We propose a model of research and development as a process of experimentation in which researchers repeatedly revise specifications of a project and
update their beliefs about the project’s type. Only a good project whose type is learned by researchers can generate value. Researchers abandon a project when
the opportunity costs of continuing exceed the expected benefits. We estimate
the structural parameters of this dynamic optimization problem using a novel
data set with information on both successful and abandoned projects from the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), an organization that creates and maintains standards necessary for the functioning of the internet. The structural approach allows us to recover researchers’ unobserved beliefs and opportunity costs, and answer questions about whether specific rules and institutions encourage “efficient abandonment” of ongoing projects. We find that opportunity costs
are decreasing over time, and feedback and comments from the IETF community at large increase the speed at which developers learn whether a project is worth
pursuing.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
Suche Autoren in