: “in which country was your mother/father born” I have grouped the countries within seven major areas: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

### 3.2.5 Control Variables

In the analyses I include a battery of variables that explain political behavior\textsuperscript{36}. (1) \textit{Age} is a continuous variable and refers to the age of the respondent. (2) \textit{Gender} is a dichotomous variable, where 0= Male, and 1= Female. (3) \textit{Education} is a

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Identification and Coding of Immigrant Voters}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Respondent born in country & Father born in country & Mother born in country & Immigrant \\
\hline
No & No & No & Yes \\
No & Yes & No & Yes \\
No & No & Yes & Yes \\
No & Yes & Yes & No \\
Yes & Yes & No & Yes \\
Yes & No & Yes & Yes \\
Yes & Yes & Yes & No \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{35} Sources:

\textsuperscript{36} The original intention of this research was to include religiosity among these variables. However, as religiosity measured in terms of how religious respondents are is highly correlated with vote choice (non-religious respondents being aligned with the left, and religious-respondents being aligned with the right) this variable had to be excluded from the analyses because these did not converge.
continuous variable measuring the years of education completed. And (4) *Income* is
an ordinal variable that locates respondents in their country’s in income deciles.

### 3.2.6 Methods

First, I use descriptive statistics to analyze the political participation and party choice of immigrant voters compared to national votes across countries. Second, I use Multiple Regression Models\(^\text{37}\) to test whether controlling for other variables, immigrant background and region of origin have an effect on party choice (using a 10-point Left-Right voting scale as the independent variable). Negative coefficients indicate that voters are more supportive of left parties and positive coefficients show that they support more right-wing parties.

### 3.3 Results

In this section I present the main results of the impact of immigration background on political participation and voting across Western European democracies. The first part of this section focuses on turnout, whereas the second section deals with party choice.

#### 3.3.1 Turnout

The political incorporation of immigrants is the result of the interaction between contextual and group characteristics mediated by the effects of political actors. In the first place, the demographic and institutional characteristic of a country has a great influence in hindering or encouraging immigrants political incorporation and participation (Bloemraad 2006). When examining turnout in national

\(^{37}\) An alternative way to test the effects of the socio-demographic variables on voting behavior across countries is to use multi-level modeling. However, given that this study include a small number of cases in the second level (N=10 countries) such method can not be implemented as its use may lead to biased results: “a small sample size at level two leads to biased estimates of the second-level standard errors” (Maas and Hox 2005: 86-92).
elections one crucial aspect to take into account is the characteristics of the
citizenship regimes, as in most countries and for most immigrant groups, naturalization is condition sine qua non for voting in national elections (Waldrauch 2003).

Furthermore, the group characteristics are important factors determining political predispositions. The size and origin of the immigrant groups, and their demographic concentration can inhibit (Jones-Correa 1998) or facilitate (Levitt 2003) the political integration of immigrant voters. Many demographic traits associated with the political activity of native populations such as age, gender, education, race, religion and occupation are also strongly associated with immigrants’ political activity (Heath et al. 2011). Yet, some immigration-specific characteristics such as nationality, years since arrival, age of arrival and level of democratization of the home country influences to a great extent immigrants’ participation in national elections (Wong et al. 2005).

Finally, political actors and their practices play a key role in the (de)mobilization of immigrant voters. Advocacy groups can facilitate the naturalization of immigrants to enable them to vote (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008, Wong 2006). Political parties can be open or reluctant to bring in minority voters. Following electoral calculations some parties may be concerned about their current constituencies and therefore be reluctant to the idea of incorporating

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38 In the United Kingdom citizens of the Republic of Ireland and the Commonwealth countries are eligible to vote. The Commonwealth countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei, Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua, New Guinea, Rwanda, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & The Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu and Zambia. Besides, citizens of the Fiji Islands and Zimbabwe retain their voting rights despite the fact that these countries have been suspended from the Commonwealth.
immigrant voters and candidates (Thompson 2005). While other parties may see an opportunity in mobilizing these new voters (Fraga 2009).

In short, the political participation of immigrant voters is the result of the interplay of contextual, group and individual characteristics, and the reaction of the contexts to the newcomers as well as the effects that the context has on them.

Table 10 shows the participation (expressed in percentages)\(^{39}\) of immigrant and native voters in the national elections closest to 2010 when the survey was conducted across Western European democracies. The empirical evidence shows that in general immigrant voters participate less than native voters\(^{40}\). Immigrant voters register the highest turnout in Sweden (89 percent), where also the native electorate has great levels of participation (96 percent). However, higher levels of participation among the local votes does not always relate to similar levels among immigrant voters. However in Denmark where native voters also register high levels of turnout (95 percent), immigrants have considerably lower levels of participation (72 percent). Overall, differences in the levels of participation of the native and immigrant groups are a little more than ten per cent. In Germany, 85 percent of the Ethnic Germans casted a vote in the general elections and only 73 percent of the immigrant voters did so. Similarly, in the Netherlands, 87 percent of Dutch voters participated against 72 percent of minority voters, turnout in Belgium among natives was of 82 percent and 74 percent among immigrants, while in Spain electoral participation reached 86 percent for native voters and 71 percent for the new citizens. France and the United Kingdom register lower levels of participation among both native and immigrant electorates, yet keeping a similar distance between both groups. 74 percent of French voters and 77 percent

\(^{39}\) An alternative way to compare the level of participation across groups would be using the ANOVA method. Yet this method could not be used in this study due to the characteristics of the data (sample sizes).

\(^{40}\) The estimations for Greece, Ireland, and Spain need to be considered with caution due to the small sample size of the group of immigrant voters.
of British voters went to the polls, and only 65 percent of French immigrant voters and 67 percent of British minority voters casted a vote. Finally, in Ireland where the level of participation of Irish voters is similar to other European democracies (81 percent), immigrant voters register a very low level of participation with only 28 per cent.

As shown above, immigrant voters register lower participation rates than native voters do, and this is observed across all the European democracies analyzed in this study. However, cross-country differences are observed in terms of the intensity of these differences while in some countries the difference is rather small (Sweden) in others they are very high (Ireland).
Table 10. Electoral Participation of Native and Immigrant Voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1038</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS 2010
3.3.2 Party Choice

In the last years, several studies have investigated the voting behavior of immigrant minorities in national elections. Most of these studies demonstrate that these minorities tend to hovelling support center-left parties. Despite some of the attempts center-right parties to gain support from the immigrant minority electorate (for instance by nominating immigrant candidates) they have not made much progress in gaining immigrants electoral support.

The comparative analysis of party preference shows that immigrant voters tend to prefer left parties to right wing parties, and they do so to a greater extent than national voters do. Figure 16 shows evidence of this relationship. In eight out of the ten cases analyzed here migrant voters prefer left parties compared to the native voters in their country of residence. The largest party preference differences between the immigrant and the native electorates are observed in Belgium and in the Netherlands. In the first country immigrant voters score an average of 4.6 points in the Left-Right scale against 5.6 for the native voters, and in the second one migrants score 4.4 against the 5.4 averaged by native Dutch. In the remaining countries the differences in voting behavior between immigrant and native voters is smaller, yet in a similar direction. In Denmark immigrants scored an average of 5 against the more conservative score of native voters (5.4 on average). Similarly in France, foreigners scored 0.5 lower than French voters with an average of 4.5 and 5 respectively. Also in Sweden, the migrant electorate preferred to support left parties scoring an average of 5 points, which is 0.6 lower of the average scored by Swede natives whose party preferences register a mean of 5.6 points. Besides, in three countries the differences between immigrant and
native voters are very small\textsuperscript{41}. In Germany, immigrant voters are more inclined to the left (4.7) but only having a very small difference compared to the average by native German voters (4.8). Also in Greece this is the case. Both, foreign-origin voters (mean = 4.3) and Greek voters (4.5) reported to prefer left parties, yet this preference is more important for immigrant voters. Lastly, in Spain where immigrants score an average of 5 while Spaniard voters score 5.1, and in the United Kingdom where minority voters prefer left parties (5.1) more than British voters (5.3), migrants are more inclined to support left parties, yet these differences remains small.

The expectation that immigrant voters’ support more left parties than national voters do is not confirmed in all the cases here analyzed. Surprisingly, immigrant voters in Ireland appear to be more aligned with right wing parties than its respective national electorates. The difference between the two groups is smaller yet in a different direction than in all other democracies. Migrant voters score 5.7 (the most right wing position of all electorates here analyzed) and native Irish score only 0.1 point less (5.6).

\textsuperscript{41}The results here presented on the party choice differences between immigrant and native voters can be biased as a result of the small number of immigrant voters that registered some of the countries in the ESS survey.
To conclude, the above-presented graphic representation of the party means scored by both immigrant and native electorates across Western European democracies shed light on two main facts. First, that in general migrant voters give more support to left parties than native voters do. In nine out of the ten countries here analyzed (Ireland excepted) immigrant voters show a stronger preference for left-leaning parties than national voters. Second, that the position of parties on the Left-Right scale seem to matter to immigrant voters. In eight out of the ten cases here studied, immigrants’ party preference was minor or equal to the threshold average 5 - the middle of the Left-Right scale, except for Ireland (mean 5.7) and the United Kingdom (mean = 5.1). Now the next step is to determine whether these findings result from some effect of immigrant background on political behavior or if it’s the result of the juxtaposition of immigrant background with other social characteristics (especially social class).
3.3.3 Migratory Background and Control Variables

In this part of the analysis I present the results of multiple regression models used to predict voters party preferences (see Table 11). I regress a set of variables that have proven to affect party choice in previous studies (age, gender, education and income)\textsuperscript{42} and the main variable of interest (immigrant background) on party choice. The coefficients show that controlling for other socio-demographic variables, the variable immigrant background affects voting behavior only in some countries.

The analysis elucidates that immigrant voters have some specific characteristics. First, in eight of ten cases here studied (excepting Ireland and Spain) and controlling for other factors the fact of having an immigrant background increases the likelihood to support a left party. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom voters that have an immigrant background show less conservative party preferences than native voters. Second, in four of the cases here analyzed the effect of background on party choice is significant. In Belgium, migratory background is the variable that has the strongest effect. Migrants prefer parties that are in the left of the political spectrum compared to national voters (coefficient -1.065) and this relationship is highly significant (p ≤ 0.001). In France, the dummy migratory variable goes also in a similar direction with migrant voters preferring left parties more than native French voters (-0.479), this relationship is also significant (p ≤ 0.05) and is only seconding the effect of age on party choice (0.02, p ≤ 0.01) meaning that younger voters are stronger supporters of left parties in comparison to older voters. In the Netherlands migratory background has an important and significant effect on electoral behavior together with socio-economic status (education and income). While immigrant voters have a stronger preference for parties aligned with more

\textsuperscript{42} The variables religiosity and political interest have been excluded because they are highly collinear with the dependent variable.
left ideas (-0.85, p ≤ 0.001), also more educated (-0.095, p ≤ 0.001) and less wealthy voters (0.115, p ≤ 0.001) are strong supporters of these parties. Finally, in Sweden, migratory background strongly affects party choice (-0.539, p ≤ 0.001) where immigrant voters also prefer parties with more left positions than native Swedes. Yet, in this case all the other variables also influence party choice. Age and income have a highly significant relationship with party choice. Older and wealthier voters have a more conservative behavior (0.018, p ≤ 0.001 and 0.136, p ≤ 0.001 respectively). Also, gender plays a role with women being less conservative than men (-0.248, p ≤ 0.01) and lastly education also affects party choice with more educated people being more conservative (0.051, p ≤ 0.05).

Generally speaking, the empirical findings presented above show that different factors affect differently voting behavior across European democracies. Age, gender, education, and income have diverse impact on vote choice across democracies. In a similar fashion migratory background plays a role in party choice only four our of then democracies. Given these facts, a next step is to determine whether immigrant groups behave in a similar manner or not.
Table 11. Voters’ Personal Characteristics and Party Preferences (Multiple Regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.055***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.198</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-1.065***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.477)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.4***</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>0.521***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.068**</td>
<td>-0.375</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.158***</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.479*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.92***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>-0.044*</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.357)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5.139***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>-0.056**</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.618***</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6.362***</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
<td>-0.095***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>-0.85***</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4.266***</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.254***</td>
<td>0.018***</td>
<td>-0.248**</td>
<td>0.051*</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
<td>-0.539***</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4.717***</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.017**</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.
3.3.4 Region of Origin

In the next step of the analysis I include a variable accounting for the region of origin of immigrant voters (Region dummies) that I regress together with the socio-demographic variables included in the previous analysis (age, gender, education, and income). Table 12 shows only the coefficients for the world region dummies. First, looking at the table it can be observed that by including the region of origin of the immigrant voters we gain explanatory power in comparison with the multiple regressions presented above. The $R^2$ differences between the multiple regressions including a dummy variable for migratory background, and the regressions including dummies indicting the region of origin of the voters are always positive, indicating that region of origin further explains electoral behavior. This means, that by specifying the geographic background of migrant voters we gain further understanding of how migratory background affects voting behavior.

Second, the findings show that it is not the fact of being a migrant *per se* which influences party choice but rather the fact of belonging to specific migrant group in a given country. The effect of immigrant background varies across groups and countries. There are countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden where the migrant voter effect is observed across two or more immigrant groups. In France the migrant effect observed above is in reality explained by the political behavior of one specific group: North African voters. In Denmark, North American voters show specific group voting behavior, and in Germany this is the case for voters of European origin.

In Belgium three migrant groups have distinctive voting behavior in comparison to the rest of the electorate. The fact of coming from the Northern Africa region significantly affects voters’ preferences. North African voters prefer parties that are more in the left than native voters (coefficient: -2.034, $p \leq 0.001$). Besides, two other regions of origin seem to have an effect on party preferences. On the one side, migrant voters coming from other European countries hold a stronger
preference for left parties in comparison to native Belgian voters, and these differences are significant (-0.608, \( p \leq 0.05 \)). On the other side, Asian background affects party choice yet for this immigrant group migratory background exercises a different effect on party choice. De facto, Asian voters show more conservative party preferences than Belgian voters (1.165, \( p \leq 0.05 \)).

In the Netherland, like in Sweden, the voters’ region of origin affects voting behavior in the case of two specific migrant groups. In the Netherlands, Latin American – of Caribbean origin in their majority - and North African voters show greater affinity with liberal parties in comparison to average Dutch voters, and these differences are strongly significant (-1.466, \( p \leq 0.01 \), and -1.913, \( p \leq 0.01 \) respectively). These coefficients also shed light on the fact that North African voters in the Netherlands held slightly more liberal views than Latin American voters. In Sweden the migrant effect that we perceived in the previous analysis is largely driven by the political behavior of Latin American and Asian immigrants in particular. Both groups are strong supporters of parties aligned with left positions in comparison with the native Swede voters (-1.965, \( p \leq 0.05 \), and -1.913, \( p \leq 0.05 \) respectively). Finally, the case of immigrant voting in France sheds light on the fact that the immigrant effect is related to the political preferences of one specific migrant group: migrants coming from North Africa, particularly the Maghreb region. The migrant voters from this region have stronger preferences for left parties than native French voters, and this effect is significant (-0.804, \( p \leq 0.05 \)).

The inclusion of the regions of the regions of origin of immigrant voters in the analysis has relevant consequences in the analysis of the immigrant voting. Looking at the data, by including the immigrant background dummy along in Denmark this variable was close to significant (\( p =0.054 \)), however when in the second analysis I include the regions of origin of the immigrant voters only one of the region variables becomes significant. As a consequence in Denmark the fact of being a migrant from North America has a significant effect on voting behavior.
Northern American migrants to Denmark are notably more favorable to support left parties than national Danes are ($-1.837, p \leq 0.05$). Similar to the Danish case is the case of Germany. Including the regions of the world variables we observe that the fact of being an intra-European migrant has an effect on voting preferences. De facto, European voters are only slightly more in the left that German voters yet this effect is significant ($-0.004, p \leq 0.05$).

Finally, from a comparative perspective it is important to notice that similar immigrant groups show rather similar behavior across countries. European migrants in Belgium and Germany have more leftist party preferences than native voters. Latin American voters vote more for left parties in The Netherlands (here a vast majority of these voters are Caribbean) and in Sweden. And, North African voters held more liberal political preferences in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. Besides, the fact of migrating from Oceania does not have major differentiated effects on voting preferences compared to native voters and migrants from other regions in any of the countries here analyzed. All in all, it appears that by including the region of origin we have managed to shed light on some of the intrinsic dynamics of the immigrant voting.

Finally, the case of Asian voters contrasts with all the rest in the sense that this group is the only one showing specifically different party preferences. In Belgium Asian voters have more conservative preferences than native voters, yet in Sweden Asian voters are more liberal than the native populations. So, taking all these observations into consideration we can conclude that we need to include more variable specifications (like sub-region, country, or religion) to explain these differences.
Table 12. Region of Origin and Socio-Demographic Variables (Multiple Regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Northern Africa</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>R² (Diff.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-0.608*</td>
<td>1.571</td>
<td>-1.256</td>
<td>-2.034***</td>
<td>-3.639</td>
<td>1.165*</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.39)</td>
<td>(-1.256)</td>
<td>(1.284)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(2.224)</td>
<td>(0.497)</td>
<td>(+0.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-0.383</td>
<td>-1.837*</td>
<td>1.639</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.803)</td>
<td>(1.389)</td>
<td>(1.391)</td>
<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>(0.516)</td>
<td>(+ 0.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>-3.346</td>
<td>-0.804*</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>-2.007</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.312)</td>
<td>(1.787)</td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(1.266)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
<td>-1.234</td>
<td>-1.429</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(2.098)</td>
<td>(1.485)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(+0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-0.428</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>1.302</td>
<td>-0.361</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.626)</td>
<td>(1.458)</td>
<td>(1.203)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(+0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.676)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>(0.673)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(+0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-0.448</td>
<td>-1.387</td>
<td>-1.466**</td>
<td>-1.913**</td>
<td>-1.736</td>
<td>-0.623</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
<td>(0.538)</td>
<td>(0.659)</td>
<td>(1.589)</td>
<td>(0.372)</td>
<td>(+0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-0.611</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.749)</td>
<td>(0.712)</td>
<td>(1.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(+0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.336</td>
<td>-0.961</td>
<td>-1.965*</td>
<td>-2.03</td>
<td>2.603</td>
<td>-1.16*</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.872)</td>
<td>(0.698)</td>
<td>(1.378)</td>
<td>(1.946)</td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
<td>(+ 0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.304</td>
<td>-0.334</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.312)</td>
<td>(0.593)</td>
<td>(0.512)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(+0.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001; R² (Diff.) shows the difference between R² of model with region of origin and model without.
For the most part, including the regions of origin of immigrant voters allows us to better understand how immigrant background affects voting behavior. Immigrant background affects to a certain extent political behavior yet it is not the migratory experience \textit{per se} which delineates a new electorate but rather the fact of belonging to a specific immigrant group in a particular receiving country. These findings indicate that one should look into the specificities of immigrant groups, and in particular examine how immigrant background interacts with the contextual factors characterizing the country where immigrant voters reside.

### 3.4 Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter I investigate if immigrant and native voters are alike, or whether immigration background emerges as a new social cleavage. The study focuses on ten European democracies that have experienced mass immigration in the last decades, moving beyond single-case studies and providing the basis for cross-national comparisons. The study is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) 2010, which is to my knowledge one of the only surveys including country of origin questions for the respondent and their parents allowing the identification of first and second-generation immigrant voters. Additionally, I use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2010 to measure the position of the parties preferred by the voters at election time.

The first part of the analyses uses descriptive statistics to examine the relationship between immigrant background and political behavior shedding light on two phenomena. First, the cross-country analyses show that immigrant voters register lower participation rates than national voters. Given that these differences are observed across all the cases analyzed there is empirical evidence to support the observation that immigration background influences the likelihood to vote. Low participation rates are explained by political alienation, which ground on feelings
of minimal connections with the exercise of power (Reef and Knoke 1999, Citrin et al. 1975), which result from the effects of characteristics of the citizenship regimes, the reluctance that main actors such as political parties show to incorporate newcomers and immigrants’ individual and group characteristics.

Second, the descriptive analysis of the relationship between background and party choice shows that immigrant voters have less conservative party preferences than native voters, providing some empirical basis that support the social cleavage hypothesis. In the second part of the analysis the socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education and income) are included into the equation. By controlling for other factors, we observe that in general immigrants tend to support left parties more than native voters do. This pattern is observed across all countries except in Ireland and Spain. Moreover, the immigrant background effect is significant in four countries: Belgium, France, Netherlands and Sweden. Summing up, as the migratory background appears an influential factors in only few countries the evidence is not sufficient to support the social cleavage hypothesis (H1) as we may incur in a Type I error.

In order to further understand the party preference of immigrants across countries in the second part I present single-country multiple regressions where the dummy variable immigration background is replaced by variables showing the region of origin of immigrant voters. The results suggest that by controlling for other socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education, and income) the political preferences of immigrants is influenced by their region of origin. On the first place, the analysis shows significant results in six countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Netherlands and Sweden. Second, the effects are visible for specific regions including: Europe, North Africa and Asia for immigrant voters in Belgium; North America in Denmark; North Africa in France; Europe in
Germany; Latin America and North Africa in the Netherlands; and Latin America and Asia in Sweden.

On the whole, the effects of region of origin on voting are as expected: immigrant voters have less conservative political preferences than native voters. There is however only one exception and that is Asian voters in Belgium who are more conservative than national Belgian voters. These findings do not support the similarity hypothesis (H2) that predicted similar patterns of political behavior across immigrant groups. For some immigrant groups, the immigration experience doesn’t have a major effect on their political preferences, for others it leads to more liberal preferences and for Asians in Belgium to more conservative ones.

Concluding, this chapter shows that immigrants tend to be more supportive of left parties but cross-country and inter-group differences exists suggesting that further studies are need to understand the phenomenon of the immigrant voting. In Chapter 4 I examine the way in which political parties address the issue of multiculturalism and what factors influence their position on this issue.
4. Issue Evolution and Political Parties

As immigration becomes one of the most important issues in European contemporary democracies and the socio-demographic basis of national electorates is changing, parties and party systems are reacting to these new social realities. The way in which political parties respond to these new societal challenges is influenced by historical trends on the way immigration is framed, and the solutions that are envisaged as well as by the dynamics that characterize electoral competition.

Cultural diversity is not a new phenomenon and along history different countries have found different ways to coexist and respect diversity. However, since the 1960s a new type of multiculturalism emerged across Western democracies. This latter stage of multiculturalism is very much related to the “human rights revolution” (quotation marks in original, Kymlicka 2010: 35) and results from a turning point on the way that cultural diversity and immigration are approached.

Previous to World War II, illiberal and undemocratic relations dominated cultural diversity. These were based on ideas of hierarchy and justified by racialist ideologies promoting the superiority of some cultures and their right to rule over others (e.g. colonizer-colonized, settler and indigenous, normalized and deviant etc.). In the aftermath of the war members of the United Nation Organization actively promoted a new ideology based on ideals of equality of races and people. They released the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including articles that specifically mention aspects of peoples’ equality and individual inalienable rights. For example article 1 and 18 of the declaration read as follows:
Article 1.
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 18.
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

These two articles embody to a great extent the new ideas that were promoted then and which derived in new social movements, including multiculturalism and minority rights. In this way, the new wave of multiculturalism appeared as a mean helpful for overcoming the “legacies of earlier hierarchies, and to help build fairer and more inclusive democratic societies” based on new models of democratic citizenship aimed at overcoming the “deeply-entrenched inequalities that have persisted after the abolition of formal discrimination” (Kymlicka 2010: 37-39). Therefore a significant part of multicultural policies are today devoted to identifying and changing “rooted traditions, customs, and symbols that have historically excluded or stigmatized minorities” and which are present in institutions and in everyday life (ibid).

In the contexts of ethnic and cultural diversity resulting from international migration, the concept of multiculturalism narrows down to a “set of mutually reinforcing approaches or methodologies concerning the incorporation and participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and their modes of cultural/religious differences” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 4). Basically, the new forms of multicultural citizenship in these contexts includes a combination of policies aimed at promoting immigrants’ incorporation and participation, among which the following can be distinguished (see for example Kymlicka 2010): (1)
institutional recognition of multiculturalism at the national or regional levels, (2) adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum, (3) inclusion of ethnic representation in the media, (4) exemption from dress-codes, (5) allowing dual citizenship, (7) support of immigrant and ethnic organizations, (8) funding of bilingual education or instruction of minority language, and (9) affirmative action of disadvantaged immigrant groups.

While, immigration democracies are increasingly in favor of the recognition of rights to national minorities, multicultural policies related to accommodation of international migrants remain very controversial and subject to political debate. As Kymlicka puts it “[t]here has been a backlash against multiculturalism policies relating to postwar migrants in several Western democracies” (2010). As shown above, multicultural polices include various types of welfare policies, which also tend to be defined along class lines. From this perspective, “[i]ssues that involve “haves versus havenots” are more likely to gain quick access to the docket because large numbers of people are involved” (quotation marks in original, Elder and Cobb 1983: 95). Yet also, many of these are based on the arguments that point to “insurmountable” cultural conflicts. Fears that a clash of civilization - due mainly to the presence of Muslim - will “fracture Europe’s cities” (Dancygier 2010:14). Resulting in a highly politicized issue that agitates political parties.

Besides, the dynamics of electoral competition also influence the positions that political parties adopt on immigration and integration, and as a consequence the whole landscape of political systems. In fact, much of the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism and the policies that are envisaged to cope with immigration and integration are linked to the way in which key actors of domestic politics react to it. First of all, party ideology is a great predictor of the positions that parties adopt on immigration-related policies. As Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012) show, immigration-related policies are more salient today that in previous year. Yet, they
show that leftist parties, in particular the Greens are responsible for promoting a pro-immigrant agenda, while center-left and right parties have turned toward more anti-immigrant positions.

Also, in a recent study Abou-Chadi (2014) showed that in democracies where radical right parties were successful mainstream parties would emphasize anti-immigration positions. And, as Van Spanje (2010) shows the electoral success of these parties would not only affect the strategies followed by mainstream parties but also entire party systems. And vice-versa, Meguid (2005) also shows that the strategies followed by mainstream parties in relation to the emphasis the give to the immigration policy area and the positions they adopt on it explains to a great extent as well the electoral success of anti-immigration parties.

Following these changes in the ways multiculturalism is dealt with, and taking into account the previously mentioned dynamics of electoral competition in this Chapter I set to examine how parties tackle the ethnic and cultural diversity in European democracies, namely what their positions on multiculturalism are, and what triggers these. Parties are crucial actors of modern democracies and play an important role in government (Schattschneider 1942). Therefore crucial questions in the context of multicultural democracies are: How do parties address the issue of multiculturalism? Does their position on the issue remains stable, or does it changes over time? And, what factors affect these dynamics?

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I present the analytical framework. Second I present the research strategy including the case selection, data, and measurements used in this study. Then I analyze parties’ positions on multiculturalism at different levels of aggregation (issue evolution, party families, party systems). Finally, I summarize and discuss the main results.
4.1 Analytical Framework

The analysis of party policy positions and policy representation relies on political issues’ theories. An issue is “a conflict between two or more identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or resources” (Cobb and Elder 1983: 82). In this way issues are manufactured based on different views on how these resources should be distributed. And, most commonly they are used as a mean to advance specific causes contributing to the gains of a given political actor (idem, 82-83).

The penetration of issues into the public agenda requires the existence of other factors. First, there should be awareness of the existence of the issue. Second, there should be a shared public concern that some type of action is required in relation to a given issue. And, third, there should be the consent that the matter is a concern of some government (Cobb and Elder 1983: 85-86).

Issues can have different temporal relevance. They can either have circumstantial relevance or a more enduring, fundamental one. Carmines and Stimson conceptualize thus temporally relevant issues as “issue evolutions”. More precisely, they define issue evolutions as:

“[T]hose issues capable of altering the political environment within which they originated and evolved. These issues have a long life cycle; they develop, evolve, and sometimes are resolved over a number of years. The crucial importance of this issue type stems from the fact that its members can lead to fundamental and permanent change in the party system” (Carmines and Stimson 1989:11).

Furthermore, the importance of issue evolutions stands from their transformative power. Issue evolutions emerge in established political settings, yet “once emerged they introduce fundamental tensions into the party system, inconsistent with the
continued stability of old patterns” (Carmines and Stimson 1989:11). Realignments are enforced by the emergence of new issues that cut across (instead of reinforcing) existing line of cleavages between parties. “As the parties respond to the new issue dimension, they redefine the basis of the party cleavage with a new line of political conflict overlaying the old” (Carmines and Stimson 1986: 901-902). And, when an issue moves to the stage of partisan politics, it is important to account for the elite actors who framed the issue in partisan terms in the first instance (ibid: 902).

In some occasions, specifics become contentious, partisan, and long lasting that they play a major role in the definition of the party system in which they arise. And, this joint transformation of issues and party systems is a dynamic process, which result in the change of issue alignments (Carmines and Stimson 1986: 901).

Some events are important because they symbolize a particular understanding of the problem, in this case of cultural intolerance. “Trigger events do occur, but they are probably rarer than one might think. More often, they are consolidating events – dramatic symbols of problems that are already rising rapidly to national attention. These events are certainly important, but more because of their timing in relation to other agenda events than because of their intrinsic value” (Baumgartner and Jones 2009:130). Cobb and Elder name it unanticipated human events and explain that such events refer to riots or protests, an imbalance on the distribution of resources, which leads to civil rights movement, and demographic change in specific regions (1983: 84-85).

In some cases, events contribute extensively to the redefinition of the issue bases of political life. And, time order is then a crucial aspect in the redefinition of the link between the issues and parties. “As individual policy sub-systems are built up or destroyed in a given period of time, these events affect other areas of the political
system as well. The cumulative impact of many small changes can often be dramatic changes in the entire political system. So the political system as a whole, not only particular issue areas, may go through periods of stability and rapid change” (Baumgartner and Jones 2009:243).

An important branch of political studies has investigated party policy position and party system change focusing on the issue of immigration. This scientific endeavor has traditionally taken two roads. First, some studies have investigated the positions adopted by parties on immigration measured as liberal or restrictive border control policy positions. For instance, Meguid (2005) investigates how the behavior of mainstream parties influences the electoral success of anti-immigration parties. By adopting “accommodative”, “adversarial” or “dismissive” strategies single parties would influence the electoral fortune of anti-immigration parties. Van Spanje (2010) has also used a similar approach, focusing on parties’ position on immigration understood as border control. Yet, the author examined the opposing mechanism, namely, how the success of anti-immigration parties shaped the strategies adopted by other parties. In this study, the author concludes that the electoral success of anti-immigration parties result in a “contagion impact on other parties”, altering not only the position of individual parties but also of entire party systems.

Contrasting with the above-presented measurement of the issue of immigration, a second branch of study focuses on the position of parties captured as their stance on multicultural and nationalistic policy positions. One of the most relevant works following this approach has been conducted by Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012). In this study the authors analyze how the increasing demographic heterogeneity of Western European societies is reflected in parties’ electoral competition. Using manifesto data the authors construct a variable by combining parties positive and negative mentions on multiculturalism, and on national ways
of living. They conclude that the issue of immigration has gained saliency in the agendas of left and right parties; and that left and right parties have in the last years been converging towards more anti-immigration positions.

As these studies show, we have gained greater understanding of how the issue of immigration has penetrated the agenda of single parties, affects electoral dynamics and party systems. Yet, in the context of multicultural democracies we know still little about the political trajectory of this issue (“multiculturalism”), and what positions parties held on this policy domain. Therefore, following the precept that “what is not represented by parties is very unlikely to be represented at all” (Pitkin 1967) I examine the emergence and evolution of multiculturalism across Western European party systems. The assumption here is that the ultimately, the position that parties held on the issue of multiculturalism tells about the partisan representation of immigrants.

Framed by the theories of political issues, and their evolutions, presented earlier, and the empirical evidence shown in the mentioned studies, three main hypotheses guide this Chapter. Hypothesis 3 points at the early stages of the issue and is stated as follows.

**Hypothesis 3: Issue Evolution**
The issue of multiculturalism has made inroads into European democracies, and it has done so largely driven by parties’ opposition to ethnic diversity and multicultural policies.

Of course, the evolution of the issue does not happen in isolation but follows the dynamics of partisan politics. In order to examine this aspect in more detail, Hypothesis 4 establishes a relationship between party families and their positions on the issue.
Hypothesis 4: Party Families
There is a defined division on the positions held on multiculturalism by left and right wing parties.

Finally, Hypothesis 5 is interested in understanding the extent to which the presence of anti-immigration parties has an effect on the positions that parties adopt on the issue of multiculturalism and tests for the “contagion effect” that these parties have over others.

Hypothesis 5: Anti-immigration Parties
In party systems where anti-immigration parties are present parties have more negative positions on multiculturalism than in party systems where they are absent.

In the next section I summarize the main research design strategies that I have followed to test the above mentioned working hypothesis.

4.2 Research Design and Measurement

In recent years the literature dealing with the issue of immigration in European party systems has considerable increased. Yet, as these studies focus on “border control” aspect of immigration, or center their focus on catch-it-all conceptualization of immigration we know relatively little about parties’ stances on multiculturalism. Therefore the main objective of this chapter is to examine and understand the early stages and evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in Western Europe, parties’ stances and the influence of anti-immigration parties on this process.
4.2.1 Case Selection

The selection of the cases that are examined in this chapter is driven by the main objectives of this research. In line with this, I examine here the position of parties on multiculturalism since 1960 across Western European democracies, determined to a great extent by the comparability of the cases (see Chapter 1) and the availability of the data.

The study includes ten countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. These countries are, in comparison with for example the United States and Canada, newer immigration countries. This fact is very important because the “new” immigration phenomena in Europe is having great political repercussions, and influences to a great extent electoral politics. Second, in relation to what I have stated before, the time span covered by the study (1960-2010) corresponds to the period in which the issue of multiculturalism gained saliency across European democracies (see Kymlicka 2010), and for which data is available. The time span covered in this analysis is very important because it covers the period in which immigration has been politicized in Europe, therefore the analyses will be able to show how the issue evolution related to several demographic and political processes.

4.2.2 Data

In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives I rely on the data provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR)43 (Volkens et al. 2013). The

43 There are several projects that measure the position of parties on immigration. For example the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015) measures the position and saliency of immigration issues defined as follows: for individual parties, determine whether it opposes / favors the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation). However, the CHES only includes four survey waves (in the last decade) therefore the MARPOR dataset is more suitable for this analysis.
project compiles and manually codes party programs released during electoral campaigns. The objective of the project is to “measure policy positions of all relevant parties competing in any democratic election in the post-World-War-II period” (MARPOR Codebook) including the coverage – among other regions – of European democracies.

Following the definition provided by MARPOR, manifestos or party programs are “parties only authoritative policy statements and, therefore, as indicators of the parties policy preferences at a given point in time”\(^\text{44}\). The party manifestos are subject to quantitative content analysis, which aims at identifying the position of parties on diverse issue positions by quantifying the statements and messages communicated to their electorate. In order to guarantee comparability, a classification and coding scheme has been elaborated and applied to make issue statements comparables. Thus, the MARPOR is an appropriate dataset to measure party positions over time and across countries. Furthermore, for the study of party positions on multiculturalism the coding scheme used by the MARPOR project is particularly suitable as it codes parties’ positives and negatives mentions of this issue.

Moreover, to understand how the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism is related to other phenomena, the study relies on statistical and historical-political data. First, the study includes population and immigration data extracted from the Statistics website of the OECD. Second, I use secondary contextual data extracted from secondary sources (mainly Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) to contextualize the policy changes occurred in the last decade.

\(^{44}\)https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents?name=handbook_v4
4.2.3 Dependent Variables

In this chapter I explain two inter-related variables: the (1) salience and (2) position of the issue of multiculturalism, as it is captured in the manifestos of political parties. The MARPOR project includes two items that capture multiculturalism:\footnote{The measurement realized by the MARPOR Project is based on a broad definition of multiculturalism. The concept does not exclusively refer to cultural diversity and plurality related to immigration but more broad, it includes also national ethnic and religious minorities. Therefore, its measurement could lead to biased interpretations of the results. Yet, Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012) report a statement by the MARPOR project leader, Andrea Volkens, in which she states that the content in the manifestos captured in the multiculturalism variables (607 and 608) is in its majority related to immigrants and immigration. Also, the relationship between multiculturalism and immigration is shown in this Chapter (see Figure 18).}

Variable 607: Multiculturalism Positive refers to “favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions”.

Variable 608: Multiculturalism Negative, defined as “The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration, appeals for cultural homogeneity in society”.

Using these items I create two variables that capture the overall attention that a party gives to the issue of multiculturalism, and the positions they defend.

Saliency: the first variable, measures the overall attention given by an individual party to multiculturalism. Therefore, the main focus of this variable is the relevance of the topic in party manifestos, which is measured as follows:
where Mpos refers to positive mentions of multiculturalism, and Mneg to negative mentions of it. Accordingly, saliency is calculated as the sum of both, positive and negative mentions of multiculturalism.

Position: the second variable captures the position of parties on the issue. The strategy adopted to measure party policy position follows the measurement proposed by Laver and Budge (1992) who measure party Left-Right positions. The measurement is designed to capture the difference between positive and negative mentions of the issue in party manifestos. The formula is as following:

Equation 2

\[ \text{Position} = M\text{pos} - M\text{neg} \]

where Mpos refers to positive mentions of multiculturalism, and Mneg to negative mentions.

4.2.4 Units of Analysis

The objective of this study is to measure how parties deal with the issue of multiculturalism; with this purpose I examine the first stages and evolution of the issue in partisan politics different units of analyses. The program of a party in a given election is the unit of observation, from which we compile the measures of
issue saliency and position. Then, I analyze issue and saliency at different levels of aggregation (Europe, party families, countries). The aim of this strategy is to shed light on how multiculturalism is dealt with, on time and across contexts.

(1) The Issue of Multiculturalism: in a first step I examine the trajectory of the issue of multiculturalism in Western Europe. I focus on the aggregated saliency and position of parties on the issue of multiculturalism in the last decades. The objective of this approach is to examine how the issue has evolved in Europe.

(2) Party Families: in a second step I distinguish parties by their party family and I analyze their stances on the issue. Party families, are a group of parties with a common origin in combination with similar ideological profiles (Mair and Mudde 1998). In the analysis, I make use of the party family classification following the MARPOR’s coding scheme. The party families included are the following: Greens, Communists, Socialist, Liberals, Christian Democrats, Conservatives, Agrarians and Nationalists. The purpose of analyzing party families is how different parties holding different ideologies framed the issue of multiculturalism in Europe.

(3) Countries: finally, I end the empirical analysis by focusing on the evolution of the issue across countries. Here I am interested in cross-country similarities and differences on the attention and positions that parties and party systems give to multiculturalism.

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46 A similar aggregation strategy is used by Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012) in their analysis of parties’ positions on immigration.
4.2.5 Methods

In this Chapter I use descriptive statistics to examine the early stages and evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in Europe, and across party families and party systems.

4.3 Results

4.3.1 The Issue of Multiculturalism (1960 – 2010)

The issue of multiculturalism has gained in relevance in national elections across Western European democracies in the last decades. The line plot presented in Figure 17 sheds light on this fact. The black line represents the saliency of the issue. We observe that before 1975 only 0.6 percent of the sentences published in party manifestos were devoted to the issue of multiculturalism. During the 1970s the saliency of the issue briefly declined (0.4 percent) to rise again during the 1980s (especially at the end of that decade) where parties doubled the attention given to multiculturalism in comparison to the previous decade. In the 1990s the saliency of the issue raised considerably (tripling the scores of the previous years) reaching by the end of the decade an average of 1.2 percent of sentences in party manifestos dealing with the issue of multiculturalism. Finally in a matter of ten years and by the 2000s the average mentions of multiculturalism-related statements in party manifestoes went from 1.2 percent to 2.4 percent, representing the most significant change on attention devoted to the issue during electoral campaigns. In sum, despite a small regression in the 1970s overall the attention that parties give to the issue of multiculturalism raised in the last decades, and in particular in the last decade.
The raising saliency of the issue of multiculturalism across European democracies is the result of important party dynamics. First, the dark grey line shown in Figure 17 represents the evolution of positive mentions of multiculturalism. The data shows that multiculturalism enjoyed largely from a positive framing by political parties in the early stages of issue politicization. Prior to 1975, and till the mid-1990s the mean share of positive sentences on multiculturalism surpassed the negative ones in party manifestos. By the 1970s this difference was of 0.1 percent in favor of positive statements and by the end of the decade the difference
increased even more, reaching up to 0.2 percent for sentences favorable to multiculturalism. The first and second part of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s continued to mark this tendency, with differences marking 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 percent respectively in favor of positive mentions of multiculturalism. Overall, what the Graph is showing is that at the early stages of multiculturalism, the saliency of the issue in the political arena was related to positive mentions of cultural diversity, and multicultural policies.

Second, as showed by the light grey line in Figure 17 which represents the percentage of negative statements, by the mid-1990s a new trend emerges across Western European democracies. By the end of the 1990s, negative statements started dominating parties’ framing of multiculturalism. By the mid-1990s the difference between positive and negative statements diminished drastically compared to the previous decades. Positive statements only surpassed negative statements by 0.13 percent on average in party programs across Europe.

The 2000s evidence a radical turning point in how multiculturalism is framed by parties during elections. At the beginning of the new millennium 0.7 percent of the manifestos were devoted to positive mentions of multiculturalism and almost 1 percent of it was on average devoted to negative mentions. This marked a difference of 0.3 percent in favor of negative framings of it. And, by the end of the 2000s this tendency was even more noticeable. Negative mentions of multiculturalism escalated to levels never observed before, scoring an average of 1.3 percent of sentences making negative references to multiculturalism. Positives mentions on the other side also continued to raise reaching 0.9 percent. Yet the difference between the two framings increased, and negative sentences surpassed on multiculturalism surpassed positive mentions of it for more than 0.4 percent. The evolution of negative mentions of multiculturalism sheds evidence on the fact that in its last stages the issue has been dominated by remarkable skepticism.
In conclusion, by analyzing the early stages and evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in Europe we observe that its saliency has drastically changed, as the political views that are dominant in the political arena. In previous decades and till the end of the 1990s, the issue has been in the agenda mainly because of positive mentions of it. Between the mid-1970s and the end of 1970s, 60 and 80 percent of the mentions of multiculturalism in party programs were positive. In the mid-1980s, 82 percent of the sentences devoted to this policy area corresponded to positive references to it, and similar shares were registered by the end of the decade and beginning of the 1990s with 81 percent in both cases.

By the end of the 1990s, positive and negative mentions of multiculturalism in party programs got much closer, positive sentences represented 55 percent of the total and negative sentences 45 percent. And, in contrast to previous years in the 2000s the raising saliency of multiculturalism in party programs was mainly related to negative mentions of ethnic diversity and multicultural policies: 59 and 60 percent of the sentences referring to immigration and integration were framed in a negative way by the mid-2000s and 2010.

In other words, the graphic representation of the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism sheds light on the fact that its early development came along with a positive framing of ethnic diversity and multicultural policies. And that it is only in the last decade that it has been dominated by anti-immigration sentiments in party programs across European democracies. To explain the above-presented issue dynamics I examine below the relationship that exists between multiculturalism, and international migration and important events related to immigration.
4.3.2 The Rise of Multiculturalism

One of the key explanations of the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in immigration countries - and the most obvious one- is immigration. “The external world causes disruptions and shocks, raises challenges and opportunities (...) the external world is always a source of problems to be solved, opportunities to be exploited” (Carmines and Stimson 1989:7). Figure 18 shows a scatter plot revealing the relationship between net migration and issue saliency in Europe in the last decades. As it can be observed, there is a strong and positive relationship between immigration and issue saliency ($r^2 = 0.74$). This indicates, that when immigration increases (positive net migration), the attention that political parties devote to the issue of multiculturalism increases. Studies show that hostility towards immigration is correlated with the visibility of new migration inflows (as shown by Teitelbaum & Wiener 1995, Money 1999). And both, economic and cultural objections to immigration shape public opinion (Espenshade & Hempstead 1996), which in turns influence the strategies followed by parties when emphasizing and framing the issue (Adams et al. 2004). Economic factors include individuals’ evaluation of the state of the national economy and their employments status, which appear as strong predictors of attitudes towards immigration (Citrin et al. 1997). Besides, as mass migration represents ethnic and cultural diversification, there is also evidence showing that native citizens tend to have preferences for in-group members with whom they share cultural and ethnic characteristics. For example when analyzing the question of who deserves public assistance native-born respondents rank immigrants lower than natives (Van Oorschot 2006), and there is evidence that group comparison and discontent occurs in contexts of mass migration (Gurr 1970, Runciman 1966). All in all, as Quillian (1995) puts it, perceived intergroup threat is an important explanatory factor of racial prejudice, so when the perceived threat increases public opinion changes and parties shift their positions.
In essence, we observe that the exploitation of the issue of multiculturalism by political parties is closely related to migratory inflows as these influence public opinion. This relation leads to two major considerations. On the first hand, it provides further evidence that the issue of multiculturalism in European democracies is overall a policy area highly related to the ethnic and cultural diversity resulting from international migration (in contrast to a multiculturalism that would refer to national minorities for example). On the other, it reveals that political parties react to the anxiety about immigration and the assumption that immigrants may exploit the welfare state and social programs (Banting 2010: 807).
4.3.3 The Turn Against Multiculturalism

The observation that political parties mainly framed multiculturalism in a positive way in previous decades raises questions about the factors that contributed to the radical change we observe in the 2000s. Certainly, net migration appears as a crucial factor determining the saliency of the topic, yet it is important to understand what other factors have contributed to the raise of the radical turn against multiculturalism that Europe has experienced in the last decade. Agenda setting and issue evolution theories provide with a framework that is useful to understand this turn. They put forward the role that major events play in the rise and framing of particular issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2009; Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg 1995; Soroka 2002; Carmines and Stimson 1989). Major events such as crises, wars, depression and terrorism penetrate the political system, affecting party strategies and electoral dynamics overall.

The advent of the 21st century has been characterized by a series of major events, which have affected our perceptions and the political relevance of immigration, and with it of multiculturalism. Therefore from this perspective, examining the some events that contributed to a negative image of immigrants and immigration seems crucial for understanding the turn against multiculturalism that dominates the political arena.
Figure 19: Timeline of Major Events related to Multiculturalism (2000-2010)\(^{47}\)

Sources: Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010: 4-6), Own Sources.

\(^{47}\) Non-exhaustive list of major events that have dominated the public and political discourses in the 2000s.
Numerous events revolved around immigrants or immigration in the 2000s. And, marked a new momentum for multiculturalism in European Democracies. As Figure 19 shows some of these major events, classified by type and ordered by date. In the upper side of the timeline two types of events are shown. The grey dotted line shows events that involved the civil society, including the Oldham Riots in the United Kingdom in May 2001, the Riots in France in October and November 2005, and the demonstrations that took place in Britain in 2008 following the economic and financial crisis asking to prioritize British over immigrant workers. The grey line shows terrorist actions. The 9/11 terrorists attacks in the United States, the train bombing in Madrid in March 2004, the assassination of the film director Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in November 2004, and the train bombing in London in July 2005.

In the lower part of the timeline, signaled by the dotted black line controversial expressions of opinions that have gained international relevance are enlisted. These include the publication of articles in the printed press such as “The Multicultural Drama” in the Netherlands in 2000, the article entitled “Too Diverse” in the United Kingdom in 2004, and the Muhammad Cartoons in Denmark in 2005. Finally, political parties, politicians and national governments have also actively contributed to the debates on multiculturalism in the 2000s (black line). The electoral success and popularity of anti-immigration parties has played an important role in the evolution of the issue. In the Netherlands in 2001 and 2002, the anti-immigration party Pym Fortuyn gained a lot of popularity and the National Front of Le Pen in France made it in 2002 to the second tour of the presidential elections. In France controversial laws were adopted, including the secularity law in 2004, and the burqa ban in 2010.

Finally, conservative representatives have played a pivotal role in setting the tone for framing multiculturalism in Europe. For instance, in 2008 the British Prime
Minister David Cameron gave speech over the “Cultural Apartheid” that emerged as a result of mass immigration. And in 2010, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared, “Multiculturalism is Dead”.

The combination of these events, which gained international attention, opened a window of opportunity for the re-politicization and re-framing of multiculturalism (and more broadly, immigration) in Europe. Their repercussions are shown below.

4.3.3.1 Events Involving the Civil Society

A series of events engaging the civil society occurred. Dancygier (2010) defines these as confrontations between immigrant groups, natives and immigrant groups, and immigrant groups and the forces of order. From this perspective three major events related to immigrant groups raised public and political concerns about multiculturalism.

First, in May 2001 in the United Kingdom riots emerged in which British Bangladeshi and Pakistani youths opposed White youths. The riots are known as the 2001 Oldham riots because they occurred in that town in Greater Manchester. These had been considered as one of the works ethnically motivated riots in the United Kingdom, and later spread to Southall, Leicester and Birmingham. Second, in October and November 2005 in France riots in urban suburbs occurred including Arab, North African and black French second-generation immigrants. These confrontations consisted mainly in burning cars and public buildings, and confrontations with the police. Third, in 2008 following the effects of the financial and economic crisis protesters of the Lindsey Oil Refinery in the United Kingdom voiced what seemed to be the concerns of many British workers: ‘British Jobs for British Workers’.
What these events have in common is that they emerge as violent expressions of existing tensions between ethnic groups that challenge the social order, polarizing public opinion, and requiring the action of the representatives in office. The diagnosis and solutions adopted in every individual case are also sources of new controversies around multiculturalism. For example, the Ritchie Report that investigated the Oldham riots shed light on how separated the lives of different ethnic groups were, and how this was the source of ethnic conflict. They stated: “[The] lives [of the different ethnic groups] often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges”\textsuperscript{48}, proposing to bring these communities close together. Years later, in the United Kingdom following the mentioned demonstrations occurred in the context of the 2008 financial and economic crisis asking to prioritize British over immigrant workers the affair turned into the enactment of a local clause that agreed to hire at least 100 British workers at the site (Barnard 2009).

4.3.3.2 Terrorism

Terrorism refers to the unofficial use of violence and intimidation for the pursuit of political aims. Several terrorist attacks occurred in immigration countries leading to numerous debates over immigration, multiculturalism, and security. First, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 in the United States increased the concern about the possible threat of Islamic terrorism in the West. The series of four terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda took place in New York and Washington. Having more than 3,000 victims it has been one of the most visible attacks in the West in the last decades. As a reaction, many countries (including Germany) passed laws to combat terrorism, which resulted for example in tougher controls over asylum policies.

Second, in March 2004 in Madrid the train bombings killed 191 people. The perpetrators of the attacks have been characterized as an Al-Qaeda inspired group yet not relationship to Al-Qaeda has been established. Big controversies over the handling and representation of the attack by the government were at the centre of the debate, confronting the two main political parties: the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (Left) and the People’s Party (Conservative), and has been interpreted as one of the main reasons why the incumbent party (People’s Party) lost the general election which was held only few days after.

Third, in November of 2004 in the Netherlands a Muslim extremist assassinated the film director Theo Van Gogh. The director had produced a short film named “Submission” (2004) in which he criticized the treatment of women in Islam. In the aftermath of his death, several attacks to mosques and Islamic schools and violent incidents against Muslims took place. Also, it resulted in the attacks to Christian churches. The murder polarized the debates in the Netherlands about the situation of the Muslim residents in the Netherlands. Among the greatest repercussions related to immigration are the statements made by Geert Wilders, an Independent member of the Dutch parliament, who advocated a five-year halt to immigration from non-Western societies. He declared: “The Netherlands has been too tolerant to intolerant people for too long. We should not import a retarded political Islamic society into our country.”

Finally, the 2005 London bombings occurred in the month of July. Four British Islamists detonated bombs. These attacks targeted civilians using public transport system, the attacks resulted in 52 victims. Some days later, it was reported that the British National Party (BNP) printed leaflets showing images of the attacks with

the slogan “Maybe now it's time to start listening to the BNP”, which was alleged by other parties as an exploitation of the tragic events to spread their beliefs.

As shown above, the repercussions of these events in the political arena are related to first to the fact that immigration has been associated with criminality (Mclaren and Johnson 2007). And, second the terrorist attacks have marked the starting point of a new relationship between citizens of European countries, and immigrants from Muslim countries (Helbling 2012:12). It has been argued, that these terrorist attacks has had a major impact on attitudes towards immigrants, in particular, the political agenda emerging after 9/11 has contributed to a “culture of suspicion against Muslims” (Fekete 2004:14). In brief, these terrorist attacks have contributed enormously to establishing a relationship between multiculturalism and security issues, which emerged together with more restrictive views vis-à-vis ethnic and cultural diversity in Europe.

4.3.3.3 Expressions of Opinions and Public Discourse

This type of events concerns expression of opinions in the press, which have been subject to public attention, and disputes over freedom of speech. Three major events related to expressions of opinions have had great influence on the debates about multiculturalism in the last decade. The first two events openly criticize multiculturalism. The third one is related to a certain characterization of Islam, which lead to major discussions. And, an interesting fact is that these publications did not emerge exclusively from conservative media groups, but media aligned with the left and liberal ideologies also contributed to the debates.

The first case took place in the Netherlands at the beginning of the 2000s. The Dutch journalist, and member of the Labor Party, Paul Scheffer published the
article “The Multicultural Disaster”\textsuperscript{50}. As the title indicates it consists of an open critic addressed to multiculturalism. In the article using statistical data, Scheffer expresses what his thoughts are about the failures of multiculturalism: “the formation of an ethnic underclass”, “integration is the exception rather than the rule”, “the multicultural drama that unfolds is also the biggest threat to social peace”. The political importance of it didn’t come only from the fact that it was an open criticism of multiculturalism, but it stands from the fact that it is one of the first open criticisms to multiculturalism coming from the left.

Similar criticisms emerged in 2004 in the United Kingdom, where the editor of a left-leaning magazine, Prospect Magazine\textsuperscript{51}, David Goodhart published the article “Too Diverse?”\textsuperscript{52}. In this article he asks whether Britain is becoming too diverse to sustain the obligations that are necessary to maintain a good society and a good working welfare state. As the author puts it: “as Britain becomes more diverse [the] common culture is being eroded. And therein lies one of the central dilemmas of political life in developed societies: sharing and solidarity can conflict with diversity”(Goodhart 2004).

Finally, by the end of the summer 2005 the independent liberal (centre-right) Danish newspaper “The Jutland Post” published 12 cartoons depicting Islam and Muhammad, from which one showed Muhammad with a bomb in his turban. The publication of these cartoons resulted in protests of the Muslim community living in Denmark, protests all over the Muslim world, and several attempts of terrorist attacks against the newspaper and the cartoonists.

\textsuperscript{50} Het multiculturele drama: http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html
\textsuperscript{51} The Prospect Magazine is a British general interest monthly magazine devoted to politics, economics and current affairs. It has been catalogued as a left-leaning magazine.
\textsuperscript{52} http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-britain-immigration-globalisation/
Interestingly, among the cases here presented two show critical views on the effects of multiculturalism in the local societies emerging from actors that defend left ideas. And the third one, from a centre-right newspaper, is related to the perceptions of Islam. This latter, is perceived as embodying a multicultural backlash related to freedom and freedom of speech.

4.3.3.4 Politics

The fourth category of events engages key political actors; these include political parties and governments. From the side of the parties, the electoral success of anti-immigration parties in the last decade has been crucial to the developments of the issue of multiculturalism in Europe. Two facts appear as highly relevant here. First, between 2001 and 2002 in the Netherlands the raise of popularity and death of the far-right politician Pim Fortuyn had major consequences in Dutch politics. The Pim Fortuyn List was created in 2002 held conservative views on multiculturalism, immigration and Islam. And, Pim Fortuyn criticized Islam for being a "backward culture". These declarations raised major discussions in the Netherlands opening the debates over immigration in that country.

At the same time in France, the French presidential elections of 2002 resulted in a great surprise for the French electorate. In the first round of the elections the conservative party leaded by Jacques Chirac and the far-right party, Front National, of Jean-Marie Le Pen obtained the majority of the votes going and making it to the second round. Reacting to these results, all candidates from opposing parties called the French voters to boycott the far-right candidate and numerous demonstrations took place in the following days in France’s largest cities. Also as a sign of protest, the conservative and incumbent candidate Jacques Chirac refused to participate in the political debates next to Le Pen.
France was also the country where controversial laws adopted by conservative governments raised major discussions over immigration and multiculturalism in particular. In February 2004 a law banning the use of signs and clothes that show the religion of students in public schools was adopted, and in September 2010 a law banning the use of veils covering the face in public spaces was passed. While the arguments related to the secularity law revolved around France’s identification with secularity and its status as secular state, the burqa law mobilized arguments related peoples’ identification, security and ultimately integration. The burqa law and the arguments around it were subject to cross-national diffusion resulting in similar debates to take place in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Finally, statements by conservative prime ministers in the United Kingdom and Germany also raised concerns about the issue of multiculturalism. In February 2008 the first minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, attacked multiculturalism alleging that it has created a “cultural apartheid” because it allows ethnic communities to lead separate lives. “For too long we’ve given in to the loudest voices from each community, without listening to what the majority want.” A few years later, in October 2010, the Chancellor of Germany declared that multiculturalism has “utterly failed”. “Of course the tendency had been to say, 'let's adopt the multicultural concept and live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other'. But this concept has failed, and failed utterly.” These declarations put Merkel next to the most conservative wing of

53 Article L.141-5-1: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071191&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006524456&dateTexte=20140708
54 LOI n° 2010-1192: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670
55 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/feb/27/immigration.humanrights
the German Christian Democrat Party. All in all, successful anti-immigration parties in the Netherlands and France, the adoption of laws limiting the rights and actions of specific immigrant groups in France, and declarations of Conservative Governments’ Heads in Britain and Germany have also influenced the strategies followed by parties during elections.

To conclude, at the beginning of this chapter and grounding on some of the assumptions put forward in political research, I advanced the premise (Hypothesis 3) that the early stages and evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in Europe has been driven by the mobilization of views opposing ethnic diversity and multicultural policies. In the temporal analysis of parties’ positions on multiculturalism in Europe we could clearly observe that a positive framing of ethnic diversity and multicultural policies dominated the early stages of the issue of multiculturalism. And, that a radical turn against multiculturalism has only conquered the political arena in more recent years.

In the next section I explore the relationship between party families and the issue of multiculturalism in the aim of understanding the role played by these parties in the evolution of the issue.

### 4.3.4 Party Families

In the previous section of this Chapter I have examined the early stages and evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in Europe. Two phenomena are remarkable. First, the saliency of the issue has increased in the last decades in the programs of political parties. Second, since the late 1990s statements apposing ethnic diversity and multicultural policies have dominated the political discourses over multiculturalism. The question that emerges in this context is whether all parties contribute equally to such evolution of the issue. In order to understand
this I examine how salient the issues is across party families, and what positions they held.

Table 13 shows the existence of great variations in terms of the mean saliency of the multiculturalism across party families. Communist and Socialist parties have the lowest scores. The mean saliency of the issue in the party manifestos for these party families is 0.5 (1.2 standard deviation) for the Communists. Similarly, the issue is not very salient in the party programs of socialist parties (mean 0.6, standard deviation 1.1). On the side of the left, the parties that seem to give more attention to the issue are the Greens, for whom the saliency of the issue is 1 (standard deviation 1.2). Following this, the liberal parties give much attention to the issue, scoring second after the Nationalist Parties. Liberal parties score a mean of 1.4 percent of sentences on this issue in their party programs (standard deviation 2.9).

Christian Democrats, Conservatives, and Agrarian parties find themselves in the middle between left parties on the one hand, and green, nationalist and liberal parties on the other. While they give more attention to the issue than left parties, they do it to a relative less extent than the second group. Christian Democrats devote 0.9 percent of their manifestos to sentences on multiculturalism (standard deviation 1.7), Conservative Parties 0.7 percent (standard deviations 1.6) and Agrarian parties 0.8 (standard deviation 1.5). Finally, Nationalist Parties are the ones giving greater attention to the issue scoring 3.2 percent of their sentences on this issue in their manifestos (standard deviation 5.2). Generally speaking, the data shows that in terms of the saliency right wing and conservative parties devote more attention to the issue of multiculturalism than left parties do.
Besides, looking at the positions of parties on the issue of multiculturalism, the manifesto data reveals two main features. First, the data shows that all the party families - with the only exception of the Nationalist parties - held on average positive positions on multiculturalism. In other words, all the party families located in the left of the political spectrum are favorable to multiculturalism. The Greens lead with most of the positive statements on the issue 0.4 (standard deviation 0.5), followed by the Communist and the Socialists which both score 0.3 (standard deviation 0.5). Also the Christian Democrats show similar scores than these parties, with 0.3 (standard deviation 0.5). Then, the Conservatives have also a slightly more positive position on the issue scoring 0.2 (standard deviation 0.6). Followed by Liberals and Agrarians, which score 0.1 (standard deviation 0.6) and 0.1 (standard deviation. 0.5) respectively.

Second, it reveals that in Europe Greens parties are the ones promoting of multiculturalism, and Nationalist Parties are the ones leading the anti-multiculturalism agenda. Based on this evidence, we notice the important role that new “niche” party families (Meguid 2005), namely Greens and Anti-immigration party families, play in the political arena in relation to immigrants and immigration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Family</th>
<th>Saliency</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>1 (1.2)</td>
<td>0.4 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>0.5 (1.2)</td>
<td>0.3 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>0.6 (1.1)</td>
<td>0.3 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>1.4 (2.9)</td>
<td>0.1 (0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>0.9 (1.7)</td>
<td>0.3 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>0.7 (1.6)</td>
<td>0.2 (0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Parties</td>
<td>3.2 (5.2)</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Parties</td>
<td>0.8 (1.5)</td>
<td>0.1 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard deviations in brackets, Pearson’s r: -0.89
Finally, the data reveals that there is a correlation between these saliency and position. The Pearson’s correlation is -0.89, indicating that when the saliency of the issue increases, the position tends to be more negative. Equally, when the saliency decreases it is related to more positive positions. This last observation grounds on the fact that the policy dimension of immigration is not always salient to all parties. In fact, the nationalist party family (as classified by the Manifesto project) includes several anti-immigration parties, which are parties that aim at restricting immigration and highlight the emergency of taking such measures (Van Spanje 2011). In sum, the very ideological nature of parties sets parties apart regarding the saliency of immigration and positions expressed in their manifestos.

### 4.3.4.1 Party Families over Time

The importance that a party attaches to such issue varies over time and place. Much of the saliency and positions on the issue of multiculturalism observed across party families, are the result from the attention and positions these parties have sustained on time. In order to better grasp these evolutions I broke down the trajectory of position per party family since 1960s and until 2010. Figure 20 shows the evolution of the positions held by different party families in the last five decades. The line plot reveals that most of the party families held positive views on the issue. Since their emergence in the 1970s, Green parties have held positive views on multiculturalism. Their position has been consistently positive and therefore the Greens count as the parties being the most positive on the issue in Western Europe. Communist and Social Democrats are also the other two party families that defend multiculturalism in their party manifests. Yet, Communists held more positive positions than the Social Democrats and even in the 1980s they surpassed the Greens in their positive approach to the issue, turn than then declined and become the second defenders of multiculturalism after the Greens.
Figure 20. Line plot of Position on Multiculturalism across Party Families (1960-2010)
On the Right of the political spectrum Conservative and Christian Democrats have held rather positive positions on the issue, which only for the former declined in the last decade. The Agrarians and the Liberals on their side have held a wide array of positions in the last years. While the Agrarians started in the decade of the 1970s holding positive views on multicultural policies, the positive statements declined in the following decades, reaching negative views in the decade of the 90s. Their position on the issue adopted again a new trend with the upcoming of the new century, and in the 2000s these parties raised again positive views on multiculturalism.

The Liberals on their side, held in the last decades moderate positions on multicultural policies. Their stances were moderately positive. Their position turned to be less positive during the decade of the 1980s but their positive views recovered in the following years. Interestingly, in the first decade of the 20th century Liberal parties gave a turn towards a more conservative view on multicultural policies turning to more mentions of negative statements than positive ones on ethnic diversity and multicultural policies.

Finally, the trajectory of the issue in relation to the positions held by Nationalist parties in the last five decades is characterized by a constant radicalization on the opinions expressed in manifestos on the issue of multiculturalism. To our surprise, prior to the 1970s these parties presented positive views on the issue of multiculturalism, yet during the 1970s we observe that they turned radically towards anti-multicultural positions. Negative statements on multicultural policies increased among Nationalist in the following decades, and stabilizing in the 1990s and 2000s around -0.6.

In other words, the time analysis of individual party families sheds light on some interesting facts. First, among all parties, the Greens parties the ones presenting
more positive views on multiculturalism in party manifestos. This fact is partially explained by the fact that the Greens being new parties in party systems embraced the so-called “post-materialist values” including ethnic diversity (Inglehart 1977).

Second, on average positive mentions of multiculturalism dominate over negative ones across all party families but the Nationalists. Communists, Social Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Agrarians score positive on average in the last five decades. Only Agrarian parties in the 1990s and Liberals in the 2000s turned towards more negative mentions of the issue, but these data points are outliers in their overall position trajectory. Surprisingly the issue position of Nationalist parties was not always in the negative part of the scale but in the 1960s these parties had positive mentions of multiculturalism in their party programs, which in the later years radicalized towards clear anti-multicultural statements.

Third, examining the positions of party families from the perspective of the saliency of the issue we can conclude that the issue is much more present in the agendas of those parties that oppose multiculturalism (or those that defend moderate positions), than of those that promote it (with the only exception of the Green parties).

Taking all these points into consideration, we can conclude that the “freezing hypothesis” advanced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967 in Mair 1997:3) is contested in the context of multicultural democracies. In reality the issue of multiculturalism is gaining in relevance in these democracies. Its politicization is largely driven first by the anti-immigration ideas mobilized by Nationalist parties. And second, by the promotion of multiculturalism undertaken by Green parties. Therefore, from this perspective “niche parties” (Meguid 2005) are playing a pivotal role in changing the landscape of electoral politics. The empirical evidence shows the growing
influence of anti-immigration parties (Mudde 2013) which influences the policy strategies adopted by other parties (Meguid 2005) having a “contagion effect” on entire party systems (Van Spanje 2010). All in all, the evidence supports the idea that Europe is experiencing a “right turn” (Minkensberg 2001:1, Zaslove 2004:99).

To conclude, I started this second analysis hypothesizing a considerable difference in the positions on multiculturalism defended by left and right parties. The data presented above shed light on differences in terms of the positions held, and the saliency of the issue in the manifestos of left and right party families. The radicalization of Nationalist parties in the last decades is imminent. However, to our surprise in the last years, Conservative parties held in average more positive views than Socialist parties. This fact suggests that we need to closely examine the dynamics of parties and party systems across countries.

4.3.5 Multiculturalism across Countries

In this section I examine the saliency and position of the issue of multiculturalism across European democracies. Broken down per country, we observe that the saliency of the issue varies greatly across democracies. As it is shown in Figure 21, the political relevance of the issue in electoral manifestos has increased in the last decades (Saliency is represented by the black line). First, by the 1980s the issue of multiculturalism was already highly politicized in some democracies, namely Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal, and Spain. By the mid 1990s the issue gained in relevance in Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom. Whereas in some democracies the attention than parties devoted to it, decreased, like in Belgium, Finland, and Sweden.

Finally, the last years witnessed an increase in the saliency of the issue in the majority of European democracies. The saliency of the issue escalated in
Denmark, where the issue is the most salient in Europe. This explained to a great extent of the effects of the foundation in 1995 of the Danish People’s Party, combining many elements of the French party Front National and supported by a far-right circle of intellectuals, which highly mediated its influence (Rydgren 2004).

Other countries where the issue is highly salient at present are Austria, Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands. The importance of the issue also increased in Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, Greece and Sweden. In some other democracies, it remained stable in comparison to the previous decades like in France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Finally, Italy and Spain are the only two countries where the average saliency of the issue decreased.

In terms of the average position of parties on multiculturalism (represented by the grey line), we observe than on average at the party system level parties showed rather positive positions on multiculturalism, or close to cero, which means that parties showed on equal basis positive and negative arguments in relation to multiculturalism in party manifestos. On average, the country that has negative arguments dominating the positions of parties is Denmark in the mid 1990s. And, on its opposite, Ireland is the country where the saliency of the issue appears to be dominated by positive statements over multiculturalism.
Figure 21. Line plots of Average Saliency (black) and Position (grey) per Country
4.3.5.1 The Effects of Anti-Immigration Parties

Previous research has shown the influence that anti-immigration parties have in influencing the strategies followed by other parties (Meguid 2005), affecting entire party systems (Van Spanje 2010). Figure 22 shows the pure position of parties on multiculturalism in the last elections held in every country (by 2010). As the illustration shows, in the presence of anti-immigration parties, party systems tend to show a greater polarization on the issue. In most of the countries, conservative parties tend to also adopt negative stances on multiculturalism. This is precisely the case in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden. In some cases however, competitor parties either avoid the issue or adopt a rather neutral (close to cero) position. This is particularly the case in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Besides, in countries without anti-immigration parties (or having some of very small relevance), the overall framing of multiculturalism is more positive, and less polarized. In some cases most parties either show neutral or only positive positions on the issue like in the cases of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Finally, in some countries like Finland, Germany and Luxembourg, there is one party opposing multiculturalism but all other parties are either neutral or positive on this matter.
Figure 22. Parties’ Position on Multiculturalism in Last Election

Countries with Anti-Immigration Parties

Countries without Anti-Immigration Parties

Position

Position

156
4.4 Conclusion and Discussion

In Chapter 4 I investigate the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism across party systems and parties, and what factors influence the issue saliency and orientation. Using the MARPOR project data I have examined the evolution of the issue in the last five decades in ten Western European democracies.

The study sheds light on interesting facts about the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in European democracies. First of all, against the expectations (H3) in previous decades multiculturalism was present in parties' political agendas. It was highly dominated by positive views on ethnic diversity and multicultural policies. It is only around the year 2000 that the politicization of the issue starts to be driven by parties’ opposition to multiculturalism. This radical turn is the result of terrorist attacks, social unrest and the mediatization of views that highlight the problems associated with international migration. Besides, the empirical analyses also give evidence that in general all party families tended to have positive (even when very moderated) positions on multicultural policies. Broken down by party family, we observe that only the Agrarian parties in the 2000s and the nationalist parties starting in the 1980s opposed multiculturalism. These findings challenge the expectations formulated in the hypothesis 4 that established a relationship between support and opposition to multiculturalism and the left and right (as shown by Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012). Indeed the evidence shows that opposition to multiculturalism has been rather an issue of anti-immigration parties (in line with the findings of Green-Pedersen 2007). Finally, the cross-country examination shows that the presence of anti-immigration parties is an important factor determining the positions adopted by other parties in a democracy, supporting hypothesis 5. When anti-immigration parties are present, parties hold more negative positions on multiculturalism than when they are absent.
Summing up, in this Chapter I show the way in which political parties respond to ethnic diversity and multicultural policies in immigration countries. Grounding on this empirical body a next question is what role do parties play in the selection and nomination of immigrant candidates. Therefore in Chapter 5 I investigate the extent to which political parties, among other factors, affect immigrants’ descriptive representation.
5. Descriptive Representation

Descriptive representation refers to the "ability of groups to elect representatives with similar traits" (Welch and Hibbing 1988). From this perspective, descriptive representatives are individuals who in their own background and experiences mirror specific groups (Mansbridge, 1999:628). This approach also called “statistical” or “mirror” representation focuses on the demographic and social characteristics of elected officials. And, it aims at assessing how well are societies’ groups politically represented. In the context of multicultural democracies three major questions emerge: (1) Is there a correspondence between the composition of national assemblies and their ethnically diverse societies? (2) How do electoral systems and parties influence the representation of immigrants in Europe? And, (3) what factors related to immigrant candidates and immigrant groups contribute to immigrants’ inroads into politics?

The aim of this chapter is to examine immigrants’ representation in national assemblies. In order to attain this objective I follow a more comprehensive approach to understand how institutional and group-level characteristics affect their representation. This chapter is organized as follows. First, I place the political representation of immigrants in the context of European multicultural democracies, and examine the main factors that can contribute or hamper it. Second I present the research design that has been developed for this study. Third, I analyze the relationship between immigrants’ representation and electoral systems, parties, constituencies and immigrant candidates. Finally I summarize and discuss the findings.
5.1 Analytical Framework

Descriptive representation refers to make something absent present by resemblance. Therefore, what is to be represented is a specific group. The rationale is that the legislature should resemble the nation and mirror the people, the public opinion, or the movement of social and economic forces of the nation (Pitkin, 1967:64). From this perspective the members of the legislature “supply” information about the groups that are in society: women, the working class, national minorities, etc. This leads to the fact that descriptive representation gives great emphasis to the composition of the legislature in terms of the characteristics of individual representatives.

The presence of minority representatives in legislative bodies is important in many ways. It can contribute to their representation in contexts of inter-group mistrust or when immigrants’ interests are not crystallized by dominant political actors (Mansbridge, 1999). Also, some of the inequalities existent across groups can be traced down to the existent indifference that elites show vis-à-vis the interests of minority and under-represented groups. Therefore from this perspective, descriptive representation can contribute to readjusting the unequal distribution of political values in society: power, participation and decision-making (Shapiro, 1981:712). Also, group representation increases political knowledge, increases contact with representatives and increases electoral participation (Banducci et al. 2004). Furthermore, descriptive representation has a potential symbolic value. Descriptive representation can contribute to inter-group trust building, and reinforce the feelings of inclusion (Mansbridge 1999). It is associated with more positive political attitudes (Banducci et al. 2004), and can play a role model with other members of that group (Bloemraad 2006:228-9).
In the context of multicultural democracies, explanations of the factors that foster and hamper immigrants’ representation can be divided into two types. On the one hand, there are the factors that conform the political landscape of the democracies in which immigrants live. In terms of the contextual and institutional features, two main factors are identified in the literature as playing an important role in immigrants’ representation: (1) the characteristics of electoral systems that set the rules of the elections, and (2) the characteristics of political parties, which are the main gatekeepers in the selection and nomination of candidates. On the other hand, supply side analyses argue that (3) the characteristics of the immigrant electorate, and (2) of immigrant candidates and representatives do matter for explaining immigrants’ descriptive representation.

Based on these arguments, below I present some empirical evidence that sheds light on the role that electoral systems, political parties, immigrant constituencies, and immigrant-origin political leaders play for descriptive representation. Based on this I derive the main hypotheses that are examined in this Chapter.

5.1.1 Electoral Systems

Electoral systems matter for representation, as these are “links in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments” (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005:3). In representative democracies citizens delegate policy-making to a small number of representatives. And the way these representatives are elected is of crucial importance for representation. The concept of electoral system refers in general to “the set of rules that structure how votes are cast in elections for a representative assembly and how these votes are then converted into seats in that assembly” (idem: p.3). Therefore, the characteristics of electoral systems are of vital relevance for political representation.
as these influence representatives’ election, the number of parties, and voters’ turnover.

The electoral formulas have major implications for representation as these determine how votes are counted and how seats are allocated. Different characteristics of different electoral systems lead to different results in the representation of immigrant minorities. Here we have a look at two types of systems. Majoritarian systems have been designed to create a majority in order to produce an effective working majority for the government. Given that majoritarian systems prioritize effective governance, the consequence is that minor parties are highly penalized and have a difficult path to government. On the other side, proportional systems have been designed to foster the inclusion of minority parties, in the aim of mirroring the composition of society in the parliament.

Studies on the relationship between electoral systems and the representation of minorities suggest that these institutional features matter for immigrants’ representation. In general, it is argued that majority systems have negative consequences for the representation of minority groups (Norris 1997:304). A study conducted across 15 European democracies showed that ethnic minorities are worst off in terms of their representation in majority systems compared to proportional systems (Kostadinova 2007). The difference between majoritarian and proportional systems in these contexts resides specifically on the inner dynamics of both systems. In majority systems candidates’ selection is often decentralized, therefore at the local level there are smaller incentive to select a candidate that will produce a more representative legislature at the national level. In contrast, in proportional systems candidates have greater visibility, therefore in such a system, there is greater incentive to present a list that “looks like the voters” (Bird 2003: 13).
The characteristics of electoral systems seem to determine to a great extent the descriptive representation of immigrants in national legislatures. Based on this evidence, the first hypothesis that is examined in this chapter states as follows:

Hypothesis 6: Electoral Systems
Immigrants are better represented in democracies having proportional electoral systems than in democracies having majoritarian systems.

5.1.2 Political Parties

Parties adopt different strategies to maximize their electoral gains (Downs 1957). In this framework, the strategies they follow when recruiting candidates to be included in the party lists (as the position they adopt, see Chapter 4) are perceived as means to these ends. In other words, candidates’ nomination is one of the means that parties have at hand to address the general electorate or certain parts of the electorate in the aims of winning a given election (Scarrow 2004).

By choosing the electoral candidates, parties are defining the pool of individuals that are eligible for government, and most importantly by this act, they are determining the overall composition of national parliaments (Norris and Lovenduski 1995:2). In this way, parties play the role of the main gatekeepers in the recruitment process (Caul 1999, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Norris 1997, Costa and Kerrouche 2007, Strom 2003). As a result, the question of which candidates are included in the party lists is of central concern. Political research has shown the existence of significant differences over candidates’ nomination across parties. Party-specific political opportunity structures influence the recruitment process resulting on representation bias of diverse nature.
In the context of multicultural democracies parties are increasingly recruiting ethnic minority candidates. Indeed, via the nomination of candidates of immigrant origin, parties “try to attract new immigrant voters with the promise to enhance their representation in parliament” (Claro da Fonseca 2011:112). Party-related characteristics influence to a great the proportions of minority candidates that participate in legislative elections (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Kittilson and Tate 2004, Caul 1999). Cross-country empirical evidence pint points at one crucial determinant of minority recruitment, and that is party ideology (Kittilson and Tate 2004, Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Left wing parties embrace ideals of equality and have traditionally offered more support to under-represented groups, therefore more immigrant candidates and representatives are found among these (Kittilson and Tate 2004). On the other hand, right-wing parties held more conservative stands vis-à-vis immigration and their integration. Likewise they appear less keen on recruiting minority candidates remaining rather unpopular within the immigrant electorate.

On the other hand, while the relationship between ideology and immigrants’ recruitment in election time seems straightforward, this assumption has been also challenged. The main argument here revolves around the party identification of immigrant voters, and its effects on the strategies followed by individual parties. As Bird (2003) puts it, durable party identification of minority groups can affect political recruitment and parties’ strategies on descriptive recruitment. As I have shown in Chapter 3, immigrant voters tend to support left and center left parties. Therefore based on this evidence if a left party counts already with the support from immigrant voters, the perceived gains of promoting the candidacy of immigrant-origin candidates are little. In contrast, parties that are weaker in the support they have from these voters (such as right wing parties) might adopt recruitment strategies aimed at attracting the immigrant voting (Bird 2003:19).
Summarizing, “by promoting minorities for office, parties may “advertise” to potential voters their support for minority issues” (Kittilson and Tate 2004:10).

Based on this evidence the relationship between party ideology and immigrant candidates’ recruitment calls for further examination. Consequently, in this Chapter I examine whether the so-claimed relationship between ideology and immigrants’ descriptive representation is still valid:

Hypothesis 7: Party Ideology

Left wing parties tend to recruit more immigrant candidates for safe seats than right wing parties58.

5.1.3 Immigrant Constituencies

Next to the role that the political context and institutions play (as shown above) some key characteristics of immigrant groups are decisive for immigrants’ descriptive representation. First, the geographic distribution of immigrants across the constituencies influences the representation of immigrants in parliament. Geographic concentration within the borders of a constituency makes the immigrant community more visible (Bird 2003). And therefore it can influence the strategies followed by parties to mobilize these immigrant voters as a bloc (Bird 2005). US-based empirical evidence shows that immigrants’ concentration in some specific electoral districts develops new political scenarios in which parties and candidates must address the immigrant voters in order to win (DeSipio and de la Garza 2005:398).

58 With the available data I have been able to examine only the candidates of immigrant origin that have been elected. A future study should include as well all the nominated candidates as to observe how immigrant candidates are distributed across safe, contested and lost seats.
Second, in terms of immigrant voters’ mobilization, geographic concentration can increase immigrants’ political participation, especially when immigrant candidates run for office. Empirical evidence has shown that immigrant voters register lower electoral turnout in comparison with native voters (see Chapter 3). Generally speaking socio-economic disparities translate into disparities in political resources and participation (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, Bartels 2009). As a result, poor citizens participate less in politics than wealthy citizens do (Bartels 2009), and as immigrants are in their majority workers (see Chapter 2) they also tend to participate less in elections. In addition, immigrant voters have reduced language skills and political knowledge, and usually have been excluded from political participation for some time before they naturalized generating some apathy among them, which also explains their lower turnout. Nevertheless, the effects of socio-economic status and group-specific characteristics on turnout seem to decrease when immigrant candidates run for office. Empirical evidence demonstrates that in the US urban Latino voters registering high levels of unemployment and living in constituencies with large shares of immigrant show high level of electoral participation (De la Garza and DeSipio 2005).

The evidence exposed above suggests that immigrants’ geographic concentration within the borders of electoral districts favors immigrants’ descriptive representation (Kostadinova 2007, Bird 2003, Togeby 2008). In constituencies where immigrant voters are visible, parties may be more likely to nominate candidates of immigrant origin. When immigrant candidates are nominated immigrant voters are more likely to turn out to vote and support the candidate (Barreto et al. 2004). From this perspective, who the leader is can be relevant for voters’ choice because candidates’ personal characteristics can provide necessary information on how they would behave with respect to unforeseen problems (Aarts et al. 2011:3). Also voters can make the assumption that immigrant representatives have a better understanding of the main concerns in these
constituencies (Mansbridge 1999), especially regarding immigration and integration.

All in all the arguments expressed above point to the assumption that group representation improves when groups are both, large and concentrated. Based on this the next hypothesis that will be examined in this Chapter is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 8: Geographic Concentration
Large shares of immigrants in a constituency are related to immigrants’ descriptive representation in national parliaments.

To finalize, I have presented the three working hypothesis that give the structure of the study presented in this Chapter. Below I will summarize the main steps that have been made in the design of the study, and explain how I measure descriptive representation.

5.2 Research Design and Measurement

5.2.1 Case Selection

The objective of this chapter is to contribute to our understanding of immigrants’ descriptive representation in European democracies. As explained earlier, given that the analysis of political representation required great efforts in terms of data collection and coding only three cases are being examined with great depth here. Precisely, this study focuses on three cases: France (2007-2012), Germany (2005-2009), and the United Kingdom (2005-2010). The comparative method is used here to be able to establish more general empirical implications of the findings (Mill 1843, Lijphart 1971). The small N strategy adopted here has been designed
to provide with a deep understanding of the factors that influence immigrants’ descriptive representation.

The selection of the three cases examined here has been inspired some baseline characteristics that these countries share in common (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The three countries rank among the most developed countries in Europe and in the world. These favorable economic conditions influence international migration cycles. As a result, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are in the continent among the countries counting more immigrants among their national populations. Even when peaks of mass immigration have been observed in other countries (like Ireland) the arrival and settlement of immigrants in these three countries have been relatively stable in the last decades resulting in the fact that these three count among the countries with the largest first and second generation immigrant populations.

Second, I focus on countries having similar political traits. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have had stable democracies in the last half a century. This guarantees certain stability in their party systems and election cycles. Democratic stability is related to the resolution of classic social cleavages in the sense of Stein and Rokkan (1967) giving room to the emergence of new issues such as immigration and the environment (Kreisi et al. 2008). Besides, early membership to the European Union makes these countries important agenda-setters in the region, and therefore they play an important role setting the agenda on immigration. Finally, the three cases have implemented some sort of single-member constituency system. France has a two-round system, Germany combines it with proportional representation, and the United Kingdom uses the first-past-the-post system. Single-member constituency systems are relevant because they incentive parties to nominate immigrant candidates in immigrants with large shares of immigrants.
5.2.2 Data

For this study, I have created an original dataset including demographic and biographical data about the members of national parliaments. Data on the background of national deputies has been gathered by the project Migrants as Political Actors\(^{59}\), and extracted from parliamentary and personal websites. Education, gender, and political career data has been gathered using MPs’ official and personal websites, as well as other secondary online sources. Furthermore, immigrant population data was gathered from the websites of the national statistics organizations of the respective countries. Finally, for measuring parties’ ideology I use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 (CHES) (Hooghe et al. 2010).

Examining the composition of national assemblies raises questions about social categories, in particular when these are related to peoples’ race and ethnicity. As Fearon (2003) states it, the notion of ethnic group is complex as it is drawing the lines of an ethnic group. Yet, generally speaking, ethnic groups have the following characteristics: (1) membership in the group is reckoned by descendant, by both, members and non-members, (2) members are conscious of group membership, (3) members share some common cultural features such as language, religion and customs, (4) the group has a homeland, (5) the group has a shared history as a group and (6) it stands on its own as a group (Fearon 2003: 201).

In this chapter I follow one of the most used strategies in social research dealing with immigration. I categorize elected representatives by their birthplace or by the birthplace of their parents. One of the main advantages of this approach is that this strategy allows doing cross-country and longitudinal analyses (see Bloemraad 2013). Following this strategy, I have identified first and second-generation

\(^{59}\) Coordinated by Andreas Wüst: http://www.migrantactors.net/
immigrants elected members of parliament based on their place of birth and nationality at birth\(^60\).

As Table 14 shows, the number of immigrant deputies is very small in the three countries. In France, out of 577 national deputies only 18 have been of immigrant origin in the 2007 Legislature. Of the three countries here examined, Germany has the smaller number of representatives with migratory background. In the 2005 general election only 12 of the 614 deputies elected were of a different ethnicity than German. Finally, the United Kingdom registers the higher number of immigrant deputies of the three countries. 21 of the 646 elected deputies in the British general election were of first and second-generation migrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Deputies</th>
<th>Immigrant Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it can be seen, the number of immigrant representatives remains relatively low across democracies. In the next sections of this Chapter I will discuss some aspects related to the measurement of descriptive representation, and then examine what factors affect immigrants’ representation.

\(^60\) I have made use of all accessible methods to identify immigrant members of national parliaments. Yet, given the nature of the data that is required in this inquires it is possible that some immigrant representatives remain unidentified.
5.2.3 Dependent Variable

Traditionally, research on descriptive representation has focused on counting the numbers of members of representatives that have specific characteristics (homosexuals, women, ethnic minorities, et cetera). Many recent studies however have highlighted the limits of this strategy (see for example Forrest 2012, Bloemraad 2013). In reality it takes more than absolute numbers to understand descriptive representation. They should be linked back to their context, that means to the electoral constituencies and the composition of the electorate of a given group (idem).

Therefore, in the aim of expanding the study of immigrants’ descriptive representation in this Chapter, I use the Representation Index developed by Bloemraad (2013)\textsuperscript{61}. I measure immigrants’ representation in national assemblies relative to their group size in society. Representation is measured as follows:

\begin{equation}
\text{Representation} = \frac{\frac{\text{ImmMps}}{\text{Mps}}}{\frac{\text{Imm}}{\text{Pop}}}
\end{equation}

where representation is equal to the share of immigrant MPs in national parliaments that result from the division of the number of immigrant MPs (ImmMps) by the total number of MPs (Mps) divided by the share of immigrants in the population, which is represented by the number of immigrants (Imm) divided by the population (Pop). Measurements close to 1 indicate that

\textsuperscript{61} Forest (2012) following a similar approach developed a similar measurement (Proportionality Index)
immigrants are well represented in national assemblies while measurements approaching 0 indicate that they are underrepresented.

The comparative study of immigrants’ descriptive representation raises theoretical and empirical questions of what the subjects of the analysis are dealt with. Furthermore, immigration research is often confronted with limitations on data availability. In this study a person is defined to be an immigrant if she was born abroad. In this study also the second-generation migrants, who are those individuals that had at least one parent born abroad, are included. The rationale behind is that individuals with a migratory background have experienced the administrative, linguistic, economic, social and cultural challenges of migration.

5.2.4 Independent Variables

In order to explain immigrants’ descriptive representation in national parliaments in this Chapter, I examine how this is affected by three main variables: (1) electoral systems, (2) political parties’ ideologies, and (3) constituency composition.

First, the variable electoral systems’ characteristics distinguish electoral systems between majoritarian and proportional systems. In order to examine the effects of electoral systems on immigrants’ representation I include in the analysis three more countries: Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway for which data on immigrants’ descriptive representation was available at the aggregate level62.

In a second step, the variable parties’ ideology captures the position of parties in the Left-Right scale. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 asks experts to place parties’ overall ideology on a 0-10 scale where 0= extreme left, and 10 = extreme right (Hooghe et al. 2010).

62 Bloemraad 2013
Finally, the third main independent variable is constituency composition, which captures the demographic composition of a given electoral constituency in terms of the percentages of immigrants that live there. This data has been gathered from the websites of each country’s national statistics institutions.

5.2.5 Methods

The analysis here presented is conducted in three steps. In a first step I use descriptive statistics to examine immigrants’ descriptive representation. I study how electoral system characteristics, parties’ ideology, and constituency composition affect immigrants’ representation. In a second step I run a logistic regression to determine the relationship between the predictors party ideology and constituency composition, and the dichotomous variable immigrant deputy elected (1=yes / 0=no). This method allows testing how these two variables explain immigrants’ representation in the different countries. The logistic model for these predictors is:

\[
\text{Logit \[P(y=1)\] = } \alpha + \beta_1 \ast \text{ideology} + \beta_2 \ast \text{constituency}
\]

Where \(\beta_1\) represents the effects of parties’ ideology and \(\beta_2\) represents the effects of the share of immigrants in the constituencies.

Finally, in a third step qualitative analyses are used to shed light on the characteristics and political trajectory of immigrant deputies.

\[\text{---}\]

\[63\] France: INSEE, Germany: Destatis, United Kingdom: ONS. As a consequence of data limitations overseas French territories, Scotland and Northern Ireland have been excluded from the analysis.
Altogether, in this empirical chapter I make use of a variety of data sources, measurements, and methods to thoroughly examine immigrants’ descriptive representation.

5.3 Results

5.3.1 Electoral Systems

Based on previous empirical research I have hypothesized that the characteristics of electoral systems play a crucial role in immigrants’ representation. Above all, proportional systems are argued to favor the representation of minority groups while majority systems are expected to penalize it. In order to examine the validity of this proposition in the context of multicultural democracies I further examine this relationship in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. With the purpose of observing how these assumptions travel across contexts, I have included 3 other cases (Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway) that help us understand their validity.

Table 15 summarizes the main statistics and values for the mains variables related to immigrants’ representation in national legislatures. The first aspect we observe is that overall the share of immigrant deputies is very low in all national legislatures (second column). In Norway, only 0.6 percent of the elected legislators in 2009 are of immigrant origin. Germany follows, with 1.9 percent of the national deputies not being of German origin in the 2005 legislature, and in Denmark 2.2 percent of legislators are non-Danish in the 2007 parliament. In France in 2007 and in the United Kingdom in 2005, have 3.1 and 3.7 percent of their legislatures of immigrant origin. Finally in the Netherlands in 2006, immigrants represent 11.3 of the national parliament. All in all, immigrants’
representation remains very low across countries, yet in the Netherlands immigrants are better represented than in other European democracies.

The Representation Index developed by Bloemraad (2013) (fourth column) sheds a brighter light of immigrants’ representation in Europe. By taking the immigrant population into account - that is the percentage of the population they represent in these democracies (second column) - we observe that in relative terms, immigrants are better represented than we would have thought by only looking at the raw percentages of immigrants that seat in national parliaments. The Representation Index shows that only in Germany and in Norway immigrants are extremely under-represented. In Germany, where immigrants represent 12.9 percent of the population, only 1.9 percent of the national parliament having a very low Representation Index score of only 0.07. In Norway, a similar phenomenon is observed. Immigrants who represent 5.6 percent of the population are represented by only 0.6 percent in the parliament. Therefore in Norway, immigrants’ index is of 0.11.
Table 15. Summary Statistics of Descriptive Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Immigrants in Office (%)</th>
<th>Immigrant in Population (%)</th>
<th>Immigrants' Representation Index</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Women's Representation Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France 2007</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 2005</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom 2005</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark 2007</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands 2006</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 2009</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Multiple\(^{64}\)

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\(^{64}\) Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway (Bloemraad 2013). In Denmark, Netherlands and Norway the immigrants in office are those considered as non-Westerns based on the data that is available. Women’s Representation: World Bank. Electoral Systems: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.
Besides, the Representation Index proves that immigrants have a greater representation in Norway (0.35), France (0.25), and United Kingdom (0.26) compared to the first measurement here presented, which only considered the percentage of immigrants in national legislatures, without considering how these scored in relation to the immigrant populations in these countries. Therefore, following the evidence provided by the Representation Index we observe that in Norway immigrants’ descriptive representation corresponds to one third of the immigrant population, while in France and the United Kingdom it corresponds to one fourth of it. This means that in these three democracies, immigrants are under-represented in national parliaments but have made great inroads in national politics.

Finally, the Netherlands reaches a very high score in the representation index (1.08) demonstrating that in this country immigrants are very well represented in the national parliament. In the first part of this Chapter I have hypothesized that there is a relationship between immigrants’ representation and the characteristics of electoral systems. To be exact empirical evidence suggests that proportional systems help immigrants’ representation, while majoritarian systems hamper it. Immigrants’ outstanding representation scores in the Netherlands can be explained to a great extent by the characteristics of its electoral system. The Dutch territory is treated as a single constituency and as a result, the Netherlands has one of the most proportional systems in the world (Leenknegt and Van Der Schyff, 2007). Therefore the “perfect” representation that immigrants have in the Netherlands results from a system that facilitates the candidacy and election of immigrant representatives.

In Denmark, the electoral system is also proportional but of a different nature. Electors can cast either a “personal” vote for one candidate or vote for one of the party lists in a system with ten-multi member constituencies. The combination of
the proportional representation system with preferential vote has created the possibility for the collective mobilization of immigrant minority groups, facilitating immigrants’ representation (Togeby 2008). In this way, proportional representation enhances immigrants’ representation.

The cases of the Netherlands and Denmark support the assumption that proportional systems facilitate the representation of immigrants. Yet, the empirical evidence for Germany and Norway show some dissonance. Indeed, in Germany and Norway, which also have proportional systems, immigrants are less represented than they are in France and the United Kingdom, which have majoritarian systems.

The evidence on the relationship between immigrants’ representation and the characteristics of electoral systems is unclear. However, as Table 15 (column 6) shows the theorized relationship between electoral system characteristics and under-represented groups works for women (as argued for example by Mateo Díaz 2005). Women are better represented in countries that have proportional systems (Denmark 0.76, Norway 0.72, Germany 0.63 and the Netherlands 0.63) and less represented in countries with majority systems (United Kingdom 0.39 and France 0.36). The fact that proportional systems favors women’s representation, but not necessarily immigrants’ suggests that in the context of multicultural democracies other factors shape immigrants’ political representation. For example, Elgie (2005) who investigated representation in France shows that majority systems are quite consequential for the representation of under-represented groups because they encourage political parties to select candidates that are “white, middle-class [and] male” (Elgie 2005:131). On the other side however, the same systems can encourage a “contagion effect” by which if one party selects a minority candidate in a given constituency, other parties can feel pressure to name minority candidates as well (Bird 2003:13).
To conclude, the relationship between electoral systems and immigrants’ political representation is mediated by other factors. Bird et al. (2011) have suggested that there is a political opportunity structure, which result from the openness of the party system and political parties, and the capacity of collective mobilization of a minority group (p.13). Correspondingly, in the next sections we explore what role these factors play.

5.3.2 Political Parties

Traditionally, left parties have been the defenders of excluded groups ethnic and minorities (Tate and Kittilson 2004), while right wing parties have to a great extent opposed immigration (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012). Existent evidence suggests that political ideology affects the openness of political parties to nominate candidates of immigrant origin for safe seats. In this way, ideology appears as a dividing line the representation of immigrants in national parliaments.

Table 16 shows the number of immigrant deputies in national legislatures in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and their distribution by party family. Overall the United Kingdom has the largest number of immigrant representatives (N=21), followed by France (N=18), and then Germany (N= 12). Broken down by party family, we observe that parties belonging to the Socialist family are the ones that have a greater number of elected representatives of immigrant origin across countries. In France, ten deputies of immigrant origin are from the Socialist party, in Germany four belong to the Social Democrat Party, and in the United Kingdom 16 members of parliament have been candidates representing the Labour party.
Other parties in the left play also a role in the representation of immigrant minorities. In France, the communist party has one elected deputy of immigrant origin. As well, in Germany three deputies are from the Left party, and 4 from the Green party. Finally, in the United Kingdom, the centrist Liberal party has one deputy of immigrant origin elected.

Finally, right wing parties have made some advancement towards increasing immigrants’ representation. In France, seven legislators of immigrant-origin are members of the UMP. In the United Kingdom four conservative deputies have a migratory background. And, in Germany, one immigrant deputy is a member of the Christian Democratic party.

Table 16. Immigrant Deputies by Party Family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Family</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Parties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Parties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concluding, the above presented evidence support the claims that there is a dividing line between left and right wing parties in immigrants’ representation. Of the three parliaments here analyzed, most of the immigrant deputies have been elected as candidates of left parties, a smaller proportion represents right wing parties, and only one deputy in the United Kingdom is from the center.
On the whole, the family of the socialists is the one that appears more open to recruit immigrant candidates. This is partially due to the fact that the Socialist Party in France, the Social Democrats in Germany, and the Labor in the United Kingdom are between the two major parties in the respective democracies. Furthermore, smaller left parties are also of crucial importance for immigrants’ representation in particular in Germany where seven out of the twelve immigrant deputies are members of smaller left parties, four of the Green party and 3 of the Left. Finally, right wing parties show different levels of openness vis-à-vis the immigrant community across countries. In France the UMP counts only 3 immigrant deputies less than the Socialist party (7 and 10 respectively). In the United Kingdom the Conservative Party has only one fourth the number of immigrant deputies the Labour party has (4 and 16 respectively). In Germany, the Christian Democrats have only one deputy of immigrant origin. Therefore it is in Germany where the extreme Left-Right division exists in terms of immigrants’ descriptive representation.

All in all, the analysis here presented reveals that left parties are more inclusive than right-wing parties vis-à-vis the immigrant community. Center-left parties play the dominant role in immigrants’ representation, while smaller Left parties show also to inclusive. At last, variations are observed across the parties located in the center and right of the political spectrum.

Following these results the next question is whether there is any relationship between immigrants’ descriptive representation and immigrant constituencies.

### 5.3.3 Immigrant Constituencies

Immigrants tend to concentrate in specific geographical areas. This results from the housing segregation that ethnic minorities experience, which leads to the formation of urban areas where ethnic minorities become the majority of the
population. This process is reinforced by the existence of ethnic networks because migrants help new migrants from the same group to settle. At last, occupational segregation is also a major factor contributing to immigrants’ geographic concentration. In some industries immigrant workforce dominates and as a result important immigrant settlements are observed in the proximities of these industries.

These demographic dynamics are very relevant in multicultural democracies. The degree of geographic concentration of the immigrant populations is related to the concentration of immigrant voters in specific electoral constituencies. When immigrants are concentrated, they become more visible and therefore more likely to be considered by key political actors in their electoral calculations, including the nomination of immigrant candidates. Also, empirical evidence suggests that immigrant voters prefer candidates of immigrant origin (see Chapter 1). Therefore, the demand for immigrant candidates increases in immigrant constituencies. The question that emerges then in the context of multicultural democracies is if immigrants’ demographic distribution is related to their political representation.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have relatively similar shares of the population with an immigrant background (11.6, 12.9 and 11.3 percent respectively). As pointed out before the immigrant populations are not evenly distributed across the countries but tend to concentrate in specific areas. Figure 22 shows the frequency distribution for the share of immigrants across the electoral democracies per country. The x-axis presents the percentage of immigrants, and the y-axis the absolute number of constituencies.
As one can see, the three histograms are not symmetric and are skewed to the right. In France for the 555 constituencies analyzed 65 there is a mean share of immigrants of 5.4 percent, with a standard deviation of 4.5 percent, and a range of 27.5. This means that in the hexagon, many constituencies have very small immigrant populations. Some have medium size immigrant communities, and a smaller number has a high concentration of immigrants. France, similarly to the United Kingdom, has many constituencies in which the share of immigrants is very low. However, similarly to Germany, most of the constituencies have between 5 and 15 percent of immigrants, and only few have more than 15 percent of immigrants.

In Germany across the 299 legislative constituencies, the average of immigrants is of 5.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.4 and a range of 26.6. Immigrants in Germany are more evenly distributed across a number of electoral constituencies, and their concentration in specific geographic areas is moderate. Constituencies with between 5 and 10 percent immigrant population are quite frequent. Also there are a relatively large number of constituencies with small immigrant populations. And in Germany constituencies with large immigrant population are quite unusual.

Lastly, in the United Kingdom, the district-level demographic data was available for 563 constituencies 66. The data shows that on average the immigrant population represents 8.3 percent of the population in the electoral districts, with a standard deviation of 11.9 percent and a range of 65.79 percent. The varying degrees of concentration of immigrants across the constituencies indicate that while in some constituencies there is almost exclusively white voters, in some other constituencies' immigrants represent big shares of the population, and in a smaller

65 Data was not available for overseas departments and territories.
66 Scottish constituencies are excluded from the graph.
number of constituencies immigrants constitute the majority of the residents. The United Kingdom has both a large number of constituencies, which are highly British and a large number with big immigrant communities (10 percent or more). Also, unlike Germany and France, it has constituencies where a vast majority of the population (50 percent or more) is of immigrant origin.

The ethnic and cultural composition of the electoral constituencies in the three countries results from the combination of the demographic dynamics of immigration which is characterized by immigrant groups that tend to live in specific cities and areas (see Chapter 2) and the main features of countries’ electoral systems. In France the law establishes that every of the 96 departments has to have a minimum of two constituencies. Yet the number of constituencies per departments varies according to its population, and the size of the electorate in every constituency should not vary more than 20 percent in relation to the average size of the population in all constituencies in the department (Elgie 2005:121). As a result, France has numerous constituencies covering middle-size territories. This leads to the formation of constituencies where immigrants represent a significant part of the population.

The case of Germany is very different in this regard due to its mixed-member system of proportional representation. The Federal Electoral Act establishes the existence of 229 constituencies. Overall the population of the constituency should not deviate more than 15 percent from the population of all constituencies. This formula aimed at respecting the proportionality vis-à-vis the overall population of the country results in a very uneven number of constituencies per region yet with a more proportional distribution of the population, including the immigrant groups.
Figure 22. Immigrants’ Distribution across Electoral Constituencies

Source: INSEE, Statistisches Bundesamt, Office of National Statistics (data of year closer to election)
In the United Kingdom there is a larger number of electoral districts in comparison to France and Germany, in the 2005 general election it counted 646 constituencies. The British legislation states that four independent Boundary Commissions operating in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland define the constituency boundaries. Each constituency must be within the 5 percent electoral quota of the country, and should not exceed a certain geographic area. Resulting from these features of the British electoral system there is a larger number of constituencies, which are geographically more concentrated. Increasing the likelihood of forming immigrant minority majority districts.

The question of whether there is a relationship between the ethnic compositions of the constituencies and immigrants substantive representation is explored below. Table 17 presents the list of elected immigrant deputies and the share of immigrants in their constituencies (quartiles). The evidence sheds light on the fact that the size of the immigrant electorate is related to the number of immigrant deputies elected, in particular in constituencies with the biggest immigrant communities. To be more precise, in France two immigrant deputies have been elected in constituencies belonging to the first quartile, that is the smallest shares of immigrants among their populations, five in the second quartile, four in the third quartile and seven in the upper quartile. In Germany the number of immigrant deputies is very low, as most of them have been elected in party lists. However of the four immigrant MPs in the Bundestag, one was elected in a constituency with mid-low immigrant shares, one in a constituency with middle-high immigrant populations and two in constituencies with high shares of immigrants. Finally in the United Kingdom equal numbers of immigrant deputies have been elected in constituencies with small, medium and medium-large immigrant populations (three in each quartile) and a large number (12) of these MPs have been nominated and elected in constituencies with very large immigrant electorates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Mid-Low</th>
<th>Mid-High</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karamanli</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bapt</td>
<td>Diefenbacher</td>
<td>Asensi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kucheida</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ferry</td>
<td>Fenech</td>
<td>Baert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idiart</td>
<td></td>
<td>Luca</td>
<td>Devedjian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbert</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pinte</td>
<td>Jung</td>
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<td>Touraine</td>
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<td>Marland-Mitiello</td>
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<td>Valls</td>
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<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
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<td>Edathy</td>
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<td>Schulz</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kumar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>Afriyie</td>
<td>Abbott</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.Miliband</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kawczynski</td>
<td>Dhanda</td>
<td>Butler</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opik</td>
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<td>Vara</td>
<td>D. Miliband</td>
<td>Hendrick</td>
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<td>Khan</td>
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<td>Mahmood</td>
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<td>Malik</td>
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<td>Singh</td>
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<td>Stuart</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The above-presented evidence suggests that there is a relationship between the nomination and subsequent election of immigrant candidates and the ethnic composition of the electoral constituencies. Although we can’t draw conclusions on the underlying mechanisms of this phenomena, we can conclude that parties may be more inclined to nominate immigrant deputies in constituencies where they may gain the support of the immigrant voters (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).

5.3.4 Parties or Immigrant Constituencies?

The statistics presented earlier show that party ideology and immigrant constituencies play an important role in shaping immigrants’ descriptive representation. However, we don’t know which factor is the most influential one. Therefore in Table 18 I show the results of a logistic regression which estimates the likelihood that an immigrant deputy gets elected given the ideology of her party and the share of immigrant that live in her constituency. Party ideology in this case is measured using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey which gives the position of parties in a Left-Right scale where 0=left and 10= right. As before, composition represents the share of immigrants living in a given constituency. The dichotomous response variable represents the background of the elected deputy (1=immigrant-origin, 0= native).

The results presented suggest a positive relationship between parties’ left ideology and the odds of an immigrant MP of getting elected across the three national parliaments here studied. However it is only in France that the relationship is significant (coeff. 0.86, p < .01). Regarding the relationship between constituency composition and representation in the three parliaments the coefficients are positive which suggest that the size of the immigrant community affects immigrants’ descriptive representation. The relationship between the variable composition and representation nonetheless is only significant for the British parliament (coeff. 0.05, p < .001).
Table 18. Logistic Regressions with Deputies’ Background as Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.052</td>
<td>.464</td>
<td>76.178</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>.866</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>3.087</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>2.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Immigrants</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.708</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>1.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.527</td>
<td>1.256</td>
<td>19.366</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1.043</td>
<td>1.169</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.372</td>
<td>2.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Immigrants</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.566</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>1.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.135</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>63.688</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.615</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.776</td>
<td>1.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Immigrants</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>19.538</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To summarize, there is a relationship between parties’ ideologies on the one hand, and constituency composition on the other, and immigrants’ representation in the three countries here analyzed, yet their effect varies across contexts. In France, parties appear as the main factor shaping immigrants’ representation in national parliaments. To be more precise, left parties play a crucial role in recruiting immigrant candidates for safe seats. In contrast in the United Kingdom, immigrants’ representation appears to be more dependent on immigrant voters being concentrated and visible in specific constituencies. Thus, in contexts where immigrants are highly concentrated parties are more likely to nominate deputies of immigrant origin. From this we can conclude that party ideology and immigrant constituencies play different roles in the contexts of multicultural democracies. Yet, given the small N on which these analyses draw we can’t at the moment derive the implications of these findings.
5.4 Who are the Immigrant Deputies?

A crucial question that underlies this chapter is whether and to what extent immigrant deputies resemble the immigrant electorate. In this section I further examine who the immigrant deputies are to understand the linkage between immigrant representatives and immigrant voters. The analysis is structured around three aspects: (1) socio-demographic characteristics, (2) political trajectory, and (3) their relationship to immigrant communities and networks. These are examined by looking at the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrant deputies, and how they are related to the immigrant communities.

5.4.1 Region of Origin

In the context of European democracies a first distinction that has to be made in terms of the country of origin of immigrants is between European and Non-European migrants. The introduction of the European citizenship granted some political rights (voting and candidacy rights for local and European parliament elections) for European migrants. Besides, the political rights granted to third-country migrants depend on national laws, thus cross-country differences are observed. While France and Germany do not grant political rights to third-country migrants, the United Kingdom grant full political rights to Commonwealth migrants.

Table 19 presents the total number of immigrant deputies per region of origin. In France 15 of the elected immigrant members of parliament are of European origin, and only three of non-European background. In Germany like in the United Kingdom the majority of the immigrant deputies are non-European. In the Bundestag the majority of immigrant deputies are from a third country (n=12), while European deputies are only two. And in the United Kingdom third-country deputies are 14 while European deputies are only 7.
Table 19. Region of Origin of Immigrant Deputies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Third Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own Source

The findings presented shed light on several phenomena. First, in France where the shares of non-European migrants in the population are very high, yet non-European migrants are under-represented in comparison to European migrants. In Germany, the logic reverses. Non-European migrants are better represented than European migrants. In France the majority of immigrant deputies are originally from within the EU. To be precise European migrants are from Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, Rumania, and Spain. Non-EU representatives count a representative from Armenia, one from Chile, and only one from Maghreb, born in Tunisia. This data is quite revealing as it shows the extent to which immigrant groups that are quite large in the French population such as Magrebiens, South-east Asians, and Turks remain underrepresented in French politics.

In contrast, a majority of third-country immigrant deputies and only few deputies of European origin are in the Bundestag. Similarly to the immigrant groups that live in Germany, third-country immigrant deputies are from Iran, India, and Turkey. Immigrant deputies from Europe in the Bundestag count a representative from Croatia, one from Poland, and one from Spain. Interestingly, the Italian and Greek communities as well as Southeast Asian migrants who have significantly big communities in Germany are not represented in the Bundestag.

Like in Germany, in the United Kingdom the number of third-country immigrant deputies overpasses the number of European immigrant deputies. Among the
representatives that are originally from EU countries the House counts deputies from Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, and Estonia. Third-country representatives are from Somalia and from the Nations of the Commonwealth, including Ghana, India, Jamaica, Pakistan, Rwanda, and South Africa. In the United Kingdom we observe the presence of deputies from countries from the Eastern Block. Also, it is quite clear that the fact that some third-country migrants in the UK enjoy full political rights helps them their political inclusion.

The evidence here presented for the three cases examined, suggests that country-specific factors play a great role in defining the demographics of national parliaments. The alarming under-representation of Maghreb immigrants in France can be explained by its colonial past. Evidence shows that Algerian migrants to France indicate some hesitation in their identification with France (Thibalat 1996). Furthermore the French ideals of assimilation and secularism make it particularly difficult for Muslims to achieve equality (Alba 2005: 32). And, the French electoral system also closes the doors to visible minorities because the two-round majority system tends to favor the nomination and election of white, male, and middle-class candidates (Elgie 2005).

In Germany, the electoral system includes proportional representation, characterized precisely by what is known as personalized proportional representation. Thus, Germany’s mixed electoral system facilitates a “personal vote at the grass roots” (Klingemann and Wessels 2001). The number of immigrant candidates is in the rise in Germany, and first and second-generation Turks constitute a great majority of the immigrant candidates. And, most importantly, immigrants’ representation is driven in Germany by the two small left Parties, the Greens and Die Linke, and to a lesser extent by the SPD. Yet increasing immigrant nomination has been also observed for the FDP. In this context, an important finding is that higher numbers of immigrant candidates are
nominated in party lists than in single-member electoral constituencies. Therefore from this it can be concluded that for smaller parties the mobilization of immigrant voters in immigrant constituencies is “becoming and feasible electoral strategy” (Claro da Fonseca 2011:122).

Lastly, in the United Kingdom, matters related to race are very much present in the political arena than in other democracies. De facto, there is evidence that the Labour and Conservative parties committed to increasing ethnic minority representation, which has drastically augmented the number of minority candidates and elected parliamentarians (Sobolewska 2013). These new political opportunity structures at the party level are fostering immigrants’ representation.

Finally, in despite of all the country-level explanations for immigrants’ representation presented above, one commonality catches our attention: the absence of Southeast Asian immigrants in political leadership. The systematic lack of participation of members of this group in national politics (low turnout, under-representation) suggests that there are group-related factors explaining their self-isolation. Sociological explanations point at their level of self-sufficiency. Families are for many of these cultures, the basic societal unit and the most important economic support (Chan et al. 2007). These societal values of independence contribute to their isolation. Furthermore, there is evidence that among some of these cultures and in particular the Chinese community there is a generalized distrust vis-à-vis the authority (Adamson et al. 2009). And, as it has been proved, political distrust accounts for low political participation (Shaffer 1981).

5.4.2 Age, Gender, Education

Political rulers conform what is called the governing elites of a society (Nadel 1956). Their preeminence draws from the fact that these elites gather the legislative and coercive authority over the most general affairs of the community.
These governing elites have some characteristics in common regarding their education and social status.

Table 20 shows the summary statistics related to the characteristics of national deputies. France is the oldest legislature with an average age of 54.8. United Kingdom follows, where deputies have an average age of 51 years old. Finally, the German bundestag is the youngest of the three having an average age of 49.2. Compared to the overall legislatures, immigrant deputies are 3 years older in France (57 years old), 7 years younger in Germany (42 years old) and 3 years younger in the United Kingdom (48 years old). The native-immigrant difference age of national deputies indicate that in France experienced immigrant deputies are preferred, whereas in the United Kingdom, and more especially in Germany, younger immigrant political leaders find their path into politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Imm.</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree (%)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, in terms of the gender composition of the national legislatures two main phenomena are observed. First I have pointed out earlier in this Chapter, women are better represented in Germany (proportional system) than in France and the United Kingdom. 31.6 percent of the members of the Bundestag are

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women, 19.5 percent in the House of Commons, and 18.2 percent in the National Assembly. Female immigrant deputies represent 41 percent of the total of immigrant deputies in Germany, 27.7 percent in France and 12 percent in the United Kingdom. All in all, immigrant women find better representation in Germany and in France than they do in the United Kingdom. The evidence indicates that the “double penalty” of sex and ethnicity (Constant et al. 2006) is more present in the United Kingdom than it is in the other two European democracies.

Finally, to understand immigrants’ representation and the barriers they encounter I examine deputies’ level of education. On average, immigrants living in Europe have very limited education (OECD 201368), yet a high level of education appears as a distinctive trait among immigrant deputies. On average the Bundestag and the National Assembly have similar education levels. 83.3 percent of the German deputies and 80 percent of the French deputies has a university degree. In the United Kingdom University degree among parliamentarians is less frequent and only 72 percent of the elected members of parliament have graduated from university. Yet interestingly in the three legislatures immigrant deputies have more formal education than the legislatures’ average (France 82.3 percent, Germany 84.3 percent and United Kingdom 96 percent). These differences are very marked in the context of the United Kingdom, where all but one immigrant MP has a university degree, contrasting to a great extent with the average education of white members of parliament.

In summary, the examination of the age, gender and education of national legislatures shows that political elites tend to be as under-representative of the ethnic structure as they are of the class structure of a given country. Furthermore, the comparison of immigrant deputies and native deputies reveals that immigrants

suffer from “cumulative disadvantage”, which makes their inroads to politics more complicated. All in all, initial comparative disadvantages in terms of education, class, and available resources are self-reinforcing (Merton 1988:606) therefore immigrants need to excel in terms of education, experience, and leadership in order to gain access to politics.

5.4.3 Ties to Immigrant Groups

Putnam, Feldstein and Cohen (2003) demonstrated the importance of civic culture for the working of democracy. Engagement in networks contributes at making bonds of trust and understanding, and building community. On other terms, they contribute to the creation of social capital, which develop “networks of relationships that weave individuals into groups and communities” (Putnam, Feldstein and Cohen 2003:1). In this way, vertical and horizontal relations enhance the development of trust, which is indispensable for pursuing collective goals. Furthermore, as Putnam puts it, social networks play a key role in political learning (2000:343).

The role that civic networks play in the political participation and trust on institutions of immigrant groups has been thoroughly examined, and the studies conclude that networks are a very relevant explanation of immigrants’ political engagement in their host countries. Fennema and Tillie (1999) examine the political participation and political trust of four different ethnic groups residing in Amsterdam: Turks, Moroccans, Surnamese, and Antilleans. The authors show that there is a correlation between the degree of civic community of the ethnic groups studied, and the level of political participation and trust in local political institutions. Basically those migrants that were engaged in ethnic networks participated more in politics and developed greater trust on the political institutions of their country of residency. Similarly, Gidengil and Stolle (2009) studied the extent to which immigrant women’s social networks affect their
propensity to vote and to participate in unconventional political activities, as well as their knowledge of politics and government services and programs in Canada. Their findings show that bonding ties (ties with people with similar social background) have a positive effect on political incorporation, and that the resources that are embedded in their social networks, are crucial for immigrant women. Togeby (2004) finds some evidence of the effects that participation on ethnic minority associations increased political participation among immigrant minorities in Denmark.

These evidence shows that the social interactions that occur within networks can also involve active attempts to influence people’s political views, to mobilize them to engage in political activities, and building a collective identity. So ethnic social networks emerge as powerful tools to foster immigrants’ political participation and representation. From this perspective, it is crucial to understand what types of relationships do immigrant deputies have to the immigrant communities and networks. As mentioned above understanding these linkages are useful because political trust of immigrants on immigrant leaders increases when there is some type of proximity (Fennema and Tillie 2001:35) and parties recruit legislative candidates from ethnic networks (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).

A small number of immigrant deputies have an official and public relationship to immigrant networks. In France, only two deputies are related to immigrant networks. The deputy Patrick Devedjian of the UMP who is of Armenian origin is a member of the Armenian Community and François Asensi, deputy of the Communist party born in Spain, is one of the founding members of the Friends of the Convicts of the Spanish Republic. In Germany, the immigrant MPs having links to ethnic networks are also only two. The deputy Juratovic of the SPD of Croatian origin is a member of the peace in former Yugoslavia network, and
Hakki Keskin who is of Turkish origin and member of Die Linke is the founding member of the Turkish Community in Germany.

In the United Kingdom the number of immigrant deputies having relation with ethnic communities is larger than in France and Germany, and count for almost the half of the total of immigrant deputies. Diane Abbot of Jamaican origin and member of the Labour party is the Founder of the Black Child Initiative. Equally, Dawn Butler who is also from the Labour party and of Jamaican origin is a member of the Union for Race and Equality. Michael Howard of Rumanian and Jewish origin has been engaged with the Jewish Community. Daniel Kawczynski born in Poland is vice-chairman of Conservative Friends of Poland. Piara Khabra who was of Indian origin is the leader of the Asian Community in West London, and the President of the Workers’ Association where he assists Indian migrants with settling and finding jobs. Sadiq Khan of Pakistani background has actively worked as a lawyer in cases related to minorities’ discrimination in several organizations. Shahid Malik of Pakistani origin is Chief executive of the Pakistan Muslim Center. Marsha Singh, of Indian origin is a member of Bradford’s Ethnic Community. Finally, Keith Vaz of Yemen origin is the Chair of the Labour Ethnic Minority Taskforce. On the side of the Conservatives, Howard who is of Rumanian origin is a member of the Jewish community. Equally, Kawczynski who is also of Polish origin is a member of the Conservative Friends of Poland organization.

Table 21. Ties to Ethnic Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ties</th>
<th>No Ties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen, some immigrants MPs are linked to immigrant networks and associations however the great majority is not. Based on this evidence here presented the claims over the relationship between ethnic network membership and immigrant candidates’ nomination (Trasher et al. 2013, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Fennema and Tillie 2001) cannot be substantiated for the cases here studied. Nonetheless, for some of the immigrant deputies, ethnic network participation and advocacy appears just in the center of their activities.

5.5 Conclusion and Discussion

In chapter 5 I examine the descriptive representation of immigrants in national parliaments. First, the study makes use of a novel method to measure descriptive representation. Traditionally, representation has been measured by only counting the number of elected representatives having specific characteristics. However in this study I use the Representation Index developed by Bloemraad (2013) to measure immigrants’ representation as a function of the size of the group in the population. Thus, in the first part of the analysis I examine six European countries and draw the following preliminary conclusions. The evidence suggests that the Representation Index is a more precise measurement of immigrants’ representation, which highlights the extent to which immigrants is under-represented in national parliaments. Interestingly, immigrants’ representation is less related to the characteristics of electoral systems (disproving hypothesis 6) because proportional systems do not necessarily enhance the descriptive representation of this group suggesting that cross-country variations are in reality related to other factors.

In the second part of the analysis I focus on three cases: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. I carry out in depth analysis of immigrants’ representation. The analysis sheds light on two phenomena. On the one hand, the descriptive
statistics show that left-parties, and in particular Socialist parties, are more open to nominate immigrants for safe seats while in Germany, the Green party also plays an important role in the election of immigrant deputies. Furthermore, there are immigrant deputies among conservative parties, yet these remain less numerous, especially in Germany. On the other hand, it shows that immigrant deputies are to a great extent elected in immigrant constituencies. The comparative analysis demonstrates that in France party ideology is the main determinant of immigrants’ representation, and in the United Kingdom, constituency is more influential. These findings provide some support to prove hypotheses 7 (the role of party ideology) and 8 (the effects of immigrant constituencies) on immigrants’ representation yet more empirical evidence is needed still to make any claim.

Finally, the third part of the study uses biographical data to further explain immigrants’ representation. The biographical analysis sheds light on three main facts. First, regarding the country of origin of immigrant deputies from European migrants are better represented in France than in Germany and the United Kingdom. At the same time, Turkish migrants in Germany and Commonwealth migrants in the United Kingdom are represented in parliament, whereas Maghreb immigrants in France are under-represented. Lastly, Southeast Asian immigrants are absent in the three parliaments, which suggests that group-specific features also influence immigrants’ representation. Furthermore, among migrants the youth is also under-represented, as much as women and the working class. This means that to some extent similar mechanisms that apply to the representation native population shape the formation of political elites among immigrants. Also, the migration background seems to have a penalizing effect for accessing parliament, this is suggested by the fact that migrant deputies are on average more educated than native members of parliament. Finally, relations to immigrant networks and groups don’t seem to be a crucial factor for a political career in the
three countries here analyzed; yet they are more important in the United Kingdom.

To conclude, the presence of immigrants in national legislatures raises the question of whether there is a relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. Indeed elected immigrant-origin representatives can work on the interests of other migrants, by influencing the public agenda, influencing the allocation of resources and voicing immigrants’ concerns (Bird et al 2011, Butler and Broockman 2011, Lovenduski and Norris 2003). Therefore I devote Chapter 6 at examining what role immigrant deputies play in the substantive representation of immigrants’ interests and views, against alternative explanations.
6. Substantive Representation

In the previous chapter I have examined immigrants' descriptive representation in national parliaments and the factors that influence the nomination and election of immigrant candidates. Yet in the context of multicultural democracies, a crucial question is whether descriptive and substantive representation are related: Do immigrant deputies represent immigrant voters? Furthermore, immigrants are concentrated within the borders of specific electoral constituencies where integration and immigration-related concerns are the most present. Then a second question is whether geographic concentration facilitates the representation of immigrants' interests and views: Do deputies respond to the immigrant constituencies when these are concentrated and more visible?

This Chapter examines immigrants’ substantive representation in national legislatures. In this aim, I analyze the written questions (WQs) asked in national legislatures in France (2007), Germany (2005) and the United Kingdom (2005), based on a dataset I created for this doctoral dissertation. The Chapter is structured as follows. It first reviews the literature on substantive representation. Subsequently the main hypotheses that are tested in the analysis are presented. In the second section the research design is explained including a detailed account of the data used, the operationalization of variables, the coding strategy and the methods used in the analysis. Then I present the statistical analyses and the main findings. Finally, the conclusion draws some possible implications of this study for the research on political representation.
6.1 Analytical Framework

Substantive representation refers to the representations of the views and interests of citizens in political institutions and policy-making (Pitkin 1967). It grounds on the assumption that “a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens” (Dahl 1971: 1–2). In general, substantive representation has focused on the representative-voter linkage. Empirically, its measurement has gone along two roads. Numerous studies centre on the elite-mass opinion congruence (Miller and Stokes 1963, Achen 1978, Powell 1982, Thomassen and Schmitt 1997, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, Marsh and Wessels 1997, Mateo Diaz 2005, Ruedin 2013). Positions in the Left-Right ideological dimension are examined for voters and parties (or candidates). This tradition focuses on the positions on the left-right dimension because this is considered as an “all-embracing” dimension (Thomassen and Schmitt, 1997:172), stable on time and the umbrella to other conflict dimensions (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). Representation is measured looking at the differences between the positions. Inspired by the concept of spatial voting, which is based on the distance between a voter A and a party or candidate B, good representation exists when there is a small distance in the position of voters and parties or candidates, in contrast when they are far away representation is rather poor.

A second stream of research has adopted a behavioral approach and centered on representatives’ behavior as the locus of representation. Embodying this tradition are studies examining different styles of representation, roll call voting, parliamentary speeches and parliamentary questioning. In order to govern, deputies have to accommodate to the rules of the legislatures and adopt different political roles in the aim of strategically allocating the scarce resources at their disposition towards specific goals (Strøm, 1997:155). Deputies can specialize in
one policy area, focus on the constituency interests, behave as a party member, or hold leadership roles within the parliament (Searing 1994). Deputies’ behavior can draw on a variety of motivations including re-nomination, re-election, party leadership, or legislative leadership (Strom and Nyblade 2007), yet the pursuit of reelection has been highlighted as the most prominent one (Mayhew 2004). The behavioral approach to representation contends that there is good representation when a given topic is very present in the agenda of individual deputies and/or the overall legislature.

In the context of multicultural democracies, the analysis of immigrants’ representation embodies several challenges. To start with, it is important to make explicit what aspects of representation we are exactly examining (Achen 1978). The opinions of immigrant voters can correlate strongly with representatives’ opinions yet congruence doesn’t guarantee that immigrants’ views and preferences are de facto represented in policy making. It is therefore important to examine the material form that these opinions take in policy making in national legislatures, and for that reason in this Chapter I examine the questions that deputies ask in national legislatures, that is following the behavioral approach.

Second, in the last decades political research has shed light on the emergence of issue voting (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Mair 1997) which “involves the conscious calculation of policy benefits for alternative electoral choices” (Carmines and Stimson 1980: 78). Following these assertions, it has been observed that in countries with large migratory inflows the issue of immigration has penetrated the political arena. Issue ownership theories have claimed that immigration is an issue of far-right parties (Green-Pedersen 2007, Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). Yet, in the context of multicultural democracies the issue has gained in complexity embracing a variety of policy areas and penetrating the agendas of conservative and left parties (Chapter 4, Meguid 2002, Van Spanje 2010) and it has even been
politicated in party systems where anti-immigration parties didn’t emerge (Pardos-Prado et al. 2013, Van Spanje 2010, Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012, Perrineau 2004). Following these observations it appears as a fertile strategy to focus on issue representation (Powell 1982) and examine immigrants’ representation by focusing on how well individual representatives represent immigrant voters on immigration-related issues, including policy areas related to border control, citizenship and integration in the questions they ask in the national legislatures.

Third, much of the literature on representation - and in particular research dealing with underrepresented social groups such as women and ethnic minorities – is centered on the study of legislators and legislatures dismissing how group representation makes sense in the light of the demand side of representation, that is the respective groups themselves. In the previous Chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 5) I pointed out at some of the concerns that researchers are rising over this fact, and some of the attempts to correct for this bias in the measurement of descriptive representation. For example the Representation Index (Bloemraad 2013, see also Forest 2012) accounts for the immigrant population in the measurement of immigrants’ descriptive representation. Accordingly descriptive representation in national legislatures is examined as a function of the size of the immigrant population in a given country. In the analysis of immigrants’ substantive representation the concept of dyadic representation is a very useful tool to account for the immigrant population. Dyadic representation emphasizes the connection between representatives and their constituencies (Weissberg 1978), and as such it has two very interesting properties for our case. On the one side, the concept applies well to single member constituency systems where the connection between representatives and voters is particularly strong. As representatives are elected in and by the constituencies, they are expected to voice the interests of their constituents (Soroka et al. 2009). Given that it is at the local level where
immigrants live together with natives and integrate (Penninx et al. 2004, Caponio and Borkert 2010), the concept of dyadic representation is useful because it structures immigrants’ representation within the framework of the relationship between immigrant constituencies and their representatives. Following this dimension, the size and concentration of the immigrant population within the borders of the electoral district are a crucial factor in measuring descriptive representation. On the other side, the concept of dyadic representation is useful because it can be used to account for “surrogate representation”. In reality, immigrants’ may have their most important interests represented by immigrant deputies that were elected in other districts. As Mansbridge (1999) puts it:

“it is in this surrogate process that descriptive representation often plays its most useful role, allowing representatives who are themselves members of a subordinate group to circumvent the strong barriers to communication between dominant and subordinate groups” (1999:642).

Given these points, the concept of dyadic representation emerges as a heuristic method to scrutinize the representational relationship that immigrants and representatives have in the context of multicultural democracies.

In this Chapter substantive representation is examined by looking at the questions asked by national deputies on issues related to immigration, and as a function of the immigrant electorates. Following this approach, three factors are likely to influence how well immigrants are represented in the questions tabled in their respective legislatures: immigrant constituencies, party ideology, and immigrant deputies.
Firstly, high priority to constituency concerns can pay off in the form of personal vote (Cain et al. 1987; Blais et al. 2003). In fact, empirical evidence shows that immigrants’ substantive representation is related to immigrants’ visibility in a given constituency; this means that it is dependent on immigrants’ concentration (see for example Forest 2012) because the size of immigrant community affects the capacities of national deputies to represent the interests of immigrants in national legislatures. When minorities are concentrated their views and interests are more salient and are more likely to be in the agenda of the elected representatives (Bird 2011:213). All in all, as it is in immigrant constituencies where much of the challenges of immigration and integration take place, therefore deputies elected in these constituencies have particular interest in allocating more resources to these issues. Furthermore, as “contact theory” shows, intergroup contact improves attitudes towards the minority group, reducing stereotyping and enhancing cooperation (Pettigrew 1998), which can lead to greater representation. Therefore the first working hypothesis of this Chapter reads as follows:

**Hypothesis 9: Immigrant Constituencies**

- Deputies elected in more ethnically diverse constituencies are more likely to ask immigration-related questions than MPs representing more homogeneous constituencies.

Yet, the representative-constituent relation as the explanans of substantive representation has been contested, particularly in European democracies, with the dominance of partisan and individual explanations of representation. The role of parties has been shown to provide a superior account of legislative behavior over other explanations across European legislatures (see for example Converse and Pierce 1986, Farah 1980). Parties offer the possibility of a structured collective action, provide with an electoral prospect, resources and influence over policy-making (Owens 2003). So in this way parties have an ex ante control, leading to behavioral cohesion between parties and party members (Strom and Nyblade
Grounding on these observations, the expectations are that parties remain distinct and coherent on the ways their party members address the issue of immigration because parties align the preferences of its members and subordinate them to centralized control (Strøm 2003:67). In this framework it is assumed that individual deputies converge with regard to their positions and activities in national legislatures with other deputies from the same party. From this viewpoint, in accordance to the party preferences deputies of the left tend to be more concerned about immigrants’ family reunion, naturalization and integration, while conservative deputies oppose all these policies (Kittilson and Tate 2004). Following these observations, the party hypothesis reads as follows:

**Hypothesis 10: Party Policy Position**

Party policy position is significantly related to immigration-related parliamentary questioning. This means that deputies affiliated to parties that are more favorable to support immigration and integration policies ask more immigration questions than deputies that are members of parties that oppose them.

Finally, “who” the leader is can be of relevance because the leaders’ personal views on specific issues might differ from those of the party. Although policy distance between deputies and parties is in general very small, “who” the representative is can be relevant for the representation of underrepresented interests (Aarts et al. 2011:3, Popkin 1994). Evidence on the relationship between deputies’ personal characteristics and their behavior sheds light on the fact that gender, sexual orientation, and ethnicity influences what deputies do in national parliaments. Women representatives advocate feminist values and express stronger concerns about social issues (Norris and Lovenduski 1995:219-224). And ethnic minority representatives address more often ethnic-related issues than non-minority deputies (Bird 2011, 2007, Wüst 2011:262, Saalfeld 2011). As can be
seen, evidence points out at dyadic representation occurring between surrogate representatives and the members of specific social groups. The concept of surrogate representation has emphasized the importance of personal characteristics for the representation of immigrants in national legislatures. In reality, representatives are primed by their personal experiences and therefore more inclined to represent issues from which they are somehow related, benefitting the representation of views and interests of those citizens with whom they share similar characteristics (Mansbridge 1999). Based on this, we examine the linkage between descriptive and substantive representation presented in Hypothesis 11.

Hypothesis 11: Immigrant Deputies
Deputies of immigrant origin are more likely to ask immigration-related questions than native deputies.

To conclude, based on the analytical framework I have derived the three main hypotheses that are examined in this Chapter and that were stated above. In order to examine them I have designed a comparative study. The research strategies adopted are presented in the next section.

6.2 Research Design and Measurement

In order to examine immigrants’ substantive representation in national legislatures and test the explanatory power of each of the above-mentioned possible explanations, a series of research design decisions have been made. A detailed account of case selection criterion, data, coding and analyses used to examine the topic are presented here.
6.2.1 Case Selection

In bicameralist democracies the lower house is the most important one because it is elected following the formula one citizen one vote (Lijphart 1999:201) serving the purpose of legitimation (Tsibellis and Money 1997:46). In single member electoral systems national deputies are elected in their electoral districts, and therefore are held accountable to the voters (Soroka et al. 2009). Deputies have stronger incentives for constituency-service and the link between voters and their representatives is considered to provide citizens with a voice in the affairs of the nation (Norris 1997).

Legislative elections in France use the single-member constituency system. At the 2007 election there were 577 constituencies, 555 of which were situated in the metropolitan territory and two in France’s overseas territories. The elections take place using the two-ballot majority-plurality system where a candidate is elected after winning the majority of the votes in either the first or the second ballot (Elgie 1997, 2009). Germany in contrast has a mixed electoral system. Each voter casts two votes, one for the first candidate in a single member district, and a second for one the sixteen closed party lists in the Land where she resides in. In the 2005 legislative election 299 deputies were elected in single constituencies and 299 in the list seats (Saalfeld 2009: 212). Finally, in the United Kingdom the single member plurality electoral system had in the 2005 election 646 seats. Electoral candidates with the most votes win irrespective of the percentage of the votes they have obtained (Mitchell 2009).

To sum up, given the emphasis that single constituency systems puts in the connection between representatives and their constituencies it is a fertile ground to test the working hypotheses proposed in this Chapter.
6.2.2 Data

The study makes use of several data sources to investigate immigrants’ descriptive representation. First, the written parliamentary questions have been extracted from the websites of respective national legislatures\(^{69}\). To examine immigrants’ opinions I use the European Social Survey 2010. And to understand how constituency interests affect representation I rely on demographic data evidencing the ethnic and cultural composition of electoral constituencies. This data has been gathered from the National Statistics websites \(^{70}\). Furthermore I measure party policy position using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 (CHES) (Hooghe et al. 2010). Finally, data about the ethnic and cultural background of national deputies has been gathered by the project Migrants as Political Actors\(^{71}\), and extracted also from parliamentary and personal websites.

6.2.3 Immigration Issues

The issue of immigration includes three main policy areas: border control, citizenship and integration policies. Border control policies refer to how many immigrants are allowed to enter the country, the categories of immigrants that are allowed to enter and the procedures that migrants have to follow in order to be allowed in the country. Historically immigration policies have been tied to economic development and the need of foreign labor force. Nonetheless cultural factors have played a predominant role in defining which immigrant groups were allowed to enter a country like the White Australia Policy or the Chinese

\(^{69}\) France: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/recherche/questions, Germany: http://www.bundestag.de/ (special thanks go to Matthias Haber for facilitating me the access to this data).

United Kingdom: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-questions-answers/


\(^{71}\) Coordinated by Andreas Wüst: http://www.migrantactors.net/
Exclusion Act in the United States. Yet, following the rise of the terrorist threat embodied by the attacks in New York, London and Madrid, border control policies became increasingly driven by securitarian concerns. For example, the European Neighborhood policy was launched by the European Union in the aim of avoiding “new dividing lines across the continent” resulting in more difficult migration procedures for certain groups (Zaiotti 2007). Citizenship policies in turn, refer to the procedures, costs and requirements for naturalization. Empirical evidence suggests that countries are turning towards more liberal citizenship policies, facilitating naturalization and allowing double citizenship (Koopmans 2005). Finally, immigrants’ integration describes the set of policies related to the incorporation and participation of immigrants, and the accommodation of their cultural differences (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010:4).

6.2.4 Written Parliamentary Questions

While there are numerous activities that deputies perform in parliament, I opted for analyzing the written parliamentary questions asked by individual deputies to a member of the national government and created the Parliamentary Question Dataset. Parliamentary questioning appears across parliaments as a mean for holding governments accountable (Wiberg 1995) and as such they are a crucial part of the system of policy making shedding light on the policies to which MPs direct their and voters’ attention (Ferree et al. 2002:14). From the perspective of political representation analysis, written parliamentary questions provide with a unique opportunity to examine both the behavior of individual parliamentarians and the functioning of modern legislatures (Martin 2011). These are a significant element of parliamentary debates providing an insight of deputies’ main concerns, as they are object to less behavioral constraints from the party leaders than other activities such as roll call voting or oral questions. Furthermore, the analysis of individual legislators’ behavior offers the possibility to examine the performance of
national legislatures - key institutions in the policy-making process – from a different perspective.

Single written parliamentary questions contain two very useful pieces of information. First, they reveal the policy areas that are of interests to individual parliamentarians. In the questions deputies ask it can be observed to which topics they feel more concerned about. Second, the content of the question shows the representation orientation adopted by individual deputies. By examining the type of topics addressed evidence of personal vote cultivation, interest on national or local issues, “good” party members following party leaders, and more independent deputies can be disclosed. In other words, written parliamentary questions stand as valid and solid measure of legislature activities compared with other parliamentary activities (Martin 2011).

Substantive representation in this Chapter is measured counting the number of parliamentary questions tabled by individual deputies on issues related to border control, citizenship, and integration policies. Certainly, the number of questions captures the saliency (importance) of the issue of immigration for a given deputy and not the positions expressed (favorable or negative opinions on that issue). Confronted with limitations on the existent data where it is not possible to extract the positions expressed, saliency is taken as a proxy for issue relevance and representation (a similar strategy is applied by Saalfeld 2011, Martin 2011, Bird 2005, Soroka et al. 2009)\textsuperscript{72}. The central unit of analysis is the individual deputy for whom the total number of immigration-related questions is measured. Large numbers of immigration-related questions evidence good representation, and on the contrary, small numbers signals poor representation (see Thomassen 2012).

\textsuperscript{72} In an ideal case a study of substantive representation would analyze the content of the questions asked to determine what positions do deputies represent in these policy areas. However to my knowledge there is not data available that would allow us to measure issue positions for every single written question.
6.2.4.1 Coding

Written parliamentary questions tabled by individual deputies in the 2007 French National Assembly, 2005 German Bundestag and 2005 British House of Commons summing up to more than 350,000 questions are analyzed in this Chapter. The coding of the questions has followed strict procedures combining computer-aided and manual coding methods. The coding scheme applied is context sensitive, which means that the objective has been to identify questions that target the immigrant population dependent on the country where these have been asked. Therefore using existent official documents and considering dominant national discursive frameworks words (including truncated words) related to border-control, citizenship and integration have been identified in French, German and English.

Following an automated process, the data has been coded as (1=related to immigration, and 0=not related to immigration). In a second step I have examined the data and searched for false negatives and positives, being able to expand the keywords related to immigration. A dummy variable was created registering whether the question explicitly referred immigration issues or not (1=immigration-related, 0=non immigration-related).

The length of the questions varies across parliaments and deputies. In the French parliament questions are long (longer that in other legislatures) and framed in ways that make more reference to general over particular issues. The following is an example of a more general question about immigration:

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73 The analysis of the French case includes the period between June 2007 and April 2011. Deputies from overseas departments and territories have been excluded. The analysis of the British Parliament excluded the deputies from Scotland.

74 The list of keywords is included in the Appendix.
France | Mr. B. from the UMP asks the Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development about the promotion of the national identity. He asks him to send him a summary of the current state of this issue.75

This question asked in the French National Assembly asks to the Minister of Immigration about the promotion of the national identity in France. The question is a good example of the more indirect style used by French representatives. Also it illustrates the tendency in French politics to use politically correct concepts to refer to highly sensitive issues (i.e. national identity).

In Germany, the written parliamentary questions are also in general lengthier than in the United Kingdom. Moreover, in terms of the topics covered they address a wide variety of issues. The following question is an example of the questions tabled at the Bundestag:

Germany | Deputy W. asks “When is the federal Government expects the completion of the scientific evaluation of about the migrant labor market reform 2010/Hartz IV, and when will the reports be published, and if not, why not?”76

This precise question deals with some studies that were conducted in relation to reforms that were to be implemented in Germany related to immigrants’ access to social benefits.

75 Mr. B. from the UMP “attire l’attention de M. le ministre de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire sur la promotion de l’identité nationale. Il lui demande de bien vouloir lui dresser un bilan de l’état de l’existant”

76 Mr. W from the Green party asks “Wann rechnet die Bundesregierung mit der Fertigstellung der wissenschaftlichen migrantenspezifischen Evaluation der Arbeitsmarktreform 2010/Hartz IV, und werden mögliche Zwischenberichte veröffentlicht, und wenn nein, warum nicht?”
Finally, generally speaking in the British House of Commons questions are shorter and address specific issues in a very direct way. The following is an example of this:

United Kingdom | Deputy A. from “Hackney North and Stoke Newington asked to the Minister of State, Department for Constitutional Affairs, what measures she has taken to increase the registration on the electoral register of black and ethnic minorities”.

This parliamentary question addresses the electoral registration of black and minority voters. In the United Kingdom, the concept “ethnic minorities” refers to the non-white British population, and includes first and second-generation migrants and the populations from former colonies and the Commonwealth.

All in all, as I show here the written questions asked evidence the concerns that individual deputies have on policies related to border control, citizenship and integration and are therefore a good element to analyze.

6.2.5 Independent Variables

The purpose of this research is to understand what factors influence immigrants’ political representation. Based on the existent literature I have hypothesized that immigrant constituencies, party policy position and immigrant deputies play a crucial role in immigration-related parliamentary question. The description and measurement of each of these variables is detailed below.

First, the variable constituency composition refers to the ethnic and cultural diversity that characterizes an electoral district. The variable measures the share of immigrant residents in every constituency, which results from the division of the number of immigrants in the constituency by the constituency total population. The share of immigrants in a constituency is a surrogate measure for constituency interests. Although a more exact measure of constituency policy preferences can
be derived from opinion polls, as the data is not available for the constituencies analyzed here I make use of this surrogate measure (for similar design see Saalfeld 2011, Soroka et al. 2009).

Second, the variable party policy position measures as the position of parties on integration policies. The Chapel Hill Expert survey (wave 2006) is used (Hooghe et al. 2010). Experts on political parties in the three countries were asked to locate parties’ position on a 11 points scale in which 0 = multiculturalism and 10 = assimilation. The use of expert surveys has two advantages compared to other ways of measuring party policy position. First, expert surveys are “set out to summarize the judgments of the consensus of experts on the matters at issue (…) in a systematic way” (Benoit and Laver 2006:75). And second, the complexity of certain issues makes expert surveys the perfect measurement instrument because experts are able to process diverse sources of information (Hooghe et al. 2010:3).

Finally, the third independent variable is deputies’ background, a dummy variable that identifies the background of individual MPs (1 = immigrant-origin and 0 = native). First and second-generation migrants have been identified among the members of the national legislatures, using deputies and deputies’ parents nationality at birth.

### 6.2.6 Control Variables

Together with the three key independent variables presented above, two control variables are included in the analysis of immigrants’ substantive representation.

The first control variable is a count variable showing total number of questions, which show the total number of questions in all topics asked by an individual deputy. The purpose of this variable is to control for the potential effects of
“hyper-productive” MPs asking numerous questions in general (Saalfeld 2011: 282).

The second control variable is a dummy variable that discriminate opposition and majority deputies (where 1= opposition and 0= majority). Question time provides the opportunity to opposition parties and deputies to hold government accountable, to criticize adopted policies, to suggest new policies, and to send signal to voters as a potential alternative to the current government (see for example Soroka et al. 2009, Franklin and Norton 1993)

6.2.7 Methods

Content analysis is a method designed for analyzing written, verbal or visual messages (Cole 1988), that relies on systematic and objective procedures to describe and quantify a phenomenon (Neundorf 1980). The method can be used with quantitative and qualitative data in a deductive, hypothesis testing, or in an inductive fashion. The usual procedure is to follow specified classifications: words and phrases that have similar meaning are filtered into fewer inclusive categories (Cavanagh 1997). The method of content analysis is particularly useful for understanding phenomena that need to be explored in depth like immigrants’ substantive representation. A structured categorization matrix containing the keywords identified has been applied to the written parliamentary questions of each of the legislatures analyzed in the search for patterns of substantive representation.

The analysis of representation in this case relies on the manifest reference of immigration policy areas in the written questions. In the first part of the analysis descriptive statistics are used to show representational similarities and differences between deputies representing demographically diverse and more homogeneous constituencies, across parties, and between immigrant-origin MPs and natives.
across parliaments. In the second part, negative binomial regressions are used to examine to what extent the main independent variables (constituency composition, party policy position, and deputy’s background) explain immigrants’ substantive representation.

6.2.8 Reliability

Reliability implies that the use of the same research methods should result in the same results for the same phenomenon (Miller 2007:92). The type of research that deals with some type of content analysis presents challenges related to the inherent subjectivity in the interpretation of text that is linked to differences in the properties that are attributed to specific concepts. Two major strategies are used to increase the reliability of these types of analyses. First, a crucial tool is inter-coder reliability where the same content is assigned to two or more coders, and the reliability is established based on the amount of agreement or correspondence between the coders (Neundorf 2002:141). With this strategy, the coding process has to achieve acceptable levels of inter-coder agreement to validate the measurement. While numerous projects make use of this technique (for example the Manifestos Project, Chapter 4) it requires the mobilization of many human and monetary resources, which are not always available. Fortunately, technological development has facilitated the use computer-assisted content analysis. This second option has the advantage that can be easily replicated and that a single researcher can cope with huge amounts of data. In sum, the use of automatic coding reduces costs and increases reliability (Kind and Lowe 2003). In this research I have then opted for the second solution and used computer-assisted content analysis to identify the parliamentary questions that deal with immigration.

77 I have included these variables (only) because similar studies show that these are the most important ones (see Bird et al. 2011, Saalfeld 2011).
6.2.9 Validity

A central concern in the social sciences is that many concepts, as the concept of political representation, are abstract and cannot be observed directly (Krippendorf 2004:315). In order to validate the main dependent variable of this research, that is immigrants’ substantive representation, I analyze one of the observable behaviors that this concept entails: asking questions in parliament on policy areas that are of central concerns for immigrant voters (border control, citizenship and integration policies). The method of content analysis on which the statistical analyses of this Chapter draw allows for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context, in the aim of providing knowledge, new insights, and a representation of facts (Krippendorff 2004) for the studied phenomenon. Precisely, the objective of content analysis is to condense data into concepts and categories, which facilitates the description immigrants’ substantive representation. Furthermore, the data here analyzed is representative of the questions asked in parliaments for the periods analyzed, fulfilling the requirement of “sampling validity” (Krippendorff 2004:319). Finally, I have ensured “semantic validity” of the data by making sure that the categories of analysis of a text correspond to the meanings these texts have within the chosen contexts (Krippendorff 2004:319).

6.3 Results

6.3.1 Immigrant Voters: Different Opinions?

The study of immigrants’ substantive representation in national parliament presents several challenges. One of the biggest is related to the question of whether immigrants’ hold views and opinions, which are substantively different from the opinions of the native population. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation I have showed evidence signaling that immigrant voters tend to support to a greater extent parties that are in the center left and left of the political spectrum. Controlling for
socio-economic factors including gender, education and income we observed that migratory background plays a role in the voters’ party choice. The underlying assumption is that parties’ position related to immigration and integration policies is decisive. Thus, immigrant voters support parties that held more liberal views on these issues.

The study of immigrants’ substantive representation is in line with the assumption that immigrant and native voters have different views on immigration. In order to explore this argument I examine the opinions of immigrant and native voters about the impact of immigration on the national economy. Figure 23 shows the distribution of opinions on immigration between immigrant and native voters in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Differences are calculated looking at the distribution of immigrant and native voters. Negative scores signal the distribution of native voters, and positive values show opinions held by immigrant voters (it expressed the differences in shares of both groups).

Figure 23 shows a very clear pattern across the three countries. Native voters tend to think that immigration is bad for the country’s economy while immigrant voters tend to think that immigration is good for the national economy. However, opinion differences between immigrant and national voters are not equally intense in the three countries. In Germany, the groups are more similar than in France and the United Kingdom. One third of the German voters think that immigration is bad for the economy, 27 percent think is neither good nor bad, and 39 percent think that it good. Among the immigrant voters 25 percent think that immigration is bad, 26 have a moderate view and 45 percent consider that immigration is food for economic development. In France opinions about immigration are more

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78 I have also examined the opinions of immigrants and native voters on other issues captured by the ESS 2010 including: (1) satisfaction with the state of the economy, (2) agreement with reduction of difference in income levels, (3) levels of satisfaction with the national government, and views on the state of (4) health services and (5) of education in the country. No major differences in opinions between immigrant and native voters are reported in these five policy areas.
polarized across groups. More than 40 percent of French voters think that immigration is bad for the economy against 24 percent of immigrant voters. 28 percent of French respondents have a moderate view on the issue, while 30 percent of immigrant voters do so. And, 30 percent of French and 46 percent of immigrant voters consider that immigration is good for the economy. Overall immigrants have more positive views on immigration than native French, and these differences are significant. Finally, in the United Kingdom inter-group differences are even more salient than in France. While 46 percent of the British population thinks that immigration is bad for the economy, only 20 percent of immigrant respondents think so. Around 30 percent of the respondents of both groups think that immigration is not good nor bad for the economy, and one third of the British respondents think that immigration is good against more than a half of the immigrant respondents (30 and 56 percent respectively).
As can be seen, immigrant voters have different concerns on immigration issues compared to national voters. Therefore, in the following sections I examine how individual legislators and national legislatures respond to views and opinions of the immigrant population.

6.3.2 National Legislatures

One of the central concerns of content analysis is to make sense of the data that is being analyzed to learn ‘what is going on’ and to obtain an understanding of the whole (Tesch 1990). Differences and similarities in the use of written
parliamentary questions are observed between the British House of Commons and the French National Assembly (see Table 22). Asking written questions is very common in the House of Commons, where the total number of questions is a bit more than 250,000. At the French Assembly, deputies ask also numerous questions as well. For the parliamentary period analyzed in this study the total number of questions summed more than 95,000. Finally, in Germany the total number of questions is around 12,000. Regarding the questions on immigration, the numbers are very small in comparison with the total number of questions. In France, 1,468 questions deal with issues that are immigration specific, representing 1.5 percent of the total number of questions. In Germany, 186 questions asked by members of the Bundestag were on immigration issues representing two percent of the total questions asked. And, in the United Kingdom 5,965 questions tabled referred to issues associated with immigration, which represents 2.3 percent of the total number of questions.

79 In this research only the questions asked at the French National Assembly between the June 2007 and April 2011 have been analyzed.
As can be seen, the attention devoted to immigration issues in parliamentary questioning is overall very low. Yet as shown above the issue is more salient in the House of Commons, followed by the Bundestag, and finally the French National Assembly.

### 6.3.3 Constituencies

As I have presented earlier, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have overall similar shares of immigrants living in their countries however the their geographic distribution varies across the countries, resulting in some constituencies being constituted of immigrants where in others native French, German or British are the great majority. To be precise, in France the mean share of immigrants per constituency is 5.4 percent, with a standard deviation of 4.5 and a range of 27.5. In Germany, the mean share of immigrants per constituency is 8.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.33 and a range of 26.6 percent. And in the United Kingdom, even greater differences are observed in terms of the socio-demographic compositions of the constituencies. The mean share of immigrants is 8.3 percent per constituency, with a standard deviation of 11.9 and a range of 65.8 percent. This means that in the United Kingdom the population is geographically very unevenly distributed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Number of WQs</th>
<th>Number Immigration of WQs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>95860</td>
<td>1486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12604</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>259799</td>
<td>5965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The question of how well immigrants are represented by the elected deputies based on their geographic concentration is examined in Table 23. The table presents the average number of questions asked by the elected deputies elected in constituencies with low, middle-low, middle-high and high shares of immigrants. The data shows that in France the average number of questions increases when the share of immigrants in the constituencies. In constituencies with very low shares of immigrants deputies asked an average of 1.8 questions, in constituencies with mid-low shares an average of 2.1 questions, in districts with mid-high shares an average of 2.5 questions and finally in constituencies with high shares of immigrants an average of 4.2 questions. This evidence signals that in France the representation of immigration issues in the National Assembly increases when the immigrant population is larger and more concentrated. This relationship between immigration-related parliamentary questioning and the size of the immigrant population is however not present at the German Bundestag, and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom.

In Germany, the shares of immigrants in the constituency and the number of immigration questions asked by the deputies elected in the single-member districts have apparently not relationship. A larger number of questions (average 0.5) have been asked by deputies elected in constituencies with lower shares of immigrants. Deputies elected in constituencies with mid-low shares of immigrants didn’t ask any question on immigration. And deputies representing districts with mid-high and high shares of immigrants asked on average 0.1 questions on this topic. Second, as it is observed the overall number of questions asked by these deputies is very low. This evidence suggests that in the German case the electoral system is in reality a crucial factor influencing immigrants’ representation. In fact of the total number of immigration questions tabled, 18 percent (48 questions) were asked by
deputies elected by the single-member district system and 82 percent by the deputies elected under proportional representation.

Finally, in the United Kingdom and more similar to France, the number of questions tends to increase together with the share of immigrants residing in the electoral constituency. Deputies elected in constituencies with low shares of immigrants tabled an average of 5.7 questions on the issue. Interestingly deputies that represent constituencies with mid-low shares of immigrants asked more than the double number of questions than the deputies of the first group (13.6 on average) and also more than the deputies elected in constituencies with more migrants. To be precise, British deputies elected in districts with mid-high shares of immigrants asked an average of 10.4 questions on immigration each, and deputies elected in constituencies with high shares of immigrants a mean number of 12.9 questions. Considering all this evidence, we observe progressive attention to immigration issues when the immigrant population increases yet the issue is more salient in constituencies with smaller, yet still visible, number of immigrants.
Grounding on this empirical evidence, we can conclude that size of the immigrant population is to a great extent related to the attention that elected deputies give to the issue (at least in France and the United Kingdom). Yet, we need to further explore this relationship to understand the dynamics of immigrants’ substantive representation.

### 6.3.4 Political Parties

The elected political parties in the general elections of France 2007, Germany 2005 and United Kingdom 2005 held different positions related to immigration. As it can be observed in Figure 24 I have extracted the positions of elected parties on whether they rather support multicultural policies or assimilation of immigrants. Looking at the location of parties we detect different landscapes for the representation of immigrants across the national parliaments.

In France, the average of position of elected parties is 6.2 with a standard deviation of 1.8 (unweighted measures) which signals that parties are in general more favorable of the assimilation of immigrants to the French culture. This

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80 This table only includes the 299 deputies elected in single-member districts who asked a total of 48 questions related to immigration (18% of the total).
observation is in line with the fact that France has in Europe the longest tradition of assimilation (Brubaker 2001: 535). The governing majority party UMP has one of the strongest positions on assimilation in the National Assembly scoring 7.5 (unweighted measure). Among the elected parties, only the Mouvement pour la France (MPF) holds a view that is more supportive of assimilation. Also close to the UMP but with a more moderate position is the centrist party coalition UDF-Modem, which scores 6.7 in the given scale. Interestingly, both the Socialist and the Communist parties score 5.8, meaning that they have more moderate views on assimilation closely followed by the Left Radical Party (PRG). Finally the Green party (Verts) remains an exception in the French legislature being the only party that openly supports multicultural policies (score = 3.2).

The German Bundestag combines, loyal its ideals of diversity, a rich array of views on the question of the integration of immigrants. On average parties score 5.2 on the multiculturalism-assimilation scale, with a standard deviation of 2.9. These measures elucidate the existence of different views, and a more polarized parliament on this policy area. To start with, the governing coalition formed by the Christian Democrats, the CSU and the SPD has a variety of positions related to multiculturalism. The Bavarian party CSU scored 9 points on the scale, followed from not far by the CDU (score = 8.1). The Social Democrats score 4.6 points being not very far from the FDP, which scores 5 points in the scale. The German left wing parties are clearly more favorable to multiculturalism than to assimilation. Yet the Linke and especially the Greens (Grünen) are strong supporters of multiculturalism scoring 3.5 and 1.3 respectively.

Lastly, the House of Commons hosts on average more moderate views on the issue (mean 5.8, sd.2.1) yet among the cases here studied is also the parliament hosting the most radical party elected, the UKIP which scores 9.3 in favor of assimilation. The Conservatives are also favorable to assimilation and to a similar
extent than the UMP in France, scoring 7.5 in the scale. And the majority party, the Labour has also more conservative views on the issue (even more than the Socialist party in France, and the Social Democrats in Germany) and scores 6.4 in favor of assimilation. The remaining parties in the House are either moderate supporters of multiculturalism, like the Scottish National Party (5) and the Liberal Democratic Party (4.9) or more enthusiastic supporters like the Party of Wales (PLAID, 4) and the Greens (3.4).
Figure 24. Multiculturalism Policy Position of Elected Parties per Country

Source: CHES 2006 and 2010.
Legend: Governing parties represented by white triangles. France: mean 6.2, sd. 1.8 | Germany: mean 5.2, sd. 2.9 | United Kingdom: mean 5.8, sd. 2.1
Summing up, the three national legislatures examined in this thesis have different landscapes in relation to the positions on immigration of the elected Governments and parties. In this very rich context, a crucial question is how parties’ position on the issue of immigration related to the questions asked by individual members of parliament.

Table 24 shows the number of immigration questions asked broken down by party\(^1\). In France, the Socialist party asked the largest number of questions on the issue of immigration in the whole French legislature, tabling 679 questions. They are closely followed by the UMP as the members of this party tabled 642 questions on immigration. The Left deputies asked 137 questions, and finally the deputies in the center asked only 28 questions in relation to immigration. In relative terms however, 3 percent of the questions asked by members of the Left party making it the party that gives proportionally more attention to the issue, which is also observed on the fact that on average Left deputies asked 6 questions on the issue. 2 percent of the questions asked by the deputies of the socialist party were related to immigration, which means that per deputy there is an average of 3.5 questions on the topic. Finally in the case of the UMP and the Center immigration questions represent only 1 percent of the total, of which on average 2 questions on immigration for the deputies of the former, and 1.1 for the elected representatives of the latter.

In Germany, the deputies of the Green party asked a total of 53 questions on immigration, which represents 2 percent of the total number of questions tabled during the legislative term, and an average of 1 percent of questions per deputy. The Linke has tabled the larges number of questions on immigration: a total of 95 questions, which represents the 3 percent of the questions its member asked.

\(^1\) For the analysis of France parliamentary groups have been used instead of parties because this is the only partisan data available for the French deputies.
Therefore on average the members of the Linke tabled 1.8 immigration questions. Surprisingly the Social Democrats tabled the smallest number of immigration questions, only 18. Still given that they tabled a small number of questions in general this represents 2 percent of the total number of questions they asked deriving on an average of 0.1 percent of immigration questions per deputy. Based on this evidence parliamentary questions does not seem to be a tool that the Social Democrats exploit fully, but this can be explained by the fact that they are part of the “grand coalition”. Finally the members of the FDP tabled 40 questions on immigration, which is 1 percent of the total number of questions and which locates them as the second party with the largest number of immigration questions per deputy (average of 0.7) in the Bundestag. Finally, the CDU/CSU which represents the largest party group in the Bundestag tabled a total of 50 questions, which represents 2 percent of the total questions asked like in the case of the Greens and the Social Democrats, yet in terms of the average number of immigration questions per deputy they are very low and perform only a bit better than the SPD (0.1 questions per deputy).

The House of Commons has compared to the Assembly and the Bundestag a different approach to immigration questions. First of all, the total number of questions in the House are considerably higher that in the other two legislatures. Also, the number of immigration questions is higher both in absolute and relative terms. The members of the Liberal Democrat party asked 1,068 questions on the issue of immigration. 2 percent of the total number of questions the Liberal deputies asked was on this topic, representing the highest average of questions per deputy 20.5 of the whole parties here examined. Labour deputies represent the governing party. They tabled in total 1,794 questions related to immigration issues which represent 3 percent of the total questions they asked (and the highest percentage in the House) yet on average Labour deputies asked only 5.8 questions, that is the smallest number in the House. This evidence signals that in
relative terms immigration issues are important for the party yet as it is the incumbent party the overall number of questions is smaller than for the opposition parties. Finally, the conservatives tabled the largest number of immigration questions (n=3,103), which represents as for the liberals 2 percent of the total questions they asked and an average of 15.9 questions per deputy of that party.

To conclude, the descriptive statistics are quite revelatory. In France left deputies give proportionally more attention to immigration questions than center and right deputies, which sheds light on the existence of a Left-Right divide. In Germany this division also exists, yet the role of representation belongs more to the Linke and Green parties, as the Social Democrats are the ones giving less attention to the issue. Lastly, in the United Kingdom all parties are very active at asking questions on immigration.
Table 24. Number and Share of Immigration Questions by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. Questions</th>
<th>Immigration Questions</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No. MPS</th>
<th>Average Deputy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>4587</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>29976</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>4441</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>56856</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Grüne</td>
<td>2781</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linke</td>
<td>2889</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>4038</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>LibDem</td>
<td>48718</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>65569</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>145512</td>
<td>3103</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Parliamentary questions are a mean for holding governments accountable (Wiberg 1995). Therefore in this context an important question is whether the fact of being in government or in the opposition has a major effect on how many questions deputies ask on immigration. Table 25 presents the questions asked by majority and opposition members. The behavior of both majority and opposition members of parliaments reveal similarities and differences across parliaments. Following the logic of government control, deputies from governing parties ask fewer questions on immigration than opposition parties. In France deputies of the UMP asked 642 questions and deputies from the opposition 844. In Germany deputies from the grand coalition asked in total 68 immigration questions whereas the deputies of the opposition asked a total of 188 questions. Finally, in the United Kingdom the Labour deputies who are members of the majority party asked in total 1,794 questions while the opposition deputies asked 4,171 questions. In relative terms however there are in France deputies of the opposition asked larger shares of immigration questions than majority deputies (2.1 and 1 percent), yet in Germany and the United Kingdom the logic reverses. 1.9 percent of the questions asked by the opposition and 2.3 percent of the questions asked by the members of the majority raised concerns about immigration in the Bundestag. While in the House of Commons, 2.1 of the questions tabled by the members of the opposition were concerned about immigration matters while 3 percent of the questions of the majority were on these questions.
To conclude, differences between left, center and right wing parties in terms of the number and percentages of questions on immigration they ask are observed across national legislatures. However, what appears as a common trait is a correlation between parties’ position on multicultural policies and the relevance of the issue for its members. Overall, the more the party favors multiculturalism (left parties in France, the Greens and the Linke in Germany and the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom) the more its members ask questions related to immigration. Finally, the role of control that parliamentary questions can play is observed in the three parliaments. Opposition deputies ask in absolute terms more questions on immigration than deputies of governing parties. Yet in relative terms immigration has been of a greater concern for the opposition only in France. And one possible explanation for this is the side in which the major center-left is located: the Socialists are in France in the opposition, yet the Social Democrats in France and the Labour party in the United Kingdom are governing parties. Thus all these findings lead us to seek for further examination of what other factors influence the treatment of immigration issues.
6.3.5 Immigrant Deputies

A major question in the study of immigrants’ representation is about the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The rationale is that deputies’ personal experiences of migration, integration, xenophobia leads them to have a greater concern about the situations experienced by immigrant residents in the country. Figure 25 shows the average number of immigration questions asked by both immigrant and native deputies in every national legislature. At a first glance we observe a similar trend across national legislatures: the average number of questions on immigration asked by immigrant deputies is higher than the average number of immigration questions asked by national deputies. In France, immigrant representatives ask on average 3.6 questions on immigration, while French deputies ask only 2.6. In Germany elected immigrants to the Bundestag asked an average of 2.3 immigration questions, while German deputies asked an average of only 0.2 questions on the issue. Finally, in the United Kingdom immigrant deputies also outperform British deputies in terms of the number of immigration questions they ask (19.4 and 10.3 respectively).
Generally speaking these findings point in the direction of a close relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of immigrants in European democracies.
6.3.6 Constituencies, Parties or Immigrant Deputies

So far I have examined the extent to which the share of immigrants in the electoral constituencies, political parties and immigrant affect individually immigrants’ descriptive representation. Looking at the above presented evidence we observe that immigration-related parliamentary questioning is related to larger immigrant populations (except in Germany), to members of parties that favor multicultural policies and to members of the legislature that have an immigrant background.

A question that emerges in this context is whether these three factors are equally important, and whether similarities are observed across countries. Therefore I proceed to analyze the extent to which these factors influence immigrants’ representation in national legislatures. Table 26 presents the results of a binomial regression examining the number of questions tabled by the members of the French National Assembly and the British House of Commons. The main independent variables included are the share of immigrants in the constituency, the position of the deputy’s party on multicultural policies, and a dummy variable indicating whether the deputy has a migratory background (1=yes, 0=no). Additionally, whether MPs are in the opposition or not and the total number of questions they ask are also relevant, so I have included these control variables. The dependent variable is the number of immigration questions, which is an over-dispersed count variable because the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. Therefore, a series of negative binomial regressions were fitted to the country cases, regressing the number of immigration-related questions asked by individual MPs in the national legislatures on the independent and control

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82 Germany has been excluded from this analysis due to the very small number of questions tabled in the Bundestag.
variables specified above. Two separate models have been run for France and the United Kingdom to account for cross-country variations.

The results presented in Table 26 show further specify immigrants’ representation in national legislatures. The first analysis examines the effects of the independent variables on immigration-related parliamentary questions in the French National Assembly. The share of immigrants in the constituency has a positive and highly significant effect (p<.001) on immigration-related parliamentary questioning, party policy position has a positive yet not significant effect on the number of questions tabled and the impact of the dummy variable background is in the expected direction because immigrant deputies also ask more questions that national deputies, yet this relationship is not significant. In terms of the effects of the control variables we observe that opposition party membership and the total number of questions asked (all topics combined) have a significant effect on the number of immigration questions (p<.001).

The second analysis examines immigration-related parliamentary questioning in the British House of Commons. The evidence shows that the share of immigrant-origin residents in the constituencies influences the number of immigration questions asked in the House, and the effect of socio-demographic composition on the number of immigration questions deputies ask is significant (p<.001). The position of parties on the issue is unlike in France negative, yet like in France it is not significant. This means that the number of questions tabled by a deputy increases when its party moves towards more assimilation policies. Regarding the dummy variable background, a change from cero to one, meaning that the members of the House has a migratory background, has an effect on the number of immigration questions, yet again the effect is not significant. Finally the fact of being a member of an opposition party and the total number of questions asked
during the legislative period have a significant effect on the total number of immigration questions.

Table 26. Negative Binomial Regression for the Number of Immigration Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituency (% Immigrants)</td>
<td>.084 (.01)***</td>
<td>.031 (.0066)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party policy position</td>
<td>-.013 (.08)</td>
<td>.100 (.0907)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Deputy (dummy)</td>
<td>.551 (.27)</td>
<td>.309 (.3620)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the Opposition (dummy)</td>
<td>.635 (.200)***</td>
<td>.814 (.1515)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No WQs</td>
<td>.003 (.000)***</td>
<td>.002 (.0002)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.806 (.677)</td>
<td>-.342 (.6075)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cells contain coefficients from a negative binomial regression model with standard errors in parentheses
*p≤.05, ** p≤.01, ***p≤.001

In essence the analyses reveal that deputies represent immigrants when these are numerous and concentrated, confirming the expectations presented earlier in this Chapter (H9) that deputies elected in ethnically diverse constituencies represent to a larger extent immigrants in national legislatures than deputies elected in “white” constituencies. Besides, the analyses do not support the expectations that parties’ position on immigration will influence the questions on immigration that deputies ask. Indeed two important facts have to be highlighted on this regard. The first one is that the effects of partisanship on immigration-related parliamentary questioning are very low. The second one is that when including all the relevant variables party policy position shows across legislatures opposing effects. While in France, deputies from parties that are closer to multiculturalism (that is closer to 0) tend to ask more questions on immigration, in the United Kingdom is the opposite: more questions are asked by members of parties that oppose

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83 The French overseas departments and territories and the Scottish constituencies have been excluded from the analyses. France includes questions asked between June 2007 and March 2011.
multiculturalism (closer to 10). As a result, we are not able to provide evidence for Hypothesis 10, which suggested a correlation between party policy position and the number of immigration questions. Finally, the analyses do not provide enough empirical foundations to establish a relationship between descriptive representations (Hypothesis 11). To put it in another way, while accounting by the effects of other factors on substantive representation, the evidence presented here doesn’t support the assumption that immigrant deputies are more likely than native deputies to represent the immigrant electorate. All things considered, we also show that deputies in the opposition and active deputies (on all topics confounded) do a great job in putting the issue of immigration on the political debate by asking numerous questions about immigration, citizenship and immigrants’ integration. So to answer the main question of this section we can conclude that it is the presence of immigrants in the electoral constituencies, which has the largest effect on their representation in national legislatures.
6.4 Conclusion and Discussion

Chapter 6 investigates the substantive representation of immigrants in national legislatures. Grounding on existent literature this study investigates in particular how the socio-demographic composition of the electoral constituencies in which deputies were elected, the policy position of the parties that deputies represent, and migratory background influence the extent to which immigration issues were among the concerns of national deputies.

The analysis of substantive representation relies on the examination of the written parliamentary questions tabled by individual deputies in their respective legislatures. Parliamentary question are a very useful tool to examine deputies’ individual policy preferences and concerns. In the context of this study substantive representation is measured in terms of the number of times a deputy ask a question that is related to immigration, citizenship or integration. And I assume that representation increases when more questions are asked. In this study I examine French National Assembly elected in 2007, the German Bundestag elected in 2005 and the British House of Commons elected in 20005. The selection of cases is based on a number of common criteria that the cases share, and has been performed to facilitate our understanding of commonalities as well of differences across European democracies.

The analyses of parliamentary questions reveal that across parliaments the share of immigrants residing in an electoral constituency (which is a surrogate measure of constituency interests) significantly affects the number of immigration-related parliamentary questions asked by the deputies elected in these constituencies providing with evidence to support H9. In this framework, deputies’ responsiveness to their constituencies makes sense as they are elected in and by the
constituencies (single-member constituency system) and high priority to constituency concerns can have a return in personal votes (Cain et al. 1987; Blais et al. 2003). Besides, traditionally, the role of parties has been shown to explain to a great extent legislative representation across European legislatures (Owens 2003, Størm and Nyblade 2007). Nonetheless in the context of immigrants’ representation parties are less influential than it is assumed which presents a disagreement with the expectations formulated in H10. Lastly, immigrant deputies are active in asking immigration questions and they do so to a greater extent than native deputies. However when other factors are considered (like the constituency in which she was elected, the party she is member of etc.) the effects of having a personal history of migration has a smaller effect on the extent to which immigration issues are a concern for these deputies, challenging the expectations of H11. Finally, factors such as being a deputy of an opposition party and being active on other topics also increases the extent to which a deputy will voice questions that are of concerns for the immigrant populations living in these countries.

To conclude the findings presented in this Chapter are in line with Saalfeld (2011) and Soroka et al. (2009) as they indicate the existence of dyadic relationship between immigrant voters and their representatives, and raises questions about the relationships between (1) party policy position and deputies’ issue representation and (2) the descriptive and substantive representation of immigrants in national legislatures, which need future examination.
7. Conclusion and Discussion

This doctoral dissertation is an empirical study of the political incorporation, participation and representation of immigrants in European democracies. While international migration is gaining in scope and complexity, not only in Europe but worldwide, I hoped to shed more light on the underlying processes and implications of this phenomenon for electoral democracies. In order to do so, I examined the process of immigrants’ political incorporation. Following Easton (1957) I examined the input of immigrants’ interests and demands, the support they receive from the immigrant and national electorates and political parties, and their impact on political representation.

This last section highlights the main findings of this study. It discusses in particular the observed effects immigration and ethnic diversity has on turnout, voting, parties and representation. Finally it summarizes the main contributions of this dissertation and reviews the limitations of the studies presented here and how these topics can be addressed in the future.

7.1 Main Findings

Chapter 2 “Setting the Context: Multicultural Democracies”: European countries are experiencing mass immigration to unknown levels and migratory inflows are becoming the main source of demographic change in these societies. Population predictions forecast that in the next decades first and second generation migrants will count for one third of the total European population.
Immigrants are in their majority workers and face several challenges including greater levels of unemployment, deskilling and discrimination. These socio-demographic transformations have considerable implications for electoral democracies. One of the most important ones is that immigrants tend to concentrate in specific cities and areas, which in combination to the liberalization of citizenship policies and the extension of voting rights contribute to formation of an immigrant electorate. As a result in some electoral constituencies the fortune of electoral candidates and political parties depends to a great extent on the support of immigrant voters. In essence, in the same way that immigration is transforming the landscape of European societies it is the drive of major transformation at the heart of electoral democracies.

**Chapter 3 “The Immigrant Voter”:** The comparative study of the voting behavior of immigrant voters sheds light on the fact that in general immigrants register lower turnout than native voters. The fact that similar participation patterns are observed across groups and contexts suggests that many immigrants feel alienated from the democratic system where they live. Electoral studies explain this by the fact that most migrants are workers and workers tend to participate less than other social classes. Yet, immigration-centered approaches also point out that immigrants are also less integrated because they usually go through a couple of years in which they are not allowed to vote, they have limited political knowledge and feel they have little or not impact on the political system. Besides, immigrant groups show different voting preferences. At first glance immigrant voters seem to be strong supporters of left and center left parties yet the evidence doesn’t support the ethnic cleavage hypothesis. Instead, the findings suggest the existence of interaction between ethnic groups specificities and party systems.
Chapter 4 “Issue Evolution and Political Parties”: The examination of the evolution multiculturalism across parties and party systems shows that the saliency of the issue is related to international migration. As a result when immigration increased the issue became more and more salient. One of the key findings of this empirical study is that against what is commonly believed the saliency of the issue is not exclusively the result of an anti-immigration agenda. Instead, till the 1990s the politicization of the issue across European democracies resulted mainly from positive mentions of multiculturalism, even among nationalist parties. Yet in the last decades parties have turned against multiculturalism. And several situations including terrorism, civil unrest, and political conflicts are associated with this twist in the politics of immigration. Finally the cross-country analysis shows that in most party systems the issue is gaining in saliency yet it is only in countries where anti-immigration parties are present that parties are more polarized on the issue and opposition to multiculturalism is stronger.

Chapter 5 “Descriptive Representation”: As for the study of descriptive representation the findings show that the characteristics of electoral systems influence to a certain extent the representation of immigrants in national legislatures. In fact, while proportional systems tend to facilitate the descriptive representation of under-represented groups in the case of immigrants it is not exactly the case. Instead, the evidence suggests that the presence of immigrant representatives results from the combination of factors: the capacity of immigrants to pursue a political career, the openness of political parties in the candidate nomination process, and the ability of immigrant candidates to mobilize the (immigrant) electorate in the constituency where they run. First, parties of the left, in particular Socialists and Greens, and are more likely to nominate immigrant candidates than center and right wing parties. Second, immigrants tend to be nominated and elected in constituencies with higher concentrations of immigrant
voters. Third, the pool of candidates among the immigrant populations is not very big partially as a result of the additional cultural and socio-economic barriers to integration that immigrants face. In consequence, those immigrant candidates that make it into national legislatures excel their national counterparts in areas like education and experience. Finally, the role that these factors for immigrants’ representation depends to a great extent on the context. In France and Germany political parties appear as the main driving forces behind the election of immigrant candidates. While in the United Kingdom immigrant constituencies are the keys in the election of immigrant deputies.

Chapter 6 “Substantive Representation”: The question of whether descriptive representation enhances substantive representation is a great concern in political research. Therefore in the last empirical study of this dissertation I have examined immigration-related parliamentary questions in the legislatures of France, Germany and United Kingdom. The empirical evidence sheds light on interesting facts. First of all, the focus on the issue of immigration is a fertile ground to examine how well immigrants are represented in policy making. Although both immigrant and native voters hold similar opinions across most policy areas because they are related to other socio-demographic variables like gender, education or income; ethnic background defines citizens’ opinions on immigration policies. In general terms, immigrants are more positive about immigration while natives are more negative about it. The representation of immigration concerns in national parliaments is the result of the interplay of key political actors. Deputies elected in immigrant constituencies, those that are members of parties having more favorable views towards multiculturalism, and deputies having a migratory background ask on average more questions about immigration than other elected representatives in national legislatures. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence in France and the United Kingdom shows that immigrants’ substantive representation depends to a vast extent on whether
immigrants are concentrated and visible within the electoral constituencies. As a matter of fact immigrants’ substantive representation increases considerably when immigrants represent big shares of the electorate because deputies are more responsive to them.

To conclude, the findings presented in this dissertation have potentially important implications for the study of electoral democracies in the age of migration since they suggest that migratory inflows and immigrant voters might matter more than previously thought.

### 7.2 Limitations

The findings presented in this dissertation should be considered with care. As I have highlighted all through the numerous clarifications and comments in this manuscript the questions examined here presented several challenges. To start with, the study of immigrants and immigrations in Europe poses the difficult task of identifying those individuals. First and second generation migrants are counted differently in population statistics, they register lower responses rates and are under-represented in most representative surveys, they change names, not to mention some of the issues related to their legal status, which make them invisible or appear underrepresented in some statistics. Therefore to a great extent immigrants are marginalized and difficult-to-reach populations. As a result of these facts, all the empirical analyses I have presented should be handled with care. Although I have always tried to use the best available data sometimes due to the lack of the adequate data many of the measurements are based on proxies or may have biases.

In its vast majority, studies on political behavior are based on representative samples of the population examined. However, as this data is not available for all
the countries examined here - at least to my knowledge - many of the findings are based on very small number of observations. Being aware of the implications of breaking so many rules at once I have opted however to proceed with the study in the aim of providing with some hints that advance our understanding about the immigrant electorate. Therefore, these findings are not to be considered as conclusive but rather as some evidence that requires further examination.

Equally important it is to be aware that the examination of immigrants’ descriptive and substantive representation in national legislatures has been conditional to my capabilities to gather data on the origin of the elected deputies. Therefore, although I have deployed many efforts to this endeavor, and I have made use of data collected by other teams, it is plausible that we are in the presence of false negatives; this means that I have treated some deputies of immigrant origin as native. Gathering personal data on citizenship and the place of birth and citizenship of the parents has proven to be a very difficult task.

Finally, I have tried to maintain as much as possible the comparative scope of this study and therefore did my best to include in every study as many cases as I could. Yet many parts of the empirical studies rely on few cases and/or cover a very limited time span, therefore the generalization of the findings should be limited to the cases here presented.

### 7.3 Future Research

While the study of multicultural democracies, immigrant voters, multiculturalism and party systems, and descriptive and substantive representation presented in this dissertation has made some substantial findings, these pave the way for the directions of future research. All the way through the whole study I have provided with evidence that shows that immigrants and immigrations are fueling socio-
political changes in European democracies, and made the point that these phenomena require further and deeper examination. In the following, I will summarize and discuss some of the aspects that demand further investigation.

**The Immigrant Electorate:** The study of the political participation and party choice of immigrant voters found evidence that the country of origin and the characteristics of immigrant group may have and impact on electoral behavior. This finding is in line with the conclusions reached by other authors who have in single-case studies shown the importance of group-specific effects (Heath et al. 2011, Brouard and Tiberj 2005). Therefore, future research should consider the impact of the country (or region) of origin on immigrants’ political behavior. This approach could facilitate the comparison of immigrant groups within a given context and shed light on how these relate to the institutions and political actors of the hosting country highlighting the inter-group commonalities and differences. In addition, similar groups should be observed across countries to understand how group-specific characteristics (like the Southeast Asians that register across countries lower turnout) travel across contexts. And vice-versa, it would be possible to better observe how specific features of given democracies foster or hamper the political integration, participation and representation of immigrant groups. There are studies demonstrating inter-group and contextual differences (for example Bloemraad 2006). Thus further examining the role of these factors in European democracies may be of great scientific value.

**Political Parties:** With regard to the examination of political parties and party families, the findings have shown that negative framings of multiculturalism are rather a new phenomenon. Taking this into account it is important to further understand the mechanisms behind the major change observed on the positions of parties and party systems on this policy domain. Future research should unpack this policy domain into immigration, citizenship and integration in order to be
able to elucidate the underlying dynamics of party policy positioning. In fact, when the issue of immigration is unpacked into different policy areas it is possible to better understand the real implications of the positions adopted. For example, right parties can favor immigration to fulfill the needs of the labor market, just as the UMP in France promoted selective high-skilled migration. Equally, left parties can promote the integration of immigrants but advocating the regulation of the number of newcomers (see for example Money 1999, Banting et al. 2006:57). Therefore political research has potentially a lot to gain from the separated analysis of political parties’ positions on these policy domains.

**Descriptive Representation:** In the study of immigrants’ descriptive representation an interesting observation is the fact that electoral systems are less related to how well immigrants are represented in national legislatures than expected. While the literature suggests women are better represented in proportional systems than in majoritarian systems, immigrants are not. This finding challenges many assumptions in the field, and therefore needs closer examination. Besides, upcoming research should seek to better incorporate the variable immigrant constituency in the examination of representation. This is in line with the claims of some researchers that the immigrant populations should be accounted for (Bloemraad 2013, Forest 2012) which are based on the observation that the size and concentration of the immigrant population are an important factor explaining representation (Bird 2005). Therefore a more elaborated measurement of descriptive representations in single member constituencies should include the size of the immigrant population into the equation.

**Substantive Representation:** Finally, the findings derived from the examination of substantive representation reveal that parties have little or no effect on immigration-related parliamentary questioning. This finding can be partially explained by the nature of written parliamentary questioning which is an
instrument that gives a lot of freedom to individual deputies. Therefore future research should examine immigrants' representation by looking at other parliamentary activities such as roll call voting and speeches. Only a truly multidimensional approach to representation can reveal the extent to which immigrants are represented in the national legislatures of multicultural democracies.
8. References

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282


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## 9. Appendix

Table 27. Glossary: Parliamentary Questions Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root</th>
<th>Concepts (EN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asyl</td>
<td>Asylum, Asylum seeker, Asylum seekers, Asylum policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deportation</td>
<td>Deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>Detention center, Detention camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Ethnic minorities, Ethnic background, Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Exclusion, Social exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Family-based immigration program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigner</td>
<td>Foreigner, Foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td>Illegal Immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigr</td>
<td>Immigrant, Immigrants, Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Integration, Integration policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>Irregular migrant, Irregular migrants, Irregular Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migr</td>
<td>Migrant, Migrant, Migratory Flow, Migratory Background, Migration Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicult</td>
<td>Multicultural, Multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permit</td>
<td>Residency permit, Working permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee, Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>Residency permit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romani People</td>
<td>Romani People</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Undocumented Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa</td>
<td>Visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenoph</td>
<td>Xenophobic, Xenophobia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Declaration of Originality

Unless otherwise indicated in the text or references, or acknowledged above, this thesis is entirely the product of my own scholarly work. Any inaccuracies of fact or faults in reasoning are my own and accordingly I take full responsibility.

This thesis has not been submitted either in whole or part, for a degree at this or any other university or institution. This is to certify that the printed version is equivalent to the submitted electronic one.

Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca